Calibán
Latin American Journal of Psychoanalysis
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Editorial

Habeas corpus

Beyond its legal resonances, which link it to the attempt to preserve the rights to life, to freedom, and to be heard by the legal system, the Latin expression habeas corpus means something like, “You may have the body.” It seems self-evident, but perhaps it is not. It is obvious that the person who lies on a couch is placing his or her body there. Psychoanalysis emerged precisely because someone decided to hear what that body – the body of hysteria, to be more specific – had to say. Contrary to what we might think, while at times our presence would seem to be reduced to a voice outside the patient’s field of vision, psychoanalysts also have a body. We may find different types of psychoanalysts depending on how they relate to their patients’ bodies – from the precursor of the discipline, Charcot, who would touch patients’ hysterogenic zones to trigger cloned attacks, to contemporary analysts, who barely touch their patients’ bodies when they greet them.

If psychoanalysis is somehow defined in relation to the body, this definition is based on an exclusion. In the consulting room we talk about and listen to the body, but we do not manipulate, caress, or explore it through a physical exam, even if anxiety occurs in the body and an accurate interpretation will touch it; even if the listener may feel a sudden sense of physical exhaustion after hearing certain discourses or is overcome by emotions that affect the body. The relative exclusion of the body from our practice does nothing but emphasize it, as it emphasizes sexuality, which is also part of the body. We do nothing but talk about it.

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We can think of different ways in which psychoanalysts relate to the body. The possibilities range from those who read hieroglyphs encrypted in their patients’ bodies, to those who decipher bodies resembling Bradbury’s “The Illustrated Man,” to those who, like forensic anthropologists, identify remains, exhume them, and restore lost identities. Talking about the body also involves exploring how it infiltrates many fields of knowledge. Language sheds light on this process. Nothing seems to escape its nominalizing ambition: medical corps, corpus delicti, the body of the nation, celestial bodies, hand to hand (cuerpo a cuerpo), the body of Christ, anatomical body, own body or foreign body; there are even two-body and three-body problems in physics.1 Whether we are speaking of typography or architecture, corporations or medicine, chemistry or religion, we need the notion of body.

Only some of these dimensions will be explored in this issue of Calibán. First, in the Arguments section, readers will find doctrinal texts written by Latin American analysts, among them, the articles that received Fepal awards this year. Second, in the Dossier we study the body from perspectives as heterogeneous as those of anthropology, choreography, and urban planning. The city, the territory where psychoanalysis is practiced, also has a body, and outside that body, Outside the Walls, things take place. In this section we present a moving account of what happens when psychoanalysis leaves the consulting room. I am referring to an event organized in São Paulo by the director of Fepal’s Community and Culture Bureau. The event had a suggestive title: Open-Air Psychoanalysis.

Two other sections, Classic & Modern and From Memory, also situate themselves outside the walls (of Fepal and the IPA) in this issue, with biographical notes on Silvia Bleichmar and Oscar Masotta. These two thinkers, who were generous in their transmission of knowledge, are unavoidable references for Latin American psychoanalysts, along with many other authors on this side of the walls. The inclusion of freethinkers, regardless of their institutional affiliation, is an enactment of the freethinking spirit of both Calibán and the institution it represents.

Issue after issue, we keep chronicling Latin America’s Invisible Cities. This time we have chosen Lima as a way of welcoming Fepal’s new administration.

In Arguments as well as in Vortex, where we suggest discussing psychoanalytic supervision, we publish not only contributions by renowned Latin American analysts, but also texts by analysts in training. We are particularly pleased to broadcast the ideas of practitioners who are training at our institutes or who have just graduated, and we have also incorporated them into the journal’s staff.

In Textual we offer an excerpt of a dialogue maintained with the Mexican writer Mario Bellatin for over a month. The conversation revolved largely around the body and psychoanalysis. In focusing on his ideas, we did not intend to consider him or his work as a case study. Since Bellatin has spent a good amount of time on the couch (has even resisted controversial experiences and would still like to try again), his comments give us an opportunity to listen and think while suspending our certainties and our theoretical tools.

In The Stranger we published “The body as evidence,” an endearing essay by a

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1. Some of these expressions do not translate properly into English. In one case, cuerpo a cuerpo, whose literal meaning is “body to body,” I gave the English equivalent and left the Spanish in parenthesis, and in another case I chose a different example that also uses the word “body.” (T. N.)
forensic anthropologist. This essay was not conceived at a university desk but in a ditch (one of the ditches that are dug around the world to disinter massacred and hidden bones) or in the morgue where these bones are identified. The author, thus, brings us a first-hand account of a different dimension of the body – the bodies that did not appear even when an habeas corpus was filed.

**Calibán’s body**

Anyone who is reading these lines with the journal in his or her hands doubtlessly knows that like high-quality wines, it has body; it has volume and weight; its pages have a specific texture and thickness that differ from those of its covers, which fold out. Reading a text on paper is not the same as reading it on the liquid crystal of the screen, just as hearing a voice on the phone is not the same as hearing a person who is speaking in front of us and an epistolary romance or online sex is not the same as its in-person counterpart. Like all bodies, this journal is a promise of shared pleasure. At *Calibán* we try to make of every issue a body that people will want to caress, a body that will make our minds more permeable to the ideas it harbors. We attempt to restore to the act of reading the eroticism that floods analytic consulting rooms, where all we speak about is love. To this end, we rely on the work of artists, who are not mere illustrators but the outpost of our exploration. Tatiana Parcero and Eduardo Stupia have left their mark on this issue, along with our usual traveling companions, Daniel Villani and Lucas di Pascuale.

As in every trade, in every discipline, complacent discourses abound in psychoanalysis. Every analyst tends to see himself or herself refracted by his or her ideal, and while psychoanalysis gives us tools to understand and modulate this phenomenon, the latter has consequences for practitioners, their institutions, and their publications. As editors, we aim to produce a journal that will be better than ourselves, not only in the usual sense, already commonplace (albeit true), which is based on the acknowledgement that a group that can create synergies will produce something better than the sum of its parts. In *Calibán* we yearn for something more; we wish to produce a journal that will not reflect, in a self-fulfilling (auto-erotic, if you will, or rather narcissistic) way, the institution that funds it and provides content for it – the Latin American Psychoanalytic Federation.

As it is an official publication, the temptation of turning it into a newsletter or a mouthpiece for the institution’s views is high. At the same time, the extreme diversity of the societies that contribute to it and the coordinates of its birth make it possible for *Calibán* to choose a different editorial policy, a policy that brings together tradition and invention to create something better than we. “Better than we” means producing a journal that is more connected with the desire of what is to come than with the satisfaction of what has already been done, more interested in making up a future than in showing the rewards of the past. “Better than we,” then, means that *Calibán* speaks more of our desires than of our ideals.

Discussing the body certainly means discussing the sexed body, but it also means discussing the aging body, the perishable body. Everything we do, including this journal, is a race against death. It is impossible to talk about the body without seeing in the horizon the end that haunts us and gives retroactive meaning to our actions. We were closing this issue when we were surprised by two deaths – that of Horacio Etchegoyen, first Latin American president of the IPA and a beloved figure...
for many of us, and that of Abbas Kiarostami, the great Iranian filmmaker, who was an enthusiast of psychoanalysis. In fact, Kiarostami’s death occurred in the midst of a dialogue with him at the doors of a hospital checkup, a checkup that, while conceived as a routine exam, was a sign of the approaching end.

The existence of this eighth issue of *Calibán* is a battle won against death. There are few publications that succeed in crossing the mined territory of the first issues, and *Calibán* has had to face more than a few obstacles. Microscopic battles are waged in the editorial world that are tied to the ways in which we understand, and aim to reflect on, our discipline, and our goals are clear. This journal is open to all possible modes of pondering psychoanalysis and permeable to manifold formats. It engages in a dialogue with culture and science, and is written in a contemporary, dynamic language.

This program, supported by the editorial team, has doubtlessly encountered conflicting interests; imaginary rivalries among publications, societies, or even countries; bureaucratic inertia; and the pettiness and doublespeak of some, not to mention our own difficulties and limitations. Yet we also rely on the courage and imagination of quite a few; the unconditional support of key figures in Latin American psychoanalysis and institutional politics; the enthusiasm of an increasing number of readers; the contributions of authors, artists, and interviewees; and editorial team members who are learning from experience and setting more and more ambitious goals for themselves. There are no guarantees, of course. Bodies die. And this is a reason why we aim to leave marks of our enthusiasm while we are alive. *Calibán* is one of them.

Kiarostami, very close to Freud on this issue, stated as follows in the interview that would have been published in our journal but was never finished: “You know, I’m a very conservative person in many ways, but when it comes to film, poetry, or photography, I’m ruthless! I become an adventurer, and I want to experience new things, sometimes against the advice of common sense.” The Iranian director told us of his fascination with psychoanalysis. He said he had always sought to be in contact with analysts, and even that his idea of making a movie where the protagonist was a psychoanalyst was an original pretext to get still closer to it... Laughing loudly, he added, “And finally not making it, and changing the narrative to eliminate the psychoanalyst was probably resistance on my part.”

Speaking about that movie, which ought to have had a psychoanalyst as the protagonist, Kiarostami suggested a definition of his task as director: “If someone asked me what I had done as film director, I would answer, ‘Nothing, but if I didn't exist, the movie wouldn't exist either’.” This description perfectly suits the psychoanalyst’s work, and also our work as editors. We share Kiarostami’s ruthless, adventurous spirit, so close to Freud’s and to his plea for a criminal behavior.

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2. In his letter to Pfister of June 5, 1910 Freud suggests that analysts “would have to be unscrupulous, give away, betray, behave like an artist who buys paints with his wife’s house-keeping money or uses the furniture as firewood to warm the studio for his model. Without a trace of that kind of unscrupulousness the job cannot be done” (Meng, H. and Freud, E.L., eds. *Psychoanalysis and Faith: The Letters of Sigmund Freud.* Translated by Erig Mosbacher. New York: Basic Books, 1963, p. 38).

Cartography of this sky

While I was writing this editorial, besides receiving sad news about death, I had the chance to watch a movie. I learned about this documentary (that’s what it was) through my friend Raya Zonana, who is Bulgarian and lives in Brazil. It has a beautiful title, *Nostalgia de la luz* [Nostalgia for the Light], and was filmed in the Atacama Desert by a Chilean director, Patricio Guzmán. We are used to this type of traffic in the slashed body of Latin America, and in *Calibán* as well, as when we reached out to Tatiana Parcero, the artist who illustrated the cover of this issue. She was born in Mexico and lives in Buenos Aires, and we contacted her through a Guatemalan friend. Sometimes we need distance to appreciate what is next to us, as when the enthusiasm of an Italian reader, Stefano Bolognini, led us to decide to produce an English version of our journal.

In his film, director Patricio Guzmán draws a parallel between the stars and the bodies of the Chilean disappeared. These bodies were buried in mass graves in the desert, and later disinterred by excavators and, perhaps, thrown into the sea. The movie displays a metaphor for memory by showing that the calcium in the bone fragments fallen from the excavators is the same calcium making up the stars. We are made of the same matter as stars. The mothers who continue searching the Atacama Desert, who are trying to put a name to the body of their disappeared children, to bury at least a fragment of their bones are probing, despite themselves, into the unknown, the unknown or what is impossible to know – that area of research where analysts, archeologists, astronomers, and forensic anthropologists dwell. That is why this journal, focused on bodies in this issue, will inquire into the unknown in the next.

Thus, we continue to implement an editorial program that would seem to have something of a retroactive consistency. Meeting places where analysts gather to ponder certain topics – Tradition & Invention, Reality & Fiction, The Body, The Analyst’s Tools, or Intimacy – alternate with other meeting places where we suggest our own topics: Time, Excess, Margins, The Unknown. This is our way of tracing the map of the psychoanalytic sky, a sky that shelters us all but takes a singular shape over the deserts, mountains, jungles, and shores of Latin America. The series of the first ten numbers of *Calibán* can be read as a particular cartography. Of course, it is not the only possible one. Luckily, the sky can accommodate more than one map. Along with my traveling companions, Laura Verissimo, Raya Zonana, Andrea Escobar

Altare, Lucia Palazzo, and a team of enthusiastic contributors who devote themselves to their task body and soul, with each issue of the journal we try to go a little farther in this journey – to weather sand storms and modify the desert.

Mariano Horenstein

Editor in Chief, *Calibán - RLP*
Arguments
Adolescence: Reflections on the group, fetishism, and the body in adolescence
In this paper I aim to reflect on problems related to the psychopathology and theory of the unstable adolescent group. From a positive point of view, my goal is to provide a sample of cases that support these reflections. Since very early on, when Freud studied how groups operated in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), he saw regression as their main organizing feature. I would like to acknowledge the value of this idea, which was somewhat overshadowed by other significant theoretical contributions for a reason I will explain shortly. That mythical text argued that the ego of group members operates under the influence of primary processes, among them, tribal aspects, which were clearly described in Freud’s anthropological myth *Totem and Taboo* (Freud, 1912-1913).

An heir to the positivist inquiry, Freud was a master at formulating laws. In these texts, while he engages in a dialogue with several authors, he strikingly overlooks the work of peers such as Durkheim,¹ who had established the laws of the sociological method, and the leading figure of positivism, Auguste Comte. Both authors were on the track of many of the problems raised by Freud. I have thoroughly searched in the biography, letters, and writings of the father of our discipline and have found no allusion to a topic that, in my view, merits further investigation. I am referring to fetishism, which was studied by Comte and has been brought back to the fore by contemporary authors (Canguilhem, 1968/2009). Freud certainly examined this notion, but not in the sense of an articulation between a group and its origin, which is what I would like to discuss here.

The positivist maxim advanced by Comte in his *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830-1842) was that humanity had gone through the theological and metaphysical states and was now developing a new state, the positive state. One of the major features of this state of knowledge is the rejection of origin.² In a brilliant style that respects the scientific inquiries of his time, Freud substitutes myth for this theological question, a move that represents a qualitative leap with regard to the model of positivist law. Regression, myth, theology, and fetishism refer to the same

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¹ Buenos Aires Psychoanalytic Association (APdeBA)

1. Durkheim advances a central law for the method he propounds: sociologists must study things rather than ideas. They must suspend concepts and deal only with facts. It is interesting to highlight this law here, for I am working between the thing and its representation. In his analysis of fetishism, Freud views myth as the ultimate thing. As part of this paper’s goal, I situate myself beyond myth.

2. One of the main features of positivism is its rejection of the question about origin. Comte affirms such rejection in his *Cours de philosophie positive* (1842) because this question refers to pre-positive problems, that is, to theology or metaphysics: “In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the coituses of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws, that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance” (Comte, 2000, p. 28). At the same time, in our practice we often observe the recurrence of psychotic delirium related to the question of origin and identity and, of course, the reference to God or his opposite.
problem in relation to origin, and in Freud’s work, to be more precise, in relation to origin, the group, the leader, and the Law.

The Freudian crowd, which at some point ceases to be a group,3 organizes around a leader who vitalizes magical thinking, reestablishes the heroicness of group members, and creates an illusion (hypnosis), a dissolution of individuals’ egos that is compensated by a primary group ideal that functions as ego ideal. If the ego of positivist thinking is governed by reason, the ego of the crowd is governed by theology and its precursor – fetishism, according to Comte. Freud is amazed to discover that magical thinking and a passive attitude toward metaphysical and theological regression prevails also among people with a good symbolic development, and even among scientists.

As does Comte himself (in the work cited above), Freud questions the French philosopher’s dream that the positivist state will stamp out earlier stages of humanity – the theological and the metaphysical. Both authors show how the human species cannot give up such regressive behavior. At the individual level, fetishism is a mode of speculation typical of “animals, children, normal adults when practice demands a decision that will exceed the results of an analysis, and passionate and deranged adults” (Comte, quoted by Canguilhem, 1968/2009, p. 87).

This quote brings all of us memories of some Freudian texts, as does this one by Darwin (also quoted by Canguilhem, 1968/2009):

every living being can continue to grow even if it stops developing [...] from the developmental perspective, remaining immobilized in any phase of their childhood [...] there is a regression (reversal) [...] animalness is the memory of humanity’s pre-specific state; it is humanity’s organic prehistory rather than its metaphysical anti-nature” (p. 123).

Comte’s text is from 1830, while Darwin’s dates back to 1881. Both analyses are in line with Freud’s concerns, as we can see. Comte claims that fetishism is an a priori condition. It is the worldview without which life would be experienced consciously: “in the beginning was fiction”; “before fetishism there’s nothing” (Comte, 1842/1896, p. 86, p. 87). Freud connects these elements, building on Darwin’s ideas, and adds that the beginning of Totemism intertwines with the violent murder of the chief. The primitive father’s sexual jealousy is part of the psychology of the group. Totemism is a mental consequence of this murder and of guilt. The passive-masochistic attitude, says Freud, is a reactivated feature of the relationship with the primordial father.

For Comte, fetishism is neither anthropomorphism nor animism, but rather biomorphism. It consists in “the spontaneous assimilation of dead nature by living nature” (quoted by Canguilhem, 1968/2009, p. 87) and the confusion “between the inorganic world and living nature” (p. 87). The author sees here a decisive error. From the point of view of psychotic states, Bion also saw it this way. He conceptualized these states

3. In his Experiences in Groups and Other Papers (1961), Bion distinguishes between working group and basic assumptions group. The latter refers to Freud’s crowd. The influence of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego is very clear in this text. Bion's expansion of Freud’s ideas has been very fruitful.
as phenomena, as areas of mental functioning that remain unmodified, where patients’ contact with others or with themselves as living objects is lost. I believe that Bion’s thesis is crucial and plays a critical role in the unfolding of all group activities carried out by unstable adolescents and their friends. The body, the group, and the group’s fetishism bear the above-mentioned features and, in addition, represent inanimate objects that take shape in relation to a leader and his or her commands.

I would rather not discuss the fetish as a veil over the absence of the penis, linked to the castration complex, or as an inanimate substitute for a psychotic aspect of the perverse solution. We are speaking of an area of the mind where development is basically group development. The fetishism described earlier does not escape these rules. The object is situated between the animate and the inanimate and, to some extent, is a way of giving life to something that is both outside the world and outside life and is trying to organize, to become alive. Violent, group, physical, and fetishistic (in the above-mentioned sense) solutions often have as their goal to indicate the corporeal/incorporeal boundary acquired by these constituting objects so as to ensure the survival of the psyche. What follows is an attempt to explain my thesis.

**Adolescent group: The body and regression**

In adolescence, and especially in adolescent social activities, we often observe the proliferation of small groups with their slogans and fetishes, their clothes, their idioms and stereotyping, which show that adolescent activity is eminently social and that the group that assumes its provisional identity is the fetishistic and theological space where identification disguises are worn and where a neo-community is created that momentarily replaces the family, society, and the ego.

The psychology of the unstable adolescent preserves these features, but it does so in ways that are paradigmatic of the field of unstable patients, that is, patients who present psychotic states typical of the paranoid-schizoid position described by Klein and of the conflicts associated with the Oedipal stage in its early phase. Next, I illustrate this thesis with clinical material, in particular, with regard to the role of the leader in the group’s mode of functioning.

As I mentioned earlier, the fetish is situated in the boundary between the animate and the inanimate. This is a central aspect of fetishism upon which a provisional religion is configured. The fetish marks the fragility of an object that lies between horror and an innovating aesthetics. For instance, Marilyn Manson, the leader of a new metal band, combines an object that announces terror with the disfigurement of his body and face. By creating a bizarre monster that does not quite horrify, he generates a border zone centered on a fetishized body that evokes the other side of life. In the band’s esthetic and in its videos and songs, we constantly find an interplay of horrifying dolls that gradually come to life as living dead, and their relationship with a fetishized leader. “I’m your horror,” he said at the beginning of a concert in Buenos Aires a few years ago. At the same time, the creation of the name Marilyn Manson involved the condensation of Marilyn Monroe and Charles Manson as a horrifying and esthetic duality.
There are other examples of marginal groups that show the relationship between regression, the leader, and fetishism as the moment prior to theology. The leader and the subgroup protect group members from the threat of a tragic unleashing. Each subgroup maintains its habitus – a logic that is different from the agreed-upon social logic – and establishes a law that is as provisional as it is Tantalean. In the Bronx, one of the four New York City boroughs, we find graffiti depicting each subgroup with its bastions and its dead. These graffiti represent an ideological set of “beliefs” whose betrayal triggers gang wars, of which we learn in the news and in hip-hop songs that narrate conflicts stemming from the rigid, liturgical features of the different groups.

We also find initiation rites, marked by public signs such as sneakers hanging from electric cables. Each subgroup represents a primitive institutionalizing attempt. Group members develop stereotypical ways of walking, waving, speaking, and so on, which become signs. The body is now the site of fetishization. Group members give their life for a flag or for the drug that brings them together in their relationship with the leader-dealer, or teenage girls who become prostitutes offer their body in their relationship with the pimp, who brings them together and occupies the fetishized locus of a mythical leader. The fetish is horror, but can also protect from it. The body is established as a site of fetishization; it is a body that articulates with a sum of bodies-pogo or a body of transmission of slogans, refrains, or humming, body-wound or body that transmits intense emotions, the spat-on body of Iggy Pop, who, upon going on stage, receives the gobs of spit of his fans as a show of the blending of bodily fluids. Iggy throws himself into his audience and gets lost; young people climb on stage and sing in his stead, and he is lost until he comes back to the center.

A unity is generated that is expressed in the creation of subgroups that share a common characteristic – the leader’s regression, and fetishism. Each configuration reveals a habitus that is expressed in a subjective social zone. These zones, in turn, acquire specific features that must be analyzed in order to understand the individual psyche. Let us briefly define these two concepts.

Field and habitus

I want to be very brief on this point. I look at the concepts of field and habitus developed by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (2014), especially at the notion of habitus, from a psychoanalytic perspective. For more than twenty years of clinical experience I have looked for a tool that would help me understand or enunciate phenomena that I observed frequently in my practice, phenomena that defied the concepts of subjectivity developed by our theories of the psyche. My impression had always been that the group zone inhabited by this type of adolescent took a lot of the session’s time. It even presented itself often in such a way that I was taken, as an analyst, to the one where that particular community developed. I gradually realized that not only were these young people in the zone, but they were the zone, which was ruled by a “legal system” all of its own in a way that was equivalent to the functioning of the zone established by psychic ideation.
At other times, the group appeared in different ways in the periphery of the consulting room, not only as an internal group, but also as an effective presence in the surroundings. In a way, we could say that when one of these teenagers enters my office, a social world is revealed to me that I would have never seen had it not been described to me by my patients. Small groups, with their own life and beliefs, inhabit cybercafés, coffee shops, corners, and clandestine spots where one can find gay people, drug dealing, unusual sexual interactions, and a variety of features of the world of rock (and lately of the world of cumbia).

These are not impulsive organizations, even though they are basically governed by impulse. They have an internal consistency that is usually fetishistic, theological, and supported by a leader, and is critical to life and death. I could give many examples, but I would like to focus on the habitus of a group that structurally replaces the family, society, and the individual psyche. Bourdieu situates himself in the intermediate field between psychology and sociology, and proceeds in the opposite way. He finds an idea that does not quite fit either in sociology or in psychoanalysis, that is, the habitus. The habitus is defined in relation to the field as an objective structure where the social is inscribed.

The habitus represents the subjective structure and refers to the set of incorporated frames of perception underlying individuals’ point of view. It ultimately generates a set of enduring dispositions to act, feel, and think. It is an internalization of objective structures of the social, a naturalization of difference, and is inscribed in the body as a determinant of the social subjectivity it represents. This habitus operates on subjects, creating coercion (Durkheim, 1982). To say it in a way that fits in with our work, the habitus separates the group’s ways of feeling, acting, and thinking from the rest of the community, and I consider that understanding this habitus, detecting it, and analyzing it allows us to understand the subjectivity of adolescents, who develop their psychic and social life in that zone.

In the following sections I discuss two cases and analyze a social event that called my attention due to the prominence of armed youths committing crimes in schools and public places in the United States. In relation to these cases, I would like to add the proviso that I only dwell on those aspects that apply to the topic discussed and set aside all other obvious considerations that may confuse the object of study.

1. A fatal habitus: Young H., aged 18, was taking the first courses in his humanities degree when an event occurred that prompted him to ask for help and to abandon his chosen career path at least for more than two years, while he was my patient. After that, the analytic space became part of a past H. did not want to remember. We hence decided, despite our good relationship, that he should start treatment with a colleague of my choosing.

H. visited a jail in the outskirts of Buenos Aires in the company of a specialist in groups of substance abusers and inmates. This specialist had ample experience working in marginal areas and with adolescents. H. had always been attracted by the work carried out by his fellow churchgoers in squatter settlements and jails. Once he became a young man, he decided to get professionally involved in these issues. The first
year things went wonderfully well. He had succeeded in gaining admission into the dark atmosphere of the jail thanks to a group of inmates who let him work with them along with the coordinator. It was an ideal group that had asked to receive more visits from H. The young men studied, talked about movies, and created discussion groups. When H. and the coordinator left, the inmates were disappointed.

Two corrections officers lurked around the meetings, and H. and his coordinator were perturbed by their presence. The two of them talked about it, and the coordinator said he believed there would be problems. Then a new topic started to emerge in the discussion groups. The inmates said that their group led two different lives – one when H. and his coordinator were there, and another one when they were away. On the first visit after this comment, two of the inmates showed signs of having been beaten. Instead of being deterred by the rarified atmosphere, H. and his coordinator felt motivated to probe into what was going on. Their inquiry revealed a whole system of sadomasochistic relationships of domination centered around a leader. One of the officers was being sodomized by the other one, and letting the “boss” assault one of the inmates was essential to the group’s welfare. They all viewed this mode of operation as normal except the two inmates who had been punished, who had somehow challenged it. That is why they were marked.

The meetings were shortened, and eventually “one of the inmates pointed out that the boss was mad and wanted to include the two lefties in the affair.” The “boss” had no fear that his behavior might become public. Who would dare talk? Nobody, as it was extremely clear, not even “the rational coordinator, who had never adopted such a messianic attitude and who had taught me that this type of group automatically generates a fantasy of salvation,” H. had said, “but there was something more intense in the situation that made us lose our sanity to a certain extent.”

One afternoon they arrived to the space that had been assigned to them to finish the preparations for a Carnival celebration, more specifically, a murga.4 When H. and the coordinator came in, they noticed that a tragic atmosphere permeated the room: “the two young rebels had killed each other in a fight with knives they had stolen while they were eating.” That was the end of the groups. A month after these events, H. was hospitalized for a few days due to “persecutory delusions.” He received the appropriate medication and was rapidly discharged. It was then that he came to see me.

In this episode one can see at a glance the role of the leader, the configuration of a habitus that is invaded by an external, foreign law, how the team members are trapped in the group regression, and how the neo-legality settles the score with those who want to transgress it. We could elaborate further, but I would rather leave room for the readers’ thoughts. Let us move on to the second example.

4. A murga is a group of people who gather to dress up, sing, and dance during Carnival. They design their own costumes and choreography. (T. N.)
2. Why did James Holmes go from being a nice, shy, and smart student at the University of Colorado, with a bachelor’s degree in neurosciences, to being Bane, the Batman villain, and finally the Denver murderer? I mentioned earlier that the adolescent’s conflict is basically expressed socially, and that the structures we usually locate inside the mind are in a state of action, of hyper-expression. Conflicts take the guise of regressive modes of confrontation with reality, and reality constitutes their favored setting. Everything teenagers do – show, sing, write, pierce, paint, kiss, cheer, cry, dance, lose, and win – they do to death. They gather in small groups whose design, whose organization has mannerisms, organizing slogans, with their colors and representations. They practice anger, the apology of drugs, the more or less acknowledged death at 27 – a state that, in the regressive world of the more disturbed youth, leads to a fatal ending. The boundary between reality and fantasy is blurred; it is subtly defined in a final act that, thanks to the triumph of the inanimate over the animate, culminates in tragedy.

Freud did not expound on the inanimate role of the fetish, even if he used disavowal to link an extreme defense to both psychosis and perversion. Bion discusses the passage to the inanimate object in the psychotic personality. It would seem that group development generates an explosive effect in more disturbed youth that marks the loss of fetishism as a crucial moment in the psychotic unraveling. While the caped crusader represents an esthetic object at the limit of horror but clearly distinct from the villain, a weak equilibrium can be maintained. In the movie Batman: The Dark Knight Rises, directed by Christopher Nolan and premiered on July 20, 2012, Batman’s life takes an unexpected turn; he withdraws for eight years. During this time, the order he represents collapses, and the figure of Bane emerges. Let us look at its appearance and origin.

a. A climate of institutional collapse prevails. Batman’s origin is revealed. The commissioner’s ethics is questioned. The reign of capitalist law, with its desire for endless profit, is also unmasked, as is the habitus of those who wield financial power. Depressed, Batman retires for eight years. A climate of unstable wellbeing predominates in Gotham. Corruption is silenced, but it bodes danger, serious danger.

b. Danger takes the guise of Bane, a masked man with no mouth or with iron teeth, who seems to talk through a microphone and whose origin is unknown. His threatening presence suspends anomie. Later we learn, although fallaciously, that he is a man born in The Pit, a prison located in a well from which it is hard to get out and reach the outside world. Bane’s mask both conceals and does not conceal an origin that portends anarchy and disorganization, and intimidates with an explosive presentation. Who will put a mask on this disorganization? Bane threatens with the total destruction of an old world and the birth of a new city. The paranoid leader brings a bomb, literally, from the bottom. On July 20th, during the premiere of the movie, James Holmes entered the theater dressed as Bane. He left twelve dead and fifty wounded. He was rapidly detained in the parking lot, and now claimed he was the Joker.

His shots were confused with the shots from the movie, baffling the spectators. He had dropped out of school in June. He was known as a happy young man but had tried to commit suicide several times.
attended a local Lutheran church. He had obtained a Bachelor’s degree in neurosciences, graduating with honors, and was member of several honors societies, that had given him letters of recommendation. In two of these letters he was described as a “very effective group leader” and as a person who “takes an active role in his education, and brings a great amount of intellectual and emotional maturity into the classroom.” In 2008 he was counselor for special-needs children aged 7 to 14. He was in charge of ten children. In 2011 he underwent psychiatric treatment for unknown reasons. In 2012 his academic performance deteriorated. He dropped out of school without offering any explanation. Objects associated with Batman movies were found in his apartment. Two weeks before the shooting he sent another student the following text message: “Have you ever met someone with dysphoric mania?” He also told her to “stay away” because he was “bad news.”

On May 22, 2012 he bought his first weapon, a Glock 22, a few hours after failing an oral exam. Then he acquired a Remington 870, and later an AR-15 semiautomatic and another gun. All these purchases were legal. Four months before the massacre he bought three thousand bullets and three hundred and fifty cartridges online, and on July 2, a combat vest. On June 25 he left a message on the answering machine of the shooting club. According to the owner, it was “bizarre and freaky,” and the police report states that the voice was thick and the manner incoherent and rambling. The killing took place at midnight on July 20. You can watch the entire trial on Youtube. It is worth checking the disturbing interventions of the experts in relation to Holmes's mental disorder.

I would like to point out that his behavior was not an accidental, impulsive act. We are dealing here with a neo-community that has become ordinary in US society, with an organized habitus linked to weapons and a theological-satanic claim. Torture in the Middle East was recorded on videos that were easily available, and civilian society developed a singular connection with weapons and a particular subjective position in relation to them. A group of students in Dayton told me that their university classrooms are tightly locked once they are inside (as we have seen, this procedure is no guarantee of safety).

Marilyn Manson appears in a long interview defending himself from the accusation of being the ideologue of the Columbine massacre. He may be right when he points out that his metallic fetishistic-masochistic artillery represents the limit, but disturbed adolescents can cross the boundary marked by the passage to the delusional act. I know many teenagers who can take this path.

The truth is that after his parents are murdered, becoming an animal saves Batman from death. The child who goes to the theater with them, the future Batman, falls into a pit and is invaded by bats and becomes one of them. After a heavy beating, Bane is saved from death in the pit by the mask that allows him to communicate. There is a transformation, and a mask that saves and heralds a lost origin and a disaster that might happen, and happens... Bane, Denver, Manson when he steps on the other side of Marilyn, and the Columbine kids.

For the multitude to stay together, a leader must keep it oppressed, in check, if you will. Batman imposes a law beyond the law.
(we should not forget that Batman is a law that shows the failure of the law). Bane wants to project his internal disaster into social terror by operating on anomie. He will make a leader come in order to control the lack of a leader and the lack of control of an unmasked city devoid of fetishes. There are two masks: Batman’s, which conceals an identity, and Bane’s, whose owner wants to escape catastrophe, wants to terrorize with his catastrophe.

James Holmes’s action might be explained as follows. James had seen the movie, of course, and that is why he bought his costume (he did not check if his weapons were the same as the ones used by Bane in the movie). His mental breakdown had probably happened gradually over the years. We know of the intense struggle between integration and disintegration, $\text{PS} \leftrightarrow \text{D}$, that take place in a personality where psychosis predominates. Each reintegration turns Holmes more into a stranger. His social behavior collapses when he drops out of school and slowly transforms into Bane, and confusion allows him to restructure and to violently embody, and start acting as, Bane the man-fetish, the man who reinstates a law and projects the projectiles of his collapse, the projectiles of his psychic fragmentation.

Behind such a strong man there is someone so weak that he can die as soon as they take off his mask. His inanimate identity gains strength with fetishization, and eternal objects are like lifeless dolls, objects that have become inanimate. The fetishistic resolution fails once the catastrophe is consummated, to the point that Holmes makes a weak attempt at restructuration by transforming into the Joker. He comes back from his internal collapse having been negatively transformed, as was the case with Julio, a patient I discuss elsewhere (Redonda, 2012). Julio came back as a vigilante who beat up black men who made flirtatious remarks to white women (an article published in August 2012!). The delusional identity suppresses fiction and reality, and finds a perfect argument in the latest Batman.

As I pointed out initially, reality is the favored realm where conflict unfolds, in this case, in a psychotic way. Anyhow, I present the elements of the film and the situations I extracted as fragments of the internal world that were psychotically identified by Holmes in the movie. Bane’s shots coincided with his. I would say that this was the most successful moment of the psychotic transformation.

3. Locked in: “You say, ‘You won’t like it,’ and it’s true, I don’t like it and won’t like it” (Norma) When I was seeing G., a tattooed 16-year-old youth, I had to go to his home, forty miles from Buenos Aires City. He was the son of a socially renowned figure and was part of a group of children of socially renowned people. I noticed right away that it was important for him to have a therapist who did not live in the area. From the start, he was part of a group subjectivity that excluded me and that would soon present itself and withdraw. My sojourn lasted three months. G. moved from the street to the living room, from the living room to the bedroom, and from the bedroom to the bathroom, behind the shower curtain. I agreed to see him there, sitting on the toilet lid. G. would talk to me through a hole he had made in the curtain.
There were no threats of suicide or violence. He received me pleasantly while he listened to music: Norma, a punk band. Based on what he told me over the course of several interviews, I deduced that he was not hiding out of terror, anxiety, psychosis, or agoraphobia; he was a scary bad guy who was scared. We had already moved to the living room. He was caught in a situation, and while he was not the target, he was involved, and went to jail. He described a veritable sociology of the gangs operating in his town and their interrelation with the ones operating in most of the country; he mentioned the differences among them, their modus operandi. You have to know what you’re getting into! It was obvious he wanted to talk. From this period, besides the fact that he was a bad kid who was scared of the world he had entered and to which he now belonged, I would like to extract two episodes.

1. While he was in prison, he learned that, just like the groups to which he had belonged before, this one had rules that he must understand if he did not want to die. An episode involving the boxer Carlos Monzón accurately illustrates this situation. Monzón, the famed middleweight world champion, visited Punta Tombo, a penguin reserve in the south of Argentina, with his then girlfriend, TV star Susana Giménez. Thrilled to see the birds, she expressed her wish to have one – probably in a symbolic way. The boxer vanished and came back later carrying a dead penguin. He came to deliver it to her. This episode exemplifies many of the inmates’ behaviors toward the leader. I heard stories of the same sort from other people.

2. When young G. was taken into custody, his fellow gang members were punishing him to prevent him from betraying a secret to the police. I use the plural because the act was performed by the leader but was actually performed by all of them. They were removing a tattoo in reaction to what they deemed an act of treason. Every tattoo represented a sign of belonging to the group, of a hierarchy; every suppression, one less bit of skin. Every success was mentioned and approved by the leader. Because of the group, they were locked up, and their being locked up was part of their success. Inside the prison he felt somewhat at ease. There were other group members there, and members of other groups – punks, grunges, new metal.

“They would go out; just like you came here, I go out,” he said to me. “When I disappear, they don’t see me again. Absence is our mark. We appear and disappear. We’re not there. You’ll never understand, will you? We don’t want to be anywhere. Neither die, nor suffer, nor win, nor lose.” “I won’t like it, I won’t like it,” he sings. “I brought you on a trip through these shadows. I just wanted to chat with someone clean. Now you can leave.” We never got to know each other. I do not want to dwell on any episodes. I want to show how the offer of the penguin represents the manifestation of love for the totem; the non-identity of the living and the lifeless becomes evident in the Punta Tombo episode. The same happens with the carnality of the removal of the tattoo as an extraction of part of the body and as the internal law that rules actions within the group. Animalness – or becoming an animal, as some philosopher would put it – lies at the center of this situation. Being part of the herd and ferocity may lead to confinement, but being confined, paradoxically, is a way of getting out, and therefore jail is where they seek to be.
To conclude, I would like to add that these reflections on problems of adolescent instability were meant to point to some of the directions taken by my work and ideas based on observing this type of patient. This is an excerpt of a larger work on the various groups and habitus that exist outside normal adolescent development. I have gathered an ample casuistry that includes photographs, videos, and private and institutional case histories, as well as social events that illustrate the ideas discussed above. We will likely talk about these issues again.

Resumen
A través de tres informes clínicos, se estudian en este trabajo las características centrales del funcionamiento grupal en el adolescente inestable. Se ponen en discusión autores que van del psicoanálisis a la sociología práctica y filosófica. Se revisan los conceptos de cuerpo y fetichismo, y se estudia la dinámica de grupos en el funcionamiento primitivo con la intención de abrir un campo de exploración esencialmente centrado en problemas limitrofes entre lo psíquico y lo social, y sus producciones en el campo de la realidad externa e interna.

Descubiertos: Adolescencia; Fetichismo; Cuerpo; Grupo; Realidad material; Realidad psíquica.

Abstract
Based on three clinical reports, this paper analyzes the main characteristics of the functioning of the perturbed adolescent’s group. The author discusses the contributions of a range of authors, from psychoanalysts to practical and philosophical sociologists. The concepts of body and fetishism are revised and the group dynamics of primitive functioning are analyzed with the aim to open a field of exploration essentially centered on problems that straddle psychology and sociology and their productions in the field of action.

Keywords: Adolescence; Fetishism; Body; Group; Material reality; Psychic reality.

References
This paper offers a reflection based on fragments of a clinical case that is presented through vignettes. The goal is to illustrate the presence of the body not just as a vehicle for symptomatic expression, but also as a sign in search of transformations/retranscriptions in a path toward mentalization and potential inclusion in the symbolic web.

The history of humanity shows countless records of the presence of bodily representations at different times and in the most diverse cultures. The worship of the body and its meaning, have suffered innumerable transformations and have occupied different places in human thought, thus generating manifold approaches and ways of understanding it. The body, inheritance, our locus in nature, is the product of the complex relationship between our biological origin, our psychological representation, and the sociocultural interactions in which we engage. Across history, the body has been invested with the rarest desires and materialized in art, in art's universality. An inexhaustible source of creativity and the free expression of beauty, art paradoxically reveals oft-avoided or negated facets of human reality by esthetically exhibiting corpuses that suffer and make suffer, that destroy and are destroyed, that age, die, and rot.

According to Jeudy (2002), the representation of the body was linked for centuries to ethical and moral values determined by social groups such as the family, the Church, and the state. Nonetheless, today’s ephemeral social relations transform it into an instrument of
personal affirmation. In our postmodern culture the contemporary body is displayed and consumed as an object with no subject. It is the expression of a hypermodern individualism (Lipovetsky, 2005), the setting for the representation of intense anxiety, depressive feelings, and feelings of internal emptiness. Such feelings oppose the euphoria of performative rituals of addiction to the gym – true acts of exorcism for the feelings of helplessness and vulnerability associated with the undeniable fragility of the body’s psychobiological status.

In psychoanalytic theory, the vicissitudes of the body/mind, somatic/mental binomial, as a focus of research have been present since pre-psychoanalytic texts. Freud’s interest and curiosity regarding the human body and mind brought him close to healthcare, philosophy, mythology and anthropology, among many fields of human knowledge. The story goes that Freud’s lively, curious spirit often led him to reexamine his choices and projects, to take detours in his scientific journey in search of new roads. These shifts prevented him from being content with the scientific knowledge produced by neurologists. In his “Report on my Studies in Paris and Berlin” he relates that when he applied for the traveling scholarship awarded by the University Jubilee Fund in 1885, his plan was to take his studies beyond Vienna to the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris. There, thanks to the abundance of clinical material, he could observe closely the phenomenon characterized by the mysterious expression of illness in a biologically sound body.

Freud recalls that in the Berlin clinic his ideas were not in line with the dominant prejudiced views on hysterical clinical pictures. Contrariwise, he felt a certain discomfort in connection with the ex-
cessive significance attached to what was called hysterical simulation in order to justify the lack of motivation to investigate somatic symptoms. According to Freud's research, and to his disappointment, this phenomenon had already been identified in the Middle Ages. Like all geniuses, Freud was ahead of his time. His research was not limited to what was already known or to explicit phenomena. He did seek hysterical “stigmata,” but his gaze went beyond the boundaries of the known. Identified with Charcot, he seems to say between the lines that he was not just trying to detect somatic symptoms but also to hear and translate what those corpuses were showing, saying, feeling, suffering.

Present-day analytic practice, grounded on Freudian developments that were bolstered by three true theoretical frameworks [“On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914), Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1921), and The Ego and the Id’s introduction to structural theory (1923)], has been enriched by post-Freudian authors' significant contributions. Thanks to these contributions, psychoanalysts turn their gaze and their listening once again, and with renewed attention, not to the “somatic signs” of hysterical pictures, but to the emotional functioning of patients who present a certain embodiment (Green, 1986b), materially enacted in evacuative movements, discharge acts, and acting-in and acting-out episodes. These are all expressions of the destructiveness that is experienced in and out of the transference.

Green’s (2001) input into contemporary psychoanalysis, the product of a new articulation between metapsychology and clinical practice (especially in relation to borderline cases and pathologies of emptiness, with a particular focus on the notions of life and death narcissism), facilitated a paradigm turn. The range and scope of theory and technique expanded to understand and treat patients who were considered difficult, that is, who presented clinical pictures outside the neurotic spectrum.

These are psychopathological pictures in which body and mind are controlled by violence and destructiveness. They show the functioning pattern of what is known as current pathologies. In these borderline pictures (Green, 2001) or non-structures (Bergeret, 1991) the “body/mind” belies1 the emptiness of its existence/non-existence. There is an atrophy of meaning marked by the intrusion of internal/external objects that force the mind to survive in the darkness of endless mourning processes, inhabited by absences, by fragments of the presence-absence pair (Green 2001). The body/mind is anxiously presentified through bulimia, anorexia, substance abuse, and internal emptiness perpetuated by negativity, under the auspices of a negative narcissism (Green 2001) and heading toward nothingness.

I think of Nina, a patient in treatment since she was 11 years old, who survives between what she calls “the fury of a volcano ready to become active” and “the instability of the roller coaster” of her emotional life. Marks inflicted on the skin with the tip of a burning cigarette and

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1. The author uses the word desmente in Portuguese, in a play of words with the word mente (mind). (T. N.)
Corpus in search of symbolization

scars from cuts with sharp objects are the silent testimony of disastrous
experiences that riddled her “gradually becoming” with intrusions.
Perverse splinters, evacuated from the mind of a caring/abusive father
and a neglectful, unstable mother invade her mind with contents of a
disproportionate magnitude in relation to the fragility of her immature
ego, transforming what would have been a search for pleasurable satis-
faction in her own body into a search for satisfaction in pain.

A “visible” pain of a lacerated, burnt skin, of bright red blood, a sign
of pain, is now represented, felt, and controlled. “In contradistinction
to anxiety, which is a signal, pain is a wound [...] the narcissistic hae-
morrhage oozing out through the open sore of wounded, gashed narc-
cissism” (Green, 2001, p. 105). “I’m not ashamed of these marks,” she
says, lovingly caressing her arms, “they were with me during my most
desperate times; they helped relieve the pain inside me when it became
unbearable. Blood appears and soothes the pain inside. The outside
pain doesn’t matter, I can bear it, and then it goes away!”

When speaking about borderline clinical pictures, Green (1986b)
recalls that initially, children need to have an object that will satis-
fy their drive demands and will be available as an ancillary ego for
their still-rudimentary one. These two roles are blended and incor-
porated into the mother’s breasts, and will be part of a gradual, re-
curring process of separation from and reunion with the object. In
this back-and-forth, a certain balance becomes necessary between
effective satisfaction and a search, on the part of the child, for the lost
paradise of fusion with the maternal object. We know that frustration
and disillusion are inevitable and are part of this process. Regular and
alternating repetition of moments of pleasure and unpleasure lead
children both to experience feelings of wellbeing and to tolerate the
discomfort and rage provoked by unpleasure.

Green (1986b) supplements this notion, alerting us that the psy-
che must not be overloaded and flooded with tension because it
needs to reencounter the quality of wellbeing in order to survive. In
any case, the author stresses that

the attempt to separate the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’, the pleasurable from the
unpleasurable, and the obligation to achieve separation instead of giving
birth to the distinction between self and object (inside and outside, so-
matic and psychic, fantasy and reality, ‘good’ and ‘bad’) engender splitting
in borderlines. In a set of complementary, opposite terms, each separated
term admits the symmetrical complement; for example, the shadow of
its light, its phantom more than its fantasy. But inevitably, it will be again
re-united in some other area of the psychic space. In severely disturbed
cases the result is a radical exclusion: splitting. (Green, 1986b, p. 75)

He is referring here to the fact that, to some extent, splitting is
part of the work of the psychic apparatus but, at the same time, rad-
cial splitting impedes the work of representation.

I expect that Nina experienced profound feelings of helplessness
in her contact with a fragilized, depressed, and unstable mother who
was unable to offer herself as a fusional object capable of containing
her baby’s primitive anxieties. In this way, instead of delimiting spa-
ces and thus contributing to the development of the psyche, splitting
produces amputations in the ego, dividing both destructive drive
representations and significant parts of the ego. The split elements return with an intrusive, persecutory quality. As a result, splitting expresses the “loss-intrusion” polarity (Green, 1986b).

When she was 11 years old, Nina would not play. She showed a high degree of intellectualization, as well as primitive anxieties of being imprisoned and ripped apart: “... I’m a small closed, dark cave, you would be a window that lets a little bit of light come through [...] I’m scared of being buried [...] sometimes I think it would be easier to die, but I don’t really want to die, only when I feel a lot of hate.” In this phase of the treatment she liked to write what she thought in the shape of poems. She still used a collection of words that were sometimes bizarre and disconnected, full of a narcissistic, destructive libido, and gave a clear impression of being a tangled mass of broken threads.

Regarding these disconnections, Green (1986b, p. 79) states that “the discourse of the borderline is not a chain of words, representations, or affects, but rather – like a pearl necklace without a string – words, representations, affects contiguous in space and time but not in meaning.” I believe that the analyst is the one who must establish what is missing in his or her own mind. Yet at times like this, I felt invaded by massive projective identifications that contaminated my ability to think, and I made a great effort to contain the confusion I felt and not to yield to the impulse to vomit premature, intellectualized translations in order to preserve my own integration.

In moments like these, the presence and help of the object/analyst are pivotal to the progress of the analytic process. According to Green (2001), analysts must offer more than their emotional and empathic capacities. The demand is that their mental functions take action, activated and guided by the countertransference “because the patient himself is only able to achieve a minimal degree of structure, insufficiently bound to make sense, but just enough to mobilize all the analyst’s patterns of thought, from the most elementary to the most complex (Green, 1986b, p. 46).

Currently, this transformation/mentализation work, which I view as a kind of “digestion of raw matter,” while still part of the main course, has ceased to be, in principle, a solitary work. Gradually, when it was possible, we started digesting and metabolizing together and we were increasingly attuned to each other, with a distance that was not experienced as abandonment and a proximity that was not felt as intrusive. It is always important, however, to be alert to the timing in relation to rhythm and the potential scope for the interactive functioning of the analytic couple.

The patient is now an adult lesbian who tirelessly struggles with feelings of uselessness and terrorizing helplessness. Having stopped taking cocaine (“a white powder that pacifies the volcano and gives minutes of joy to the ups and downs of the roller coaster,” the representation of devastating introjected primary objects), she seeks relief by trying to retrieve the most primitive contact she experienced in her history, the object that was lost long before it was found. “I leave the tin of powder milk near my body, and when I’m down I put my head inside the tin and inhale. I know it’s not coke, but inhaling it soothes my nose, which wants to inhale [...] it’s a white powder, something good [...] only I know that what my nose actually wants is the bad one.”
From a countertransference perspective, I often feel thrown into the edges of the volcano; I hear its roar and shudder when I envision that one day everything may end up flooded with lava. Other times I feel pushed onto the roller coaster without a safety belt, challenged and put to the test regarding how much I can tolerate without acting or reacting (before being able to notice the impact) with a paralyzing fear that will prevent me from acting or thinking.

Nina arrives in the office with her eyebrows completely removed. In their place she has painted very noticeable black eyebrows in a continuous, strong line. I open the door and, when I look at her, I have a clear feeling that I will start crying, sobbing. We sit down. Nina cannot bear lying down on the couch. Without taking my eyes away from her, I try to collect myself while she asks:

N: “How am I doing?”
A: “Sad.”
N: [crying] “I don’t know why I did this! It’s just that I needed to change something! I drew the eyebrows pointing up because they were already pointing down...”
A: “A happier face to ward off sadness!”
N: “Luckily you don’t think I look awful!!!” [She cries.]

Nina would make me share her primitive feelings, wordless records, mute marks, silenced cries that were overcome by pain. In those moments, our mode of contact was sensory rather than verbal. Regarding the question of attaching autonomy to narcissism, Green (2001) states that today, clinical experience enables us to think that there are narcissistic structures and transferences in which narcissism appears as the core of the conflict. This author warns us that none of these modalities can be pondered or interpreted in isolation. Attention must encompass both object relations and the overall problem of the relationship between the ego and the erotic and destructive libido. At the same time, he cautions us that this does not imply that the formation of narcissistic structures follows a development completely detached from the drives that are turned toward the object, a viewpoint that agrees with Freud’s (1914).

I think of my therapeutic relationship with Nina and the long, grueling work we have ahead of us. Even after several years of treatment, her fragile, immature ego will at times interpret the feelings intensely experienced by the analytic pair as potentially devastating. In these moments, she defends herself with all her might, activating the resources at her disposal in her narcissistic refuge: omnipotent thinking and erasure of the time/space dimension and of the me-not me differentiation. After a longer weekend, she tells me: “There’s nothing to do about it, when I’m close to you I fight, but I admit that I really feel your absence! I think I’m going to need to come my whole life. Sometimes I see myself being really old and still coming.”

I am receptive to the manifestation of the link, but I point out the erasure of the age difference between us. The patient, conveying a mix of disappointment and joy, says with a sad smile that even so, she will come with her cane to bring flowers to my grave. In these moments, with her mental functioning still limited to very primitive
laws and representations that are immersed in the adhesive viscosity of the lack of discrimination, there is no space left for the construction of a more symbolic thinking. Memories cannot meet such a concrete need. She needs a body and a place to represent me (from a countertransference perspective, I sometimes felt I was being swallowed by the lack of discrimination).

I try to save myself. I interpret that the attempt to magically cancel the passage of time and perpetuate the analytic couple could also petrify her – leave her motionless, lifeless. “Then I’ll confess that I dreamed that you were mummified.” From a clinical perspective, Green (2001) considers that narcissists are wounded subjects; from the point of view of narcissism, they are lacking subjects. He points out, and he could be referring to Nina’s case, that the disappointment they have suffered, a wound that is still open, possibly refers not to one but to both (real or projected) parents. Their having been left with only themselves as a love object is thus explained. In this case, Green understands that the sexualization of the ego leads to the transformation of the desire for the object into desire for the ego. He calls this desire the desire for the One, which erases the desire for the Other. This is positive narcissism, which results from the neutralization of the object. Green adds that the search for independence in relation to the object is precious but precarious, because the ego has no way of fully substituting the object.

Petrified or mummified, alive or dead, object-amulet rendered indispensable by my magic charge, I have become part of her. There is a deficiency in the evolution of the “work of decorporealization” (Green, 1986a) in relation to primary objects. The command to survive psychically forces Nina to preserve or even save the damaged, living/dead internal objects in order to prevent the chaos that was experienced even before being felt. My clinical understanding, based on the reconstruction of the previous history of patients with a predominantly pre-Oedipal functioning, is perfectly in tune with Green’s (2001) thoughts on the constitution of the subject in his or her primary relations. This author connects early deprivation or traumas (chaotic, destructuring relations with primary objects) with severe psychopathological pictures. He makes clear his position regarding the critical role played by early object relations in normal development, stating as follows:

“...What strikes me is that the baby inside the mother’s body has no need for love and, contrariwise, once it comes out of the mother’s womb it needs love and not just milk. Perhaps that is what the psyche is. This love passes through the mother’s body, but it is not only the mother’s body [...] The ‘good breast’ [...] is not the mother’s milk; the ‘good breast’ is the mother’s smile [...] This means that there would be a love of the body but also a love that is manifested, I would say, in a ‘decorporealized’ way. That is the origin of the psyche – the smile. (Green, 1986, p. 72)

Green recalls that since at first the child has no notion that it is its screaming and crying that brings its mother to its aid, it experiences the satisfaction of an omnipotent illusion. Later, if these primordial acts ensure its vital needs, the baby acquires a confidence that will
Corpus in search of symbolization

enable it to find other solutions to cope with new situations in which the object is absent. Among them, this author highlights primarily the hallucinatory satisfaction of desire as a precursor of identification, a solution that eliminates the representation of the object. For Green (2001), hence, the ego becomes the object and is confused with it. The result is primary, or narcissistic, identification, an essential achievement for the constitution of the subject. Yet this author warns us that the persistence of narcissistic identification beyond the stage of fusion with the object, that is, once the ego accepts separation from the object, will expose the ego to recurring disappointment.

For Green (1986a), normal development depends on the mother's work, a work of decorporealization. "Thanks to this work," he argues, "the body plays an increasingly smaller role in the exchanges, which acquire a greater psychic quality" (p. 72). Furthermore, clinical practice shows that the lack of acknowledgment of the alterity of the object promotes endless disappointments and is intended to assuage psychic pain by way of idealization in hopes of reencountering the center (Green, 2001). Green warns that in this case, instead of being an evolutionary achievement, triangulation increases complexity, for often the two narcissistically invested parental objects cause double the amount of disappointment and lead to the failure of the use of displacement in the search for a substitute that may repair the injury caused by the original object.

From now on, displacement aimed at finding substitute objects will tend to repeat the initial failure. We can see this process materialize in the presence of transference/countertransference oscillations in our clinical work, for instance, in Nina's case. When distance or absence mark differentiation, the patient tends to cancel differences to relieve unbearable feelings of absolute helplessness. Alive or dead, one must "be there" materially; one must exist even when one does not exist in order to prevent the collapse that results from the feeling of absence, from the need of the object, of the other.

Green (2001) cautions that it is critical to understand that these displacements only allow for imperfect solutions because the experience of satisfaction never fully satiates. Yet he believes that it is always good to recall that this process causes the libido to be constantly in search of new investitures and, at the same time, imposes on the ego the need to struggle against fragmentation anxieties so as to neutralize the lack of the object. In this way, the ego often trusts only its self-investitures and its own drives, that is, realizations of positive narcissism. Nonetheless, he warns that life narcissism is never fully successful (Green, 2001).

In addition, there are early traumatic experiences of neglect, abandonment, and chaotic object relations. Yet Green points out the paradox that in some cases, the very possibility of the existence of the object may lead to disastrous consequences, and the decentering experience may generate “resentment, hatred, and despair” (Green, 2001). Gus (2007) adds that “destructive manifestations lead to an impoverishment of the ego, surrendered to disinvestiture, which opposes the work of mourning that is at the root of transformational processes” (p. 19). Green (2001) links these severe cases to the exis-
tence of a negative narcissism that aspires to a level zero, an expression of the deobjectalizing function that falls not only on objects but also on the objectalizing process itself. In this case, the solution transforms the negative hallucinatory realization of desire into a model.

Nina, near 18 years of age, reminds me of Green's (1986b) description of a certain “anorexia of life” in reference to those moments when the deobjectalizing function governs psychic activity. She reported a total lack of appetite, “even for living.” Her “motto” was: “Die young and skinny and be a pretty corpse.” And she said it with pride, as a valued achievement. I wonder whether this logic is associated with deobjectalization, disinvestiture, disconnection from life; with precarious remnants of objectalization of the body, whether alive or dead; and with the objectalization of the image, of beauty, whether in life or in death. Is this a positive narcissism that is addicted to form, to image, to the fantasy of immortality? Or a negative narcissism, characterized by a disconnection from life, from the reality principle? Is this logic still supported by a precarious but present fusion as part of the work of Eros?

I think that these are questions to be pondered without pragmatism or haste, and without expecting closed answers. On the contrary, these questions must open the way toward a reflection that may account for their complexity. The ups and downs in relation to this patient made me learn that when the logic of destructiveness rules the scene, in order to be with Nina, I must leave theory, concepts, reason, and vanity aside to enter the thick atmosphere of the field and tolerate not knowing. Above all, I need to be there, body and soul, alive, without giving up, resisting. This state of mind reminds me of Gilberto Gil’s song: “If I want to talk to God / I need to be alone / I need to turn off the light / I need to lower my voice / I need to find peace / I need to loosen the knots / of my shoes, of my tie / of desires, of mistrust / I need to forget the date / I need to lose count / I need to have empty hands.” Green (1986b, p. 74) agrees with this idea when he asserts that in the case of borderline patients, at times the affective quality of their communication and of the countertransference feelings awakened in the therapist become hard to recount “unless one writes poetry.”

In closing, I would like to clarify something. In the vignettes I selected, I chose those aspects of the case that were related to the suggested topic and left out other elements. Based on this choice, I had to take the risk, inherent in a more targeted presentation, that I might convey the erroneous idea that I was trying to reach conclusions when, on the contrary, the suggestion was to offer living material so as to expand our ability to reflect about patients who suffer these ailments and, thus, broaden our listening above and beyond what words can tell us.

Resumen

Este trabajo propone una reflexión a través de la presentación de viñetas de un caso clínico de la experiencia del analista, que tiene como objetivo ilustrar la fuerza de las manifestaciones del cuerpo, no solo como elemento de expresión sintomática, sino también como
un cierto signo en busca de simbolización. La autora se vale de los aportes teóricos de autores como Freud y Green para enfatizar la cuestión de la escucha psicoanalítica que en estos casos iría más allá o más acá de lo que las palabras pueden decir.

**Descriptores:** Cuerpo; Signo; Escucha psicoanalítica; Simbolización.

**Candidato a descriptor:** Cuadros fronterizos.

**Abstract**

This paper proposes a reflection based on the presentation of vignettes from one of the author’s cases with the purpose of illustrating the strength of the body’s manifestations, not only as an element of symptomatic expression, but also as a kind of sign in search of symbolization. The author draws on the theoretical contributions of Freud, Green and Rosenfeld, among others, to highlight psychoanalytic listening, which in cases such as this must transcend what words can say.

**Keywords:** Body; Sign; Psychoanalytic listening; Symbolization.

**Candidate to keyword:** Borderline picture.

**References**


The body and analytic training

Introduction

We use our mind to talk about the body. We use our body to express what is in our mind. Body and mind appear as a continuum, and it is hard to tell where one starts and the other ends. The theme of Fepal’s thirty-first conference challenged us to think about the body in psychoanalysis. To do so, we joined our bodies and minds in a hard but extremely rich exercise of collective writing. Without our bodies, we would not be able to meet and put into words what is brewing in our minds and wants to be expressed. Without our minds, we would be but bodies together; we would not be able to be here, communicating what we experience and learn in a group. We share our ideas and rhythms, and based on them we are able to create this physical-emotional experience, a kind of dance/work similar to the one that takes place in the vivid encounter with our patients in the analytic session.

All bodies have a time, a thought, a verb, an emotion, and a dance.
And this dance is always singular to each person and takes the guise of movements, expressions, and gestures that may be up to us to help interpret or to simply feel, in a closeness and sharing mirrored with affects.

Milheiro, 2005

* Analysts in training, Puerto Alegre Psychoanalytic Society.

1. “Todo corpo tem um tempo, um pensamento, um verbo, uma emoção e uma dança. E esta dança, sempre particular em cada um, sob a forma de movimentos, expressões e gestos, que a nós pode caber ajudar a interpretar ou apenas sentir, na cumplicidade e na partilha espelhada de afetos” (Milheiro, 2005, p. 17).
In the inceptions of psychoanalysis, the psychic apparatus was conceived of as capable of connecting psyche and soma. The latter was viewed as the site of primordial, foundational ego experiences that made possible the connection between psyche and soma. After Winnicott and Bion, primitive bodily sensations were understood as essential communications for the development of the baby’s mind, as long as the relationship with the caregiver was satisfactory, that is, capable of maintaining the continuity of being and acting as a container that could decode first the baby’s needs and later its desires. As psychoanalysis continued to evolve, Bick and Anzieu spoke of the significance of the skin for the structuring of the psychic apparatus. Drawing on these and other authors, we dared fluctuate between clinical experience and group conjectures in order to articulate questions and outline some conclusions on the subject of the body.

**Evolution of the concepts of body and mind in psychoanalysis**

Early in his research, Freud abandons the idea of a predominantly organic body and argues that there is a strong connection between the body and sexuality (the drives). He asserts that the psyche is grounded in bodily sensations. He conceives of the psychic apparatus as able to receive, transform, and represent internal and external perceptions thanks to the body, the site of the ego’s primitive, foundational experiences (Freud, 1905). In this way, mind and body are intricately bound by an indissoluble tie that introduces the field of symbolization.
Winnicott (1970), in turn, delves into the complexity of the beginning of life. He points out the significance of the relationship between psyche and soma and attributes the integration of human beings to a satisfactory operational agreement between them. At first the baby experiences what Winnicott calls “unthinkable anxieties,” which are expressed in the feeling of endless falling and of no longer having a connection with the body. By way of maternal care, contact with the mother, and the feeling of having its needs met, the baby gradually achieves what Winnicott (1988) calls a “sense of continuity,” which is critical for healthy development. The provision of a reliable environment will allow it to reach a state of integration.

When this sense of continuity of being is broken, there is a break in somato-psychic integration, and body and psyche operate discordantly. The mother is expected to understand and translate the baby's communications. The baby, for its part, demands trust to be able to express them. In this way, both transform a body of sensations into a spoken body through a dialogue that is based on bodily functioning (crying, smiles, and so many other expressions). If this functioning is effective, it is silent (Campos, 2011).

Bion (1962) also skillfully describes some primitive feelings. This author stresses that sensory data originate both inside and outside the baby. Initially, they are in a raw state and devoid of meaning (beta elements). Therefore, they need a mind that will welcome them in order to start processing their emotions, an activity closely tied to the formation of symbols and dreams. According to Bion, if emotional experiences are not transformed by the alpha function, they accumulate as beta elements and must be discharged. Elimination may happen through action (using the body in raw form), hallucinations, or somatic innervations. In this sense, the mother's alpha function (mind) is closely tied to the task of containing the baby's sensations (body) and translating them so as to generate a somato-psychic matrix.

Bick (1968) develops the idea of the skin as a metaphor for a container for the ego's psychic functions, an ego that initially is neither integrated nor discriminate. Through an initial communication via skin-to-skin (physical) contact, the mother can provide the baby with a psychic skin, a containing model that will be introjected by the baby and will help it form its own psychic apparatus. Lacking an external container, the baby will necessarily attempt to contain itself and thus develop what the author calls a “second skin.” Anzieu (1985) reaffirms the pivotal role of the skin in relation to the psychic apparatus; the skin provides representations that constitute the ego and its main functions. This author highlights some of the skin-ego's functions: containing envelope (sack), protecting barrier for the psyche (fabric), filter for exchanges and for the inscriptions of the first traces, and mirror of reality. Similarly to the skin, which supports the skeleton and the muscles, the skin-ego functions as a support for the psyche (Anzieu, 1980), and this function is developed through primary identification with a containing object.
The body and analytic training

Throughout the evolution of psychoanalysis, the physical contact between analyst and patient has been the object of different interpretations. Initially, Freud (1909) claimed that the emotions experienced by the analyst favored the understanding of the psyche. In 1912, concerned with ensuring the scientific credibility and the ethics of the discipline, he listed technical recommendations intended to avoid physical contact between patient and analyst. In this way, analysts' actions or feelings directed toward the patient (countertransference) were seen as undesirable, and their elimination was advised. At the same time, the acts and feelings of the patient (transference) were seen as resistance. The countertransference, moreover, was not viewed as an essential tool of the analytic method.

For a long time the word was the favored instrument in the process of communication between members of the analytic couple, and analysts considered that the analyst's body should be safeguarded. Locating it behind the couch would facilitate free association and protect analysts from revealing involuntary physical movements that were expressions of their unconscious. We believe that this choice may have served to promote a certain body/mind dissociation in the analyst as well as in the relationship between analyst and patient, with the consequent delay in theoretical and clinical development.

Gradually, however, analysts seem to have been able to re-conquer more space for their bodies and consider them as a pivotal aspect of analytic work. As theory and personal analysis evolved, the specter of severe, iatrogenic enactments seems to have been mitigated over the years. Today we see that psychoanalytic training within Latin American culture does not forbid physical proximity, bodily contact, or spontaneous gestures between analyst and patient. Returning a hug or a kiss in special dates, accepting presents, offering congratulations for an achievement, attending ceremonies, providing water to a thirsty patient, a towel to the one who arrives soaking wet due to a storm that caught him or her unawares on the way to the office, or money to another who was mugged and has no means to go to his or her next destination are examples of a certain “breakup” of the setting in rare, spontaneous, and humane ways.

We dwell on these relatively common situations that can be considered non-analytic (and not anti-analytic) because we consider that it is important to take them into account. We underscore that we are not promoting or encouraging analysts to act. On the contrary, we believe that recognizing their actions, legitimizing them is the first step toward understanding them better. We need to admit that besides being analysts, we are human beings taking care of other human beings, which is desirable and advisable. We perceive that these situations unfold in a natural, often spontaneous and intuitive way. While this behavior may be considered an enactment because it involves an act, it strongly resembles the care provided to a newborn by its mother, something that can only be felt physically, as Winnicott theorized.
Leite (2006) stresses the relevance of the bodily manifestations and physical sensations generated in the analyst thanks to analytic listening. According to this author, such manifestations and sensations accompany analysts’ association processes in the session. He claims that these effects are more common in clinical work with so-called difficult cases, where the difficulty to represent is enhanced, as well as at critical moments in any analysis. Based on our own experience, we believe that these are special moments when communication between the members of the analytic couple is established in a more primitive way. Overall, these moments are characterized by a strengthening of the bond, a strengthening that is not always verbalized right away but is acknowledged by both members as an “experience of human aliveness” (Ogden, 1997, p. 6).

This spontaneous act tends to be very significant and therapeutic. It could be described as analogous to a dance, where instinctive, spontaneous body movements take place to the sound of the music that resonates in the session, like a psychoanalytic ballet performed by the analytic couple. Even though this event can only be verbalized later, we could say that in some cases there is a tacit understanding that something important and very deep has been shared. In this way, the analytic couple’s somatic manifestations may be interpreted as part of an intense, transformative process rather than just as the expression of an overflow of emotions toward the body (Holovko, 2002).

Falcão (2011), based on Botella and Botella’s ideas, suggests that when analysts are in tune with their patients, they may undergo experiences of the type of the “bodily flash.” Analysts may identify signs of what is inadequately forming in the psyche when they feel something in the body during the session and will search, by way of figurability, for a new way to gain access to what has not yet reached psychic status or, even more, what patients cannot think. The author suggests that we understand this process as an expansion of maternal reverie, which takes a path called pre-figurability.

**Practicing the analytic dance through analytic training**

At certain moments in clinical work, our bodies anticipate something that is not yet verbal. In a session during the first year of treatment of a neurotic patient, during a period with no apparent turmoil, the analyst sat on her armchair and felt compelled to make the automatic movement of fastening her seatbelt, as if she were sitting in her car. Even at a time when she did not need, in fact, to make any movements with her body, she perceived communications coming from it, and stored them in her mind. While the body provides communication signs from the field, for these sensations to become understandable, we must have enough mental time and space to process them. After a few months, the patient was able to verbalize that she was gradually feeling safer in the therapeutic process, because a few months earlier she had felt somewhat lost, and scared of what she might find on the “road” she was traveling in her treatment. The word road seems to be tied to the analyst’s feeling about the seatbelt, a feeling that was still waiting to be deciphered.
When analysts are emotionally attuned to their analysands, their bodily manifestations tend to respond to the level of psychic organization of the analytic field. An exchange of raw elements, affects, and sensations takes place in an interplay in which transference and countertransference are embodied rather than represented (Prat and Israel, 2010). In this context, in certain conditions the exchange enacted by the analytic couple may have a value that should be preserved in its association with language; it may be called “passage to the act” or “interpretive action.” The latter has been described by Ogden (1994, p. 108) as “the analyst’s communication of his understanding of the transference-countertransference to the analysand by means of activity other than that of verbal symbolization.”

A patient who had been in analysis for almost two years and was in the last months of her pregnancy had a hard time lying down comfortably on the couch. The analyst, in turn, perceived that she was also moving more than usual on her armchair during the sessions. She realized she was identifying with her patient and was remembering her own difficulties to lie down when she was pregnant, and how her own analyst had offered her a pillow for support. As a result, probably because she was also identifying with her own analyst, she asked her patient if she wanted to use a cushion. At first the patient said no, but then requested it during the next session.

Surprised, the analyst spontaneously offered the patient her own cushion, the only one available. The patient accepted it and placed it under her belly, and kept it at hand during all her hours until her due date. This personal object carried the analyst’s smell, and was soft. Gradually, it came to be felt as “belonging to this patient” and as if its use by other patients were not “permitted.” It hence acquired the patient’s smell. Soon after that, the patient had a dream. In the dream she had a marsupial in her belly, as if she were a kangaroo, and so she was able to touch her baby, caress it and talk to it in a soothing melody. She associated that this child was still in the process of developing and, therefore, needed this sack/protection until this process ended.

We understand that for this patient, the cushion could represent both the analyst’s (visual) absence and her emotional, empathetic presence. It became a third, just like her own fetus, which was slowly incorporated into the setting. During more regressive times, the patient curled around it in a fetal position, smelling it or hugging it as if it were a transitional object. We believe that the analyst’s associations regarding her identification with the introjected models (of people, analysts, and theories) that provided support for her personal and analytic development were confirmed by the patient’s dream. Just as patient and analyst were supported by the analysis and by analytic training, respectively, until they finished their developmental process, so could the patient, metaphorically, build a container in her dreams – a living physical sack/tissue, that is in constant exchange and motion and provides support for the baby.

We can think that the development of the analyst’s professional identity is also tied to the primary need for a container that, like a marsupial’s pouch, will support him or her throughout analytic train-
ing in all its aspects, namely, theoretical framework, personal analysis, supervision, and institutional involvement. The anxieties and distress produced by the interaction with more regressive patients and/or by the potential for more regressive contact, in special moments, with more balanced patients reinforce even further the role of the support provided by the four pillars. Such support will facilitate the passage from the two-dimensionality of theoretical knowledge to the three-dimensionality of the encounter with the other.

If we drew an analogy between the art of dance and the “art of psychoanalysis,” we could say that playing is actualized when instead of words, a body in motion emerges that produces meaning. While in ballet the goal is to appropriate technique through repetition in search of perfection, contemporary dance favors the esthetic reconstruction of the experiences undergone by the dancers, thus making room for freedom of expression (Campos, 2011). Classical psychoanalysis also rigidly sought technical appropriation. Sometimes, in the early stages of their training, analysts obstinately strive to thoroughly appropriate technique in order to reach perfection. As they progress, however, just like contemporary dancers, they increase their sense of freedom and their participation in the creative process of the analytic couple, with all the new challenges posed by the command of the technique.

In the contemporary dance project, body and language come close to each other, in so far as the body is seen as a bearer of stories. It is a body that presents itself as a stage where a relational dance is being performed between psyche and soma, the basic elements of psychoanalysis. Movement goes from the inside to the outside and brings out each dancer’s language (Campos, 2011). Over the course of analytic training, each candidate also experiences an inside-outside movement that is expressed in a unique way. Each will create his or her own language, in keeping with a unique identity that will gradually develop. In the same way, a language will be established with each patient in the context of a specific harmony, melody, and rhythm, and the analytic couple will dance to that music.

**Conclusions**

We have witnessed how psychoanalysis has evolved from listening to the body of the patient to listening to the body of the analyst. We would like to highlight that the analyst’s actual body, as well as all its manifestations, especially those that are involuntary, may serve as an invaluable source of information, and that the technical/therapeutic use of such information is extremely relevant to the cure. Analysts listen (and communicate) through what they feel in their own body, a surface that acts as a receptor and as an unrepresented channel for the transmission of both patient and analyst’s drives. Patients, in turn, also hear viscerally, based on what the analyst’s body communicates by way of gestures, tones of voice, gazes, smells, and physical contact.

What patients interpret/grasp from the analyst also deserves to be studied in greater depth, something this paper cannot do. We can
assume, however, that from a therapeutic perspective, the complex notion of psychoanalytic interpretation, which is predominantly verbal, goes beyond a simple statement. Probably, what patients understand and construct with it is the result of a shared experience that was gradually created throughout the entire process, something that transcends words.

We believe that those who speak say more than they intended to say. Today, undeciphered somatic manifestations burst into the session, rich in meaning, and make themselves heard. We would like to underscore that the analytic couple’s listening, and their corresponding spontaneous (or not) motions, also happens during the silent moments of the session and shapes, and is shaped by, the field. Therefore, the broadening of the horizons of present-day clinical practice, which includes a greater scope of the various mental/bodily manifestations (which are being taken more into consideration), also makes us ponder the need to modify traditional analytic technique, which favored words. Even if issues as sensitive as this one may eventually cause some unease or concern, the development of spaces that facilitate the study of such topics enhances the flexibility and maturity of a psychoanalysis that changes in response to the demand.

We understand that the more visceral the analytic process, the greater skin-sack-marsupial-mirror support will the analytic couple need. In other words, it will need more holding and reverie. For this reason, we believe that over the course of the analytic training, we need to increase our exploration and reassessment of issues linked to bodily communication by engaging in a broader, more intense, and more complex reflection. To say it differently, we need to create intimacy and seamless communication with our “analytic body.” And just as dance allows us to constantly redefine our physical boundaries, so does the analytic training process allow the expansion of analyst and patient’s mental and physical boundaries in search of the expression and understanding of the unconscious.

The four pillars of analytic training are highly significant in that they facilitate the articulation of what is felt and expressed in and through the body with intuition, feelings, thought, and language. At present, training offers us the support of an innovative theoretical and technical framework that sustains new analysts just as they sustain their patients. In this way, the analytic pair can maintain the analytic dance in a free, creative way, without losing track of the experienced rhythm, which is imposed by the unconscious.

Resumen

El cuerpo posee diversos significados en psicoanálisis, pero su importancia y su utilidad en la técnica psicoanalítica varían de acuerdo a las diferentes teorías y épocas estudiadas. Comenzamos nuestro recorrido en Freud y fuimos revisando otras importantes contribuciones, como las de Winnicott, Bion, Bick, Anzieu y Ogden acerca de la constitución mente-cuerpo. Partiendo de este estudio y como analistas en formación, nos servimos de experiencias clínicas para cuestionarnos cuál es el papel de las manifestaciones del cuerpo de
paciente y analista en el proceso terapéutico. Reflexionamos sobre la forma en la que lidiamos con la irrupción del cuerpo en los tratamientos y la importancia de la formación analítica para respaldar a los candidatos en la desafiante tarea de conectarse y decodificar lo que proviene de su cuerpo y del de su paciente, para que estos, juntos, puedan ejecutar vivamente la danza analítica según el ritmo del inconsciente, en el escenario del campo analítico.

Descriptores: Cuerpo; Yo corporal; Yo-piel; Psiquismo.
Candidates a descriptores: Acción interpretativa; Formación analítica.

Abstract

The body has several meanings in psychoanalysis, but its importance and usefulness for psychoanalytic technique vary according to the different theories and periods studied. The authors begin their journey with Freud and include other important contributions on the development of the mind-body, such as Winnicott, Bion, Bick, Anzieu, and Ogden. Based on this literature and on their point of view as analysts in training, they use clinical experience to question the role of the analyst and patient’s bodily manifestations in the therapeutic process. They ponder how to deal with these manifestations in the therapy, as well as the significance of analytic training in providing them with the necessary support in this challenging task so that they can connect with and understand the messages from their body and from their patients. They believe that this ongoing exercise will allow them to perform the analytic dance vividly to the rhythm of the unconscious in the analytic field.

Keywords: Body; Body-ego; Skin-ego; Psyche.
Candidates to keywords: Interpretive action; Analytic training.
References


On bodies, culture, and habits: Crossings and articulations

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1. Introduction

This morning it occurred to me for the first time that my body, my faithful companion and friend, truer and better known to me than my own soul, may be after all only a sly beast who will end by devouring his master.

Marguerite Yourcenar, 1954

In 1930, Freud describes the three sources of human suffering: “the superior power of nature, the feebleness of our own bodies and the inadequacy of the regulations which adjust the mutual relationships of human beings in the family, the state and society” (Freud, 1930, p. 33). Slightly earlier, he expounds about “our own body, which is doomed to decay and dissolution and which cannot even do without pain and anxiety as warning signals” (p. 26). It is also clear how Yourcenar, in our epigraph, puts these feelings into Hadrian’s mouth, referring to this process as the betrayal of a “faithful companion,” which becomes a “sly beast” that destroys the subject.

Thence we can deduce that the three sources of suffering are interrelated, and that we cannot study them separately. The body represents the traversing of nature by a culture that includes conflicts and deifying ideals. Today the human organism is much better known than it was in Freud’s times, and new technologies, including all kinds of surgeries as well as virtual reality and artificial intelligence, have become new, sophisticated prostheses.

The purpose of this paper is to offer a psychoanalytic perspective on the relationship among the three Freudian sources of suffering. In particular, we inquire into the ways in which beliefs, habits, ways of life, sets of values, traditions, morality, and the law traverse the nature of bodies. To this end, we describe what we consider, from a psychoanalytic perspective, the cultural vectors (legalities and ideals)
that shape subjectivities. The latter articulate through attitudes and behaviors that have been scarcely studied by traditional psychoanalysis. We are referring to habits.

2. Bodies, legalities, and dominant cultural ideals

2.1. Twenty years before the discovery of psychoanalysis, Tylor (1871) formulated one of the first classic definitions of culture as

that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. The condition of culture among the various societies of mankind, in so far as it is capable of being investigated on general principles, is a subject apt for the study of laws of human thought and action. (Tylor, 1971, p. 1; emphasis added)

Diverse schools of thought – culturalist, structuralist, Marxist, neoevolutionist, and others – have studied and defined the scope and the very notion of culture, as well as its relationship with the concept of civilization. One of the major problems, among many, that we are dealing with today is cultural diversity. According to UNESCO’s (2002) Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, “culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (p. 4; emphasis added). Mosterin (2009), for his part, defines culture as information transmitted among animals of the same species by way of social learning. As such, it opposes nature, that is, genetically transmitted information.

This view is tied to the theory of memes. Meme is a neologism coined by Richard Dawkins (1976) to refer to the theoretical unit of cultural information that can be transmitted from one individual to another, from one mind to another, or from one generation to the next. If memes are units or elemental fragments of acquired information, an individual’s culture at a certain time will be the set of memes that are present in that individual’s brain at that time.

2.2. From a psychoanalytic perspective, we think that cultural transmission of “ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” happens through two vectors, namely, dominant legalities and cultural ideals. These vectors, in turn, correspond with the two great modes of psychic functioning, Oedipal and narcissistic. We call dominant cultural legalities the set of explicit and implicit standards and rules of a certain culture. These legalities, which regulate intersubjective relations, originate in traditions, legislations, scientific develop-
ments, and taboos or myths. In relation to the body, they are generally established as the prohibition, authorization, or promotion of behaviors and attitudes that vary according to each subject’s cultural or microcultural milieu.

In a sociological study of the body, Martínez Barreiro (2004) states that dress is part of the microsocial order of most social spaces, and when we dress we must keep in mind the implicit rules governing these spaces, for there is a dress code that we must obey. We may not always be aware of it except in certain circumstances, such as formal occasions, which demand a high level of awareness of our bodies and attire. However, we internalize certain dress rules or standards that we apply unconsciously every day. (p. 128; emphasis added)

This example is valid for numerous physical behaviors, including ways of greeting, posture, distance from the other, erotic and sexual contact, ways of eating, dancing or singing, and so on. We should point out here that legalities may be more or less associated with Foucault’s (1977) concept of disciplines, that is, “methods [that] made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body [and] assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility” (p. 137).

From a psychoanalytic viewpoint, cultural legalities regulate drive satisfaction by way of the superego, which, as is well known, develops based on parental figures. These, in turn, are the bearers of prevailing cultural values. At the same time, the paradigmatic notion of repression, as well as the explanatory concept of the psychoneurotic symptom in the early Freud and the notion of “civilization and its discontents” in the late Freud, is closely related to what we are calling here dominant cultural legalities. We should also take into account that the prohibition-authorization axis is, generally speaking, the site where a range of behaviors are generated – from rebellion to neurotic productions that are consistent with the theory of conflict grounded in the universal Oedipal structure.

The second major vector, ideals, which emerge from another great universal structure in the development of subjectivity, i.e. narcissism and its vicissitudes, produce different effects. We define dominant cultural ideals as the notions and beliefs that develop within a certain culture or microculture and the devices associated with them. These ideals serve to regulate the self-esteem of the subjects who are part of that culture (Zukerfeld and Zonis Zukerfeld, 2005). They involve different discursive variants, circulate in the intersubjective and transsubjective fields, and are reproduced in family, social, and work relationships. As we all know, we must conceptually distinguish here between the ideal as ego ideal, which is part of the intersubjective conflict (trophic narcissism tied to the Oedipal structure), from the ideal as ideal ego, whose prevalence results from a lack that does not appear as conflict but as deficit. Different ideals exist and are pro-

duced at different historical times, and some of them have shown a clear relationship or association with certain pathological conditions. They hence constitute the "social" side of biopsychosocial or pathogenic multidetermination models intended to explain the heterogeneous set of current pathologies.

These ideals are cultural because they are the product of a group that corresponds to a specific place, time, social class, and mode of intersubjective connection. They are dominant because they enjoy an implicit consensus that denotes the existence of a mechanism of obedience to them. Their imposition, therefore, is not necessarily characterized by the tension resulting from subjection, as is the case with certain cultural legalities, but rather by the ego-syntonicity of agreement. They are actually experienced as desirable, so that their dominance is not perceived as such and is somewhat naturalized.

2.3. However, what we view as more significant is the relationship between human bodies and the ideals that appear in a more specific association with certain pathologies. We are referring to the ideals of efficiency, immediacy, and physical manipulation. The ideal of efficiency alludes to cultural conditions that promote performance and competitive victory as defining values for all social practices. In particular, this ideal dominates the work-leisure dynamics and appears as an exaltation of external reality. The already-classic notion of over-adjustment, developed by Liberman et al. (1982), finds its clearest expression in this ideal. Subjects disavow internal signs (e.g. anger, tiredness, fear) in a direct relationship with the achievement of a certain efficiency. Other notions like alexithymia and normopathy (McDougall, 1989) or operatory life (Marty, 1990) are linked to this ideal as well.

The ideal of immediacy refers to cultural conditions that promote ahistoric action, that is, the solution of a problem in a present devoid of antecedents or consequents. In particular, this ideal dominates erotic and social bonds and materializes as intolerance to uncertainty, impulsive activity intended to reduce tension, and the need to permanently acquire up-to-date information. The wide field of addiction finds in it one of its cornerstones, as does the use of communication devices developed by technoculture, since these devices become identity prostheses.

The ideal of manipulation and physical change involves direct action on the body, and is tied to cultural conditions that promote physical perfection and the subversion of biology. In other words, it relies on the ability to endlessly change the aspect and workings of the body in its somatic and sexual capacities. This ideal dominates the bond between subjects and themselves, and it manifests as a tireless search for beauty, power, and youth through diet, muscle development, and surgical manipulation. What prevails here is the disavowal of bodily boundaries as an expression of a culture in which medical technology claims that everything is possible. There is evidence of the association of this ideal with specific pathologies such as anorexia and bulimia, with diffuse disorders such as orthorexia and vigoreia, and with the set of obsessions linked to the search for eternal youth.

It should be stressed here that there is a difference between the
effects on the bodies and on subjectivity of dominant legalities and of dominant cultural ideals. While legalities, regardless of their origin, are part of conflicts that are resolved in different ways, dominant ideals are internalized more naturally and, therefore, their power is not perceived. In a way, they realize the aphorism coined by Pessoa (or one of his heteronyms): “How little of myself is mine.” Both vectors, which regulate bonds, self-esteem, and identities, express themselves through a variety of symptoms but also through attitudes, beliefs and behaviors, which, when repeated and automated, constitute habits. These habits regulate tensions that traverse bodies and are not processed by representational systems.

### 3. Habits: The third repetition

*Pay attention to your thoughts, as they become words;*
*Pay attention to your words, as they become actions:*
*Pay attention to your actions, as they become habits;*
*Pay attention to your habits, as they become your character;*
*Pay attention to your character, as it becomes your destiny.*

Talmudic aphorism

*All our life, so far as it has definite form, is but a mass of habits.*

William James, 1899

#### 3.1. The Real Academia Española defines habit [hábito] (2014) as “the special way of proceeding or behaving acquired by repetition of equal or similar acts or originating in instinctive tendencies”. All the meanings of this word refer to its being a steady disposition to act in a certain way that is acquired through the repetition of certain acts. Habits as such have been largely studied by different disciplines, starting with Aristotle’s (Trad. 1934) hexis, which was translated into Latin as habitus. In his *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle tackles ethical virtues, which constitute a “second nature” in that they are acquired, and distinguishes them from passions. He considers that ethical virtues are habits, that is, “dispositions [that] are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the emotions” (2.5.2). In this sense, habits may be linked to virtue or to vice. Vice is characterized by excess or defect, while virtue is always defined by “the mean.”

Pierre Bourdieu (1987), in turn, has studied this notion from a sociological perspective. This author defines habitus as a set of practices that are generated by social conditions and, at the same time, as the ways in which these practices are related to the social structure and configure a lifestyle. Paul Ricoeur (1950/1986), for his part, argues that habits can be acquired because “the living being has the admirable power of changing himself through his acts” (Ricoeur, 1950/1986, p. 253). Habits, argues Ricoeur, offer a platform for reflection and enable the will to leap forward.

Gregory Bateson considers that habits constitute one of the most significant economies of conscious thought, and that “no organism can afford to be conscious of matters with which it could deal at
unconscious levels” (Bateson, 1967/1991, p. 152). This idea connects habit with memory. Henri Bergson (1896/2006) had already divided memory into habit-memory, technical or constructive, and image-memory, or vital memory. The first one is defined today as implicit memory, a true memory without memories which, according to Cyrulnik (2007), “creates non-conscious sensibilities, preferences, and social skills in people, a kind of memory of the body” (p. 124; emphasis added). In his review of neurocognitive contributions to psychoanalysis, Pedro Moreno (2012) points out that according to Squire, implicit memory includes “a heterogeneous collection of skills, habits, and dispositions that are inaccessible to conscious memory and yet have been molded by experience, influence our behavior and mental life, and are an essential part of who we are” (p. 84; emphasis added).

3.2. Freud writes as follows in Psychopathology of everyday life (1901/1986e):

These extremely frequent chance and symptomatic acts might be arranged in three groups, according to whether they occur habitually, regularly under certain conditions, or sporadically. Actions of the first group (such as playing with one's watch-chain, fingering one's beard and so on), which can almost be taken as characteristics of the person concerned, trench upon the multifarious movements known as tics and no doubt deserve to be dealt with in connection with them. In the second group I include [...], scribbling with a pencil that one happens to be holding, jingling coins in one's pocket [...], fiddling with one's clothing in all kinds of ways and so forth [...], idle play of this sort regularly conceals a sense and meaning which are denied to any other form of expression. (p. 194)

Freud draws a distinction that has not received much attention because the discovery of repression (and based on it, the discovery of “a sense and a meaning” that were the focus of later developments) obscured the understanding of mechanisms originating in habit. At the same time, these “extremely frequent” actions are bodily actions, and are classified according to the logic of the tic – they involve discharges. Nonetheless, sometimes the repressed interferes with habits, as Freud points out later on in the same text:

The smallest actions habitually and inconspicuously performed, for instance winding up one's watch before going to sleep, putting out the light before leaving the room, and so forth, are sometimes prone to disruptions that unmistakably illustrate the influence of unconscious complexes on what appear to be the most firmly established of habits (p. 205; emphasis added)

Furthermore, when he explains the comic effect in his essay on jokes, he points out that “he neglects to adapt himself to the needs of the situation, by giving way to the automatic action of habit” (Freud, 1905, p. 65). In addition, in the cases of Juanito and Dora Freud talks several times about masturbation as a habit, and he had already referred to it as “the one major habit,” something like a “primal addiction” (1897, p. 274). He also uses the term habit in 1912 to allude to humans’ link to food and drink in relation to the vicissitudes of the drive. In this sense, he states that “habit constantly tightens the bond
between a man and the kind of wine he drinks” (Freud, 1912, p. 188), thus showing the strength of the fixation to the object.

We believe, then, that overall, Freud alludes to habit as a more or less automatic discharge, and distinguishes it from the symbolically valuable symptom, which is the product of a conflict. Ferenczi (1926) explicitly tackles this issue when he writes that “habit-formation implies that the id has become responsible for a previous ego-activity (adaptation), whereas to break a habit implies that the conscious ego has taken over from the id a previously automatic method of discharge, in order to apply it in a new direction” (p. 285). Later he adds that “of course the third ego-component, the super-ego, has also an important part to play in processes of habit-formation and habit breaking” (p. 286). Furthermore, he points out that habits would not be easily acquired and abandoned “if there were no previous identification with the educating forces whose example is built up in the mind as a pattern of behavior” (p. 234; emphasis added).

Glover (1928), for his part, argues that habits would be an intermediate action between conscious will and instinctive forces, whereas Hartmann (1938) states that they participate in the regulation of behavior and do not have a specific meaning, and Hart (1953) considers that the automatism of habits may be likened to the automatism of machines. Several contemporary psychoanalytic authors deal with the acquisition and development of habits in relation to implicit memory and learning processes (Davis, 2001; Brockman, 2001; Bowins, 2010). Others, instead, favor the cultural aspect, and differentiate the role of culture from that of instincts in the construction of habits (Chessick, 1997; Hogenson, 2001; Jaenicke, 2010).

According to this overview, we can outline four core features of habits: they are acquired, repeated, unconscious, and automatic (ARUA).

4. This acronym [ARIA in Spanish] has a metaphorical value, since “aria” is a musical piece created to be sung by a soloist and is part of an opera. In the same way, and following William James (as quoted in the epigraph), habits constitute subjects’ expressive melody in everyday life.
Involves enacting the resisting symptom. The other, the compulsion to repeat, is beyond the pleasure principle (Freud, 1920). The first one is the repetition of conflict, which may be deciphered in its transactional-desiderative composition. Subjects repeat so as not to remember. The second one, linked to trauma, is a binding repetition aimed at working through the ineffable. The difference between conflict and trauma is resolved between the two, but both involve symptomatic manifestations and both have been described in character disorders.

3.3. What we are arguing here, however, is that psychoanalytic theory and practice should also be concerned with what we understand as a third type of repetition, that of the habit, which we call regulatory repetition. When we acquire habits, we repeat in order to instate in our memory what we want to remember without having to think about it. They hence constitute a central aspect of our personality. Yet, what kind of memories are we talking about? These are not the memories of the episodic or semantic narrative (declarative memory), but, as Bleichmar (2001) points out, presymbolic inscriptions solidly embedded in the psyche that form implicit memory and are inscribed in the non-repressed unconscious. In other words, they are procedural and emotional memories. This process involves an economy of repression and conscious energy based on automatization. Consequently, habits perform a regulatory function.

Habits are acquired as a “second nature” in Aristotelian terms. They are the product of culture, and are thus distinguished from innate reflexes. Yet what is important is the difference between habits and symptoms, for, sensu stricto, the former do not stem from conflict. There is no transaction or return of the repressed but a combination of identifications, repetitions, and regulation of excitations, depending on which type of habits they are. Consequently, the metapsychology of habits that we are advancing here suggests that from a topographic point of view, they are procedures that develop and consolidate in the non-repressed unconscious. This thesis is based on the heterogeneity of the unconscious because it implies that repression is not part of every unconscious production.

From a dynamic point of view, therefore, there is no intrapsychic conflict in the construction of the habit, but conflicts can interfere with habits by way of inhibition or excess. At the same time, however, the automatism of habits may crystallize a conflict and render it chronic. This means that under certain conditions, the third repetition subsumes the other two. Moreover, we must take into account intersubjective conflicts that develop when childhood habits do not satisfy the caregiver’s desires or, in general, the appearance of habits that clash with the ideals of a certain family and cultural realm. In this sense, and from a structural perspective, the ego, which is the agent of habits, perceives the tension in the superego.

As a result, the habit acquires an egodystonic quality that it did not have at the outset as a process which is external to conflict. However, conflict may also generate habits, in the sense that the latter may be a device for defense or for the containment of anxiety. From this point of view, whether or not a habit has a regulatory function, it is a mechanism for adapting to the environment that may thereby be considered as a defense against the repressed contents.

5. The cough symptom is a clinical example of how a symptom that expresses conflict can become automatic and be transformed into a habit in the case of the so-called nervous cough.
not have at first. At the same time, certain habits consolidate due to the secondary gain they entail for the ego. From the economic point of view, habits involve an economy of conscious energy and a discharge of excitations. For this reason, as we pointed out earlier, they perform a regulatory function that may be altered, precisely, by intrapsychic conflicts or by threats posed by external reality.

We can roughly classify habits into four categories – physiological, affective, cognitive, and operational – while taking into account that they all articulate culture, mind, and body. Physiological habits are innate and constitute basic ego functions (related to food, sleep, motion, and so on). Their modality and features depend on the child’s interactions with its caregiver, and they are unconsciously established in a process that is strongly tied to both dyadic emotional regulation and self-regulation. The second group comprises emotional or affective habits, that is, the various modes of emotional response to events, and especially the link modality – the ways of being with others. We should also include here the degree of intimacy experienced in primary links and the series of empathy, reflective function, and mentalization (Fonagy, 2006).

The third group is made up of cognitive and executive habits: systems of beliefs, goal setting or inhibition, and initiating or maintaining an action. Finally, the fourth group is composed of operational, or motor, habits, whose acquisition is the result of voluntary learning, repetition, and training. Among them are riding a bicycle, playing the piano, and playing tennis. They tend to become significant ego resources because they constitute skills or aptitudes that subjects may or may not develop and are relevant in transformation processes. Habits, then, are not just behaviors or skills but a complex combination of intertwined unconscious procedures that may or may not be impeded by conflict. Such interference, however, is different from the construction of the habit, since habits are a product of the non-repressed unconscious.

Figure 1 shows the permanent relationship between symptomatic offshoots of conflict and the latter’s interference effect on certain habits (for instance, conversion mechanisms), as well as the automatization habits may cause, which renders certain symptoms chronic.

4. Mentalized body and embodied mind

…complexity cannot be summarized by the word complexity, cannot be brought back to a law of complexity nor be reduced to the idea of complexity. Complexity cannot be something that would be defined in a simple way and would replace simplicity. Complexity is a problem word, not a solution word. Edgar Morin, 2008
4.1. The classification and definition discussed above show, in our perspective, how habits become essential and recursive articulators between mind and body. In this sense, if we distinguish between the materiality of the body and its representation (the body image), we must take into account the ways in which acquiring habits through interaction and identification with significant figures leads to the development of this representation of the body. In this representation, conscious, preconscious, and unconscious levels intertwine. These levels refer to its shape or aspect, its interiority, and its meaning, respectively.

The level of shape comprises conscious representations associated with the direct perception of the dimensions, posture, motion, and surface of the body, which are directly accessible through sensory organs. The level of interiority, by contrast, includes preconscious representations linked to proprioceptive and kinesthetic sensations, among them, signs within the series hunger-satiety, tension-release, and pain-pleasure. Finally, the level of meaning corresponds to the notion of erogenous body and includes the set of unconscious representations tied to intersubjective links and the vicissitudes of desire. It is well known that the caregiver’s habits contribute to bodily erogeneity and to its close relationship with the level of interiority and its physiological habits. At the same time, the three levels are articulated through cognitive, emotional, and operational habits.

There are, then, mental habits that determine and modulate bodily aspects, perceptions, and functions, and there are also physical habits that determine different kinds of psychic functioning. We can hence point to the complexity involved in the fact that the first statement suggests the existence of a mentalized body, and the second, of an embodied mind. Ricardo Bernardi (2002/2005) challenges the traditional division between erogenous and biological body as well as the distinction between body and psyche. He posits the existence of a single but complex body, and of “an embodied psyche,” and recognizes “on the border between them the existence of both areas of overlap and no man’s lands” (p. 42).

Many have thought and written about this matter, from Descartes to Spinoza and from Plato to Kandel, and from the medical scientists of Freud’s times to present-day psychoneuroimmunoendocrinologists. The series soul-psyche-mind and organism-soma-body, as well as their different monistic and dualistic versions, have brought to light the above-mentioned complexity, which prevents this type of problem from being “reduced to the idea of complexity,” in Morin’s words. In actuality, it is Freud who develops the notion of a psychic apparatus activated by the drives and their vicissitudes with objects.

We should recall here what André Green argues in his debate with Chiozza. There, he points out that Freud’s position is, on the contrary, conceiving of the psyche as inseparable from the body, differentiated from it and dependent on the needs that place it in the animal series [...] monism is not, incidentally, suitable to defend this position [...] Freud, then, will be left with only one strategy, that is, the defense and illustration of a ‘reunion dualism’ against the dualism of separation, which is the ordinary form of dualistic concepts. Freud’s originality was the
creation of a reunion dualism. By this notion, we should understand a structural rather than essential difference between the psychic and the non-psychic (or bodily). It is a conception of the psyche as both rooted in the body and determined by its objects, instead of as an autonomous organization. (Green and Chiozza, 1992, pp. 47-49; emphasis added)

From the perspective of this reunion dualism, we choose the word mind to refer to the functioning of a psychic apparatus in which repressed and non-repressed processes coexist that depend on a neuro-biological substratum traversed by culture and its vectors, that is, by legalities and dominant cultural ideals. In addition, we use the word body to allude to the complex set of biological mechanisms, with and without symbolic value, that traverse and are traversed by the mind.

4.2. This idea of taking root allows us to argue that there is an “embodied mind.” Damasio (1994) describes it when he writes that the body “contributes a content that is part and parcel of the workings of the normal mind” (p. 226), and adds that “mind is probably not conceivable without some sort of embodiment” (p. 234; author’s emphasis). We should point out here that due to the above-mentioned complexity, changes in biological functions (e.g. endocrine, neurological, or immunological) affect psychic functioning. This is the case, for instance, with so-called major depression or thyroid disorders, as well as with any chronic pathology. Besides, along with this embodied mind there is a “mentalized body” whose main expression, conversion hysteria, led to Freud’s discovery of repression and the unconscious.

Nevertheless, as we indicated earlier, the effects of the psychic apparatus on bodily functions are not limited to conversion phenomena, as evidenced by somatization, stress symptoms, and the findings of the Paris school of psychosomatics. In both cases, habits act as recursive articulators, as we have pointed out, because under different conditions the body shows habits that generate mental and subjective states, and the mind develops habits that determine a variety of bodily attitudes, ways of functioning, and behaviors. Hence, the first movement corresponds to the embodied mind, and the second to the mentalized body.

4.3. Neuroscientific findings have made it possible to distinguish between declarative or explicit memories, on the one hand, and implicit memories, on the other. The latter, procedural and emotional, correspond to unconscious modes of functioning that, as mentioned earlier, constitute the topographic and economic foundations of habits. Emotional memory depends on different neural structures such as the amygdala, which receives stimuli from the external world that do not reach the cortex. This information immediately activates a series of bodily responses. At the same time, the activated body, through a recurrent circuit, also emits a series of responses that are interpreted first by the amygdala and then by cortical circuits, where a narrative is created that includes the reading of the corporeal along with sub-

6. Ramón Riera (2011) also uses this term to refer to Damasio’s research into the embodied mind.
Damasio describes this reading of a kind of “landscape” as follows: “In the landscape of your body, the objects are the viscera (heart, lungs, gut, muscles), while the light and shadow and movement and sound represent a point in the range of operation of those organs at a certain moment. By and large, a feeling is the momentary ‘view’ of a part of that body landscape” (Damasio, 1994, p. xiv-xv). Moreover, he is the one who describes “somatic markers,” that is, bodily signs that appear in response to certain stimuli associated with primary emotions (e.g. fear, joy) at first, and later, by way of social learning, with complex feelings that determine decisions and behaviors. Detecting the landscape, therefore, involves identifying affects expressed in attitudes and behaviors that are not tied to the repressed. We believe that these considerations allow us to argue that the separation between erogenous body and soma may conceal, deep down, a Cartesian way of thinking and support, to some extent, a “neurotic-centric” approach.

Doubtless, different authors across the history of psychoanalysis have clearly distinguished conversion from other mechanisms, but always based on the tenet that psychic functioning determines bodily functioning. Yet, what happens when the body, through the substances that form it, sends messages to the mind and provokes emotional, behavioral, or ideational changes? Pondering the mutual influence, the coexistence of habit and conflict and the lack of a causal relationship between them is a necessary and ongoing task for psychoanalytic thought, and has two purposes. One is avoiding theoretical naiveté, and the other, avoiding unrecognized iatrogenias.

It is important to remember that in both directions, when the mechanism is unconscious (but not repressed), repeated, and automatic, we are dealing with different types of habits that may or may not be interfered by conflicts tied to a subjective history. Figure 2 shows an outline of the process described above, whereby culture generates habits through its two major vectors (legalities and dominant cultural ideals), associated with the founding myths (Oedipus and Narcissus). Some of these habits are acquired by learning, and others are established unconsciously and act as articulating agents between the two ways – the embodied mind (EM) and the mentalized body (MB).

From here derive the corollaries that give title to this paper:

a) Cultural vectors, in their Oedipal and narcissistic modes, traverse bodies, generating different types of habits, some of which are established on innate foundations.

b) Consolidated habits articulate the functioning of what we call mind with the functio-
ning of what we call body in such a way that no cause or origin can be determined, and also perform regulatory functions.

5. On shaking clinical pictures

Every sickness has an alien quality, a feeling of invasion and loss of control that is evident in the language we use about it [...] The shaking woman felt like me and not like me at the same time. From the chin up, I was my familiar self. From the neck down, I was a shuddering stranger [...] I decided to go in search of the shaking woman.

Siri Hustvedt, 2010

5.1. Fabiana is 24 years old. She is covered in several layers of clothing, and her thinness is startling. What is most striking, however, is the rigidity of her movements, her absent gaze, and her scant gestures. She says her previous analyst threw her out because she was tired of her repetitive tales about her fear of putting on weight, of food, and of physical activity, and because Fabiana “didn’t comply with the treatment’s conditions; I didn’t bring my dreams or associate.” She is the eldest of three siblings. The other two are men and work in the family business. She says that she was obese as a child, and that her weight prompted her cousins to make fun of her. Her mother punished her violently for the same reason. She would often say to her, “Stop eating. Because of you we’re the family’s laughingstock.”

During her analysis she discovers that her father, who also punished her, is an alcoholic, and that the family negates his behavior. To go to school, she would cover her entire body so that nobody would see her bruises. Her mother would do all her homework for her because she claimed Fabiana was useless. Her worst experiences began at 14, when she started cutting her hands. Once they had to call an ambulance. It was then that she first started therapy. She relates that they treated her as if she were crazy and gave her a medication that made her gain a lot of weight. Then she started eating by herself. She had no friends, and spent her days at home or working for the family business.

She started searching the Internet and reading specialized books and magazines in order to learn the number of calories contained in each food and the caloric expenditure of each activity. She adds and subtracts calories all day long. She works out for four to six hours a day, and if she eats anything out of her plan, she adds another hour on the exercise bike. When this is not enough, she starts throwing up. This behavior started after an argument with her mother. In her initial interviews with her current analyst, she says, “I throw up three or four times a day, but I’m getting along pretty well with Mom. The problem is that now she wants me to gain weight.”

The new analytic process is conducted in an interdisciplinary framework. The analyst is in touch with a nutritionist and a psychia-

7. At that time she weighed 40 kg, when the average weight for her age and height is around 54 kg.
trist. They focus on different issues related to her vomiting and to her eating and workout habits. In the transference, based on the drawings and poems she brings to her hour, the analyst encourages her to engage in artistic activities. Perceiving her analyst's approval, Fabiana starts to take drawing lessons. After two years, her weight has become normal. It is still on the low side, but her diet is better. She struggles with what she calls “throwing up for the fun of it,” can distinguish between being fat and feeling fat, and starts a relationship with an art teacher.

5.2. Alicia is 19 years old. Last year she graduated from a prestigious bilingual high school. She was an excellent student. She is the first daughter of successful professionals who are athletes and are very self-demanding about their looks. When she goes shopping with her mother, they are asked if they are sisters. She played sports at school and participated in several tournaments. She writes down everything that happens to her in her journal, lists the phone calls she needs to make every day, never forgets a date, and keeps track of everyone who calls her on her birthday and gets very upset if someone forgets. She says that her last year of school “was not a good year.” Her parents started asking what she wanted to study, and she was very confused. She's sick of studying, and nothing appeals to her. She is constantly comparing herself to others and feels that she does not share interests with her schoolmates. She is insecure, and feels the need to eat out of the blue.

At the same time, when the date of the graduation trip approaches, she starts feeling anxious. She feels fat, and says that the way her body looks, she could never wear a swimsuit. She asks her mother to take her to a doctor, who tells her that her weight is right for her age and height, but if she wants she can lose two kilos. He gives her a diet. She starts feeling that her parents are watching her. Meals become torture; she is tense, feels great abdominal pain, and her throat closes. As a result, she often leaves the table without eating and then eats everything she can find. These bingeing episodes recur, and she says she is very distressed. She feels that everything is out of control and does not know what to do.

During the analytic process, the analyst makes supporting interventions intended to validate the patient's experience in situations that are demanding and paralyzing due to ambivalent identifications with the parental figures. After a year of treatment, Fabiana says, “My mom is wonderful, I love her, but she works a lot. I want her to have peace of mind, to rest.”

5.3. As we can see in these short vignettes, these are patients who suffer what psychiatry designates as “eating disorders.” Like other illnesses that compromise the body and entail significant risk, these pathologies reveal a “shaking” clinical picture, insofar as they produce fear, mystery, and frustration. Both patients exhibit pathological eating behavior and, more specifically, distorted body images, but their

8. The analyst makes an interpretive intervention that is confined to reverting the order of the phrase, which becomes “to rest in peace” and generates significant insight about the patient’s ambivalence.
history and parental links are very different. Fabiana shows a prevalence of the effects of trauma, and Alicia, of the Oedipal conflict. Still, both display repetitive behaviors and beliefs that have become automatic, for instance, vomiting in Fabiana, and bingeing in Alicia. At the same time, cultural vectors are present in both cases that are acting through the Internet in the first case and through the parental environment in the second.

In both cases, the analytic process could progress because the analysts were engaged and listened. Simultaneously, however, they saw these shaking bodies altered by distorted psychic functioning and contaminated minds – in Fabiana’s case, by the body’s physiological disorders. It is our contention that in both patients we can see how conflict interferes with eating habits as well as with cognitive habits (beliefs) concerning their bodies, and how the automatization of these habits renders conflict chronic and hinders its resolution. Furthermore, we should highlight the styles of intervention and the design of the frame, which shows a great availability of the analyst within an interdisciplinary framework. Fabiana’s analyst does not just listen to her story; she also sees a malnourished body and its effects on the psyche. Alicia’s analyst, in turn, must intervene within a microcultural context full of habits that perpetuate singular conflicts.

6. Final thoughts: On Procrusteanism and translation

It’s that there are “resistances” to translation, resistances that may be subsumed into two equally powerful forces. On the one hand, there is the ethnocentrism of the target or translating language, its tendency toward cultural hegemony, its difficulty to say the other because it cannot stop saying itself. On the other, there is the inscrutability of the foreign-language text. Patricia Willson, 2009

The body that has traditionally been the concern of psychoanalysis is the erogenous body. In his debate with Marty, Green (2000) asserts that this is the only body in which he is interested as a psychoanalyst, and that he leaves the other one (the soma) to the sciences dealing with biology. He states as follows:

The body is the libidinal body in a broad sense (erotic, aggressive, and narcissistic libido), while the soma refers to the biological organization, if we agree that we can separate the unconscious from the libido, as Marty argues. Yet in analysis [...] it should be understood that we must always deal with the body, even in the case of somatic disorganization. Would it be possible to work directly with the soma? I do not think so. (p. 56)

Still, considering what we have discussed in this essay, we ask the following questions: Is this body with no narrative, called soma or organism, absent from the psychoanalytic scene? Do the connection between mind and soma and the messages the former sends have conflict as their only source? In fact, we think we are dealing with a unit that is approached with different methodologies, harbors manifold languages and crossroads, and is a space where new languages are created.
Is it possible to interpret that subjects whose antibodies are attacking the cells of their thyroid gland are attacking themselves? It is clear that analysts do not treat somatic disorders, but, can we overlook them? Or, what is worse, can we attach a meaning to them that will reaffirm our identity status? This is the problem that we define as Procrusteanism, that is, the tendency to manipulate certain facts cognitively and emotionally to make them fit into preexisting theoretical ideas or to attribute familiarity to the unknown (Zukerfeld and Zonis Zukerfeld, 2016).

Moreover, this attitude is innocuous neither in clinical work, nor in terms of the position of psychoanalysis in the field of mental health or, in general, in the scientific realm. At the same time, today the analytic frame includes face-to-face modalities in which analysts not only listen but also see and are seen, and these meetings are full of words and gestures, emotions, and thoughts. It is easy to acknowledge that the body-mind-culture unit and its relational derivatives in the transference field involve a range of singular problems.

We think, therefore, that we cannot reduce this unit and its complex mechanisms to a single language. In order to do our job, we must translate, but translating is not reducing; “translating is understanding,” as Ricoeur points out, paraphrasing George Steiner. Ricoeur also writes: “There is certainly a constraint: if we want to travel, to negotiate, indeed to spy we definitely have to have messengers who speak the language of others” (p. 21; emphasis added). Consequently, it is important to understand these messengers who come from the same land but contribute different languages. To do so in analytic practice, we must adopt an interdisciplinary perspective. Thus, present-day psychoanalysis must come to terms both with its “difficulty to say the other because it cannot stop saying itself” and “the inscrutability of the foreign-language text” that Willson mentions in the epigraph to this section.

Analysts must hence be humble “polyglots” in terms of both how we listen and look and how we intervene. Perhaps, if we pay attention to conflict and habit, as the Talmud advices, accept the impossibility of the master word, as Morin points out, and understand how little of ourselves is ours, as Pessoa writes, bodies will cease to be “shuddering strangers,” as Hustvedt puts it, and, above all, will not threaten us with the uncanny anxiety of the “sly beasts” described by Yourcenar’s Hadrian.

**Resumen**

El propósito de este trabajo es presentar una perspectiva psicoanalítica de cómo atraviesan la naturaleza de los cuerpos los vectores culturales –legalidades e ideales– que conforman subjetividades que se articulan a través de hábitos. Las legalidades son normas explícitas e implícitas que regulan las relaciones intersubjetivas, y los ideales culturales dominantes son las nociones y creencias, que se ofrecen para la regulación de la autoestima de los sujetos que integran una cultura determinada. Los hábitos son actitudes y comportamientos adquiridos, repetidos, inconscientes y automáticos, que pueden ser interferi-
dos por un conflicto, pero que son un producto de lo inconsciente no reprimido. Se plantea la existencia de una “mente corporizada” y un “cuerpo mentalizado” como un doble circuito donde los vectores culturales atraviesan los cuerpos generando distintos tipos de hábitos. Además, los hábitos consolidados articulan en sentido recursivo los funcionamientos de lo que llamamos mente con los de aquello que llamamos cuerpo. Se presentan dos viñetas clínicas que definen lo que se llama “clínica temblorosa”, donde el trabajo analítico con la unidad mente-cuerpo necesita dispositivos de traducción para comprender que la separación entre cuerpo erógeno y soma puede ocultar en el fondo un pensamiento cartesiano.

**Descriptores:** Mente; Cuerpo; Ideal; Hábitos; Traducción.

**Abstract**

The aim of this paper is to present a psychoanalytic perspective of how the nature of bodies is traversed by cultural vectors –legalities and ideals– that shape subjectivities and are articulated through habits. Legalities are explicit and implicit rules governing relationships, and the dominant cultural ideals are notions and beliefs that contribute to regulating the self-esteem of the subjects that integrate a particular culture. Habits are acquired, repeated, unconscious, and automatic attitudes and behaviors that can be interfered by a conflict but are a product of the non-repressed unconscious. The authors advance the existence of an “embodied mind” and a “mentalized body” as a double circuit where cultural vectors traverse the bodies, generating different types of habits. Besides, consolidated habits articulate the operations of what we call mind with those of what we call body, creating a mutually influenced meaning.

Two clinical vignettes are presented that define what the authors call "shaking clinical pictures," where the analytic work with the mind-body unit needs translation devices. The aim is to understand that the separation between erogenous body and soma may hide a Cartesian way of thinking.

**Keywords:** Mind; Body; Ideal; Habits; Translation.

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The analyst is present:
The sensitive art of
Marina Abramović

Some information about the artist

Marina Abramović was born in 1946 in Belgrade, in the former Yugoslavia. From the beginning of her career, in the 1970s, she was a pioneer in the use of performance as a form of visual art. In her first works she explored the physical and mental boundaries of her being, and resisted exhaustion and pain countless times in her search for a potential emotional transformation. In 2011 the Modern Art Museum of New York (MoMA) launched a major retrospective of her career. For three months, Abramović sat on a chair for twelve hours, six days a week, without getting up to satisfy physical needs. She gave museum visitors the opportunity to sit in front of her in silence and

* Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of Sao Paulo.
establish a connection through the gaze, the only sense at their disposal. The result of this experience may be seen in the documentary *Marina Abramović: The artist is present* (Chermayeff & Dupre, 2012).

**Performance as Art: Present Body**

If we examine the word performance, which serves as a name for this artistic expression, we can see that it starts with the prefix per. This prefix plays an emphasizing role and denotes *proximity*, *intensity*, or *totality*. The noun *form*, in turn, highlights the external boundaries of the matter making up a body, which confer upon it its particular aspect or configuration. Consequently, this word indicates the mode of existence or manifestation of a thing. For our purposes, therefore, we can take the word *performance* to mean something that has a certain configuration and is intensely expressive. In this mode of artistic manifestation, artists’ present body, by expressing itself in a certain
At what stage of the development of art did artists come to be considered works of art?

Performance as art is characteristic of the second half of the twentieth century, but its origins can be traced back to the avant-garde movements of the beginning of that century. We could think that the seeds of the presence of the artist as an artwork were sown by the expressionist movement. The members of this movement wanted their work to convey feelings, especially those that had permeated them while they created their work. Van Gogh, who is considered a pre-expressionist and who poured his emotional turmoil into his paintings, said that his ultimate wish was that the person who looked at one of his pieces would say, “This artist can really feel.” We should not forget that psychoanalysis was also developing at the beginning of that century, based on its creator's dreams. Work and author also became one.

If the work of art records the artist's feelings, as the expressionists assumed, the next step would be to consider that the acting artist expresses the work of art itself.

The artist, the artwork, and the spectator

If we think of the historical evolution of the relationship between artwork and spectator, at first we can envision three separate objects, namely, the artist, the artwork, and the spectator. Artists leave their marks in the work. Their body disappears, and their bodily invisibility is recorded in the singularity of their traces and in their signature. The task of the anonymous spectator is simply to observe. With the emergence of expressionism, whose advocates wanted spectators faced with their work to simply feel, we can assume that a new vision was formed concerning the relationship between artwork, artist, and spectator. Work and artist mingle in such a way that artists carry their work in their bodies. Artists become art – they are the artwork itself.

And spectators? What role do they play in this new art? They abandon voyeurism and start to interact with the work. Let us return, then, to the art propounded by Abramović. We do not find it in the spectator or in the artist, but in the relationship that is established between them. The work is in between. When the spectator or the artist leaves, the work disappears; it no longer exists in the real world but remains as a transforming experience in the imaginary of artist and spectator.

The artist's journey: From the concrete body to abstraction

In the 1970s, Marina presented a series of performances under the title of *Rhythm* in which her body was available for extreme actions carried out both by the audience and by her. Spectators, and sometimes the artist herself, behaved as if they were acting upon her inert
body – as if her body were a concrete object with no subject whose physical integrity was not at stake. Among all the possible explanations, to understand this experience we could think that the idea was to show that an extreme physical action must be carried out upon this inert body to awaken it and thus subjectivate it.

In *Rhythm 10* (1973), for instance, the artist took twenty different knives and stuck them between her fingers. She would do this very fast, until she cut herself. Then she would change knives. Let us imagine that the artist wants to treat herself as a concrete body, an object with no subject, whose world bursts violently into its environment to stir it up. After years of engaging in a performance work in which violence exerted on the body played a key role, Marina performs *The Artist is Present*. In this case, the idea seems to be to display a body that contains its subjectivity in its entirety and offer spectators an essentially abstract contact that can arouse intense emotions through the gaze, the senses, and the imagination.

We might assume that in the evolution of her work, the artist somehow mimics human psychic development. A body in contact with the world (and in this case, such contact is extremely painful) slowly builds a psyche, fantasies, and thought, and may reach an extreme degree of subtlety and sensory intensity by offering affect through a gaze. By way of my experience as a psychoanalyst, I intend to reflect on this latest work by Abramović and ponder what may be the reason of its intense effect on us.

**The art of the link: The question of experience in the artwork and in the analytic scene**

This is a reflection shared by psychoanalysts. There is no doubt that the word *link* rapidly takes us to a place we know well, that is, the consulting room. We are very familiar with the experience of the analytic link, its strength, its density, its ramifications, its splits, its mysteries, and, primarily, the obstacles we often face when we want to recount, beyond the four walls of the consulting room, emotional events occurring in our work. The experience suggested by Marina Abramović in *The Artist is Present* immediately refers us to our profession, for this experience reveals what we witness through the development of the analytic link and verbal language.

**The visibility of the transference: The analyst is present**

In the consulting room, we focus first and foremost on the field of the word, which gives voice to the psychoanalytic event and carries a whole range of unconscious, sensory, and emotional experiences that are alive in the transference link. It is hard not to see in the word (which we modify with the adjective *interpretive*) a kind of decisive moment in the transforming process resulting from the meeting between analyst and analysand, a moment whose purpose is to open new possibilities in mental life. We consider that the upheavals of neurosis are a kind of dam in a river that should flow freely toward
the sea, following its unique, singular course. From this viewpoint, psychosis could be envisioned as an accident that halts the current of that river (which has a free-flowing nature and is in constant motion) and makes it stagnate or even dries its bed.

In this way, interpretive words would be there, in the psychoanalytic field, as a kind of compass – as magnetized words. We know that the interpretive word is not a word without body or history. Moreover, it is not directed to an object, but to a subject who came looking for it and is present with his or her history, pain, fears, terrors, sensoriness, thoughts, silences, affliction, perplexity, emptiness... We go into our consulting rooms with our theories, which are always trying to trace a roadmap for mental development, a kind of guide that will facilitate our understanding of our experiences and convey them to our patients.

Our theories foresee, without exception, the idea of a beginning, a point of departure, as if, in a certain way, the biblical story of Genesis were repeating itself; first came chaos, or, before words came the body. Words offer a path for development that will structure our thinking, whereby a baby, whether still protected by the mother's womb or already in contact with the external world, gradually develops its mind in its interaction with countless stimuli of the most diverse nature.

As the passage of time imposes its presence, the body evolves by way of innumerable processes of which we have scant knowledge, and thus gradually acquires its subjectivity. It is almost as if it stopped being an object to become a subject. In this, almost biblical, story, words gradually earn a place, and are perfected and viewed as if their acquisition placed subjects at a highly developed psychic level. In this sense, it is very likely that we will eventually stop noticing that words have never abandoned their historical body, full of sensory impressions and non-verbal experiences.

If we now return to our initial question about the profound effect of Abramović's work on its spectators, it is very likely that this effect is due to the absence of words. The lack of words offers us the opportunity to observe the more forceful emotions that often serve as their foundation. In the same way, the analytic bond, grounded in the transference, may be experienced as a permanent inaugural experience whose sensoriness is open both to emotional events and to the spoken words, the heard silences, and the perceived movements that may be stirred up over the course of a session. All non-verbal and sensory experiences are there in an analysis. All we have to do is feel them.

Resumen

Es muy posible que la artista Marina Abramović, al expresarse como la propia obra de arte, hiciera evidente el vigor imperativo que un vínculo emocional puede despertar. El psicoanálisis, al darnos a conocer la fuerza de la transferencia y enseñarnos a sumergirnos en la densidad de sus desdoblamientos, ofrece una experiencia no siempre dispuesta a dejarse esclarecer. El expresivo arte de Marina Abramović da visibilidad a la voz psicoanalítica. Y así, una vez más, el arte y el psicoanálisis se entrelazan. La intención de las palabras de este texto, por lo tanto, es mostrar cómo un arte expresivo, sin palabras, puede
It is quite possible that the artist Marina Abramović, by expressing herself as the work of art itself, has made visible the imperative force that may be awakened by an emotional bond. By unveiling the strength of the transference and teaching us to submerge ourselves in the density of its deployments, psychoanalysis offers an experience that cannot always be elucidated. The expressiveness in the art of Marina Abramović makes the psychoanalytic voice visible. Thus, once again, art and psychoanalysis intertwine. The intention of this text, therefore, is to show how art’s wordless expressiveness can give voice and images to the experience lived by analyst and patient in the analytic session.

**References**

Countless:
Analysts and their bodies

There is a story that says that when we reach the fourth floor, the elevator stops and the doors open. That there’s some sleepy timber in the shape of a floor, and that the very lively lights gently touch the walls and chatter with the air. That the notes, papers, and books jump up and down on the table. That the rug teaches time, which used to move differently, how to walk, and that the armchair looks at the couch and the clock hands jump five times, ten squares at a time... and in the middle, they say, there are, most of all, two tiny flames of life.

In a toy box that has more toys than a toy store, a letter was once found that read:

- Do you know how many stars are in the sky?
- No, I don’t... many.
- You really don’t know... There are less than you can count.
- How can you be so sure?
- Easy... Count less!

They say that everyone knows about the fifty minutes, that people disagree about that, and that the fifty minutes make it easier to find psychoanalysts’ consulting rooms. At the same time, a question is in the air: How do you find psychoanalysts? How do you corporealize them?

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1. The original play on words is untranslatable. Cincuenta means fifty, and sin cuenta, which is pronounced exactly the same, means countless. My attempt at translation leaves out the word “fifty” and hence the connection with the duration of a session. (T. N.)
The little ones scream that the stars have been placed in the firmament so that they can’t be discovered – that they are annoyingly countless, marvelously numberless... that there are Cetus, Andromeda, Crater, constellations and constellations. They hum that stars dress up in costumes, come together, and transform to give birth to other constellations.

The mystery returns... bodies, limited expanses, analysts, people, patients, people. How is a psychoanalyst formed? The kids answer that just like the stars in the heavenly board, with their shapes, and the clouds, with their designs... a psychoanalyst is created in a game played by two or more where one lends oneself to be seen, and the one who sees, in seeing, is observed, and in this play of gazes, everyone sees.

The lads whistle that analysts can be quantified, can fit into the number fifty, into that joke that is life, that disguises realities, that doodles images. The kids keep whistling, but the faces in the sky’s sponges dissipate, and the question returns: How are analysts formed?

_They essay that it’s easy – COUNTLESS..._ Apparently, the story is told along with another person and with as many others as inhabit that person. The story has good and bad breasts, good-enough doodles, white beards and pipes among so many costumes... It has friends, parents, colleagues, people, patients, and partners... it has so many experiences, formations and deformations... so many children, babies, teenagers, and adults who inhabit them and inhabit unawares, unwittingly.

The story tells about characters that blend into countless ones.

They say that inside the countless there are things to be recounted, to be discovered – revealed, glimpsed things that, from one moment to the next, may tell a different story, and this story, in turn, tells another one that retells a known one... Children say that psychoanalysts are like clouds in a blue country sky, like the figures kids see caressing the grass... that they take different shapes, that there are many... that a single one can have different images, that they can shift, join other clouds, leave and come back. They can be the product of more than one cloud; they are in the air but also on land; they are light but, at the same time, heavily burdened; they feel, they are sensitive to the weather, to the winds that announce and accompany storms, they provide shade... They say that if we close our eyes and can see again, we can see something else, other worlds... They chant that analysts can read two or more stories at the same time in the same book, see more than one movie in a film... They mention that they can count countlessly.

Gouts with red marbles on their cheeks, who draw stars, say that analysts have the ability to understand people, to understand people’s material and refer it to their internal world, to their unconscious conflicts, to their personal worlds. Yet these children also say that often analysts get lost in their constellations and can no longer see the sky.

The brats say that in order to see the sky we have to look up, and in order to be an analyst one has to look inside, knowing that, as is true in the case of stars, stories can never be fully re-counted.

The little ones say that psychoanalysts can be recognized when they talk and are experienced, and that their words and silences
are like nighttime stories, that they resemble dreams, that they live in many times simultaneously, that they say simple things that can reach very deep. They don't need to talk a lot; they show drawings, color palettes. They say that one is never just like the other one, and that they are never the same with the passage of time, although they all end up resembling each other. The little ants scream that analysts have a body with many bodies, that they wear many suits, and that deep down and not so deep, they are also like kids playing.

Children say that if we look carefully in an analyst's consulting room, we'll always find a toy on display; in some corner there's a doll, a car, a horse. The squirts write that if we look carefully, we can get to know the person behind the pipe. They remark that in each fiber of the couch there are stories stored... They tell that the stories are always there; they never leave, even if they depart. They describe that the walls are not made of plaster but of words... They relate that when the nightstand is turned off and the door closed, words leave the walls and have coffee, and they resume their places in the morning.

Children sing; they sing and play while counting stars... Analysts think, feel, sing, count their bodies without knowing everything they sing. Children recite that tears draw waterfalls on pillows, that laughs are like the gasps of kids who can't stop laughing. They say that even in the most absolute silence there's a lot of noise. They pray that inside the consulting room there are other worlds, other rooms, other landscapes, that Rosario, Paris, and Buenos Aires exist in the same time and place, that one can stroll through Montmartre, have coffee in Recoleta, and walk through the Martin neighborhood in a jiffy.

Kids whisper that when an interpretation is offered to them, they are told stories about the present and the past at the same time, that a tree is tree, father, mother, brother, that it is a fruit of the present but is also the fruit of the backyards of memory. Laddies buzz that when they pay fees they are not just paying fees, that money symbolizes other things. Tykes chatter that when they dream, they’re not just dreaming, that dreams always mean something else, that with love, hates appear, and with hates, loves – that when one loves, one doesn’t know quite what one’s doing.

The mites babble that fifty minutes don't last fifty minutes, that words have feet, that tears trace faces, that analysts are also other people and that life can be put together and taken apart; that it's a magical cube, has many colors, and is never put together and always taken apart, and that being an analyst is something one loves and soaks up.

The little lambs bleat that Mom sounds similar everywhere, and that the body of a word is similar in Cartagena and in India. The lambs bleat that analysts have their own song, that each song sounds different but similar in some level. They hum that an analyst doesn't go unnoticed, that psychoanalysis is something we soak up – that it's a cup of warm milk, a soft sheet, cotton against the cheek, sand inside the shoes. They recite that in the world of analysts, letters are neither masculine nor feminine or are everything at the same time, very similar to each other. And that if we wrote a screenplay with what’s in our head, images would talk; that psychoanalysts are architects and engineers, that they build bridges with saliva.
The youngsters chatter that analysts are made of ears, that they have a thousand words for ribs, that they breathe them out to size. They wonder, “How do analysts listen?” And they answer, in a hurry, that they are fantasy eggs, they are surprises; it would be surprising to offer an answer. They listen with theory, but also with life; they are a non-figurative painting. They are a nesting doll inside a thousand nesting dolls; their bodies are windows to the infinite. They can’t be counted, they count grains in a salt marsh. The question about the body, about the bodies of analysts is endless.

This is the end of this story, which is still being endlessly told.

Resumen

El autor muestra en su trabajo una particular mirada sobre el cuerpo de los psicoanalistas. Con la ayuda de la poesía y a través de metáforas, a la vez que abre una serie de interrogantes, intenta responder a la pregunta: ¿Cómo se constituye el cuerpo de los psicoanalistas? Lo que parecía ser un cuerpo se constituye en la idea de muchos cuerpos en una misma persona. A lo largo del relato, gran cantidad de voces de niños darán su peculiar visión para describir a los psicoanalistas y sus consultorios, y tratar de descubrir a la persona detrás del profesional. El autor intenta contar un mundo de imágenes y de colores para acercarse a los psicoanalistas.

Descriptores: Cuerpo; Psicoanalista.
Candidato a descriptor: Persona.

Abstract

In his paper, the author shows a particular view regarding the body of psychoanalysts. While opening a series of interrogations through poetry and metaphors, he aims to answer the following question: How is psychoanalysts’ body constituted? What seems to be one body is constituted in the idea of many bodies within a single person. Throughout the narrative, lots of children’s voices share their peculiar vision to describe psychoanalysts and their offices and to try to discover the person behind the professional.

The author endeavors to narrate a world of images and colors in order to get closer to psychoanalysts.

Keywords: Body; Psychoanalyst.
Candidate to keyword: Person.
1. The case

Once upon a time there was a little girl, very little, just 3 years old. Her parents were very scared because this very little girl would not stop screaming at night, ate less and less, and could not tolerate strangers – because this very little girl could not separate from Mom. And once upon a time there were two very, very scared parents who didn’t know what was wrong with their daughter. The father stopped sleeping with his wife because the daughter had expelled him from the bedroom. These very, very scared parents were witnessing their daughter lose weight; she would only eat white food because she could not bear any other color. They saw how their daughter started peeing in her bed again and went back to wearing diapers. Scared, they saw her withdraw and lose interest in school. She only played with children who bothered her or even hit her. The parents watched in fear how the little girl would return to these abusive kids time and time again.

Once upon a time there was a little girl who couldn’t pronounce the r, who stuttered and spoke of herself in the third person, who never said her name and talked about herself through allusions. Once upon a time there was a family that had been happy and satisfied, and the parents suddenly saw how their little one was vanishing from...
their sight and were scared. Every Sunday, as is right and proper, the family goes to the paternal great-uncle's home for lunch. Inexplicably, the daughter gets increasingly restless as they get nearer the uncle's house. Once they get there, she will not leave her mother's side.

Once upon a time there were a mother and a father who got very, very scared as they watched their little girl reach a state of panic on the way to her great-uncle's home. Only then do they start suspecting that something bad might be happening to their daughter in that home. Yet their suspicion is not enough to make them take action. A week later, the mother thinks that perhaps they're exaggerating, and they decide to take the girl to the uncle's house again. That's when the 3-year-old girl has to say clearly and bluntly that she does not want to see her uncle because he touches her butt and shows her his penis. After this confession, the girl falls into increasing marasmus. She no longer talks about the event. She has night terrors and wakes up screaming, but has no nightmare to tell; it's a nameless fear. That's when they decide to seek help.

And it is here that the story, the ability to tell comes to an end, because now the little girl cannot even say her name, so they call her R. And here ends R's story, because her parents are also left speechless and cannot recount what happened. Paradoxically, once R reports the aggression, she never mentions it again; only the symptoms are left. When one talks about symptoms and theories, the children vanish from the narrative, as R's name vanished. This is the effect of trauma on the person suffering it. The narrative of that person's life is replaced by the geography of his or her symptoms.

The first time I see her, R arrives as if she were being deposited in my office. According to the mother, R does not refuse to come to her two sessions a week, but she externalizes no emotions. I expected the typical apprehension of a girl her age in front of a stranger, especially after a traumatic event with a man. Her attitude, however, is one of careful indifference. This is the tone of our first sessions. We play neutral games, or she draws abstract shapes. Then she dozes, reclined on the couch. When she overcomes her drowsiness, she draws confusing drawings, almost doodles—a jumbled hodgepodge of lines or colorful stains that she repeats with no apparent intention. As I have experienced in other treatments with girls who have suffered some form of sexual violence, her sleeping in the consulting room is a critical stage that makes treatment possible. In this regard, I recommend Downing's (2005) article and its thought-provoking bibliography.

R would stay lounging amid the cushions in a kind of drowsiness that would start in the middle of her hour at the beginning but that slowly colonized the entire session. I would sit next to her and say things that ranged from colorful notes about the day to the difficulty to say anything. After a few sessions, I also started to doze. Nodding off was inevitable, and I would inadvertently fall asleep for a moment and wake up with a start, feeling that something or someone had entered the office.

The same thing happened several times. I felt anxious and was sure I was doing something wrong. The first thing I thought was that falling asleep at work was outrageous. "If her mother
knew...” I would say to myself, with the vague feeling that an idea was developing at the edge of my mind that the shock had erased. “If her mother knew...” would recur like an echo, attempting, in vain, to find an ending. I would promise myself not to do it during the next session, but it was useless. I could not help dozing off. And every time, I would wake up with a start, feeling I was committing a transgression and with the same idea in my mind. “If her mother knew what was happening...” I would tell myself, with the feeling that something was missing, until I finally completed the phrase: “If her mother knew what was happening in here...”

At the same time, I noticed that instead of sleeping, R. was watching me with her eyes half-closed. I felt I had been caught because I did not know when she had started watching me. Shortly after, I associated the feeling of doing something wrong and R.’s watch over me, and I started saying out loud that she was testing whether she could trust me, whether I was going to do something bad to her. Finally I was able to verbalize the sense of threat with which I had woken up, and said: “R. is watching in case Alejandro becomes a monster...”
and hurts her.” After that session R. was increasingly alert during her hour, and started a new stage in her play.

Before discussing this new stage, I would like to mention that I asked for an interview with the parents because I thought that my countertransference behavior, the scene of sleeping in the consulting room, had a meaning that escaped me. This was the first space R. and I shared. My sleeping, as a literal act, promoted the reverie function. The parents talked to me about the event that made them suspect that the paternal uncle had sexually abused R. They told me for the first time that when R. was three years old, the mother had undergone a depression that had kept her in bed in the afternoon. The uncle would come over during that time to play with R. While the mother slept in the other room, the uncle played with R. As you can see, this scene is replicated almost exactly in the consulting room. This situation, which lasted a month, was suddenly interrupted when the father arrived home earlier than usual and walked into the living room, where he saw, as in a flash, that R. was straddling on top of his uncle. They both rapidly moved to opposite corners of the room, and his uncle left and never again volunteered to babysit R.

Dozing in the session constituted an acting-out episode that enacted the conditions under which violence had been committed. The mother had dozed while R. was being abused in the other room under the guise of a game. With this knowledge in mind and with R. awake, she and I started playing with the dolls in her box and with building blocks. R., however, is rapidly frustrated; she cannot put together a narrative sequence that will guide the game, and loses hope. The beginning is always the same. There is a doll, which I move and to which I give voice, that chases a dragonfly, which is R., and which I can never reach. At the same time, as though in a different scene, a man dressed as a king, moved by her, forces a white horse to knock down the blocks. The game comes to an end when R. tries to go beyond this first scene. She stops playing and starts drawing, engrossed, different figures that she then cuts out (incidentally, now she draws recognizable people or animal shapes). I will leave out the various interventions and interpretations I made with no apparent result.

Some time went by in this fashion until one day, after R.’s departure at the end of her hour, I noticed that she had left a cutout on the floor. This was odd, because she was always very meticulous about putting things away in her box. I saw that it was a drawing of a girl that had been crossed out. I was overcome with emotion, but my astonishment was great when, as I was putting the drawing away, I saw that R. had written letters on the reverse, unbeknownst to me, and the letters simulated an incomprehensible text, a message in a mysterious code. I understood that this girl was asking me to help her tell her story.

I will not elaborate on the clinical aspects of trauma or on the well-known theoretical and technical problems it involves. I would just like to stress one aspect that was essential during this stage of my work with R. I am referring to the analyst’s narrative function, a category used by Maria Cecília Pereira da Silva (2012, 2013) as an elaboration on the notion of narrative construction advanced by Antonino Ferro.
(2006b), which, in turn, is a corollary of the concept of psychoanalytic field proposed by W. and M. Baranger (1969). When children suffer a pure trauma, to use W. Baranger, M. Baranger, and Mom’s (1988) term, the event escapes their ability to represent it because it breaks the stimuli barrier and thus disorganizes a developing internal world. When she reported the abuse, R. was trapped in the situation she had reported; she became a trauma. It is worth noting that once she was able to talk about the traumatic situation, once she could make her parents tell the event, R. lost her ability to name it. In the face of this extreme condition, the words that allude to it become things. They are frozen in a terrifying scene and lose their polysemic nature – their liberating potential as a resource for displacement and condensation.

Turning back to the case, in the next session I showed R. the drawing and told her she was asking for my help to write the story of the game. She got excited with the idea, and every time the game with the dolls and blocks seemed to come to a stop, she would run to her notebook, write some letters, cut the paper in the shape of a letter, and give it to me to read. And I, following the theme of what had happened in the analytic field, would put words to the game. The analyst’s narrative function (Pereira da Silva, 2013) involves working through the beta elements emitted in the analytic field (Bion, 1959, 1962; Ferro, 2006a) and bringing them back, thanks to the working-through of the transference, as elements that the child can organize as a story. This is the process that, following Ferro (2004, 2006b), we call narrative construction. The goal is to historicize an event that, by definition, destroys the person’s ability to tell a story.

As the game progressed and the sessions succeeded one another, the mother mentioned that R. was finally telling her the nightmares that made her scream at night. In the next session, when a horrible monster had knocked down the house made of blocks that we had built for the dragonfly, I told R. that she was showing me her nightmares, and then she told me about the monster that lived under her bed. It is something like a crocodile that comes out when everybody is asleep and does awful things to her. There is nobody else there, she says every time she tells me this story. The monster fills all the space, and it will eat R; it is inevitable. Then I say to her, “Oh, of course, that’s why the girl and the dragonfly need someone to help them build a house, because they feel that if they are alone, the monster will win.” The game is now about finding an ally to fight the monster.

The analyst’s narrative function thus serves as a container, because for R., the uncanny feeling (the role of terror in this story) stems from the fact that while there is a trauma (with everything that, as we know, its advent entails), this trauma becomes an uncontrollable condition when the parents cannot tell the event. And once they are able to do so, they cannot find a way out, a narrative that will make room for that trauma, and then R.’s mind starts to come apart. For the parents to save her from the monster, their daughter had to disintegrate. Still, we should recall, along with Winnicott (1965), that in disintegration, in destruction there is a moment of hope that the environment will respond by providing support and, I add, granting meaning to the event.
In a session in which we were striving to save the house from the attacks of the white horse, we both discovered, surprised and amused, that we had gradually changed the quality of this character from a terrible being to a kind of fairly ridiculous stooge of the bad man. So we started laughing at it and forcing it to do funny things. What R. liked best was when the bad man and the horse started charging against the house, and the beast threw the rider off. R. would burst into laughter time and time again.

Gradually, instead of being clumsy, the horse became a secret help to the other dolls; it would throw off the rider, pretending it had made a mistake, when it was secretly trying to help. Two weeks later it had turned into a brave ally of the girl and her dragonfly. It defended them from the bad man and kept the house intact. Once, when the building remained standing the entire hour, R. excitedly said to me, “And tomorrow, when I come, the girl will have the same name I have, and I will go with the horse to visit my friend the dragonfly.” And thus, unexpectedly, R. told me her name for the first time, and the narration of our games changed forever.

Once upon a time there was a girl called Raquel, and Raquel was once attacked by a very, very ugly monster. Raquel was so scared that she didn't realize that this monster was actually a man who had done something awful to her that only monsters can do; he had destroyed Raquel's house. But a white horse saved her from the monster man and expelled him forever. The white horse, who had the same name as her dad, and Raquel fixed the house so that Mom could come back to live with them. Once upon a time there was a girl named Raquel and, along with her mom, she rode a white horse, and they had many adventures together, some good and some not so good. Once upon a time there was a psychoanalytic session...

2. Elements for a potential dialogue

1. As I mentioned earlier, this paper does not aim to elaborate on the theory and clinical practice of trauma. Rather, it focuses on the role played by narrative construction in the treatment of severe cases.

2. In this sense, I agree with Maria Cecília Pereira da Silva (2012, 2013) that the analyst's narrative function plays a key role in the case of children with severe development problems arising either from an organic condition or (in some cases, instead of or, one should say and) from a traumatic situation resulting from excess or lack. This assertion is based on studies conducted by Tustin (1990) that show that children with organic conditions also experience psychic trauma. In other words, organic affections have an effect on the internal world that resembles that of a traumatic experience. This is the path toward a possible psychotherapeutic treatment that will not be just a rehab or conditioning exercise.

1. I do not want to minimize the relevance of rehab, but the problem is the loss of specificity of each therapeutic experience.
3. Freud's first analysis of the symptom viewed it as a foreign body inside an apparatus. This viewpoint assumes that the emergence of the symptom's latent content will be enough to bring about its dissolution, an idea that assumes, in turn, that the trauma can be eliminated once it is remembered in the therapy. Nevertheless, Freud gradually abandoned this optimistic view [and here I follow Hugo Bleichmar (1978)], and eventually introduced the notion of working-through (Freud, 1914/1984b) as an integral aspect of the cure. This development gave rise to a substantial change in the theory of trauma. The latter was no longer conceived of as simply embedded in the structure, but rather as modifying it. If I mention this evolution of the theory and practice of trauma, it is because, while it is well known, many practitioners still espouse Freud's first conception of the symptom. Remembering is enough to cure or, to put it differently, when we remember, the pathogenic effects of the event, such as the symptom, will vanish.

4. This point leads us specifically to the role of working-through and constructions in psychoanalysis. There are different ways of understanding the process whereby analysts come into contact with patients' unconscious elements, which enable them to suggest a narrative scenario that grants meaning to patients' internal contents. I purposefully chose as an example a tradition removed from the ideas of W. and M. Baranger because this exercise is intended to show points of clinical convergence that transcend specific theoretical frameworks.

In this sense, it is worth recalling Sandler's (1976) suggestion that the patient's transference provokes such an effective response in the analyst that a unique compromise-formation is created in the dyad that involves both the analyst and the patient's unconscious. We can examine Campbell's (1995) development of Sandler's idea within the same tradition. Campbell views analysts' acting out from the perspective of this compromise-formation. If we understand that the latter, by definition, contains at least one blind spot, the analyst's (because his or her unconscious is at play), we will also understand the origin of the construction. Given that what takes place in the session is a compromise-formation, elucidating their own material allows analysts to talk about their patients' elements (since the material also comes from them). Thus, by suggesting a way of making sense of these elements, that is, by creating a construction, as Freud (1937/1986a) called it, they serve as a container and matrix to generate meaning for beta elements.

Faced with the narcissistic withdrawal of severely ill patients, analysts feel compelled to act in order to retaliate or to attempt to contain. Carefully determining the aim of the acting-out and transforming it into an act of thought in Bion's sense (Bion, 1959, 1962/1975) enable analysts to find a narrative to suggest, which, in the case of severely ill children, may become the seed of a shared game. Since it involves the unconscious of the analytic pair, this compromise-formation constitutes a new reality. It is a phenomenon occurring in the analytic field or, better yet, produced by the field. Or rather, in the
kind of paradox that Winnicott liked so much, it is the field itself, because this exchange of organized elements generates a possible space.

5. This thesis differs from its Freudian foundations in several ways. Primarily, it does not aspire to truth. Freud (1914/1986b, 1920/1986c, 1937/1986a) never quite abandoned the aspiration to reality of his constructions (although his insistence on their conjectural nature is critical). In the proposal outlined here, by contrast, reality is set aside due to the true nature of the narration. The construction is not true because it responds to reality; it is true insofar as it makes sense to the analysand.

6. This way of understanding truth has a long tradition. One of its sources may be found in Dante Alighieri’s break with medieval hermeneutics (Singleton, 1954). As is well known, to the various levels of allegory, Dante adds poetic allegory (1307/2006). This type of allegory formulates a truth as a statement that explains meaning according to one individual, thus founding subjectivity as an internal experience. From a psychoanalytic perspective, in so-called severe cases, where a trauma breaks the symbolic web that supports individuals, what is lacking is precisely a place from where they can understand, understand themselves, and be understood. Individuals need a weft to which they can cling. The narrative function, brought into play thanks to, and in, the compromise-formation (or the analytic field), (re)creates a possible place.

7. As a corollary, we can state that, in this sense, construction in analysis is, indeed, in agreement with reality. If we leave behind the naive, positive view of reality and accept the latter as a dimension under (and for) construction, as a field that is created by social actors, then the narrated story is reality insofar as it is an effective truth that links the analytic pair and in which the rest of the symbolic world can be connected.

8. However, it is also evident that by accepting that what we call reality is a construction, I come close to constructivism, for instance, to Watzlawick’s (1996) position, and, more specifically, to conceptions of the role of narrative both in therapeutic models and in post-rationalist devices (Balbi, 2004). Nonetheless, there is a difference not in emphasis but in the basic paradigm. In psychoanalysis, as Lacan (1962-1963/2014) points out, what constructivism calls reality is actually a symbolic structure, while the real will continue to be the plane of what lies beyond words, which has not been symbolized (yet).

9. By overlooking this difference between the real and symbolic reality, constructivism adopts an omnipotent approach that is congruent with its epistemological principle: reality is a construction based on an exercise of the will. In psychotherapeutic terms, it assumes that the narrative functions suggested by constructivist therapies and by psychoanalysis differ in the fact that the latter accepts the real and its effects, that is, the unconscious as that which escapes the will of the actors and the (potential) critique of symbolic reality as a dimension that is imposed on individuals’ existence.
10. This perspective entails recognizing the presence of a membrane separating inside from outside and, therefore, different dimensions that may be called internal and external realities (Winnicott, 1965). Fantasy in the psychoanalytic sense would be the evidence that allows us to allude to these dimensions and to the membrane dividing them. The devastating effect of the traumatic event would be due to the destruction of this membrane and the consequent negation of the existence of an internal reality.

11. The narrative construction seeks to recreate this membrane rather than endow individuals with specific contents. In other words, rather than to configure a specific kind of subject, an individual who is subject to a certain order of discourse, its aim is to facilitate, through the containment offered by the continuous experience of the analytic field, the formation of a membrane that differentiates outside from inside. As a consequence of the destruction of the membrane, the pain and bereavement derived from the experience of an internal world are negated, and working-through (of loss, of trauma) is impeded.

12. In the analytic field, where a narrative is constructed, the mode of operation is the opposite of manic defense as Winnicott (1965) understands it. When subjects resort to this defense, the external object becomes a means to negate internal reality. As a result, subjects cannot experience their internal life fully because they can only recognize the good if they accept destruction (as a condition for existence and a subjective intention). Conversely, the analytic field is bolstered when an external object promotes knowledge of the destruction and, therefore, makes it possible to recognize the good in the object. To this end, a membrane must be generated so that the patient can tolerate such knowledge. Knowledge is promoted by re-establishing (or establishing) the ability to play, that is, omnipotent (fantastic) manipulation of objects in a safe environment provided by the analyst who, in this sense, is literally a container (hence the test, sleeping in the office, to which traumatized children unconsciously put us). An internal and an external space are gradually created where the patient can escape (internal or external) reality when the latter becomes unmanageable. Flight from (to) reality is a defense, not necessarily a pathology. Still, in order to flee, another plane of reality, internal or external, must exist to which flight is possible. Patients flee reality in order to flee toward reality.

13. As we can see, the goal is not to treat a specific pathological structure; this is a potential subsequent task. Instead, it is to create the conditions for this subsequent task, that is, to set in motion the basic conditions for the existence of a mental apparatus that promotes the differentiation between outside and inside and the later distinction between the good and the bad, and thus overcome what Bleger (1967) describes as the glischrocaric position.
Resumen

R. es una pequeña de tres años que fue abusada por un tío. Si bien la pequeña lo denuncia ante sus padres, ellos la atienden después de que presenta severos síntomas y regresiones. El tratamiento comienza con una indiferencia de la analizanda. A este inicio sigue un estado sopor en el cual la niña se queda dormida por etapas cada vez más largas de la sesión. Cuando el analista comparte este dormir, en estado de ensueñación, puede prefigurar el escenario del abuso.

Es desde ese escenario como la diada analítica inicia un juego donde se plantean ejes narrativos que le dan sentido al trauma que sufrió la niña. El suceder de las sesiones supuso la construcción narrativa por parte de la diada de una explicación posible para aquello que le había sucedido. Se discute la importancia de la construcción narrativa en casos graves. Esta supone una implicación más activa de parte del analista, pues al existir fragmentariamente procesos lúdicos y utilización de símbolos, se requiere de un uso más señalado de la contratransferencia. La construcción narrativa estaría encaminada a la (re)construcción de la capacidad de jugar, de crear un espacio transicional en el niño, más que a explicar el evento.

Descriptores: Trauma; Narración; Posición glischrocárica; Subjetivación; Rêverie.

Abstract

R. is a three-year-old girl who was abused by an uncle. Even though the little girl reported it to her parents, she did not receive treatment until after presenting with severe symptoms and regressions. The analysand was indifferent when treatment began. This beginning was followed by a drowsy stage in which the child fell asleep for longer and longer periods during sessions. When the analyst shares this sleeping, in a dream-like state, he can visualize the abuse scenario. It is from this scenario that the analytical dyad starts a game through which narrative building blocks are developed that give meaning to the trauma suffered by the child. The sessions involved a narrative construction by the dyad of a possible explanation of what had happened to her. The importance of narrative construction in severe cases is discussed. This process requires a more active engagement on the part of the analyst, since fragmentary playful processes and the recourse to symbols demand a more marked use of the countertransference. The narrative construction would be aimed at (re)building the ability to play, at creating a transitional space in the child rather than at explaining the event.

Keywords: Trauma; Narration; Glischrocaric position; Subjectivation; Reverie.
Under my bed lives a monster...Narrative construction and child psychoanalysis

References


Memories of suffering in children’s bodies

The child’s symptomatology reflects illness in one or both of the parents or in the social situation, and [...] it is this which needs attention.

D. W. Winnicott

Introduction

In this paper we would like to share new approaches to the treatment of psychosomatic pathology in babies, children, tweens, and teenagers. Since 2010, we have coordinated the Multifamily Parenting School at the Ricardo Gutiérrez Children’s Hospital, along with the Department of Dermatology. We organize sessions with many families at the same time, which are attended by parents of children who have skin pathologies. Sometimes the parents themselves or their relatives suffer other organic, psychological, or psychiatric illnesses. Dermatology residents are also present, as well as the members of the Department of Psychosomatic Illness of the Buenos Aires University.

* Argentine Psychoanalytic Association.
** Mental Health Chair: Dr. Gustavo Finvarb; Dermatology Chair: Dr. J. Mássimo; Coordinator: Lic. Eva Rotenberg; Assistant Coordinators: Lic. Elena Stenger and Dr. Silvia De Francesco.
School of Psychology and interns from the Argentine provinces and from Spain, France, Mexico, and other countries.

Attending pediatricians increasingly mention the need for physicians to develop an integrated view of mind and body that would allow them to modify the narrow approach learned in the various medical specialties. Suffering families that cannot find a solution to their pain are faced with a dilemma. This situation may result in the emergence of an illness or a symptom in a family member. Children, tweens, and teenagers who receive care at the Department of Dermatology present vitiligo, psoriasis, alopecia, or severe acne, and many of them have atypical dermatitis. Their socioeconomic situation varies. Families belong to diverse social and cultural classes. Since the health providers at the hospital are very good, patients come from the Greater Buenos Aires area as well as from other provinces and countries, not just from Buenos Aires City.

Winnicott (1971/2017) believed that making good use of the first interview allowed him to face the challenges posed by some psychiatric cases. He also considered that “it may be taken as axiomatic that if a child or adolescent or a grown-up is suffering, some of this will appear in an interview if conditions are provided which might possibly lead to understanding” (Winnicott, 1989, p. 53). While there
are patients who have been attending the group’s meetings for more than two years and there is a steady group of families, in some cases, their socioeconomic condition and their place of residence reduce the psychotherapeutic intervention to one, two, or a few meetings. For this reason, we resorted to Winnicott’s “therapeutic consultation,” adjusting it to the theory and technique of the Multifamily Parenting School created by Eva Rotenberg. This method builds on the theory and technique developed by Jorge García Badaracco (2000) in his work with adults with severe illnesses. It incorporates drawing, play, psychoanalytic theories and techniques related to psychic structuring and childhood, as well as psychosomatics theories and techniques, among them, those of Winnicott, Esther Bick, Didier Anzieu, Arminda Aberastury, Aurora Pérez, Elsa Aisemberg, and Silvia Bleichmar.

Anzieu (1995/2016) claims that

the concept of the Skin-ego, which I am proposing in psychoanalysis [...] How are the psychical wrappings formed, what are their structures, interleaved series, and pathologies? And how, by means of a ‘transitional’ psychoanalytic treatment of the individual and perhaps even of groups and institutions, can they be reestablished? These are the questions I ask myself and which I hope this book will begin to answer. (Anzieu, 2016, p. 9)

**The significance of the expanded and open setting**

The Multifamily Parenting School is a space of readiness that operates every Thursday at the same time during the entire year without taking any breaks, not even during the summer. Families know they are always welcome because it is an expanded and open frame. There are families that have been coming for two years, since the beginning, and others that have just started attending. Unlike many mental health departments, where the situation is dire, there is no waiting list. The setting (which Badaracco defines as expanded because it includes many families, and to which Rotenberg added the notion of openness) offers availability and support for the families; it provides emotional safety and respect. If families miss more than two sessions, they do not lose their space, as is the case with other hospital settings (in mental health departments), not only in Argentina but also in other countries.

The two-hour session also differs from the sessions offered at other institutions, which may last fifteen minutes or a little more – even in private institutions, no matter what specialty. We cannot expect to cure autism or other severe illnesses, including some neurotic pathologies, when we have a maximum of two months at little more than fifteen minutes a week for the therapeutic process to unfold. Illnesses, therefore, tend to become chronic. Moreover, patients think their affliction is genetic and irreversible, without realizing how important it is not to lose valuable time or the need to have a setting that respects each individual’s interiority. Only then will children and adolescents develop the necessary confidence to speak honestly, without the influence of invisible dependencies on the parents that hamper the development of their own inner resources.
The setting and time availability are factors that determine whether patients can envision the potential remission of the pathology or, on the contrary, whether they will believe that it is incurable. The importance of an open setting lies in the substantial therapeutic value of creating a space where families are undergoing different stages of their processes. Let us explain. Some families have no words to talk about their suffering or cannot link the appearance of the psychosomatic or organic illness to a specific traumatic or difficult situation and come only because their doctor referred them. Yet when they hear the stories of other families that have already reached a more advanced stage in the psychoanalytic process and can hence associate their suffering with their children's disease, these stories resonate emotionally with them. They feel a kinship with these families' suffering or with their child's, despite the child's inability to explain its feelings and the fact that the only sign that something is wrong is often the symptom expressed in the skin. At the same time, when the families that have been working in the group for some time hear the discourse of the new participants, they become aware of their own evolution and feel confident that psychic change is possible, and therefore that the somatic pathology may be cured.

When a child or an adult connects emotionally and starts finding an emotional meaning for his or her organic ailment, we agree that this is a “sacred” moment, because all participants in the multifamily meeting are astonished to see that children often improve in the first session or during the first week, and that remission persists. As soon as the mother or the parents feel supported by the therapeutic team and start talking about losses, death anxiety, grief that has not been worked through, or other traumas and disruptive feelings, the children improve and start drawing or playing, and the babies fall placidly asleep.

Based on our experience, we agree with Elsa Aisemberg (2012) that psychosomatic pathology is the expression of “non-signified quantity, with a deficit in psychic processing that results in anxiety” (p. 27). Psychosomatic illness in childhood requires a different treatment from the one implemented with adults, because we know that in the former case, parental anxiety is transmitted to the child without mediation as pure quantity, a topic that we discuss later on. Our setting, therefore, is not individual.

We do not hold an interview with the child whose illness prompted the parents to seek help, as did Winnicott (but this does not mean that the child or the parents cannot delve deeper into their problems in individual therapy). The meeting is attended by some family members (the mother and the child who has the dermatological condition, and often the father and a sibling) of different families. We consider that the open multifamily setting creates many highly favorable conditions for the unfolding of the psychic or somatic problem and for the emergence of the true self. The entire family participates in this therapeutic process, and all members are transformed by it. While the adults talk, the children draw, play, or talk with other children of different ages, and with us as well. As they draw, they express their suffering and the family wefts that condition it.
Our premise of respect contemplates every member of the group: children, adults, and practitioners. Children are rarely heard by their families, their doctors, or their school. In many cases, the parents do not know how to listen to them. Therefore, when one of the children wants to say something or gives us a drawing, which is a valuable expression of its internal world because it tells us of its pain or secret suffering or serves to express the split or repressed unconscious, we respectfully ask if we can show it. Children almost always say yes; they like to show it because they feel we value them. If they agree, every participant looks at the drawing, and the therapists discuss and interpret it, as does any group member who has something to contribute. Children’s drawings are surprising because they always express individual and family problems. Moreover, they progressively change as we are able to understand what they transmit. They adopt the features that correspond to the child’s developmental stage, or express problems that had not been addressed yet.

The setting of multifamily psychoanalysis developed by García Badaracco and the one applied at the Multifamily Parenting School, which builds on the former and is used with babies, children, and teenagers and their families, provide an ideal model to work on those areas of the psychic apparatus that have not developed word-presentations and to deal with the transmission of trauma from parents to children. Since it cannot be processed, the trauma becomes symptom. “This setting enables families to give words to the unsayable, to the absence of metaphors in a language that had become ‘objectified’ with the irruption of dermatological and other organic illnesses, so that psychic pain was materialized in the body” (Rotenberg and Stenger, 2012a).

**Skin pathology**

In our clinical experience with dermatological disease, we have verified the existence of an environmental deficiency. This is a key conceptualization that is present in all of Winnicott’s work and has led us to state that “when the mother’s [or the father’s] holding fails to transform anxiety, the child’s container-body expresses itself” (Rotenberg and Stenger, 2012b). Winnicott claims that psychic pain breaks the psyche-soma unit. We suggest, then, not to consider the soma in and of itself but rather the soma-psyche relationship. Furthermore, in the case of children and adolescents, we should look at this relationship in the context of family bonds.

Rotenberg argues that if the environmental deficiency is severe, it may even impede the integration of the ego: “Talking about a failed parental function does not mean saying that the parents are ‘bad’ [...] they have not been able to develop healthy parental functions, that is, they do not have ego resources to contain their own anxiety and, therefore, they transmit this anxiety to their children” (Rotenberg, 2014, p. 66). In some cases, such as the one we present below, the skin illness appears in babies who have not yet developed an ego capable of thought when there is no maternal ego available to transform their anxieties. Instead, their mother’s ego amplifies these anxieties.
In other cases, adult anxiety invades the baby's self, which is unable to process this experience, and organic pathology appears as a result. In our experience, dermatological illnesses are always tied to situations of family or transgenerational suffering such as bereavement, loss of a job, excess work imposed on the mother, the father, or both (with their resulting absence from the home), problems in the couple (e.g. cheating or separation), mental or physical illness, or repeated moves. The baby or small child does not have the psychic tools to express and work through its own psychic suffering, let alone that of the most significant people in its environment. As a consequence, in some cases there is a surplus of non-psychic excitation that corresponds to a trauma that was transferred from the parents as pure quantity. In other cases, there is traumatic content that concerns the entire family or perinatal risk situations that the child or teenager can neither solve nor process. According to Rotenberg (2014), “when the response of the parental function is almost always distorting, the baby develops in a state of confusion and cannot integrate its feelings and vital needs with the parent's responses” (p. 43).

The body is the favored medium to express organically what the baby is still incapable of symbolizing. In the book Parentalidades [Parenting], Stenger (2014) refers to the notion of reciprocal interdependencies. She sees it as a “valuable clinical concept because it allows us to account for complex emotional processes that occur in every emotional bond between humans in situations of both health and illness” (p. 109). Later she adds:

When we talk about “reciprocal interdependencies” between parents and children, as in any other relationship, it is highly relevant to distinguish between “normogenous” interdependencies, which contribute to the growth and health of participants in the relationship, and “pathogenous” interdependencies. The latter cause development arrests that may be expressed in children’s body and/or behavior, thus significantly conditioning psychic structuring during early childhood and producing, in many cases, very severe mental pathologies during childhood and adolescence. (p. 111)

Illness clearly appears as an expression of the bond between the baby and the mother and/or the father, or between the teenager and the mother, the father, and the siblings. At the Multifamily Parenting School, addressing the problems identified in dual and family relationships results in the immediate relief of dermatological symptoms, to the astonishment of physicians, parents, and other attendees. The baby or child stops scratching and often falls into a calm sleep, while the mother or both parents continue to process their painful stories of loss or misunderstanding that have now found the needed support. The full word is thus contained and empathically understood by therapists and physicians, who start to realize, some more easily than others, that emotions play a determining role in skin diseases.

Diagnosis often serves as a “signifier of the gaze of the environment, which gives back a very strong identificatory mark, and when someone is named and spoken through and from his or her illness, what we call ‘bodily identity’ is constructed around the wounded body” (Rotenberg and Vázquez, 2000). In the case of babies, toddlers,
children going through latency, and teenagers, we see the detour of psychic problems toward the body due to the family’s silence regarding their suffering. Powerful mind-body splitting mechanisms are at play, and we frequently witness the emergence of deep symbolization deficiencies. Next, we present two clinical vignettes with different dermatological pathologies to illustrate our work model.

**Atopic dermatitis case**

Atopic dermatitis is characterized by constant scratching, which prevents the child from resting and causes injuries that will eventually get infected. The family is distressed and feels helpless in its efforts to relieve the child. From a medical viewpoint, there is no clear etiology. Nonetheless, what we want to highlight is the treatment, which starts with skin lotions that rarely help. Then the child receives steroids, and if these fail, immunosuppressants, which improve the dermatitis but may expose patients to other illnesses due to low defenses. The tragic path toward immunosuppression, a therapy that puts patients at risk for cancer or other life-threatening diseases, renders the right use of psychoanalytic intervention crucial.

A young foreign mother came to the hospital with her 11-month-old baby girl, who presented a severe case of atopic dermatitis in her entire body. She would scratch and injure herself, and her mother would yell at her and grab or wrap her hands so that the baby would not hurt herself. The pediatric dermatologists gave her lotions and steroids, but instead of improving, the baby got worse. She was hospitalized for long periods of time during her first two years of life.

According to Anzieu (2016, p. 36), “in children under two years, eczema can mark the lack of a tender, enveloping physical touch on the part of the mother.” The mother showed significant concern, and her intolerance and anxiety were increasing. For this reason, the doctors suggested treating her daughter with cyclosporine, an immunosuppressant that is used as a last resource. The pediatric dermatologist, who was very worried, insisted that we try to understand what was going on with this very anxious but simultaneously very slippery and untrusting mother.

It was during a session whose outcome would determine the indication of the immunosuppressant that we tried to go deeper into the mother’s attitude. We could not understand why she would claim she found the group useful and then vanish for several months. She explained that those were the months when her daughter was in the hospital. She was finally able to tell us that she had sworn she would never convey anxiety to her children because she had lived through her parents’ fights and ensuing divorce as well as her brother’s psychotic breakdown. When she came to the therapy group and associated with her extreme anxiety and her daughter’s disease, she felt she wanted to kill herself “or throw the girl from the balcony” (and would then “clarify” that she was “joking”).

The week after this intense session, the girl showed no eczema, although she still had a dermatitis in the folds of her neck and in her hands. The mother said it was because she had stopped using
a lotion that was not prescribed in the United States. We all knew that this was a rationalization and a disavowal, because she still had a hard time connecting more intensely with her emotions. We should recall here Spitz’s suggestion that “when a child reacts in the form of eczema this may be a demand to its mother to touch it more often; or on the other hand, it may be a form of narcissistic withdrawal, since through eczema it can obtain the somatic stimuli she has refused to provide” (quoted in Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 36-7).

The important thing is that the mother continued to attend and, once the skin pathology was cured, the girl’s lack of psychic organization and the mother’s difficulty in connecting emotionally with her daughter came to light. We are still working on this difficulty today. The girl, who might have developed a pathology within the autism spectrum or a form of psychosis, attends a bilingual school and performs well there. Rotenberg (2014) suggests “differentiating ‘as-if or false-self parents’ from the authentic parental function [...] the ‘true-self parental function’,” and adds: “authentic parental functions are those that recognize the satisfaction of the baby’s id, facilitate ego integration, and recognize the baby as an other” (p. 50).

Providing emotional support for the mother was part of the process. We became a container for her so that she could contain her daughter. She was able to distinguish her own past history from the traumatic experiences she had undergone with her husband after the baby’s birth, and learned that emotional support does not mean filling her daughter with food or gifts. Elsa Aisemberg (2012), a specialist in psychosomatic pathology, asserts that in the case of infants, “narcissistic confirmation constitutes the libidinal cover for the body image that they construct when they are accepted, loved, and wished for, first by the mother, and later by the father, and when both parents recognize them as differentiated subject projects” (130).

A case of spread vitiligo

A few years ago, a 40-year-old woman and her 9-year-old daughter joined the Multifamily Parenting School. The girl presented with a vitiligo that had spread primarily on her face and hands. The mother told us that the disease had started when her daughter was little. When we asked her if they had been going through a difficult situation at that time, she answered that she did not know, that she could not remember. Then she said she associated it with the birth of the baby of her eldest daughter, who lives with them, and added that there was a big commotion in the family because her daughter had had the baby without being in a relationship with the baby’s father.

The girl sat at the table where the children sit to draw. Her drawings almost always resembled castles, and there was a princess looking out the window. She would often go near her mother and say to her, “Mom, I’ll take care of you for the rest of your life,” and would become very emotional. The role reversal and the false self she was developing were remarkable. At times, when she spoke of something that might distress her mother, the girl would sit on her lap, reassure her and kiss her, and repeat, “Don’t worry, I will always take care of
you.” We were struck by these remarks and by the advanced stage of the vitiligo, given the girl’s age. We decided to wait for mother and daughter to feel the trust and sense of safety that patients must feel in order to share their suffering.

Mother and daughter came promptly every week and paid careful attention. Gradually, encouraged by the stories she heard from other families, the mother started talking about her work, her eldest children, and her separation. After many months, the daughter started drawing a series. The drawings looked like fairy tale castles. They had two towers, one on each side, and there was a woman in each. Considering, the presence of a false self and the advanced skin pathology, one of us said to the mother, “Something must have happened early in your daughter’s life.” It is worth noting that when the pathology expressed in the body is severe, we cannot think of a minor triggering factor; there must have been a significant trauma that became a family secret or is unconscious but split.

The mother was very moved. She started crying, and told us that the girl had been born in jail; the mother had been arrested because her brother, who was living in the house in front of hers, was selling drugs. She was five months pregnant, and they put her in the mothers’ ward. “Many of them were murderers!” she added. “So I never left the baby alone when she was born. I would go to the bathroom with her, take a shower with her, because those women were capable of anything! The girl learned to walk when she was 2, after they released me.”

According to Anzieu (1995/2016),

the Skin-ego is an intermediate structure of the psychic apparatus: it mediates chronologically between the mother and the infant and structurally between the mutual inclusion of psyches in the state of original fusion and the differentiation of psychical agencies that corresponds to Freud’s second topography. If the appropriate experiences do not occur at the right moment, this structure will not be acquired or, more commonly, will be distorted. (p. 5)

The mother believed that the girl knew nothing about this experience. The girl went to her mother and hugged her, and they both cried.

We are often asked if it is advisable for parents to talk in front of the children. When the drawings show that there is unconscious knowledge, speaking means starting to put what was split into words. A favorable evolution, moreover, confirms our hypothesis. When the secret is an adult issue, we interrupt the account and offer the parent an individual space to talk about the cause of his or her anxiety.

We now understood that the castles were actually the jail! There was unconscious knowledge! This shared experience generated a relationship of mutual dependence so intense, that except for school, mother and daughter went everywhere together. The eldest daughters, who had brought up their siblings with the help of relatives while their parents were in jail, harshly criticized this relationship. Steady attendance to the Multifamily Parenting School gave mother and daughter the ability to differentiate themselves from each other and include people of their own age in their lives, especially in the case of
the daughter, who resembled an adult and shared all her mother’s ac-
tivities. The girl started having a more pleasurable relationship with
other children and with her body. Among other things, she started
to take dance classes, and her vitiligo receded slightly. Mother and
daughter seemed more relaxed, confident, and lively, and considera-
bly improved their responsiveness to their own emotions and to the
emotions of the other members of the group, to whom they offered
support, associations, and their own encouraging experience.

The girl stopped feeling the need to take care of her mother, and
was able to concern herself with topics and interests typical of her
age. Her true self, which had been trapped in the mother’s, started
to emerge, as did her own traumatic history, which had started when
she was in her mother’s womb. This unconscious history required
that she give back to her mother the intense protection she had recei-
ved when they were in jail, which had likely saved her life.

At first, the drawings from this series looked like princess homes
or castles, and the girl could not associate anything with them (and
neither could her mother). The castle drawings acquired their true
meaning of “jails” after our intervention. We thought the vitiligo was
too pronounced to be just an “expression of jealousy” toward her nie-
ce and, therefore, asked the mother what else had happened during
the first years of the girl’s life.
References


The Stranger
The body as evidence

“I leave my story here so that someone else will take it,” they say in some places in Africa when they finish telling a story, and they put the palms of their hands on the ground. Clyde Snow taught us that bones do the same thing; they leave us their stories so we can tell them. We only need to know how to “read” them, and we learned to do so from him.

I started working in the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) in 1990. I was studying anthropology at the La Plata University and was 22 years old. I was invited to help in the exhumations they were conducting in Sector 134 of the Avellaneda cemetery, in Greater Buenos Aires. The area was thirty-six feet wide by seventy-two feet long. It was next to a small building where a kind of morgue had operated, and was half-hidden in the back and divided from the rest of the ceme-

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1. Clyde Snow (1928-2014) was a US professor and forensic anthropologist. He worked with several human rights groups, and his work in Argentina’s mass graves had great repercussion. He created and trained the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team. He also worked in mass graves in Yugoslavia, and participated in the identification of the remains of Nazi criminal Josef Mengele in Brazil, among many important jobs in countries such as Chile, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Croatia, the Kurdish region in Iraq, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, and the Philippines. In the US, upon a request by Congress, he confirmed that the X-rays of John F. Kennedy’s autopsy actually belonged to the late president.

2. The Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) is a scientific non-governmental and not-for-profit organization that applies forensic sciences (primarily, forensic anthropology and archeology) to the investigation of human rights violations around the world. It was created in 1984 to investigate the cases of disappeared people in Argentina during the last military dictatorship (1976-1983). Currently, the team is working in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe in five programmatic areas, namely, research, training and assistance, scientific development, strengthening of the sector, documentation, and dissemination.
tery by a wall. While it was also separated from the neighborhood by another wall, the people living in the buildings on the neighboring street knew very well what had happened there and what was happening now.

The members of the EAAF had found nineteen mass graves and eighteen individual ones. When I arrived, the work was quite advanced; they had started in 1988. They gave me the archeologist's tools (trowel, bone tools, and brushes) and said to me, as they showed me a section in one of the graves: "Go down and start over there; it's easier because they're leg bones." That night I had a dream. "Over here... brush farther to the right... Remove the stone... like that... That's my kneecap... Good job..." It was the ghost of a young woman. She was calmly giving me directions so that I could go on digging and find her entire body. In the dream my hands worked with a brush on part of her exposed bones, and her ghost had risen from the area that was still covered with soil. She wanted me to find her. She was happy with what I was doing. It was a reassuring dream. I don't believe in ghosts, but I hesitated no longer. I knew what I had to do.

Traditional archeology aims to learn about the way of life of extinct human populations. We try to interpret how they lived, and we do so through material remnants. While objects may carry information, the context where we find them contributes many more explanations. I am referring to their location in space, the relationship between the various objects found, their time of origin, and so on. We call this archeological record. Although we know this record is dynamic, because it is very unlikely that we will dig in Pompeii (where the lava from Vesuvius left everything exactly as it was, even the people who died there), we document it as best we can and in every possible way (measurements, maps, notes, photographs, and videos, among others) in order to extract as much information as current knowledge allows.
When archeologists dig, they destroy, so if they do not do it properly or do not record their finds accurately, the information contained in the site is lost. When we use these techniques in forensic archeology, in mass grave digs such as the ones in the Avellaneda cemetery or in the San Vicente cemetery in Córdoba, we are making bones “talk” from the moment we find them. Forensic archeologists work in sites that are the “scene of the crime”; although people were rarely buried in the same place where they had been executed, the place where the bones are found gives us many kinds of data about the crime. For example, it is no coincidence that we have found similarities in the location of clandestine graves in different cemeteries in Argentina. They are usually at the end of the cemetery, in places reserved for those who cannot pay. Burial places “speak”; material remnants associated with the bones (clothing, objects, projectiles) have stories to tell. Due to their relationship with the bones, these objects constitute evidence in trials.

Clyde Snow was interviewed in relation to the statement he gave at the 2005 trial against Saddam Hussein for crimes against the Kurdish people. The journalist asked him if Hussein had talked to him, and Clyde answered:

Yes, he stood up (he was holding a huge Quran in his hand) and essentially questioned my credibility. He asked who I was, and said he had never heard of me or of forensic anthropology. Afterward, regarding the skeletons we had found, he said, “Iraq is full of common graves. How do you know that they are not Hittites from five or six thousand years ago?” I wanted to answer. I wanted to say that I knew that the Hittites were a very advanced civilization, but not so much as to own digital watches. I would have also said that most of these watches had stopped working on August 28, 1988. But before I could do so, the judge said I had already been confirmed as an expert. I could never answer his question. (Wiesse and Saravia, 2012)

Don Sotero’s skin is weather-beaten, and his clothes hang loose from his bones. He wears a hat and has a twig in his mouth. He speaks little and inward. It’s very hard to understand him. And while he’s telling us, perhaps, the worst thing that ever happened to him, his nervousness and fear, probably caused by these three Argentine foreigners who want to take the dead out of the soil, make him smile and show the few teeth he still has left. We’re in El Salvador, near a hamlet known as La Joya, in the Morazán mountains, in the middle of a mango grove. It’s mango season, and the fruit that isn’t harvested rots on the ground.

He’s showing us the place where he buried his children. Local peasants are helping us dig. They have learned the archeologist’s trade quite fast. The bones appeared far down, about six-foot deep. Don Sotero, local residents, and members of human rights organizations follow our work carefully from above. It’s April 2000, and it’s the first time I have to exhume children’s bones. Pato and Mimi3 already did, in 1991. These bones are delicate, fragile. You have to work with great care. Besides, there are many more, because they haven’t fused like ours. They had to continue growing, but weren’t allowed to...

– What’s that? one of the workers asks, and shows me a rag. He’s squatting and digging behind me.

– A garment.
– No. There’s something inside.
– Uncover it to see what’s in it.

I turn around to help. The piece of fabric was wrapping a plastic doll. The doll’s arms are raised, as if it were holding its head. It was next to her owner. The people

3. Patricia Bernardi and Mercedes Doretti, founding members of EAAF.
above also witnessed the scene. There's no need to explain anything. Besides, nobody can make a sound. “Let’s take a break,” says Mimi. Someone starts singing a religious song, and then everyone joins in a prayer. We leave to smoke a cigarette, farther away.

This is one of EAAFs emblem cases – the Mozote massacre in El Salvador. Long before the La Joya dig in 1992, upon the request of the United Nations and based on an investigation conducted by the Oficina de Tutela Legal (Legal Guardianship Office, an NGO founded by Monsignor Romero), EAAF led the digging in the ruins of a room next to the church in El Mozote. It was the first of several missions carried out in the Morazán area in relation to this massacre. This time, material clues told us that 131 children under 12 had been killed, that they were all locked in a room, and that two people had shot them through the window and door. Once again, each one of those bodies, of those tiny bones uncovered the official lie. The story of a confrontation between the military and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front turns into the dust covering bones, clothes, and toys. There's no question about it.

Identity

When we take our findings to the lab, we continue to probe into these material clues to try to find answers regarding the events. Every element has something to tell. To the bones, we basically ask questions about two issues: identity and cause of death. This is a more complex stage. We are constantly taking apart and putting back together; we go from the unit to the whole, and from the whole to the unit – from isolated bones to a whole skeleton, and from the skeleton, to the context of the findings. The nature of the process depends on the nature of the question we are trying to answer. Our identity goes from our singularity to our belonging to a social group. We cannot identify someone by studying only that person, not even if we make use of cutting-edge genetic technology. To identify someone, we must compare the genetic profile of his or her bones with the genetic profile of a relative.

At the same time, it is thanks to this singularity that we can identify the person, especially if we're studying bones. As the body decomposes, the potential for visual recognition by a relative is reduced. The traces of “humaness” will vanish, and the bones will become “things.” In his book Dancing on the Grave, Nigel Barley (1995) exemplifies this process with the case of the Lindow Man, a corpse from the Iron Age that has been very well preserved due to a natural mummification process (because it sank into a swamp). This corpse is at the British Museum and was given the name of Pete Marsh. Barley argues that a person’s fascination lies in the flesh rather than the bones. It is his preserved flesh that makes Pete Marsh an individual instead of inert matter. He still has an identity and a nationality. He has a face. According to this author, we draw a boundary between flesh and blood on the one hand, and bone on the other, between the perishable and what remains “relatively clean and clear.”

4. During the 1981 civil war, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front had a greater presence on the border with Honduras, in the north of the Morazán department. Between December 7 and December 12 of that year, the Salvadoran army carried out an offensive in that area with an elite battalion, Atlácatl, created in 1980 (the soldiers had trained at the Americas School, established by the US army and located in Panama). Allies of Ronald Reagan’s government decided to implement the “scorched earth” strategy used in Vietnam. The goal is to prevent the guerrillas from finding supplies. To this end, the surrounding towns and hamlets must be destroyed. Thus, on December 8 the Atlácatl battalion went into several hamlets in Morazán, among them, El Mozote. Heeding a rumor that the army was coming in, the men fled to the mountains and left the women, children, and elderly people. There were only two survivors – a boy and a woman who managed to escape. The official story talks about a confrontation between the guerrillas and the army.
In the lab there are approximately four hundred cardboard boxes, each with a skeleton inside. Not all of these bones belong to “disappeared,” but they are bodies with no identity; they belong to people who, for some reason, were buried without a name. Some were forgotten, and others are being unsuccessfully sought by their relatives. Yet others, due to the neglect suffered by graves in a “modern” society that is losing respect for their dead, were thrown out on the street after having been used as study “material” by some aspiring physician or as part of some ritual, or simply because they were considered garbage until, by a merciful chance, they ended up in our lab.

At the same time, there are identities without a body – the identities of those whose relatives are searching for them. In recent years, genetic advances have allowed us to identify more corpses, but there are still many to be identified.

–Good morning, I’d like to talk to María Carolina Llorens.

–It’s me.

–My name is Anahí Ginarte. I’m a member of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team. I’d like to talk to you in person. When would you be available?

We had identified her parents.

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5. This is the name given to people who were kidnapped and imprisoned in clandestine detention centers during the last military dictatorship in Argentina. There they were tortured and later murdered, and their bodies were hidden in different ways (thrown into the sea, buried as John or Jane Doe in municipal cemeteries, or buried in mass graves hidden in military fields).
My parents, Sebastián Llorens y Diana Triay, who were PRT/ERP* militants, were kidnapped on December 9, 1975 and had remained disappeared since then [...] Despite the family’s efforts to explain to us what had happened to our parents, we often had unanswered questions. Were they dead? If death is an ancestral question that humans have always asked, what is non-death? What is a disappeared? What is this absence without certainties? [...] One morning my 8-year-old son woke up asking, “I understand about the military, but Mom, tell me: The bones, where are Grandpa and Grandma’s bones?” Later, when we went to give a statement at the court, he kept asking: “Then, we don’t know where they are? Can they be anywhere? Can they be here, under the sidewalk?” [...] Finally we have a certainty that opens doors, a tangible possibility to say good-bye, to cry for our dead – one of the undeniable human rights, already mentioned in Antigone’s tragedy, which is known as “the right to mourn.” After all these losses and failed searches, Nelly Ruiz de Llorens, my parental grandmother, who is 92 and still fighting, can finally say good-bye. And the children, siblings, nieces, nephews, grandmothers, cousins, grandchildren, friends, neighbors can say good-bye. In short, an entire society needs to say good-bye. This farewell involves ambiguous and apparently contradictory emotions, because it is a reunion and a farewell at the same time. It produces a “strange joy,” as my uncle Bernardo put it. It’s the joy of learning the truth after so much darkness and uncertainty, the indescribable emotion of seeing them again through the words of their remains. The farewell, by contrast, is painful, because the loss becomes present again in a mourning process that is as intense “as if they had died yesterday.” (Llorens, 2013)

In other cases, we cannot find the “whole” because we only have a few “small parts.” The court had notified this family of the identification. We had found the bones in some old lime kilns in the La Ochoa ranch, the military field where the La Perla clandestine detention center had operated, in Córdoba Province.

–We don’t have them all. They are mixed bones. Many of them are small fragments, and some are burnt. They were together amid the debris that covered the chimney of Kiln Number 3. We gathered the bones that were duplicate – three left

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6. The Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT) was a Communist party that operated between the late 1960s and mid-1970s, and the Revolutionary People’s Army (ERP) was its militant wing. (T.N.)
scaphoids, two left and two right lunates, all the hand bones – and we sent them to have the DNA extracted. We knew that the bones were from at least three people, and the geneticists found a fourth profile. That's why we were able to identify the children. But they're not full skeletons. We will only be able to give you some bones, and others will remain mixed.

How hard it was to explain to Ana and Mariano that we didn't have the full skeleton of her sister, Lila Gómez. Only by seeing the photographs were they able to understand. In the morning of December 6, 1975, a military commando kidnapped four medical students from National Córdoba University: Lila Rosa Gómez Granja, Ricardo Enrique Saibene, Luis Agustín Santillán, and Alfredo Felipe Sinópoli. They were gathered in front of the Dante statue in Sarmiento Park. We don't know what hell they went through, like Dante, to get to the place where we found them. What we do know is how much their families suffered.

My heart aches with your absence... not yesterday, not today, but every day. It's like an indelible stain, an unbearable rending, enduring, persistent... never "disappeared." It hurts me to imagine you alone in the dark, in the silence, but it hurts even more to imagine you with them, under their power, suffering. Your memory hurts, but thinking of the possibility of forgetting hurts even more. What I know of your story hurts, but what I never knew hurts even more... "Disappeared"... but never absent. (Saibene, s/d)

The four families decided that the fragments that could not be separated should be buried jointly in the garden of the La Perla Memory Space, where they planted four trees. When such an incredible connection is achieved with just fractional DNA and it is possible to reach the magnificence of an identification, a hidden story is revealed. It is there. Given the facts, there is no question about it.

The part and the whole

Imbued in a kind of systemic epistemology, without wondering too much if this is actually the case, we start with the analysis of the “parts” and from there we move on to the “whole,” which becomes a “part” as we switch levels of analysis. We study the sternal end of the rib to estimate the individual's age, and based on that information, by adding other methods of study that focus on other small parts of the bones, we can make overall statements about the skeleton. And when we are able to identify it by analyzing and comparing its genetic profile (obtained from a dental piece), this skeleton becomes a person with a history, a family, and a society.

Other professionals (psychologists, social anthropologists, and so on) study the consequences of these findings, but we have to be alert to these consequences in order to make decisions and take action if needed. In Zimbabwe we worked jointly with Amani Trust, an NGO whose main task was to provide psychological and medical treatment to Gukurahundi survivors who had suffered physical and psychological torture. We were asked to help with exhumations and identifications to

7. Omar José Saibene, brother of Ricardo Enrique Saibene.
8. Amani Trust was created in 1993 to prevent violence and torture. In 2002, the Minister of Justice, Patrick Chinamasa, declared several NGOs illegal, Amani Trust among them. The organization was also accused of working with the British government to overthrow President Robert Mugabe.
9. Gukurahundi was a government campaign conducted between 1982 and the late 1980s. The Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe army, led by Perence Shiri, murdered members and sympathizers of the African Popular Union in Matabeleland and Midlands, the provinces of the Ndebele people.
respond to a repeated request from members of different Ndebele communities, who could not achieve peace of mind because they hadn’t been able to bury their dead properly.

According to the *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace* report, drafted by Zimbabwe’s Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJPZ) (1997), the Fifth Brigade did not allow the bereaved to perform mourning or burial rites for those who were murdered during the Gukurahundi campaign, and they even fired shots targeting the relatives of the victims. In many cases, these relatives had to watch their loved ones’ bodies rot in the sun and be ravaged by animals. They also had to face other obstacles; since they did not have a death certificate, they could not inherit their relatives’ goods, enjoy benefits, or conduct administrative procedures.

Above all, they had to cope with great psychological suffering caused by the inability to hold vigils or bury their dead according to their customs.

Death plays an important role in the wellbeing of the living in Ndebele culture. Those who were not buried come back as vengeful spirits, innocent but harmed and damaged, and dangerous for the living. Not only are those whose final fate or place of burial is unknown considered missing, but also those who were buried in common graves are culturally seen as spirits who are unhappy and ‘in limbo.’ The tears of the living and a decent mourning period are needed so that they can rest in peace.

Edwell suffered a very cruel death in February 1984. A truck carrying five soldiers came to the town of Mapane. The soldiers surrounded the peasants, men and women, near the school. It was terrifying. They accused the peasants of being dissidents and beat them brutally. Edwell was 22 years old, and short. He and his cousin were detained, hung head down from a tree, and fiercely beaten on the head with boots and guns. Edwell died, but his cousin was still breathing. They put him in the truck and took him away. He has disappeared. Edwell’s body was dragged to the cave of an anteater, in the school playground, and left there. The soldiers threatened to kill anyone who tried to move it. That night the dogs ate away at it. Despite their fear, his family and friends decided to bury him deeper in the same hole and cover him with stones. They were all distressed by the fact that the grave was in the same place where the school kids ran and played.

As the forensic work was completed, the skeletons were restored to the families. The funerals were carried out in the kraal10 of each family with the participation of the entire community and different religious institutions. We were invited, too. In each funeral, different people, relatives or community members, talked about their feelings and narrated part of the story. Below is the speech made by the elder of the family, M. Madlela.

We are here today at Edwell’s home. He died in a very unusual way, during the time when the Earth trembled... He had to wait a long time. As you know, Zimbabwe was liberated by an armed struggle. Well, the people who were buried in the wrong places also have to struggle. They struggle from below, where they are lying, until they’re liberated. Today Edwell was liberated and returned to give testimony for the others, the others who died. We are all very grateful for that. Today we all know that he’s here in an acceptable way for a human being. The way we buried him responded to each family’s wishes... This is excellent! We thank the people who were educated with their parents’ money to carry out this great work. They know people’s bones and can separate them. Hopefully, God will make them come back so that those who have

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10. A kraal is a settlement of huts organized in a circle. The space in the center is used to keep cattle. They are found among the peoples of Southern Africa.
been delayed can be with their relatives in their homes. I thank the visitors from the other side of the sea who came to liberate these people who were in unknown places under the earth. Hopefully, God will help them, and we ask him to bless them, if we have that power. Thank you.

Edwell's death had other consequences for the living. His mother could finally register his death with the authorities, and hence his son could inherit his goods.

Ben Khumalo and Stanley Sibanda were murdered during the Liberation War, on November 18, 1978. Ben Khumalo was the chief of the tribe. Only after a year had gone by since we recovered his body, and once the umbuyiso ritual was performed, was his son able to take on his father's role in the community. The umbuyiso or Bringing Home Ceremony is conducted a year after the person's death and is an important part of the Ndebele's religious beliefs. It marks the return of the dead in a harmonious relationship, an uninterrupted communion between the family's dead and living members. The spirit is asked to come back and watch over the family and protect them from harm. We were allowed to participate in the ceremonies. We also learned that after the first restitutions we made in 1999, the spirits were able to rest in peace, and the rain season brought back enough water for the fragile family economies.

The trials: Signifier and signified

Many of the anthropologists that trained at La Plata or Buenos Aires University and studied the discipline comprehensively in its three branches (archeology, social anthropology, and biological anthropology) learned the concepts of signifier and signified as they were developed by the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. As explained above, recording and documenting our work is essential. Thus, we supply the retrieved evidence in different formats (writing, photographs, and videos) to the institutions in charge of meting out justice. As technology advances, the quality of documentation improves, and archiving and searching for evidence become easier. Today we can make three-dimensional imprints of a skull that show a firearm wound. However, the value attached to this way of presenting evidence depends on the internalization of technology in each society.

“You don't understand. I want the skeletons in the trial room. For us Africans, an image is not the same as seeing the bones themselves, told us Ato Gyurma Wajjira, the attorney general, in April 2002, prior to our statement before the High Federal Court in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Mimi and I were very concerned about the relatives of the thirteen people we had identified. Clyde was fascinated. He had given statements in many trials around the world, but never with the corpse lying before judges and defendants.

We asked for a meeting with the relatives. They all agreed with the attorney general. While it would be painful for them, they understood the importance of this procedure. The day before, we went to the courtroom and set up the evidence and the skeletons. These were placed in anatomical position on thirteen tables arranged in a fan shape in front of the judge panel. On a separate table were the thirteen ropes that had been used to strangle the victims, which had been found around their necks. Mimi and Clyde's statement lasted several hours. I showed the images and the characteristics of the skeletons. We were told later that the defendants had confessed soon after our statements.
Then...

Forensic anthropologists translate what the bones want to tell us. With these bones, we materialize the stories of relatives, survivors, and witnesses. We do our bit to help reveal the truth about events:

Above all, just as one person speaks for many, so can a people speak for others, because since it focuses on the micro levels, on details, this type of evidence conveys a very dramatic story to judges and juries. We do not bore them with statistics. Joseph Stalin made a very interesting observation. When he spoke of the deaths that had occurred during his reign of terror, he said: “A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths, a statistic.” And it is true. (Wiesse and Saravia, 2012)

References


Dossier: Cuerpo
The presentation of this issue’s Dossier (The body) already started in the previous issue (Margins), where we moved along the edges of the body, along its surface, stimulating the senses with smells, flavors, slight touches, sounds, and images that were sometimes dizzying, sometimes subtle. Once the senses are aroused, the body starts moving and expressing itself. The simple motions of everyday life become lines, traces, colors, and static scenes in the eyes and hands of the artists, generating emotions and maintaining the thread of life.

At the turn of the nineteenth century at the La Salpêtrière Hospital, while trying to elucidate the nature of hysteria, Charcot fixes a static gaze on the body of his patients. To observe them better, to understand them through their mannerisms and movements, he “captures” them in photographs. He creates an iconographic museum of hysteria. Did he imagine that he could thus grasp and decipher what was concealed behind the twists and extraordinary positions of the bodies of those women, who resembled sculptures in the photographic images? We could say that with these pictures, Charcot could hold the hysterical body in his hands in all its theatricality. Almost an art. With this experience (in which Freud participated at some point) as a starting point, what path did he follow toward the body of psychoanalysis?

I’d like to return to the beginning of this story, to the body of the hysterical and the inaugural act of psychoanalysis, that is, giving this body a voice: “Further, her painful legs began to ‘join in the conversation’ during our analyses” (Freud, 1893-1895, p. 148). Long before he was attracted to the dialogue suggested to him by the painful body of Elisabeth von R. (a body that told past stories that Elisabeth herself could not remember), Freud’s attention, like Charcot’s, had been drawn to the bodies of the sick women of La Salpêtrière, to their strange, eroticized movements, which drew a somewhat sinister dance in the air. That is how
psychoanalysis started, with few words and violent physical movements that scandalized Victorian society, since they granted visibility to a forbidden body – the erotic, sexualized body that shamelessly expressed its pain and jouissance in hysteria. Finding in these apparently incomprehensible movements a narrative with the value of an individual history, giving them meaning is what psychoanalysts have tried to do since Freud.

From the anatomical body, life is born into another form, the symbolic form, traced in the words and gestures that culture embroiders and marks in it, immemorial marks that are waiting to transfer a history to a new body by means of new scars. Life does not stop, but at some point it does stop. I borrow here an idea developed by Kantorovich (1957) regarding the legal framework of the Middle Ages. In his book *The King’s Two Bodies*, this author speaks of the King’s immortal body politic and the king’s human body, which, like all human bodies, is subject to finitude. In this way, we can think that if the anatomical body dies, the symbolic body will transmit the humanness engraved in it across history.

With which body do we enter into a dialogue in psychoanalysis? In that web where the anatomical, the symbolic, and the erogenous interweave, the body expresses itself in memory and symbols. Each unique human story is built based on the same reminiscences that ailed Freud’s hysterics, stories that throb under the skin and escape through gaps/words. Of these very reminiscences, which we each stage in our own way, is made the matter that weaves life. Paradoxically, maintaining life is one of the reasons why we worship the dead and bury their bodies as part of the cultural legacy that sustains humanity and its history.

In Ancient Greece, an unburied body, which had not been submitted to the funerary rites, condemned the dead person to wander for one hundred years on the banks...
of the Lethe River (the river of oblivion that led to the world of the dead) without ever embarking on the journey across. Furthermore, neither could the living who had ties to these wandering beings embark on their journey of pain, and hence they remained in the limbo of melancholia. When the body of the loved one was missing, the bereaved buried a stone in the ground, the kolossos. This stone enabled the living (daylight and sounds) to come into contact with the dead (darkness and silence). In this way, the invisible body manifested itself through an unexpected, ambiguous presence that was also the sign of its absence – a mark of a memory created in stone, the mark of a story without a narrator. Are psychoanalysts narrators? Are we the ones who, in the absence of narratives in the bodies of those who seek our help, yearn to build kolossos, links between the silent, motionless body and the word?

In a recent article in the Folha de São Paulo daily, the Cuban writer Leonardo Padura (2016) points to a delicate issue concerning the history of his homeland. Cuba is a country, he says, whose memory is split, lost. The break happened after 1959, with the revolution that put Castro in power. Since then, those who left the country and those who stayed started having different memories. The former are not familiar with the country's present, while the latter do not know the history of their fellow countrymen abroad. Forgetfulness, an altered memory, is present not only in Cuba but also in any country, people, or individual who has experienced situations of breakdown with no symbolic inscription – unrepresented events. Unlike the pain resulting from trauma – an experience that becomes a foreign body, is maintained as a “separate body,” and creates a “body that suffers from reminiscences” – suffering here is not tied to memories because there are no memories. There is neither story nor narrator. A story must be created that will give meaning to the body, that will give it an identity and a sense of belonging. With these bodies, psychoanalysts enter into a dialogue through stories that have not been spoken but inscribed in subterranean spaces. These are transgenerational legacies that often stick to the bodies of cities and of their inhabitants, as we see in so many Latin American cities.

Identity, a mobile category to which other elements are always added that reconfigure it, is body in motion. Countries and individuals experience splitting, transformations, conflict situations, and tensions that constantly modify them. This is what Cristian Nanzer, architect and urban planner, writes in “Notes on the body of the city,” included in this Dossier: “Understanding the historical dimension of the city provides us with patterns and guidelines to explain contemporary phenomena; it allows us to read processes and breaks, repetitions and singularities, mutations and continuities.”

From the altered memory described by Padura, we cannot heal without scars that, whether visible or not, are always deep. The sociologist David Le Breton ponders this issue from a different perspective – that of face transplants. Here we are not dealing with an organ that is invisible to subjects or to those looking at them. Rather, this is precisely the “bodily space” with which we look and are looked at, in which the sense of identity is embodied, in which individuals recognize themselves and are recognized by others. Embedded in our own face, alterity demands a necessary and essential work of assimilation. In this way, the alchemy that integrates another person’s gestures and expressions will take place, enabling their appropriation.

Le Breton shows how subjects start viewing parts of themselves as abject. There is an almost non-existent, destroyed face they would like to remove and a face they would like to recover, in which they may recognize a humanness that they feel they have lost. How much of themselves should they surrender? How much of the invasion by the other through prostheses and transplants should they accept in order to maintain a non-perishable body, a body in which time will not leave undesired marks, which is the greatest human aspiration, always yearned for, sought, and sung in prose and verse? This question traverses the essay by Tarso Adoni, neurologist, and he leaves it open as a source of reflection for readers. It is also the topic of an exquisite article by Freud (1916) that talks about the poet who observes the beauty of spring flowers during a stroll and sadly complains about the fleetingness of beautiful things, which are all mortal. Freud suggests that the
poet pay attention to movement in nature, to the movement of bodies that are reborn as other bodies within the finitude reserved to them.

There is a waiting time, an “in-between” that suggests a gestation, a space in which what is about to come is created. Using poetic prose, Iván García, actor and opera singer, tells us in “Poetizing silence and the interpreter’s listening” about the actor/singer’s body in the silence of the wait, in the void of the “in-between,” which always suggests sorrow, the anxiety of creating a transformative movement that cannot be seen or heard but is already present in the silence that precedes it. An instant! “In a trembling, dreadful, fateful silence, Orpheus experiences the void and sings, disturbed: ‘Ohimé!’ (Woe is me!) [...] a prolonged silence that will reveal and propel the lament.” We should remark here that the prolonged silence would correspond to an empty form that promotes, that creates a space for the voice (a presence that is a mark of the body) and for movement. In the same way, the human gesture, in its movement, traces and creates this space. Between one step and the next is the body.

Let us turn now to ballet, to the expressive movement involved in dancing. In a text that travels through the history of ballet, Chaimovich, philosopher and curator of the São Paulo Museum of Modern Art, introduces us to the meanders of the creation of this art and to the ways in which hard discipline was instated so as to maintain the repressed body of the ballerina rigid and impassible, even in contemporary dance, which is allegedly freer. I find an articulation between the trained, rigid body of the ballerina, who dances while touched by music, and the painful, avid body of the hysteric, who dances her story, in a phrase by the ballerina Inês Bogéa.1 According to Bogéa, “dancing meant occupying space with my personality” (Bogéa, 2011, p. 15). Her desire to throw her leg as high as possible is meaningful only if it has expression as its aim. Otherwise it is nothing but a gesture.

Perhaps, with words that could grant meaning to what had hitherto been only a gesture of anxiety (albeit full of jouissance), Freud transformed some hysterias into dance. See, for instance, the ending of the tale of his patient Elisabeth von R.: "In the spring of 1894 I heard she was going to a private ball for which I was able to get an invitation, and I did not allow the opportunity to escape me of seeing my former patient whirl past in a lively dance” (Freud, 1893-1895, p. 160).

It is a mobile, nimble, and immortal body that we wish for, and maybe that is why when we talk to our children about death, to avoid scaring them or scaring ourselves with the inexorableness of the end, of the motionless silence that we envision on the other side of the Lethe river, we tell them that the loved one did not die but became a star that will remain in the heavens, shined on and shining, always following those left in the world of the living with its light. We transform the human body into a heavenly body so that it will survive – so that we will be able to whisper along with Galileo Galilei, “Eppur si muove.”2

References

1. Director, Sao Paulo Dance Company and PhD in Arts (Campinas University). She was a dancer in the Corpo Group, Belo Horizonte, Brazil.
2. “Eppur si muove” (“And yet, it moves”) is a phrase attributed to Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), who would have whispered it after publicly rejecting the fact that the Earth revolved around the sun in front of an Inquisition tribunal in Rome in 1633.
From disfigurement to face transplant: An anthropological approach

The anthropological status of the face¹

Face transplants intervene abruptly, like a sudden jolt, in the matrix of a person’s sense of self, insofar as they borrow the most intimate feature of the other. The face is not a non-descript place in the geography of the body. It embodies individuals’ sense of identity; it is the place where they recognize themselves. Individuals are identified, named, judged by it. They are assigned a sex, an age, a skin color, a psychology. They are loved, despised, or anonymous, lost in the indifference of the crowd.

Getting to know someone involves allowing him or her to see and understand a countenance rich in meaning and value and, in return, rendering the other’s countenance into a place equally meaningful and interesting.

Of all the zones of the human body, the face condenses the highest values. It is the place of the sense of self, where seduction, the endless varieties of beauty and ugliness, of old age, of emotions are fixed... In our individualistic societies, the value of the face prevails when the recognition of oneself or of others depends on individuality and not on one’s belonging to a group or one’s position within a caste. For individuals to have a social and cultural place, there must be a place in the body that is sufficiently mobile and variable in its declensions to unambiguously signify the difference between one human being and the next and to support communication needs. The body must mark the boundaries between the self and the external world and between the self and others. It becomes an identity border, and the face, a territory in which individuality is inscribed.² There is no other space in the body that is more suitable to mark individual singularity and to indicate this singularity socially.

In love games, the social and individual value attributed to the face, which distinguish-
es it from the rest of the body, is expressed in the attention lavished on it by lovers. There is in the countenance of the beloved a beckoning, a mystery, and the movement of an always-renewed desire. Literature offers many examples. The loved countenance always seems to be the place where truth is about to be revealed. Furthermore, the end of a love relationship is doubtlessly the testimony of the mutual banality that has captured the lovers’ faces – the inability to search for the mystery in the other’s features.

The sacred has been gradually desecrated over the course of everyday life, and has lost its aura. While the intensity of feeling endures, however, the countenance surrenders, in the manner of a key, to enter into the joy of what it is. Yet since the countenance is the place of the sacred par excellence in the relationship between oneself and the other, it is also the object of a will to desecrate, to sully, to destroy when the goal is to eliminate the individual, to take away his or her singularity. The denial of humans is exemplarily connected with a refusal to grant dignity to the face. Everyday idioms reveal this: lose face, a bald-faced lie, poker face, long face, to fall on one’s face, in your face, a kick in the face, and so on.3

Insults vulgarize the face or drag it through the mud: turd face, mug, kisser, and so on. All of these are ways of disqualifying human beings that symbolically demand that they be deprived of their face to humiliate them even more. The will to fully suppress humans’ hu-

3. Since not all the French idioms translate literally into English, I used other idioms with the word “face.” The same is true for the insults. (T. N.)
manity alludes to the need to break in them the unique sign of their belonging to the species and of their singularity, in this case, their face. Where love symbolically elevates the face, hatred insists on trampling on it. An anthropological school of the sacred highlights its spirituality, its height, the emotion of seeing it, while another school recalls, instead, the awe, the terror and, therefore, the will to destroy.

Alteration of the face

In the context of everyday life, every facial wound is experienced as a drama. Confronting a damaged face is as hard for the affected person as it is for those looking at him or her. Both are confronted with the mirror test. The face is a totality, a unique gestalt that cannot be changed, even slightly, without an effect on the sense of self. Every alteration deeply transforms the person, who can no longer recognize himself or herself and does not dare look at himself or herself in the face, in both a moral and a concrete sense. Disfiguration redefines the matrix of the identity of an individual who has become unnamable, monstrous (in the etymological sense, which means that his or her misfortune draws everyone's attention).

Disfigured people no longer belong entirely to themselves. The symbolic boundaries of their body no longer close upon them; they negatively stretch into the social space. Wounds and scars located in other parts of the body are less painful even when they are more serious. The break of the sacredness of the countenance sometimes arouses horror in close relations. The sacredness of fascination gives way to repulsion. Disfiguration does not only tear out the skin of the face, rendering the person unrecognizable. It also subtly tears out the identity it embodied, which was confirmed every day by others’ gazes. The individual who has been hit this way will never again recognize himself or herself, neither in the real nor in the figurative sense. It is as though an earthquake had wrecked the old foundations.

“Losing face,” keeping up appearances, and “putting on a good face” (Goffman, 1967) cease to be metaphors. This time the situation concretely occupies the center of the social bond when each mirror, each hesitation on one’s part triggers stigmatization and provokes a feeling of personal ambiguity and of being an exception to the species. Without respite, the disfigured person must assume this violence of the others’ gaze, must face his or her own destroyed sense of identity and the contrast with a body image that had been strongly fixed in memory before the accident or illness. This image, which changes very slowly, recalls the cruelty of fate.

The ability to overcome this trial and fully recover the will to live is rooted in individuals’ experience, their social and cultural status, their age, and the characteristics of their environment as well. Disfiguration is not a wound that heals without consequences. The tear endures. It amounts to a mutilation, even if the individual has not lost a limb. It leaves no alternative but to accept it and undergo the successive surgeries that revive hope, but also the pain of the lost face. Disfiguration puts a mask on the face that suffers it. This mask will be there forever; it will be the prelude of every encounter. Nobody lives just inside a physical body. If that were the case, no face injury, save a functional one, could prevent us from living as if nothing had happened.

Human beings live first in an imaginary body, full of meanings and values with which they incorporate the world into themselves and join the external world. In our societies, disfigured people, chosen as a target of collective attention against their will, pull the wool over the others’ eyes by their unobtrusiveness and strive to become paradoxically invisible so as to go unnoticed. The hierarchy of dread brings facial disfiguration (caused either by an accident or an illness) to the forefront. That person “no longer looks like a person,” says the popular adage. It is a metaphor that marks one’s withdrawal from the social bond and, even more, that says death. The particularity of disfigured people consists in the symbolic lack they offer the world through their damaged features. Their ability to work, love, educate, live, travel remains intact, but their full humanity has been questioned.

A subtle boundary distances them from the others by way of a symbolic violence that is all
the more virulent as it is often unwitting. I have spoken, in this sense, of a disability of appearance (Le Breton, 2010). In normal social life conditions, certain labels connected with putting the body into play rule interactions, circumscribe threats that may derive from the unknown and thus establish points of reference that ensure the unfolding of the exchange. Diluted in the ritual, the body goes unnoticed; it is reabsorbed by the prevailing codes and finds in the other, as in a mirror, its own attitudes and an image with no surprises. The ritualized erasure of the body is socially mandatory (Le Breton, 1990/2008a).

Those who, deliberately or against their will, abrogate the rites that rule interactions generate malaise or distress. The roughness of the body or of the words impedes the progress of the dialogue. How do we face that other whose damaged face is immediately evident? The smooth regulation of the exchange is no longer possible; the body is no longer erased by the proper functioning of the ritual, and it becomes hard to negotiate a shared definition of the interaction outside the customary points of reference. The relationship with the person with a damaged face poses considerable challenge due to the projection of archaic fantasies and terrors. A “game” interferes in the meeting and generates distress or malaise. The disfigured person is not spared the uncertainty concerning the definition of the situation.

These people avoid every public situation because they feel too exposed, and will not stop resorting to strategies aimed at going unnoticed, such as avoiding public transportation or crowded places. They find themselves in the symbolic situation of losing face before every person they encounter, hence their frequent withdrawal; they rarely leave their houses, or they wait for the night so they can get lost in anonymity. “I will never again be presentable to men,” Isabelle Dinoire had told herself before her transplant, when she discovered that her face had been destroyed.4

Disfiguration deprives individuals of their full personal and social identity. It metamorphoses them into problematic beings who must learn to recover the others’ gaze and to defeat evasion. Every encounter is a new trial that feeds their doubts as to how they will be received and whether their dignity will be respected. Witnesses who are physically sound, hence, tend to avoid experiencing a disagreeable uneasiness, so they move on, not without trying to see better. If people claim a credit of trust in their favor in social relations, those whose faces are damaged, just like those affected by a psychic or sensory handicap, will find themselves charged with a negative a priori that makes it hard to get close to others. And this process is silent, almost discreet but effective thanks to the subtlety of the void created around them, of the manifold gazes surrounding them, and also to the difficulty they experience in enjoying everyday relationships, which they must conquer with difficulty, feeling the awkwardness they arouse in those who have not gotten used to their presence.

If the face is confused with the being, its deformation constitutes a crack in the heart of that being and is experienced as a desecration of the self. The person who has been thus hit is doomed to the in-between, is the prisoner of an intermediate status, is entangled in an endless liminality. The awkwardness these people cause is linked to the lack of clarity of their social definition. They are neither sick nor healthy, neither dead nor fully alive, neither outside nor inside society, both impossible to identify but with a damaged face that becomes painfully obvious, incontestably human even if they do not carry the signs – they no longer even have a sex. The social ambivalence they generate is a kind of replication of the ambiguity of the situation, of its persisting and ungraspable nature. It is a situation that cannot be ritualized and is, therefore, always marked by discomfort. Under these circumstances, discretion constitutes the privilege of being commonplace, the impossible dream of blending into the anonymity of the crowds. All those suffering a visible handicap constantly draw attention on themselves.

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4. The quotes by Isabelle Dinoire have been taken from the interview she gave to the Le Monde daily, published on July 7, 2007.
From the face transplant to the transplant of the countenance

Isabelle Dinoire, who was the first one to undergo a face transplant in 2005, had entered into the vertigo of an existence deprived of a countenance. “I didn’t dare leave my room. I had such a hard time looking at myself. How could I inflict that on others? It was monstrous, traumatizing; I couldn’t show myself. In front of the mirror, I always had the impression that I wasn’t myself.” She recalls the cruelty of children’s reaction to her when she had to wear a mask before the surgery. Adults did not help her either. For men or women with a disfigured face, social life becomes a stage, and the least displacement disturbs spectators’ attention. In the etymological sense of the word, disfigurement operates as a stigma. All those who have it know the same social violence, as if they never left the stage; they are forced actors in their social life.

Jerome Hamon, aged 35, has neurofibromatosis, a degenerative illness that greatly deformed his face despite ten operations that did not check the progress of the disease. He was the first patient to undergo a full-face transplant, including the lids and the lacrimal system. He remembers “the pain I felt when I saw those looks, the terror I saw during thirty-five years in the eyes of those who crossed paths with me” (Hamon, 2015, p. 126). The burden of this status is irreversible. It is impossible to free oneself from this restrictive identity imposed by others and from being nothing but a disfigured person.

In the case of Isabelle Dinoire, no solution other than a transplant can be contemplated if she wants to recover her status in social life. The worst thing would be to continue to live with a hole instead of a face, forever excluded from a relationship with others. Something essential having been amputated from her relationship with the world, she suffers for not being able to look at herself in the face or recognize herself in that dreadful figure. The issue, then, is not saving patients’ lives but restoring their place in the world and their will to live. The operation resembles a symbolic return to the world. Transplanting a countenance is actually transplanting the foundations of an identity. Of course, these people are already immersed in the horror of their social indignity, and the foundations of their identity were already shaken when they suffered the accident or during the evolution of their illness. Yet the transplant is a second shock, albeit colored by their hope in this last operation.

Indications for face transplants are rare, and correspond to several types of traumatism: neurofibromatosis, animal bites, burns, some after-effects of cancer, and ballistic trauma. In the years following the first transplant of a triangle comprising the mouth, part of the cheeks and the nose, Isabelle Dinoire underwent transplants of the larynx, part of the trachea, the thyroid and parathyroid glands and nerves, the tongue, and the jaw. This transplant involves a dual transgression. It requires tearing part of the facial tissue of a dead donor. We know the symbolic value attached to the various organs. While donors or their relatives agree to the removal of the kidneys, for instance, there is reluctance when it is the heart, and sometimes the lungs. The corneas create greater problems because many families do not donate them so as not to deprive the dead from the shine of their gaze, and consequently of their face. In our societies the eyes are associated with “a window to the soul.” It is as though there were more or less humanity in different organs. In this context, removing facial tissues may be perceived as a radical desecration of the dead, a last violence exerted against them.

Another transgression with regard to the person receiving the transplant is having to live with someone else’s face. They must take that person’s strongest sign of identity and encounter alterity every time they are reflected in a mirror or a glass, as though somebody else had appropriated them in their most intimate and singular aspect. For many people

5. See also Lafrance, 2010; Le Breton, 2015.
6. On the anthropological facets of donations and transplants, see Le Breton, 2008b.
who have undergone face transplants, it will not be easy to see every day the semblance of another one looking at them in the mirror. The danger is that the debt will become stronger. Not only have the recipients taken the most intimate part of that Other and appropriated it, but they give nothing back except an abstract Thank you, unless they internalize him or her as a secret companion. A period of assimilation, of symbolic appropriation will be necessary, and will be more or less long depending on recipients’ personal histories and the support offered by those around them.

Organ or tissue transplants pose the problem of sacrifice. There is a symbolic price to be paid for reestablishing a more favorable health and, in this case, for recovering a socially acceptable face and, if possible, a face similar to the disfigured one. Understandably, some patients will be willing to risk absolutely everything in a kind of ordeal because their very existence has lost meaning. If living with a disfigurement involves endless, rending suffering, this choice makes sense, even if the price to pay is high. It is important, however, to be clear about what is at stake in identity wagers – the potential ambivalence before a countenance marked by ambiguity.

Face transplants pose essential anthropological questions: Who am I? Whose is this face that is now mine? Jerome Hamon cannot avoid wondering about his donor. Like many people who underwent transplants, he is faced with a painful question about him and about the age difference with which he is forced to live. When the beard starts growing again, it is grey. What belongs to the other is still there, even if it rapidly disappears. “How will my face age in relation to my body? The skin of my transplant is twenty-eight years older than I. Will it age independently?” (Hamon, 2015, p. 153). Yet this episode will quickly pass, and his hair will resume its usual color.

In any case, people with face transplants are certainly less inclined toward debt or de-personalization insofar as they are coming back from a very far place. For a more or less long time, they were isolated from social life, singled out by myriad looks every time they were in a public space. Their identity was bruised, and they were sure they would never recover their place in the world. Whereas other patients with transplants have long struggled against their illness and preserved their sense of identity to see themselves brutally confronted with the unnamable experience of receiving, by way of a transplant, the fragment of somebody else’s body, disfigured patients were outside the world or, rather, completely isolated yet clearly seeing the social violence around them.

When you lose your face, you lose your mouth, your lips, your nose, your smile. After the transplant, you eat with someone else’s mouth, smile with a different face, kiss with other lips, until the alchemy happens and the transplant integrates those gestures and expressions as if they belonged to you. It is important to integrate “the other’s face” in the operational dimension (thanks to physical therapy) but, above all, in the symbolic dimension, in order to appropriate it and gradually recognize oneself in it. That is why it is necessary to have the support of a medical and care team reinforced by strong emotional support. In addition, patients must appeal to their intimate resources in order to successfully travel this path of appropriation of a radical alterity.

Hundreds of hours of physical therapy are needed. This long, hesitant ritualization of the relationship with oneself is a way of preventing potential obstacles inherent in transplants. All patients’ efforts, all their investment is focused on this functional and symbolic assimilation of this face. It took years for Isabelle Dinoire to be able to join her lips to give a kiss. “At first it was like a mask, completely still,” she says. “I had to make facial exercises to reactivate my muscles, especially around the mouth.” The face (visage) is first a foreign body, as the physiologies of the transplanted organ and of the recipient do not blend and nerves and muscles are rejected.

Jerome Harmon (2015) speaks in his testimony of his “Keaton period,” referring to the US actor who had the reputation of never smiling. Despite countless reeducation hours, his face remained inert for three years; he still had to make it his own. His mouth stayed open for months. His meals were torture. His
elocution was sometimes hard. He underwent moments of doubt. He regretted having to put a “poker face” in front of his interlocutors because he had not yet acquired the social expressions that are needed for communication, especially the smile. One day long after his transplant, his first smile caused great emotion at the family table (p. 228).

The smile is the most important sign of the success of the transplant, because it involves motor and symbolic recovery that expresses the metamorphosis of the face into countenance. In no case is the transplant a duplication of the donated face on the recipient. The transplant is modeled on the recipient’s bone structure, but he or she does not get the previous face back. At the end of the road, an initiation passage may be anticipated. Isabelle Dinoire experiences a renaissance after her surgery, a return to the world after a long journey through the night. “I came back to the planet of the humans,” she says, “those who have a face, a smile, facial expressions that make communication possible. I revived. I experienced both a nightmare and an adventure about which I still don’t know how to speak.”

Jerome Hamon (2015) refers several times in his book to his surprise when he no longer called people’s attention when walking on the street. “I definitely blend in the crowd. This time it is my happiness that is unspeakable” (p. 220). And he ends his book with a heart-rending experience. Years after his transplant, he encounters a group of children who are calling each other at the top of their voices, laughing. Nothing happens, and this “nothing” is for him a happiness that makes him become aware that from now on, he has been born again. Nobody mocks him anymore. He identifies with this new face that came to him when he was thirty-five years old; he has mastered its alterity in the years following the transplant.

About this process, he writes: “Recognizing myself in this new face, I don’t have the impression of seeing someone else reflected in the mirror; I see myself” (p. 175). Over the years, the internalized face becomes a true countenance. This tenacious struggle to be oneself again, to change the alterity that has settled in one through daily exercises takes the shape of a ritual, of a subjectivation that slowly transforms the other’s tissues into one’s own countenance. People who have undergone a face transplant are always actively appropriating the transplant, and this work constantly mobilizes a sense of self that can be restored over time. This is not the case of other transplant recipients, who are in the hands of their doctors and of medical procedures and are under less pressure, since they reconnect with their lives through an organ they cannot see, lost in the darkness of the body. After some time, Isabelle Dinoire is able to control the muscles of her face and skin and can hence smile but, unlike Jerome, she cannot cry. Smiling and crying are two sensitive features of the human condition. Isabelle and Jerome have both recovered their countenance.

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The survival of ballet in our times may reveal the itinerary of the repression of the Western body, a repression associated with a process of forgetting. The very fact that the training of professional or amateur dancers is still governed by ballet in different types of schools attests to the persistence of this bodily technique in present-day society. Nonetheless, the reason for its survival seems obscure, beyond conservative arguments that aim to preserve Western cultural patterns. Where would this technique of physical discipline come from whose movements are associated with grace and ease but are apparently so different from everyday movements?

Ballet was coded during the period when the European courts accelerated the process of bodily self-control. In his book *The Civilization Process* (1994), Norbert Elias compiled passages from diverse European court behavior manuals written between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries. He shows how the concentration of the right to violence in the hands of the state was accompanied by changes in physical habits that tended toward separating individuals, an increase in disgust standards, and mastery over involuntary functions, such as toilet training. Simultaneously, mourning as a legitimate individual expression was repressed, as was violence, and urban police forces were created.

The process described by Elias may be qualified as a specifically Western process. The notion of West emerges between the third and fourth centuries with the splitting of the Roman Empire into two halves – the half of the rising sun, or East, and the half of the setting sun, or West. After the fall of the Western half, the Eastern half converted to Christianity and reconquered parts of the West, thus introducing Christianity in Europe. In 801 the Pope crowned Charlemagne as the first Roman em-
peror of the Christian West. The later subdivision of the Carolingian empire gave rise to the European court system.

These courts were led by military chiefs who cultivated violence as a sign of nobility and as a class indicator. When a leader was able to impose his power over his regional noble allies, he forced them to subject to him concerning the use of violence. Such imposition was visible in the habits of coexistence of the Western courts. According to Elias, the Court of Louis XIV was primarily responsible for the coding of this process, as it combined state policy with severe impositions of courtly behavior. The etiquette followed at Versailles represented the peak of these regulations, as Elias had already highlighted in *The Court Society* (1983). In Versailles the education of the courtier's body included ongoing dance lessons. Aiming to expand the state's activities in this realm, Louis XIV created the Royal Dancing Academy in 1661 with the purpose of gathering and codifying the court's choreographic repertoire.

The French monarchy had already acknowledged the connection between dance and academic studies in the previous century. The first academies in France had emerged in the 1400s under the influence of the Florentine academies. They consisted of groups of scholars primarily focused on the study of Plato's *Dialogues* and of his philosophical heirs. When Catalina de Medici married the French king Henri II in the mid-sixteenth century, the French crown started protecting the first group of Parisian institutions that had adopted the name of *academy*.

Parisian academies were devoted to the metrification of the French language along with the metrification of French music. Academics considered that the ancient Greeks had imposed a mathematical metrics on language and music, an endeavor that would be in keeping with the significance attached to geometry in the worldview presented by Plato in *Minos* and *Timaeus*. It was in the context of the Parisian academy that Baldassarino de Belgioioso choreographed the first *Ballet de Cour*, titled *Comic Queen's Ballet*, which was presented at the Court on October 15, 1581 as one of the seventeen entertainments that celebrated the marriage of the queen's sister, Marguerite de Lorraine, with the Duke of Joyeuse.

In this piece the groups of dancers formed various geometrical figures, such as triangles and circles. Belgioioso's choreography was recorded in prose, following the literary style of a book owned by the French royal family. It was a copy of the treatise on dance *De pratica seu arte tripudii* [On the Practice or Art of Dancing] by Guglielmo da Pesaro. King Louis XII had brought this book from the Milanese library of the Visconti-Sforza family to the Royal Library of Blois in 1499. From there, the book went to the Royal Library of Fontainbleau. It was written in 1463, and it is the third treatise on dance ever written. The other two had also been written for the Sforza Court in 1450.

In the court of Louis XIII, in the first half of the seventeenth century, the noble dance prevailed. Dancers executed a precise repertory of steps that led them through predetermined paths in the shape of geometrical figures. In the early years of his son Louis XIV's reign, noble dance was practice by courtiers whose poor skills negatively contrasted with the dexterity of the young king, a highly talented dancer who had already shone in front of thirty thousand Parisian spectators at the age of fifteen. When he was 23 years old, Louis XIV created the Royal Academy of Dance to improve court dance. In his view, "we see few in our court and our retinue who can participate in our ballets and similar dance entertainments" (Luis XIV, 1663, p. 5). Dance lessons for courtiers would serve to train their bodies and prepare them for all kinds of exercises, even for armed combat (e.g. fencing), besides honing a range of ceremonial gestures such as bowing.

This royal measure considerably improved courtiers’ performance throughout Louis XIV’s reign, as recorded in the *Mercure galant*, the Court's periodical. Concerning the 1708 Epiphany festivities, it states that “one would be hard pressed to find [...] so many people dancing so well” (Anonymous, 1708, p. 283).

In this way, a routine of ongoing dance classes was established among the French ar-
Ballet as the movement of the repressed body

istocracy. Dance became a physical training standard for life in polite society, as reflected in the subtitle of *Le maître à danser* (1725), by Court master Pierre Rameau: “A useful work not only for Youth who want to learn how to dance well, but also for honest and polite persons who want to learn the rules on how to walk straight, greet, and bow properly in all kinds of company.”

At the same time, Louis XIV also separated ballroom dance from stage dance. At 31, he suddenly ceased to participate in court dances after the opening of *Les amants magnifiques* in February 1670. Perhaps due to his having lost the skills needed to dazzle thousands of subjects, the king forced the nobility to withdraw from the stage. Court dance instantly became obsolete, and the comedy-ballet started to prevail. This dance genre was performed exclusively by dancing masters, that is, professional dancers who must comply with the standards of the Royal Academy of Dance. Court dance was now restricted to ballroom dancing. Nevertheless, across the eighteenth century, an ongoing exchange took place between the French Court's ballroom dances and the ballet, and dancing masters were also professional dancers.

The contredanse, for instance, came from England to the French court in 1684, and included more figures than noble dance. In the contredanse, the pairs intertwine in movements of symmetry and difference, and thus trace winding paths instead of favoring steps that form geometrical shapes. The contredanse appeared in a ballet for the first time in 1720. Until the revolution, ballroom dances copied ballet contredanses, and vice versa. Contredanses became popular and were also practiced in balls outside the court. Two factors contributed to the social expansion of this dance. First, in 1715 a royal ordinance granted permission to organize public balls in Parisian theaters. Since then, the stalls were emptied of seats and became ballrooms where audiences could pay to dance or do it for free. This form of entertainment spread through French cities and later through Europe. Second, Pierre Beauchamp and his disciple Raoul-Augier Feuillet created the first choreographic notation system.

This system was created for the French court dances and published by Feuillet in 1700 with the title of *Chorégraphie, ou l’art de décrire la danse par caractères, figures, et signes démonstratifs* [Choreography, or the art of describing dance through characters, figures, and demonstrative signs]. This notation made it possible to record full choreographies, and enabled the transmission and learning of ballroom and ballet dances by courtiers and others. In this way, printed pamphlets with fashionable contredanses circulated among French cities in choreographic notation throughout the eighteenth century, and these pamphlets provided ball patrons with the latest innovations. While learning dance served as a preparation for ball dancing and for the polite performance of social gestures, the physical habits of the Versailles court were gradually learned by those who took dancing lessons or attended public and private balls, both in Paris and in the provinces.

The ballet was completely separated from ballroom dancing during the Bourbons’ restoration to the French throne, between 1815 and 1848. In *La Sylphide*, created by the Royal Academy of Music in the early 1830s, the point shoe was adopted as the primary ballerina footwear. In the first act the ballerinas still wore heeled shoes, but in the second they all wore point shoes. With the adoption of these shoes, ballet choreographies came to follow a very different codification of the body that was removed from everyday gestures. Choreographies were now generated based on a codified world of basic steps and positions that were combined in figures. As it split from the ball, the nineteenth-century French ballet became immersed in its own world of movements created on the basis of a repertoire that originated in an earlier historical time, for it was no longer influenced by its dynamic relationship with ball dances. Ballet, thus, closed itself off and focused on its own choreographic language.

The separation between stage and ball dancing resulted in the persistence of Ancien Régime habits in the bodies of ballet dancers. An example of the survival of this archaic body language is the rigid alignment of shoulders and hips, a consequence of the courtly use of
the stiff-bodied gown or *grand habit*. The body of the Versailles courtier was disciplined from early childhood to show the enduring tone of its parts, thus avoiding *molesse* (idleness), which was considered inadvisable. The children of the Ancien Regime nobility were subjected to the use of a rigid corset that foreshadowed the figure that must be maintained to wear adult clothing. Even without a corset, dancers devoted themselves to strengthening their dorsal and abdominal muscles so as to keep still the quadrangle marked by shoulders and hips.

Across the nineteenth century, the distinction between ballet's physical training and Western social habits intensified. In this way, the origin of Beauchamp's codification of basic ballet positions, linked to Versailles bodily habits, was forgotten. Isolated from everyday gestures, ballet produced dominant teaching methods stemming from the national dance schools of the various European courts. One of the main followers of French academic ballet was the Saint Petersburg Imperial School of Ballet. In the nineteenth century, Russia fought against Napoleon and supported the Bourbon restoration as a response to the threat to European monarchies, and implemented a primarily conservative policy. The excellence of the Russian imperial ballet drew great dancers to Saint Petersburg, among them, Agrippina Vaganova (1879-1951), Enrico Cechetti (1850-1928), and Georges Balanchine (1904-1983). These three dancers created their own teaching methods, which, while diverging from canonical codification, remained variants of classical ballet and prevailed in the twentieth century.

At the same time, since the turn of the nineteenth century, dancers and choreographers such as Loïe Fuller (1862-1928), Isadora Duncan (1877-1927), Rudolf Laban (1879-1928), and Mary Wigman (1886-1973) reacted against classical ballet and developed alternative repertoires of choreographic elements. They came to view this discipline as a repressive force against which modern dance must rebel. Still, the discipline of ballet classes was not abandoned in the training of modern dancers. The methods created by Vaganova, Cechetti, and Balanchine, as well as the one developed by Great Britain's Royal Academy of Dance, all deriving from French ballet, have endured to this day as parameters for dancers' education and training, even among practitioners of modern forms of Western dance.

In Latin America, the São Paulo Dance Company has combined a repertoire of contemporary choreographies and a daily routine of classical ballet lessons, besides including acclaimed pieces in its seasons. Classical foundations are so relevant to the company's training, that it regularly invites choreographers from other groups to stage renowned pieces. Among these guests have been Mario Galizzi, former artistic director of the Colón Theater Ballet Company, who staged *La Sylphide* in 2014, and the director of the Santiago de Chile Ballet, Marcia Haydée, who staged *Don Quixote's Dream*.

The persistence of ballet as the seminal codification of Western dance shows the endurance of a technique of bodily repression as it was at its peak, when the forces of physical self-control typical of the Versailles court were shaping academic standards. Nonetheless, the sociopolitical meaning of the repressive force was forgotten due to the separation between ballet and ballroom dances and the fact that the latter continued to accompany the changes occurring in the social history of the body. The ballet is hence associated with a feeling of nostalgia because it brings with it the absence of a lost collective meaning, even if the dancer's trained body keeps expressing the height of the polite Western movement.
References


Cristián Nanzer* 

Notes on the body of the city
The city: The sensory form of civilization

The city represents civilization’s most accomplished collective construction; it is the highest form of history. There is no politics without the city. History does not exist without the history of the city. As Argan (1983/1984) puts it, the city is the sensory form of civilization. Understanding its historical dimension provides us with patterns and guidelines to explain contemporary phenomena; it allows us to read processes and breaks, repetitions and singularities, mutations and continuities. Viewed as a historical construction, the city spatially displays the various time layers that were consolidated by the magma of events. In his *Scientific Autobiography* (1981) Aldo Rossi states as follows: “I have always claimed that places are stronger than people, the fixed scene stronger than the transitory succession of events.” And he adds: “The singular authority of the built object and of the landscape is that of a permanence beyond people” (Rossi, 1981, pp. 50-53).

Insofar as it is an expression of collective action, the city is an unfinished work by definition. People make the city, and the city gives shape and meaning to the people who inhabit it. During the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries people made the city into a world that belongs to them, and dangerously reduced the heterogeneity and diversity of the world to the notion of a single planetary city. The urban experience multiplies and encompasses everything. It is a growing, organic archipelago that is electronically synchronized and in constant expansion. Yet not every urban agglomeration is a city. There is an original, political meaning to the birth of a city as the space of collective construction that grants citizenship (that is, rights and obligations) to the people who inhabit it, the place of the political conception of collectivity. It is the place of solidarity as well as of conflict, and people even have the right to radically transform it if their ideas are shared by most and are expressed in a collective will.

City or urban agglomeration? Today more than ever, this dichotomy brings into play the values and meaning of urbanized civilization. There are those who say that most people live...
not in cities but in large urbanized peripheries that are anonymous and removed from the rights of citizenship. The right to the city is a concept developed by Henri Lefebvre in 1968 in the book of the same title. This author highlighted the negative impact suffered by cities with a capitalist economy when they were turned into the single object of income accumulation and multiplication, thus displacing people from their role as the essence of the urban question and putting the market and its interests in their place. Citizens became consumers, and the public space, a market place. All urban activities and, above all, the very territory of the city were traversed by this logic, which favored socio-spatial dispersion and fracture. The population was thus ghettoized according to social class, and archipelagos of social segmentation were created that followed the laws of the market: select enclaves for some, anonymous urbanizations excluded from basic services and rights for others (Lefebvre, 1968/1996).

In contrast to this image, through the notion of the right to the city, Lefebvre advocated the rescue of human beings as protagonists of the city they themselves built. The right to the city, then, means restoring the city’s meaning, creating a potential for “good living” for everyone, and making the city into a meeting place where human beings can create a collective life (Lefebvre, 1968/1996).

In his book La naturaleza del espacio (2002/2006) [The Nature of Space], Milton Santos contributes to the definition of the city based on the study of the relationship between human beings and their territory, a relationship mediated by technology. This author asserts that humans establish their primary mode of relationship with the natural environment by way of technology. The latter is the means of anthropization of the territory. From a geographical perspective, therefore, we can define the city as a techno-structure that results from essential interrelations between the system of technical objects and social and ecological structures. The city as a whole may be defined as an infrastructure of appropriation of the territory. In this context, technology constitutes the environment, the new “natural” environment inhabited by human beings, the interface that enables them to collectively inhabit the planet.

Accelerated technological progress (especially in the realm of information) even facilitated the paradoxical “detrimentalization” of historical processes of appropriation of the territory such as production, recreation, and information activities. As a result, it was possible to embark on the expansion of concepts intended to give geographical depth to the new urban topographies of the advanced technological environment. There is a technical dimension that recreates and simulates artificial geographies, which will doubtless transform relations between the city and its new
support. This process raises the question whether techno-structure is the new urban geography, particularly when this new technical, multiscale dimension of urban infrastructure has the ability to become a virtual territory connecting productive processes of material transformation with complex immaterial relations. In this way, the synchronization of a temporal dimension is superimposed onto a spatial dimension. We can hence hazard, as the philosopher and urban planner Paul Virilio (1996/1997) has professed, that the spatial urbanization typical of the twentieth century will be followed by the urbanization of time in the twenty-first century.

The city is an idea

We can assume that the city spatially expresses a clear, inescapable landscape of cultural traits as well as the behavior of the society that inhabits it. In it we find the inexorable material traces of the historical progress of a society in relation to the territory that supports it. We are the city we inhabit and, in turn, the city we inhabit teaches us to be and to build a community defined by the particular forms it adopts in space. The city expresses us. The city is a spatial phenomenon of human networks, an exponential outline of stratified overlaps in the flow of time, of tensions, and of actions, reactions, and synergies that occur between the territory that supports the city and the society that inhabits it.

The concentration of energy and exchanges is such (like a big bang) that the city transcends the solidity of its constitution and transmutes into an idea, singular and unique, much more concrete than the matter that gives it shape and gravity, and this transmutation occurs when we utter its name and evoke it. Perhaps that is why it is so hard to kill a city. An atomic bomb may be dropped on it, and it may still survive thirty years later. Very few cities fail. Cities are constantly built and destroyed, and always regenerate. At the same time, they inhabit the paradox of the construction of identity; to continue to exist, they must cease to be what they were, or, to put it differently, to maintain a tradition, we must transgress it.

The city: The last resource

In the last two hundred years cities have grown at an exponential rate, with an irreversible trend that leads to the consolidation of an urban world. So much so, that in the second part of the twenty-first century the world will be completely dominated by cities. For instance, China foresees that in the next twenty years, three hundred new cities will be built. It is estimated that in a predictable future (until 2050), every week more than a million people will join cities around the world. This is an extraordinary phenomenon that affects everything. It bears unsuspected consequences for every dimension of life and, above all, large-scale environmental impacts and the resulting sustainability crisis.

While the city can be considered the greatest human invention, paradoxically, it can also be shown as the greatest example of human beings’ contradictions, since all the processes that jeopardize the future of humanity have been triggered here. Its nature expresses a dual condition: the city is both the problem and the means to solve it. The crisis of the modern world is a crisis of civilization; it is the direct consequence of the dominant development model, which is based solely on sustained economic growth and consumption. The capitalist development paradigm, exponentially propelled by the advance of information technology, has turned the entire planet into this synchronized network of production and multiplication of capital that has come to be referred to as the city/world, thus eroding the harmonious relationship between human beings and nature. So much so, that nature is now considered an economic externality of any equation of capital multiplication.

Catastrophic imbalances have ensued, many of which are becoming irreversible: depletion of resources, extermination of animal species, global pollution, climate change (which, according to the forecast, will modify the geography of the continents), new diseases, mass migration, exponential growth of the big cities, and others. Today the environmental situation is so critical that it radically challenges the complacency of the dominant model. This crisis of civilization originates in
and largely affects cities, which are the epicenter of environmental collapse. They will hence have to mutate, a process that involves urgently trying alternative modes of urban organization. We need new responsible ways of land use based on ethical principles that preserve the quality of living of all its inhabitants and its descendants while avoiding the split between the development model and the material factors that make it possible.

The need to conceive of new ways of organizing life in our cities and of organizing cities in the territory becomes imperative. We must also find spaces that represent more effective alternatives for the concentration of urban life— that will be more inclusive, equitable, creative, and diverse. I agree here with Paul Virilio (1996/1999, p. 52) when he claims that if we lose the city, “we have lost everything. Recovering the city, we will have gained everything. If there is a solution possible today, it lies in reorganizing the place of communal life [...] We must face the drama and tragedy of the city-world, this virtual city that delocalizes work and our relationship to others.”

Open ending

The city occupies everything. It crystallizes in space the force fields of the powers at play. It is a complex, dynamic constellation that focuses the energy of the territory; it accumulates it all, multiplies it all, all the time, always in motion. It remains in unstable equilibrium, sensitive to internal and external stimuli, like magma, a suspended swarm of diversity. The tension among nature, energy, matter, information, flows, the unexpected concentration of people, and the exponential accumulation of things produces the material conglomerate of the artifact. All these features confer onto the city the category of self-regulated entity; it is an organism that is superior to its constituting parts and, at the same time, a powerful creator of the symbolic world where society operates.

The city builds itself, and controls what escapes the control of the regulating bureaucracy (almost everything). The state's planning dream focuses on some spots, some neighborhoods, some streets that act as “beachheads” in enemy territory. The rest effervesces with destructive energy and speed. The informal cracks the superficial form of the established; there are interstices everywhere. Capital slips through some of them, daggers made of terse glass that serve as a platform for money. In others, in the gaps, in the shadows and in the dark live those who are submerged. In the middle, the “neither-nor” (neither so much nor so little), halfway through the steel cable, and underneath, the void. Hell, as Sartre said, is the others' gaze. It is no coincidence that some abyssal depths support the crests of the icebergs that shine in the sun. The circuit of capital, autonomous from any form of power (deterritorialized from every geography, weightless, with no resistance), multiplies and concentrates.

There are as many cities in a city as people who reminisce about them. Cities surround us and stick to our body until they blend with it and give shape to our life experiences; our biographies can be measured in the time spent in cities. Finally, they become platforms through which we come into contact with the presence of others and assimilate the meaning of the world. The city is the only form of spatial organization humans have found that allows them to coexist with a multitude of fellow beings. It became the factory of civilization from the start; it was tied to the development of creativity, art, the economy, and politics, and to the evolution of thought in every field. It was also created, among other purposes, to fortify that civilization and protect it from barbarism.

Today we discover within our cities the coexistence of the most abject barbarism with the most exquisite refinement achieved by humanity. Perhaps because nothing was left outside their boundaries, because they have finally gobbled up everything, even to the point that the fate of humanity became linked to their future, we cannot conceive of our existence without them. In any case, and despite everything, the city is the spatial device where collective intelligence resides; where urban synapses occur by the millions (the cloud of neuron networks and crisscrossing of information that reinvent our behavioral patterns, our set of values, and our collective imagin-
ies); and where the promises of solutions to quandaries are engendered.

In this way, it also triggers our deepest fears, our irreproducible miseries, the most lethal risks. Everything is there, latent, a game open to possibilities, an unpredictable breeding ground depending on the web of contingencies, the onslaught of power, the sectarian fragmentation of interests, the various wills organized to impose their order on the distribution of space, the dominant architectures of chance, the architectures of matter and energy (even those that are yet to come), the generic city, and the assembly of memory. It is all still there, and the ending is open.

References
Iván García*

The interpreter’s poetizing of silence and listening

* Opera singer, actor, and more.

The intermittence of time is silence. In the memory of silence, words are always fresh. May abysses open suddenly and may we be absorbed by their brightness! Yes! There is brightness in the abyss. Francisco Catalano, 2010

On the stage, silence (in music and in recited words) becomes a habitable place. In it, harmony and lack of harmony, balance and imbalance coexist, as well as the transforming impulse of affect, the expression of emotional awareness. In the early Baroque of the seventeenth century, words in music or the music of words acquired unexpected meaning through a unique esthetics. I am referring to the practice of “reciting by singing,” to the value of the emotional nature of words – affetti rather than melody. Affect in words serves as a vehicle for the exploration of all their expressive compo-
nents, including silence, which has its main foundation, within discourse, in utterances.

This meeting of words, emotions, and music may be found in L’Orfeo, by Claudio Monteverdi, the first musical drama, written in 1607. In it, the power of reciting by singing is expressed, which renders this drama into one of the masterpieces in the history of music. Monteverdi offers there the first dramatic silence, in keeping with the theory of affects discussed in the Camerata Fiorentina, to which Monteverdi belonged. This theory was an esthetic concept of baroque music, derived from Greek and Latin doctrines of rhetoric and oratory, that provided a system to codify the emotions and explained how these categories induced emotions in the listener. Furthermore, it entered into a dialogue with seventeenth-century philosophy and psychology and drew from The Passions of the Soul, by the French philosopher René Descartes (1649/1985), which greatly influenced baroque musicians.

Faced with the loss of his beloved Eurydice, who died by snake poison, Orpheus, the singer par excellence, the musician and poet is overcome by a deep emotion. In a trembling, dreadful, fateful silence, Orpheus experiences the void and sings, disturbed: “Ohimé!” (Woe is me!). We should keep in mind what Monteverdi
states about the score. He writes a sign that asks to be read as a prolonged silence that will reveal and propel the lament. “Ohimé!” is a suspension in the silence that precedes the act of naming. It is a moving dramatic pause, both in the music and in the words, that founds the complex musical dramatic art that we know as opera.

Interpreters, who are simultaneously actors, singers, and musicians, will be the first recipients who, by voicing melodies and words and through their inner drive, will later inhabit that silence and thus inaugurate the interpretive space from the very mystery that configures it. The voicers will illuminate the instant, containing and prolonging the duration of silence – a fertile void, even if it represents death.

Silence and listening, a unique personal experience

Every true word must be born from silence.
Berta Meneses, 2011

This progress, this journey of saying leads me to identify the variations of silence that emerge when approaching a piece, which generate the diverse ways of hearing it. Silence and listening offer the proper shelter for an authentic saying. Identifying them, knowing them, and recognizing them require mettle and a willingness to make room for the emotional and existential range they summon. The experience may be harrowing. During my studies and at the beginning of my career, the most sensitive teachers would say, “Silence is also music”; and my drama teachers would insist, “The silence of the word and the phrase... Delve into it!” These words accompany me in my role as comedian and officiant.

Throughout my concerts and across the characters I interpret (those that leave and those that remain and coexist inside me), I am marked by endless resonances, and I create a personal inventory with which I poetize listening and silence. Inhabiting this space conjures shadows and memory and leads me into each word and the after-time that pulsates and propels its sound. In music with words and in the words that set alight is where I find the contemplative moment, the wait. The poet Cecilia Ortiz (2006, p. 115) says that “the pure silence of the eyes will await your return.” As an interpreter, I freely and apprehensively sink into that wait of pure silence and its reverberations, which reveal themselves as mysterious, disturbing, luminous, playful, childish, heart-rending, loving, repressive. It is an inexhaustible space that gains vitality in its potential for being heard, for being welcomed. Hearing the silence, which contains everything, and reporting its answer constitutes an abyssal experience.

Inexhaustible abyss

In the process of character development, interpreters confront chasms, places of dizzying seclusion, abyssal silences. We rely on them to make contact with the emotional ripples that develop from the first encounter with the piece (in the studio or in the everyday laboratory) to its public presentation and conclusion. This abyssal silence shakes and mobilizes us. It summons us to listen to all its dimensions and resonances, and thus entwines its various occurrences. Silence and listening, like agaporni, remain together forever.

Alert to this silent listening-abyss, we are beckoned by the emotions we explore during the process, and thereby open a space for mythical happenings, a space of shamanic resonances that generates questions. I experienced such questions in a forceful theatrical process with my teacher Gustavo Tambascio: Is it an awareness about the reasons why we became actors and singers? Is it an awareness about the reasons why we are summoned to sing or act in a certain piece? Is it an awareness of the process-rehearsal in which we are involved?

From this starting point, with these questions, we unmask ourselves as interpreters and become empowered; we introduce ourselves in the progress of the piece by composing a character, a score and then voicing it, and with it we infuse our speech-song with beauty in action. In making these places our own, we watch over the traffic of emotions in the rela-
tionship between stage and audience, because the listening audience perceives that something is being announced, and is captured by this saying. Interpreters, in turn, feel that something compels them, and this compulsion is always unfailingly coming from silence.

Silence and listening: the perfect relationship

In the silence-listening dynamics generated between interpreters and their audience, a sinking into the abyss takes place; we sink into the abyss. In this encounter, in this joint sinking that is contained within the physical space to which we are beckoned, an interesting tacit relationship unfolds. I am here, with my silence and my listening; you are there, with your silence and your listening. Two enigmatic spaces give birth to the instant, propelled by imagination and pathos, and in them interpreters and audience, simultaneously sunk and connected, enter into a dialogue and will give life to each life of the words, images, and sound.

Both will gaze at each other and approach with a taming whip and will repeatedly jump into the abyss, together or separately – an abyss that resonates as many times as necessary and names the emotion that charms and captures us. It is a leap to the other shore, a gesture of loving coupling that inflames us and leads us to vertigo, separates us and brings us together, and fuses us. In Roland Barthes’s words in A Loving Discourse: Fragments, “the gesture of the amorous embrace seems to fulfill, for a time, the subject’s dream of total union with the loved being” (Barthes, 1978, p. 104). The listening of the audience, loving and loved, has a silent regulator; it is the listening of the observer. The listening of the interpreter, loving and loved, bears the silence of the one who is being gazed at. It is an almost perfect relationship.

Facing silence as an interpreter requires careful self-observation and listening; it means being ready to tackle dense, watery, dark and also luminous places; it means encountering the challenging opposite, the other with whom we gradually become. These spaces are obvious most of the time, but we are unable to see them, and they are almost always surprising. From that harrowing place, we are invited to an unconscious exploration starting from the psychic and physical body. To engage in this exploration, based on my experience, the first thing I suggest is performing concrete, conscious actions that will help us put together an itinerary, a journey (the questions posed by Tambascio that I discussed above). This journey will slowly unmask us in our daily exercise, will summon us to commune with our emotions and our personal silences so that we can approach the piece and the character with a playful gaze and distinguish our silences from theirs – a distinction that can be extreme at times. From the instant I play and sail, I enter, step by step, into the skin of the character or the music, and I get ready to develop the artifice, that is, the other mask. And it is there that my personal silences become foreign, my bodies face one another, and time is no longer time.

Masked, I am a stranger, an erring individual who constantly mutates, like an initiate. In this journey, I kindle and drive the plot, the action (concertare), the product of attentive listening, which is beyond sound vibration and which the fine ear of a good conductor always perceives, extols, and rescues. In concertare the empathy between interpreter and character develops – a luminous happening that explores this way of sharing, from the origin, what is known and recognized, which will be propelled, I insist, only through the actor’s, the singer’s action. It is here that, for an instant, the piece is erased or loses visibility in the interiority of the interpreter. And now he is interpreter-character in a single integrated body. He is other and himself at the same time. There are no strangers, only entrails.
The ensuing silence, the curtain falls

*The rest is silence.*
*William Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1603*

Every interpreter experiences one of the most awkward silences that occur along the journey of exposure – the end of the performance. After the expectant clapping, which erupts once the last note or word is voiced and resonates in the theater, comes this other silence that takes over the exultant, affected, and tired physical body. The body will then start to gravitate alone in the attempt to capture something of what is being offered in the outpouring of the qualities shared and the mutual excitation of affects. This odd silence takes over and invites a different, novel listening that is confused, elusive, delayed, or distant. It is the time to gaze at the stage that hugged you, honoring with your look the shared emotion, watching the exit of the seats that, once empty, remind us that *something happened here*.

It is a mysterious silence that abducts the officiant, an awkward guest that creates uncertainty and gradually supersedes you. You are absorbed. A final place and moment in which the last breath of that silence experienced on stage, and its consequent listening, becomes a desert. You cease to be other. Returning shocks, hurts – exuberant heartbeats, widened veins, altered flow of the bloodstream. And from the space of the stage to the dressing room, other words resonate that were not publicly uttered, other sounds that will later be appropriated, secretly sowed, hidden inside the voice.

After the performance, when everything is mysterious and unanswerable, when everything is silenced in those bodies, interpreters need to grab on to something or someone who will contain them, who will save them. The silence that fills them in front of their audience empties them in the end.

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Writing about the body based on my training in neurology and, above all, on my particular interest in the history of neuroscience led me to review the evolution of the concept of seat of mental activity across history. Also, and no less important, it becomes necessary to outline two antagonistic views that have emerged and confront each other in the most diverse fields of knowledge, especially in philosophy and psychology. These two visions are dualism, understood here as the existence of a clear division between mind and body, and monism, which does not conceive of the possibility of dividing them and sees the mind-body binomial as constituted by a single essence.

Before coming back to this point, let us turn to history. Egyptian papyri dating from the year 3500 B.C. tell us that the members of that civilization believed humans’ mental life to be located in the heart and the diaphragm. There is no mention of the brain. Alcmaeon of Croton, a physician and disciple of Pythagoras who lived in the fifth century B.C., recorded the first impressions of an outline of a brain-centric theory according to which the nervous tissue would be the seat of our sensations. Furthermore, we cannot fail to quote Hippocrates of Chios (460-377 B.C.), who made his views clear:

Men ought to know that from nothing else but the brain come joys, delights, laughter and sports, and sorrows, griefs, despondency, and lamentations. And by this, in an especial manner, we acquire wisdom and knowledge, and see and hear, and know what are foul and what are fair, what are bad and what are good, what are sweet, and what unsavory… (Hippocrates, 400 B.C./s/d, no pagination)

Yet the Greek were far from consensus. Less than a century later Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) would claim that, on the contrary, the heart was the home and origin of all our sensations and thoughts. Around that time, naturalist philosophers started spreading the spirit doctrine, whereby everything originates in the liver (natural spirit) and goes through the heart, the lungs, and finally the brain (which they called the animal spirit). According to this theory, the animal spirit was the essence of the soul and the mind.

Galen of Pergamon (129-217 A.C.) greatly refined this doctrine, which prevailed for nearly a millennium.
The physician and philosopher claimed that the animal spirit inhabited the brain cavities (ventricles), which were naturally filled with a clear, hyaline fluid, and animated the brain tissue so that it could function. The view of the animal spirit as the essence of our mental activity was debunked many centuries later with the introduction of information gathered by physicians, scientists, and philosophers from the Islamic world. Nonetheless, the essential aspect of Galen of Pergamon's formulation (regardless of the misunderstanding that led to see the ventricles rather than brain tissue as the origin of the animal spirit) is that the brain started to be viewed as the seat of our mental processes.

Now that the problem of the dwelling of our mental life has been solved, I will focus on the philosophical discussion between the dualist school, which prevails in our Western society and is identified with metaphysics and the transcendental aspects of life, and the monist school, still in the minority and identified with scientific materialism. It is important to keep in mind the existence of this dialectical conflict between the two schools when we discuss the body from a cultural viewpoint as well as technological interference with that body. Data from the World Health Organization (WHO) show that the world population is aging as never before and that the age pyramid is reverting in many countries. It is estimated that there are more than fourteen million people in Brazil who are over 60 years old, and the projection for 2025 is that more than thirty-two million will be in that range. Besides the obvious impact in the country’s finances and pension system, health policies will have to be aligned with the new demand.

From a medical point of view, we are starting to witness a degradation of the body that was not even envisioned in the past, and with it, the phenomenon of the Faustian dream of immortality. Medical clinics specialized in beauty treatments had never made so much money. Cosmetics companies launch an endless number of products and procedures every year, which they sell with the promise of an ever-young appearance. At the same time, longevity leaves undesirable marks in the majority of the population, not only in our immediately visible (esthetic) aspect, but also in our cognitive performance.

Aging has proved to be the major risk factor in the development of degenerative brain diseases, the best known of which is Alzheimer’s. It is estimated that the prevalence of clinical pictures of dementia in the 75-80 age range is of 7.9%, but if we look at the age group over 85, the ratio increases to almost 40%. The bad news is that medicine is still doing very little to minimize the impact of age on our brains. While there are reasonable prospects of interfering in the pathological aging of the brain, these are still remote. We are thus experiencing the very topical dilemma of the dissatisfied body that is simultaneously unable to solve the problem of inexorable cognitive deterioration.

The question of how to reduce the impact of aging on our psyche has more than one answer. To find the right one, we must take into account each individual’s beliefs and values. Durkheim (1995, p. 273) states that “... if there are to be separate personalities [...] an element of individuation is necessary. The body plays this role.” I will venture to suggest that culture may serve to mitigate the negative effect of our wrinkles and of the cognitive failure that will inevitably occur as we reach increasingly older ages. Culture may be understood in two different ways: as the process of accumulation of individual knowledge over the years and, why not, as a life project, on the one hand; and as a set of social values and, more importantly, as the way in which each society views and welcomes old age, on the other.

I would like to resume my discussion on the conflict between dualists and monists. For the former, mental life, often understood as the soul, will be restored after the death of the physical body; for the latter, any ability to reflect or to restore the body ends with the last breath. The debate between dualists and monists is still marked by the lack of a complete definition of consciousness. There are heated arguments between the two schools, and even
disagreements within groups that advocate the same general perspective. If we set aside the many nuances of monist and dualist theories and looked only at the extreme views in both schools, we would have dualists who are convinced of the immateriality of the mind and of mental functions due to the existence of an “animated brain,” that is, a “brain with a soul,” and monists who reduce all our mental processes to neurophysiological correlates and, therefore, to matter itself.

Since the debate between such antagonistic views is far from being resolved (and the reasons for such a great misunderstanding are clear and intuitively seen as irreconcilable), I would like to address the topic of what I call the eternalized body. The current technological revolution and its successes, which seem endless, have brought with them the wish to eternalize life. Genetic progress, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology (as well as all the other fields connected with
each of these large areas) promise a so-called technological singularity. According to this theory, human intelligence will soon be superseded by artificial intelligence, which will lead to a revolution whose consequences for nature and for human civilization are entirely unpredictable.

From a practical point of view, medicine is already working on the brain-machine interface and is getting closer and closer to, for instance, restoring movement to paraplegic patients with spinal cord injuries or making communication possible for patients with degenerative diseases that affect all movement (including speech) but spare their intellectual skills. (The most notorious of these is amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS, whose most illustrious victim is the British physicist Stephen Hawking.) At the same time, if we look at a different interface with no therapeutic aims, our dependence on so-called smartphones is clear; they have become almost natural extensions of our body. The most popular Internet search engine, Google, has turned into a real prosthesis for our memory.

Ray Kurzweil is an enthusiastic advocate of technological singularity, and he points to 2029 as the year in which we will reach a level of interaction between humans and machines that we would have never thought possible. This 68-year-old scientist has already recorded a video, available online, where he says he takes two hundred and fifty pills a day so he can reach the oldest possible age and thus enjoy singularity on the way to eternity. The ethical and moral implications of this scenario are not clear yet. According to the US philosopher and professor Michael J. Sandel (2007, p. 9), "when science moves faster than moral understanding, as it does today, men and women struggle to articulate their unease."

Let us set aside the terrifying futuristic prediction of technological singularity. Today, eternalizing the body, a process remote from the simple mummification practiced by ancient Egyptian nobility, is closely tied to technology. Based on data recorded in text messages, WhatsApp, emails, and social networks, it is already possible to recreate the dialogues and answers expected from a certain individual even after that person's death. Thus, a digital avatar (or soon, perhaps, a clone) will enable us to call or connect with a "dead person" and keep chatting with him or her in a fairly real way by resorting to a smart algorithm and that person's digital life data stored in the cloud.

The advent of technology is about to cause a profound resignification of the body. If the desire for extreme longevity is fulfilled, the question still remains as to what that extremely old body will look like. Shall we all be cyborgs? Will old age cease to arrive with a high cost to our bodies? Will muscle and joint pain, spine deformations, loss of height, and reduced vision and hearing (besides the above-mentioned cognitive loss) stop being part of our body inventory as time goes by? Will the scathing words of the poet Giacomo Leopardi have their days numbered? "With his usual acerbic lucidity," says Fernando Savater, Leopardi points out that "we should fear old age more than death, because death eliminates every evil that afflicts us, along with the desire for, or the awareness of, the goods and pleasures we can no longer enjoy; old age, instead, takes away the pleasures but leaves intact the unfulfilled appetite for them, besides providing new pains and humiliations" (Savater, 2007, p. 62).

Will the character developed by Philip Roth (2006, p. 156), who utters the phrase "old age isn't a battle; old age is a massacre," be outdated? And there still remains the issue of resignifying the very "meaning of life," since it is the certainty of the advent of death in a more or less known period of time that drives us and guides our life project. Once life expectancy is extended, what will stimulate us to maintain our current pace of life? Who will pay for the financial and social costs of this change?

I turn once again to poets and philosophers who, without reaching any conclusion, help us think. When he says that we are not eternal but endless, Jorge Luis Borges makes clear that the manifold hermeneutic possibilities given by the assimilation of culture can provide the secret tool to overcome our failed immortality. This idea is also present in Albert Camus (1942/1955), who is inspired by the Greek poet Pindar, quoted in the epigraph to
his book *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*: “O my soul, do not aspire to immortal life, but exhaust the limits of the possible.” According to St. Thomas Aquinas, having faith is enough for us to believe. For my part, I conclude with the words of Carlos Drummond de Andrade (1951/2006, p. 77), who, while admiring the beauty of the baroque church of Saint Francis of Assisi in Ouro Preto, ends his poem with this line: “I apologize, Lord, for not loving you.”

**References**


Mario Bellatin
Mario Bellatin is a writer born in Mexico. He holds a degree in communications from Lima University and won a scholarship to study scriptwriting at the International Latin American Film School in San Antonio de los Baños in 1987. He was chair of the Area of Literature and Humanities of the Claustro de Sor Juana University and was a member of Mexico’s National Creator System. Mr. Bellatin was awarded the Xavier Villaurrutia award for his novel Flores [Flowers] (2001), a Guggenheim Fellowship (2002), the Mazatlán National Literary Award (2008), and the Antonin Artaud Award (2012). He created the Dynamic Writers School of Mexico City, and has carried out projects that combine literature with other cultural and artistic manifestations related to the genres of performance and happening.

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When you talk to Mario Bellatin, you don’t know if you are in front of one of the most original authors in our continent – often compared to César Aira or Roberto Bolaño – or in front of one of his characters. In any case, this question is irrelevant, because Bellatin systematically devotes himself to challenging any clear boundary between reality and fiction. Born in Mexico and educated in Peru, he now lives in his home country after a sojourn in Cuba. While he isn’t interested in any Latin American mark of origin, he notices “a terrifying poverty of native thought” in the region, and alerts against the enthronement of fashionable thinkers as if they were chosen beings.

Since he is a writer, he may find it particularly appealing to remove the effects of the voice and the gaze (“in Mexico you look, in Argentina you listen,” he’ll tell us) and favor reading instead – in this case, what Bellatin has written on the tactile surface of an iPhone with his only hand.¹

¹ Psychoanalysts know of the significance of meetings. In this case, however, we have published the extract of the written exchange conducted between Mariano Horenstein and Mario Bellatin over the course of a month prior to their meeting in person. The dialogue hinged, among other things, on psychoanalysis and its effects, viewed from the perspective, both insightful and critical, of the person who has been in analysis without being an analyst.
Is there an aspect of speech that is lost in writing, or the other way around, is there something that can only appear in writing?

In both we win and we lose. I decided to become a writer precisely so that I could find themes in my texts that I knew nothing about and that would never appear in the spoken language. In a way, I feel that speech has something of a justifying role, and writing, of a bottomless pit. Everybody talks, cries, and laughs in the same way, but there are some who write differently, in a way that is equal only to itself.

The path of silence

In a movie where you play the leading role you say something that sounds very interesting to a psychoanalyst: “Nobody listens to anybody.”

I have no memory of what I said in that movie, and neither do I remember most of my texts... In those moments, the only important thing is the flow of an emergency system that will somehow create the necessary verisimilitude structure to support that... unique... changing... time that, in the case of a movie, is dead time... Who speaks in that movie? I wonder. What you see on the screen is dead; it's a representation. I don't think I have any authority or power over those words that were said I don't even know by whom. What is more, I have to believe what you say because I don't have a memory of having said something like that. But if you ask me now, if you ask the person I expect I am now, I will tell you that indeed, nobody listens to anybody, just as nobody reads anybody. Not even authors themselves can read their own work. Or, as is the case with the psychoanalytic principle, I believe, one is too clumsy to listen to oneself. That's why we need the presence of a witness, of a couch, of a certain amount of time, placed there with the remote hope that the analysand will be able to actually hear at least a percentage of his or her own discourse. That is why analysts' ear is trained – so that they can hear what nobody else hears. Analysts will thus be able to identify as an existential clue something that the utterer may see as a funny, amusing, superficial way of naming things in the world around him or her. What we should ask ourselves, then, is whether that person knows how to hear. Hence, I return to a hunch of mine. We seek the document, the case, the trace, the phenomenon characterized by self-sufficiency, without taking into account, most of the time, the being who emits the words. In this sense, I think that listening resembles the task of certain oncologists, certain scientists who apply their recipe against cancer regardless of patients' life or well-being. What is the goal of not-listening, of the biased ear, of the understanding that expects what it already knows?

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2. Invernadero (Castro, 2010).
Can you elaborate on that? Couldn’t the space of psychoanalysis be one of the last bastions where someone actually listens?

In the Catholic confessional, it is obvious that priests listen in bulk, and their ear is trained to grasp the sin and often to take delight in its induced repetition. I remember that the first time I was exposed to a targeted listening, when I was seven or eight, I understood how biased it is to hear only what one wants to hear. Obviously, I only realized years later. Unwittingly, I was able to satisfy the priest with the right answer when he asked if I had played with my body. (A while later, I understood he was referring to masturbation.) Since back then I knew nothing about that practice, I took the question literally and answered that of course I had. I thought the inquisitor’s reasoning was highly odd, almost surreal, since he thought I could play (soccer, Chinese checkers, hide and seek) metaphysically. It was obvious to me that I had no option but to say yes, which apparently satisfied the listener’s expectations. That’s what concerns me about psychoanalysis, namely, the fact that analytic training presupposes a certain way of hearing that is so entrenched in its own logic that it is deaf to true demand or to a potentially different demand.

I also heard you say, in a rich dialogue with Margo Glantz in the film, that you were “a writer of the unsaid.” What is the role of the unsaid in everyday discourse, in literature, in psychoanalysis?

I think it should be an integral part. It is precisely in the unsaid that the unexpected may be found. Nobody can know the path of silence, the unfathomable mystery of the autistic person. I remember entire sessions, forty-five minutes of the most absolute silence. What could have happened during that trance? Nobody knows. And thanks to our ignorance, we have a space that we can fill; we can remember its content according to our current needs. I have also said that I consider myself a dis-writer. It is when we dis-write that true problems appear, even problems of space-time perception. When did I find the time and space to create a text that takes such a long time to be eliminated? Right now, in the next book I’ll publish, I’m in this process of cutting more and more, to the extent that, at times, I’m afraid I’ll be left with a kind of haiku-novel. The most important thing, obviously, is the unsaid, an art in which the Japanese are experts. Or perhaps not. This art may be created in the process of transferring a hexagram to a Western language. During the psychoanalytic session there is too much noise in participants’ minds. Perhaps that’s why I feel that the subject, the living person who wants something for that same afternoon or a concrete outcome for the next day moves to the background to make way for the majesty of discourse.

In hearing you or reading you, it becomes clearer how you narrate different versions of yourself, how what had already been narrated appears always as something new, how you undo that delicate boundary between reality and fiction... There is a problem we are always trying to solve in psychoanalysis: how to tell something old as if it were new, how to achieve unexpected effects and escape repetition through speech. You seem to have found an intelligent way of situating yourself in that spot, even in relation to your own work. Do you see it like that or not?
It's only an extreme act of sincerity. I don't feel I'm the same person today as I was yesterday. I was precisely referring to the worn-out aspect of discourses, an issue I must face every day when I'm writing. As I somehow tried to say earlier, the new must lie in the non-discourses. These very questions, I feel, are somewhat contaminated by discourse. In a roundabout way, they have the answers concealed in them, sometimes more deeply than other times.

How does discourse contaminate everything? Is it possible to get out of discourse? In a way that doesn't involve madness? Or do you think, rather, of nonsense (which is very present in your writing) as a way of escaping fossilized meanings?

I don't understand why fleeing traditional discourses would imply madness. I mentioned silence as a way of escaping, but not necessarily an innocent silence that is grounded in emptiness. Rather, it is a silence with a trace – that which has been silenced, which is left after a cleanup, after the eradication of discourse. It is similar to the difference between an empty space where nothing ever existed, and an empty space born from the disappearance of the element that occupied it. Nonsense is even more absurd; it is presupposed by its very name. And when we talk about madness, we are obviously talking about discourse. Many people cry in the same way, and mad people also have predetermined ways of being mad. There is rarely anything more formal and predictable than a demented person. He knows he's mad, and he must fit into his category. And nonsense is a kind of hobby that was often practiced by the twentieth-century avant-gardes. There is no room for what doesn't narrate, but neither is there room for what makes a strong, familiar noise.

What's the condition for the creation of something new, forgetfulness or memory?

Forgetfulness, primarily. We can even create something by practicing the exercise of forgetting. Remembrance, always in the present tense, solid, comes dangerously close to ideas. And writing or therapies based on ideas lead to the most absolute failure.

An obstinate person in love with analysis

The anecdote that says that you didn’t pay for your sessions with money but with texts is well known. In one of your novels you even say that you delivered the texts in fragments in order to stretch the duration of the analysis as much as possible... You paid for your (said or about to be said) words with your written words. You must know that the question of payment, of money, is important in psychoanalysis... Could you tell us more about what happened there?

Besides having been written, this anecdote has appeared in two movies.³ Someone comes to therapy and puts the idea of his total lack of money in the foreground. Furthermore, it is a past, present, and future absence. A stubborn analysand comes

³. He is referring to Invernadero (Castro, 2010) and Resfriada (Castro, 2008).
back despite the lack of the required amount, and is reprimanded but seen anyway
time and time again, endlessly. Aiming, perhaps, for the needed break to occur
that will prevent the repetition of the reprimand. It is thus revealed that the La-
canian style (the whims, the precepts, the forceful truths) may often cease to be
meaningful, that many of its postulates may become meaningless under certain
circumstances. The therapist, then, will come up with the possibility of bringing
written texts. I think that at first these writings are concealed behind the invective
that they must describe dreams. The shift to texts that are written without a con-
crete motivation, to free texts is subtle. I was in love with analysis despite the fact
that, back then, I rarely said a word during my hour. I was often completely quiet
from beginning to end. Still, my intention of having the greatest possible number
of sessions led me to realize that due to its subjective, emblematic nature, the text,
like money, can be endlessly manipulated. And that’s what I did, both in those texts
and, I think, in my current writing. I stretch it and unstretch it in a perpetual game,
an absurd, eternal game whose features are similar to the features of most of our
behaviors.

It’s interesting what you’re saying when you show this subject who comes to his analysis with
no money but with his lack, and hence with his desire, well in the open. Also, how the “La-
canian style,” like any orthodoxy, may be revealed as meaningless... Did that analysis work?

Who am I to tell? I can only attest to the fact that I came to a series of sessions
during a certain amount of time, about three years. I ended up leaving that city
forever. Would that be a cure? Shortly after I left, I found out that the analyst was
planning to publish a book where she proved that one could do Lacan despite La-
can. I remember that the book (I skimped through it) was divided into a series
cases in which the therapist had broken with basic tenets and done things such
as having sex with her analysand and working with patients with whom she had
had previous ties, and there was also the question of money. That was my case. I
remember that when I found out, I asked her to include false information about me
so that I would not be easily recognized, but her answer was that since I had paid
her with words, she could do whatever she wanted with those words. In a way, her
reaction changes the meaning of paying with texts. Apparently, the cost increased
by the words said, and therefore professional secrecy was eliminated. “You didn’t
pay with money, so you lost all your rights.” Luckily, due to the nature of my work
and my way of situating myself in the social world, I took something that could
have been very harmful, I think (even unbearable) with an ironic smile. Perhaps it
was one of the first reaffirmations that I don’t give a damn about the other.

In psychoanalysis, regardless of differences concerning style, schools, and theories, regard-
less even of a certain freedom to intervene, we tend to think that there are rules that are
immune to challenge. They are few but critical, and one of them is the so-called rule of ab-
sstinence. In this sense, disregarding professional secrecy or having sex with a patient breaks
an agreement that analysts should respect. In any case, the (written) words you used in lieu
of payment increased in value with the increase in your popularity. As manuscripts (and in
“market” terms), they ended up being worth much more than they were when you used them
as payment... Is it true that your former analyst finally donated them to a public archive that
stores your work?
It's true. She gathered all the texts she had and donated them to a curator at the La Plata University – to close her own process, she said. I didn't know until then that analysts must end their consultations. I expect these famous rules, immune to challenge, must exist, and obviously the analyst also knew that, hence her interest in writing that kind of book, where she wanted to show that even if every rule were broken, there was still analysis. It is curious, then, that someone who wanted to question indispensable tenets would be so concerned, in the end, with closing her analysis, which I suppose is another necessary rule. Indeed, she wanted to get rid of something that had a kind of inadequate surplus value in order to continue with her professional practice.

It's odd because, unlike other practices, psychoanalysis offers a profit from the process itself that can only be capitalized by the person in analysis. If analysts achieve notoriety, it isn’t because they see “famous” patients (something that usually remains in the privacy of the consulting room), but because they attain prestige through their writing, theorizing, or teaching. In your case, it would even seem that based on your rapidly acquired notoriety as a writer and the curious agreement to trade texts for sessions, the person who analyzed you became famous... How do you see this?

It's a complicated problem that becomes evident not only in analytic practice, but in other social areas as well. I have many examples, but there is a symptomatic case of a prestigious analyst who, when I went to see him because I was depressed, also decided to break every rule and almost forced me to see him (although he had declared himself a fan of my writing). He put me on a couch when I was undergoing a severe crisis. In that treatment, I felt that the analyst was attempting to discover, by any possible means, the faint shadow that separates madmen from artists. These were weeks of great suffering (during which the analyst asked me to do unheard-of things, like coming to his office three or four times a day) that ended in an attack of seizures that instantly cured my depression. I remember I was in such bad shape that when I went into his office thinking that he would refer me to a colleague he trusted, I didn't have the energy to say, 'I don't want you to see me.' During that time, the only thing that would provide some relief was writing a book that outlined the shadow of this process. I think that a kind of reversal of reality took place; fantasies were reality, and vice versa. From that period, I also remember that I was hospitalized because of the convulsions, and the analyst would call and tell me to leave the hospital (which everybody knows is impossible) to go to his office and then come back to my bed. I don't know who seeks notoriety at what cost. And it’s something that doesn't matter to me at all. I will always be the famous one. What's the use of this fame? It’s a mystery I haven’t been able to solve so far.

Do you still feel like trying again?

Going back to therapy? Of course. It's the only way offered by contemporary thought to undo spells with spells without, of course, resorting to magical-religious thinking. I have a ghost that follows me and makes me totally unhappy, that prevents me from appreciating the good things around me. A thing, a shadow that has always followed me. It’s like an immovable rock, identical to itself. It makes its
presence increasingly scandalous precisely because of the huge contrast with the volatile, surprising, shifting, and generous way in which the other aspects of my life tend to present themselves. I don’t see where else I could go to understand the persistence of something that appears to me as a supernatural mystery. I’m used to deconstructing events around me, but this space refuses to reveal its mystery. It is deep; profound; so identical to itself and so predictable, that I can even foretell its presence.

What, if any, were the effects of analysis on your work, if you can talk about them?

I sought therapy out of intellectual curiosity or curiosity about life, just as I have submitted to a series of practices and experiences for the sake of experiencing them. Some of these forays cause no harm, but others do. In the case of therapy, it was interesting enough to me that I decided to do it despite the obstacles. I expect that after the therapy, I was able to sustain something as out of the ordinary as writing full time, without much hardship.

An inevitable comparison emerges between your writing, or the way you think of your writing, and the work carried out by a person undergoing analysis. For instance, you have written different autobiographies, something that would sound strange to anyone except a psychoanalyst, who listens to the different ways in which people narrate themselves on the couch over the years... You have also talked about that sublime state you achieve some times, which is reading your own texts as if they had been written by someone else. If we substitute listening for reading, this is another core aspect of a true analysis.

I have always performed these actions. Keep in mind that I’ve written nons-top (and compulsively at times) since I was ten years old. The foundations of my current writing were laid back then. And yes, there can be a parallel space of coincidence between facing a void that is filled with text and creating imaginaries in analytic treatments. Perhaps it was a meeting between similar beings that generated empathy. I don’t believe in a cause-effect relationship, at least in my case. Perhaps a kind of recognition of similar techniques. Fiction is limited. Anybody who practices it knows that. And if it isn’t, or if we try to expand it toward an alleged creative infinite (which is curiously seen as a goal to be met), we obtain the exact opposite, that is, bad fiction. A kind of affliction. And to stay on topic, oddly enough, people ask about our writing and not about us. How’s your writing going? Great, thank you... How’s your life going? Terrible, thank you...

Borges thought of psychoanalysis as a branch of fantastic literature. How do you see it?

Borges was a rhetorician who sought the salon medal. I don’t see it, I experience it, and so far, it hasn’t hit upon a solution. I feel that it’s like a dart game where the darts miss the center by millimeters and never hit target.
The one-armed man

How do you see the body? Are we a body, do we have a body? From your perspective, what is it like to experience one's body when one is lying on the couch speaking, or when one is typing one's latest novel on a mobile phone with one's left hand?

Of course we have a body. I'd like to believe, moreover, that that's the only thing we should care about. Who's saying that? Someone who can be on the couch at the same time as he types these answers and drives a car and listens to music and pays attention to a conversation. And all these actions may leave no mark. They may cause a car accident or lead to a misunderstanding, but it's likely (and this is what we don't seem ready to accept) that they won't leave a record that can be taken as a document by someone else. And the subject? And the body? And instantaneous, inexplicable enjoyment? In other words, where do we put the body? More than once, I've had the fantasy that someone is lying on a couch and, besides the typical analyst hidden from his or her sight, there is an entire medical arsenal measuring his or her blood pressure, blood sugar, and heart palpitations, and there are electrodes on the brain reporting electric changes that may occur during the session. I think we're already tired of Madame Curies lying on couches, exposing their bodies to radiation in order to ensure an alleged happiness for future generations.

I think it's very interesting to think of the relationship you establish with your own body... Far from hiding it or choosing a prosthesis that perfectly imitates the human arm, you distance yourself from this ideal (to which many aspire, even technology) and make your prosthesis into a striking, multiple object. And I understand that you leave it behind, you don't use it all the time. Is that right?

I have talked before about the dramatic removal of my last prosthesis, the myoelectric one. It was on the Ganges, in Benares, in the early hours of the morning. I was sailing on a boat surrounded by corpses floating around me. Then, obeying an impulse, I removed the false forearm and threw it into the river so that it would follow the path of the dead who didn't have the right to be incinerated. Yet upon my return from India, I noticed something horrible. While the prosthesis had prevented me from performing some physical actions, its absence prevented me from performing certain psychological acts. I'd have to go into too many details, but I realized that without the prosthesis I didn't dare do certain things. And its absence highlighted absence, an absence that was otherwise false. And because it was misunderstood, to call it something, a void was created that wasn't such. In addition, this void had to be filled by way of a device that would take its place. When I became aware of its emotional weight, I had to restore things to their original order. Since I had only one arm, there was nothing to restore. Getting rid of the arm wasn't enough; I had to do something with those subjective things I couldn't do with the ease with which I'd done them in the past.

You were saying earlier that you took harmful or unbearable things with a smile, unconcerned about others... Something like that would seem to hover over the way you do things with your missing forearm. While for someone else it could be an inhibiting factor, you show the absence with ease. While someone else might yearn for a prosthesis identical to the lost original, you change prostheses, you ask artists to design new ones for you...

At first I thought it might be harmful, but I rapidly understood that while it might be a bad thing for others, it wasn't for me. Concerning my body, what I've been
undoing spells with spells. A conversation with Mario Bellatin

Doing in the last years is rectify a mistake, a deficiency that is present even in the question you just posed. I'm not missing a part of my body; I'm already like this. I'm a one-armed person. I could say, and perhaps prove, that many others have an extra limb. And I'm like this because I was born like this. And what I've tried to rectify for many years is that since I was a child, my parents, my doctors treated me like someone who's missing something. I understand that there are people who are actually missing a limb because they lost it, and prostheses are designed for that type of injury. I was forced to use them from childhood even though I knew I could manage better without them, with the result that they generated a terrible emotional dependence. That's what I was trying to escape, emotional dependence on prostheses, and I used art as a means of transition. Finding a series of similarities between the world of art and orthopedics was useful. Among these similarities are the significance of the existence of a unique model for each client and the endless surplus value. It was a kind of art cure.

Now I've returned to a kind of origin, the one-armed man who is like that and was designed to function like that, which makes me feel somewhat reconciled with my situation, both in terms of my state of mind and financially, because the orthopedic path forced me to spend huge and endless amounts of money in objects I didn't want.

What is that about, “art as a means of transition” and the similarities between the world of art and orthopedics?

I don't have ideas about this; what I have is a concrete experience. Erroneously, I was subjected to the prosthesis regime from an early age, but liberation finally happened (very late – how strong must my subjection have been). That's when the story about Benares and the Ganges takes place. But at the end of my pilgrimage across India and surrounding areas, I'm present (at home, in my everyday environment) with one element less – with the void left by the prosthesis, the same void I'd managed to forget in a place where habits were foreign to me. Yet in my everyday life, I had the feeling I was demanding its presence of void at the top of my lungs, a presence that actually put the void in its place. And it wasn't an imaginary construction; it was true, I was missing an arm. Where could I have left it? And curiously, because I'm able to do almost everything with the arm I do have, I noticed then that I needed the false arm so that I could adopt symbolic behaviors that I was otherwise unable to adopt. I noticed a certain change in the way I exerted authority, approached certain people, or made certain subtle requests and demanded certain behaviors, behaviors that had never posed obstacles when I had a bought arm. And I repeat, it wasn't just my idea; it was true that the absence became radically present. I noticed it in the new inabilities I experienced.

That's when I discovered a mediating instance between the lack of adjustment to my original state (being a one-hand person) and the use of orthopedics (to which it was now impossible to return). I found the links between orthopedics and other disciplines. The most evident was the connection with art. I was struck by the number of similarities. The two major ones are the fact that, overall, mass-produced objects are kept out of the galleries (thence Warhol's parodies) and the inherent surplus value in both activities, precisely because the pieces offered are usually outside the realm of industry. In the case of orthopedics, the value of objects stems from the idea that perfect people are all alike. We can verify this assump-
tion when we enter the studio of any haute couture designer, where everything fits perfectly because everybody is perfect, and when we realize that each deformed person has a singular deformity. I thus learned that exquisiteness, expensiveness, uniqueness did not lie in perfection, in symmetry but in its opposite. And this need for a unique object promotes the existence of surplus value in both markets. The screw we buy in a hardware store increases its value a hundredfold if it's sold at an orthopedics store.

I think it's useless to compare the value of supplies with the cost of an artwork. That's when I started using art for the transition I needed. A group of artists created a series of objects that would fill the void of the prosthesis that had been thrown into the river. I used these objects for close to a year, choosing among them depending on the occasion. It was funny how my taking the leap from one discipline to the other led to a greater physical awareness of the artificial element that was added to my body. This time the howl of absence was replaced by the certainty of wearing something uncomfortable – by the evidence of an excess placed artificially on a body. As the effects of the absence decreased, I rejected the gadgets more and more, until the moment came when my body itself completely rejected their use. I remember that the last time I used one of those objects was with a specific purpose. I wanted to scare Marilyn Manson, who was going to the same party as I, by wearing a prosthesis shaped like a dildo (I remember it was quite cumbersome). I've kept the picture, which I asked someone to take, of Manson's fear when, by way of saying hello, I put the prosthesis in the middle of his face.

Your references, even the titles of some of your books allude to contemporary art. You participated in the Kassel Documenta, your literature often mutates into performances... What does contemporary art tell us about contemporariness?

First of all, I think it's impossible to talk about this kind of art because it changes before we know what it's about. If I use those names in some of my books, I think it's a contemporary way of naming nothingness, the void. It's a shame that the contemporary reference, Duchamp, is someone who was born in a society where the car had not yet been invented and electricity was beginning to be tested. When we talk now, we have to start from different standards...

From your perspective, how do you see this kind of “body a la carte” that science is bent on providing for whoever wants it by means of plastic surgery, sex change surgery, assisted fertility technology, and so on?

In my case, it was a mistake. That's why I use Kuhn's paradigms in some of my books. One of these books relates, somewhat optimistically, how science is in tune with the progress made in different areas, but nowhere in the book is there any mention of what happens when a mistake is made. I shouldn't have used a prosthesis because I didn't suffer an injury. I'm a one-hand person; that's the way I am. The prosthesis was imposed on me because in the 1960s, postwar orthopedics was still popular. When I was a child, the important thing was that I wear my prosthesis, no matter the consequences of its use. That's why I developed a strong psychological dependence, and I only took it off to sleep when I was alone. Even when I had sex I had to have it on. I stress this fact because I understand that it was even worse
than what anyone may feel about the challenge of walking down the street naked. Due to my own history, I’m against offering all that kind of scientific assistance to people. Perhaps for this reason I’m very aware of friends who died as a result of liposuction, who had triplets or children with different problems due to fertilization treatments, and to the current debate about vaccines and autism.

How do you deal with the passage of time, the decay of the body, the sighted death?

I deal with it without thinking about it; by remembering every time a pain takes over; by creating what I have baptized “a gel-like state of existence,” in which one of the best things that could happen to me is going to sleep placidly one night and not waking up ever again.

References
Vortex: Supervision
In search of a language of our own, Latin American psychoanalysts have followed a long course toward self-knowledge that could be called anthropophagic, for they consume both foreign literature and literature produced in their own countries, with which they have emotional and theoretical convergences and divergences. By addressing the topic of psychoanalytic supervision, the Vortex section aims to open a debate. To this end, it looks at some of the training models adopted by psychoanalytic institutes. This is a favorable opportunity to reflect on some issues faced by young students when they learn that psychoanalysts speak different theoretical and practical languages. Due to the malaise experienced in front of such diversity, they tend to conclude that “true” analysis is the one they themselves practice, in line with their analysts and supervisors.

* Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of Rio de Janeiro.
Mezan illustrates this initial commotion very well:

People tend to react to this shock with a defensive spasm: the good psychoanalysis is the one I was taught, the one that guided my personal analysis and the supervisions I have done so far [...] What “they” call psychoanalysis is an aberration! “Lacan? An unrepentant intellectualizer, a manipulator of the transference,” a Bionian will say. “Bion? A mystic who never left the imaginary,” a Lacanian will say. And so on and so forth... This conviction is accompanied by a disdain for the potential meaning of such discrepancies with regard to the nature of psychoanalysis. They are ignored in the name of a military (and coarse) logic, according to which there are only absolute truths and integral mistakes. (Mezan, 2014, p. 24)

Not to mention the attacks targeting alleged Kleinian groups and good-natured Winnicottians, which put envy and “cuddling” in the hot seat. The history of the psychoanalytic movement, with its disagreements and confrontations, caused agitation in illustrious hearts and minds that were struggling to defend the Freudian legacy. Already at that time, practitioners felt the need not only to transmit their knowledge, but also to share theoretical and clinical concerns and experiences. To this end, Freud received his sympathizers at home and went for long walks with them. At the turn of the nineteenth century, he inaugurated the Wednesday Group in the waiting room of his office, where he received young physicians and members of a variety of professions (among them, journalists, publishers, and university professors) who wanted to learn his ideas in order to apply them to psychotherapy, but also to discuss plays and other cultural expressions. Herr Professor devoted himself to clinical studies and discoveries and produced abundant written material. In addition, he watched over the creation of the first psychoanalytic journal, the Yearbook of Psychoanalytic and Psychopathological Research (Mezan, 2014).

According to Roudinesco (1998), Freud introduced the term supervision in 1919, and in 1925 supervisions were officially instituted as mandatory, along with personal analysis, in all IPA societies. Max Eitingon, furthermore, reports that the Berlin Psychoanalytic Polyclinic had systematized this practice as early as 1929. The goal was to monitor therapies by way of detailed notes that would prevent deceit and protect the patients who were entrusted to beginners (Stein, 1992). Control analyses gained strength and expanded with the immigration of European psychoanalysts who were fleeing Nazism, a development that promoted the creation of training models and standards.

While it differed from Freud’s initial idea that rather than adopting a leading attitude, analysts must engage in self-inquiry and criticism in relation to analytic work, the notion of control analysis prevailed in some institutes. In addition, Parisian analysts started group supervisions, but these generated controversy. The paper written by María Eugenia Fissore, Adriana Pontelli, Marcela Armeñanzas, María Laura Dargenton, Silvina Tombión, Patricia de Cara, Pablo Dragotto, and Milena Vigil, a group of candidates from the Córdoba Psychoanalytic
Association, opens up the discussion of this issue in the current context and hence enriches the debate unfolding in Vortex.

Standards imposed on beginners were intended to organize the transmission of a knowledge that fluctuated between the candidate’s analyst’s couch, the candidate’s own couch, and the supervisor’s couch; and between the candidates’ exuberance, emancipation, and creativity, and institutional vices, power struggles, cross-transferences, and standard models. In some ways, the savage horde gave way to the flock that thirsts for diplomas and theoretical explanations. Conditions for admission and recognition were standardized.

Several myths developed: the myth of the best analysand (preferably neurotics) for the official case; the myth of the deepest analysis with a very high frequency; the myth that the supervisor must have the same theoretical perspective as the personal analyst; the belief in the perennity of institutions that follow a certain model and in the guarantee of scientific reproduction. Additionally, there are matters inherent in personal analysis, where the demand for supervision arises, and vice versa, the emergence of a demand for analysis in supervision.

It is obvious that we need to talk about clinical practice with our peers, and training institutes are seeking ways of dealing with resistance to change. Several societies have now spaces for group supervisions, which are very well attended because they bring participants closer to the experience of a living practice. Community clinics sometimes have a group of analysts who offer free supervisions to candidates who see patients enrolled in this project. The relevance of this practice stems from the condition of alterity required by the analytic function; supervision opens other spaces for reflection and makes it possible to come into contact with a variety of theoretical perspectives. Analysts in training can learn about other theoretical views and techniques and can deal with the idealizations and conflicts typical of institutional life.

Who is talking to whom?

According to Mannoni, this question outlines the main platform for the analyst-supervisor pair’s forays into the unconscious experience. Mannoni recalls that Freud introduced the notion of training, *Ausbildung*, which is closer to the idea of self-questioning and self-criticism than to the idea of model. “The notion of training included a concern with camaraderie, with the need, in some people’s minds, to help subjects free themselves from every identification with the analyst and of every institutional superego” (Mannoni, 1992, p. 37). Later she defines the supervisor’s position: “Supervisors must help analysts become aware of the references with which they operate and confront them with other references, thus helping them find a style of their own that is not mere imitation of the other’s skill” (p. 38).

The question of who is talking to whom suggests several different interlocutions and viewpoints that may even be complementary and can be found in the texts written by the Vortex authors: Carlos Barredo, Griselda Sánchez Zago, Fernanda Marinho, André Beetschen, Bruno Salésio, and Olga Varela. The opportunity to get to know several “masters” or to travel through different analytic meeting points enriches the (ongoing) path that all analysts are willing to take. The daily contact with psychoanalysis arouses in us, apprentices with a blind gaze, the vigor, exuberance, strength, and freshness of the first years – the storm of the unconscious, which neither stops nor quiets down.

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Supervision is located in a differentiated place in relation to the other two components of the so-called training tripod, and its relations with these components are tied to its specificity. The most fruitful is doubtless the relationship with personal analysis. According to Jacques-Alain Miller (2000), supervision is not personal analysis but is connected with it. While we can agree that having been in analysis is the main requirement to practice psychoanalysis, it is also clear that to this experience of the unconscious, we must add a certain savoir-faire that can only be acquired through analytic practice itself. It is in this sense that speaking about one’s own experience as an analyst in front of another analyst takes on a specific role in the supervision device.

In principle, if a person is speaking to an analyst, it means that a transference relationship already exists. In other words, supervision is not a consultation with an expert concerning the right way of applying a preestablished knowledge, where the expert will prescribe the right technique for the implementation of an analytic treatment. What is actually happening is what the word pedagogy fails to name, for it is something that is not taught. What is brought into play in this space does not consist of...
knowledge statements that may be passively received just as they are. On the contrary, supervisees must bring into play something of themselves, since we are not dealing only with the patient-analyst relationship and the exchanges between them, but also, and primarily, with the tie between analysts and psychoanalysis. What are their views on the discipline? What are the consequences of such views for their practice?

Every practitioner of psychoanalysis is inhabited by ideas about language and its relationship with the body, the unconscious, emotional ties, the end of analysis, and so on. Depending on the level of their conceptual formalization, these ideas are transmitted to a greater or lesser extent in analytic action under the guise of prejudices. The focus is not on acquiring knowledge about a case (its diagnosis, pathology, and so on) as a place where a generality (obsessional or hysterical neurosis or paranoia, among others) takes shape or, much less, on legitimizing the position of the analyst through the experience he or she has accumulated in any of its forms but, precisely, on sustaining and promoting trust in this reinvention that takes place in each unique analysis.

At the same time, trust is grounded in the belief in the unconscious, that is, in considering knowledge as supposed, as Other, as ready to be produced based on the raw material of a narrative, rather than as already embedded in the theory, the psychoanalytic literature, and so on accumulated by the supervisor. We know how an analysis can become a caricature of itself when analysts aim to respond to their analysant? by means of a knowledge articulated by their supervisor – a knowledge to which they resort as a possession rather than as something built with scattered effects of truth that must be articulated without losing their connection with experience.

The space of supervision allows us to glimpse and debate the transference strategy needed in an analysis or the politics of the treatment’s ultimate goals, but not to prescribe its interpretive tactic. The pressing needs that are translated into demands of the kind of “What do I do?” or “What do I tell him/her?” can only be met if they are oriented toward the work of listening and of maintaining the analytic position. The question is how to incorporate the mode of operation of another one whose role is not teaching what he or she knows. Rather, supervisors should rechannel knowledge toward what analysts must hear in order to situate themselves – how to find their place as analysts based on a “knowing how to do there” in a specific moment (kairos).

Finding this place always requires embarking on a training journey that entails the abandonment of other positions (medical-psychiatric, pedagogical, and so on) from where we might respond to the demands formulated by a patient. Like mourning processes, abandoning these positions is painful and generates resistance. In view of the helplessness caused by the confrontation with the opacity of the real in clinical practice, the essential task of supervision is to orient the wish to supervise thus aroused toward the shelter offered by one’s trust in one’s ability to face the unconscious, traveling through impossibility without obstructing it with any reference knowledge.

Lacan postulates that, by acting,

the supervisor manifests a second sight [...], which makes the experience at least as instructive for him as for the person supervised [...] The reason for this enigma is that the supervised person acts as a filter, or even as a refractor, of the subject’s discourse, and in this way there is presented to the supervisor a ready-made stereograph, making clear from the start the three or four registers on which the musical score constituted by the subject’s discourse can be read.

He then points out that if the analyst under supervision “could be put by the supervisor into a subjective position different from that implied by the sinister term contrôler [...], the greatest profit he would derive from this exercise would be to learn to maintain himself in

1. The author uses the Spanish word analizante, a neologism that aims to represent the active nature of psychoanalytic patients’ role. This word is formed by adding the suffix -ante to the root of the verb “analizar,” to analyze. This suffix serves to form active participles whose meaning is “who/that carries out the action expressed by the root.” The Spanish word that is usually used to speak of the analysand is “analizando” or “analizado,” neither of which denotes action. (T. N.)
the position of second subjectivity into which the situation automatically puts the supervisor” (Lacan, 1953/1977, p. 34).

The fundamental rule organizes the analytic exchange, and this feature distinguishes the analytic exchange from the notion of alliance and sheds light on the fact that intellectual cooperation is not a path toward truth. Likewise, the supervising task is organized on the basis of a narrative, the presentation of the material. While free association is not promoted, it is clear that insofar as it is heard within the transference, this narrative, whatever form it adopts, will be subjected to breaks in the continuity of its sequences that will enable the emergence of different articulations or arrangements and give rise to the production of new knowledge. As I pointed out earlier, such knowledge will render the experience “instructive” for the supervisor.

In my view, the foregoing renders inadvisable the suggestion, much less the imposition, of a preestablished form for the material contributed by the supervisee, thus setting aside any ideal of “objectivity.” We must recall that it is not possible to report what happens in an analysis by attempting to bring together the patient's sayings and the analyst's state of mind. There is a radical loss in relation to the experience of the session, and trying to compensate for it is a form of indecency (Dumézil, 1989/1992). It is advisable, then, that supervisees choose the shape they prefer to give their narrative, that is, whether they would rather speak of what they remember of the sessions, use notes taken afterward, or transcribe recordings, among some options. The narrative of the case, the choice of marks, and the construction of the plot are more appropriate means of displaying the ways in which analysts are implicated in the transference they hold (what has been called countertransference) than the occasional confessions that may be prompted by such narrative.

Supervisees’ saying, then, is the means by which they “unwittingly” bring into play something of themselves, which shows their relationship with psychoanalysis. It is this wish that the supervision device must house and sustain so as to give rise, through the exploration of those who are exposing themselves, to what institutes analysts’ experience as practitioners and constitutes the only way for them to authorize themselves, not de sí mismo, the way Lacan’s formula has been translated into Spanish, but de él mismo, which will never coincide other than partially with a version of oneself through the mediation of that artifact of the “turn toward the Other” (support of the infant in the construction of the specular tie, Le Gaufey, 1998). Supervisors must occupy this place of thirdness, anticipated in the “stereography” promoted by the supervisee’s narrative, so that analysts may authorize themselves by taking as a reference this position made evident by the device.

As a training environment, the analytic institution will fulfill its role as long as it preserves that form of the social tie that institutes, promotes, and fosters the experience of supervision as a device that is consistent with the analyst’s discourse and ethics (Barredo, 2005). For this reason, the differences between what has been posited as instituting in the experience and in the institution (associated with organizational requirements or demands of recognition) must always be clear. We should recall that in the supervision practice, the search for approval, the need for the quick appearance of signs of improvement, the constant alertness aimed at avoiding interruptions or at making good interpretations reflect ideals that, as such, fulfill their role of instating and maintaining repressions in the analytic experience, that is, of resisting the work of analysis.

2. The author is using Lacan’s term dire, usually translated into English as “saying,” in the plural. Another possible translation is “word”. (T. N.)

References


Supervision: Between memories and experiences

Glossary

I start by recalling words that, in referring to psychoanalysts’ practice of speaking regularly with colleagues about their difficult cases, express, in their differences, those aspects of this practice that are contemplated in one word and not in others. Freud used the term Kontrollanalyse in 1919. At that time, the psychoanalytic institution adopted a mode of control; one had to undergo supervision in order to become a member. The practice of supervision has expanded toward a deeper understanding of countertransference and personal analysis (Mijolla, 2002/2005; Roudinesco & Plon, 1997/1998). English-speaking analysts started using the term supervision. It was expected that student-psychoanalysts would perfect and deepen their knowledge of the psychoanalytic method and theory and make themselves accepted by a community of psychoanalysts.

The term assisted listening, in turn, conceives of supervision as resistance to analysis, as a pathology of the teacher, as misunderstandings of supply and demand, as unconscious rivalry between supervisor and supervisee. Inter-analytic relationship, for its part, emphasizes the existence of two professionals who tell each other their clinical experiences, their discoveries and vicissitudes. Here, verticality and hierarchy become irrelevant. Field of supervision (Volmer Filho & Pires, 2012) is a dynamic concept that incorporates the ideas of field and bastion in the context of the understanding or resolution of countertransference impasses.

Psychologically, the child is the father of the adult

In clinical thinking, temporality tends to be expressed through metaphors, such as the title of this section, for we do not always find words that convey the full scope of a meaning. The before and the after articulate and feed off each other, and hence subvert the

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1. Pelotas Psychoanalytic Society and Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of Rio de Janeiro.

linear sequence. This is a characteristic of the unconscious in clinical practice, where we find words as old contents presented in verbal guises (Freud, quoted in Botella, 2015). I suggest that we think how supervision could contribute, and may have contributed, to the development of psychoanalysis.

On a hot Friday of June of 1883, after having dined “in his shirt-sleeves” (Mijolla, quoted in Stein, 1989/1992, p. 113), Breuer (who was 41 years old!) confided in Freud (who was 27!) the “very curious case” of Bertha Pappenheim, whose treatment was not progressing. What did Breuer expect from a professional man who was starting his career, from his judgment and understanding? Breuer sought relief from his unconscious suffering, which was of a sexual nature and hampered his understanding and generated anxiety – in other words, from his countertransference feelings. Bertha had transferred her neurotic feelings to Breuer and expected his receptiveness. She thus manifested her desire to find/reencounter someone on whom she could count. She yearned for Breuer’s love because she “grasped” that he would welcome and understand her. This behavior scared Breuer and certainly disappointed Bertha. Breuer’s countertransference prevented him from understanding Bertha’s demand. By sharing it with Freud (“original supervision”), Breuer occupied the place of the one in need of understanding and insight about his unconscious response – a love that was analogous (transference love) to the one Bertha had sought in him. How did Freud receive Breuer’s demand? In “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement” (1914) Freud recounts how his ability to listen to the demand about the sexual element, which had been “resisted” by Breuer, gave rise to a fruitful theoretical-clinical development in the next years of Freud’s life. Supervision (this act of sharing) reaffirmed his sexual hypothesis. This and other reasons led to the development of psychoanalysis. This curious situation shows that, from a historical perspective, supervision was the mother of psychoanalysis. The person/object of the transference believes that, by receiving what was transferred, he or she becomes important and loved by the person who transferred these feelings. If the person/object of the transference cannot occupy the place of the one who tolerates being loved, he or she will create an impasse in the person who transferred the feelings. Behold the countertransference (Grinberg, 1975, pp. 15-37). Developments analogous to the ones that unfolded between Freud/supervisee and Fliess/supervisor, as well as between Freud/supervisor and Jung/supervisee (regarding the history of Sabina Spielrein), are common in supervisions. It is at this point that Freud recognizes his “narrow escape” from his countertransference entanglement, a “blessing in disguise,” and refers to “the thick skin we need” in relation to the countertransference (McGuire, 1974, pp. 230-31).

Scopophilia between teacher and student

The scopophilic impulse is divided into two: looking, and exhibiting oneself (Freud, 1915). The shift from activity to passivity introduces a new subject before whom the person exhibits himself or herself, seeking to be looked at. Initially autoerotic (narcissistic formation), scopophilia gradually leaves narcissism behind. In passivity, it clings to the narcissistic object. Teacher and student (Stein, 1989/1992) inhabit this pair. Teacher Freud and student Breuer? Perhaps there was between Freud and Fliess an ambition to become teachers? The supervision relationship is emotional and intense (Francisco, 1994). When supervising their clinical experiences, their discoveries and their vicissitudes, students want to be looked at, to be well regarded (Mabilde, 1991), by the teacher/other, and teachers think their students admire their vision; there is a teacher who is being (actively) idealized by the student, and a teacher who needs to accept the condition of being looked at because of his or her value. The teacher will receive the idealiz-
ing gaze (“being a new object”) of the student and will accept himself or herself as (narcissistically) admirable, in keeping with his or her personal equation.

How do we look at a patient who becomes such an interesting case that the analyst/student is motivated to present it to a teacher? What prestige (being looked at) is at stake? The supervision “dose” is a work that oscillates between idealization and admirability in varying proportions – more autoerotic or more object-oriented. For both participants in the field, it involves positioning oneself between what is being idealized and what serves to reinforce the need to be looked at. Furthermore, it cannot happen without intense affectivity and involvement.

Four agencies are always present: patient, student-analyst, supervisor, implicated community of analysts. Each agency has the need to look at/endorse and be looked at (taken into account). It is a complex field. The teacher’s exhibition may perpetuate the myth of the “best in-depth analysand,” as was the case with second-generation psychoanalysts after Freud (Mijolla, as quoted in Stein, 1989/1992, p. 123). Did the second generation’s negative transference develop because most of the analysts of the first generation had not experienced analytic treatment?

This is an ongoing occurrence in the “transgenerationalness of psychoanalysts.” Our institutions have founders, a first generation, a second generation, and so on. Freud’s great-grandchild, Klein’s son, Bion’s adopted child (since Bion refused to give supervisions!) are split between supervisions that go more in depth, and “more analysis.” The process of looking and being looked at generates a list of supervisors who demand written material, are very quiet, are very directive, and sink their supervisees into an obsolete orthodoxy. In a “field of supervision” we see how the patient’s transference with the candidate and the latter’s transference with the supervisor unfold (Fink, 2007/2009) without the establishment of a transference neurosis.

What we see at play is the powerful psychic need to transfer. Not getting involved entails the risk of simply becoming a professor who benefits from an attribution of power. All identification dynamics are inherent in the supervisee/supervisor relationship: conscious, unconscious and complicit identifications; mimesis (psittaciform) without resolution of identification conflicts; and personal identifying sensibility, whose conscious management and unconscious vibration give rise to a certain kind of psychoanalytic practice. The tendency to identify may crystallize and provoke the adherence to a single model.

Memories and experiences

Memory develops a theory (in keeping with Freudian conceptions, within representation) for control analysis, and this theory may be subjected to an institutional compulsion to repeat that colonizes, alienates and disorganizes subjects (Minerbo, 2013, p. 81). An experience is memory without memories, and opens the possibility for the creation of a non-repetitive inscription, for the retrieval of an inscription (Botella, 2015). The Freud of the “original supervision” did not have a memory of psychoanalytic theory (which had not been written yet), but did have personal sexual experiences, conscious and unconscious, which could potentially enable the retrieval of an inscription. This is an example of how to avoid the risk of transforming control analysis into a repetitive control of analysis.
References


French psychoanalysis has challenged the work of supervision to such an extent that this challenge has fueled conflicts around analytic training. My society, the France Psychoanalytic Association (APF), has stood out for the past forty years due to its abandonment of “personal analysis.” This decision has granted particular relevance to so-called supervision cures, which have become a critical instrument in analytic training. So much so, that some have talked about a “personalization” of supervision. What I am suggesting, then, is part of the curriculum of APF’s Institute. Each analyst in training must have two successive supervisions and choose a supervisor among the association’s full members. Both supervision cures are subjected to validation. A commission meets separately with the analyst in training and the supervisor to learn about the work performed, and reports on these meetings to the Training Committee. This committee, in turn, decides on the validity of the supervision work based on the commission’s report.
This brief review suggests that supervision work, which is essential for training and on which we have relatively little clinical documentation, is partly subjected to an “aim-representation” (Freud, 1900/2003) in which institutional or superego pressure is much greater than in an independent supervision. Such aim-representation is one of the elements of debate when contrasting the training models proposed by the various psychoanalytic societies.1 Nevertheless, within my own institution, when we try to ponder the specifically psychoanalytic dimension of the supervision experience, opinions vary. What kind of work is being performed? What transformations are produced? What is the “natural end” of a supervision? We can compare this issue with that of the “Analysis terminable and interminable” (Freud, 1937/2010b) by examining resistances and obstacles that are present in the path of supervision. The distance between training and transmission rests, I think, on the difference between teaching technique and transmitting the method, and this distance rules out the comparison between supervision work and learning.

I am particularly interested in examining supervisors’ position and work. Dissymmetry and an overhanging position support the construction of a scene from which they are excluded and which they will sometimes seek to enter subjected to unrefrained curiosity. If the two scenes are separate (taking up the image provided by Freud in “Constructions in analysis” (1937/2010a)), the supervision scene responds mainly to a displacement, which grants it its transference nature. Even (“evenly suspended”) listening is analytic and is directed to the only material brought to the session – the supervisee’s words and affects. This third position asks then, about the thought mechanisms set in motion in the supervisor, namely, conflicting identifications or co-thoughts, following Daniel Widlöcher (2010). It is a listening that is constantly being pulled in different directions, what Nathalie Zaltzman (2008) very accurately calls different “poles of attraction” (the transference, the learning process, the clinical-theoretical dimension), depending on the supervisee’s material.

If this listening has a chance of becoming psychoanalytic listening, it is by avoiding, I believe, the detailed and hypermnesiac account of the sessions, an account that unfolds based on notes brought to the supervision or reread immediately prior to it. Certainly, one finds here the “lameness” typical of supervision, which cannot detach itself, except in a phobic defensive movement, from the precision of association ties. Supervisors must, however, count on the forgetfulness that alone spares the surprise of recollection in the supervisee, especially when the supervisor’s “refusal” invites the supervisee to “try to say more,” a principle characteristic of the method that confronts resistances. It is, then, the welcoming and “divination” of the transference, in its inevitable quality of excess and resistance, that have the potential to reveal what, due to unconscious acting out (a “mute” acting out underlying words and representations), the transference offers to interpretation as much as it “does” to the analyst.

It is based on this process that countertransference resistances may be heard, eventually, in a dimension of repetition of “blind spots” or interpretive acting-out episodes that supervision work will reveal without always being able to treat them specifically. Nonetheless, it can eventually indicate the path to a resumption of analysis. Rather than learning an interpretive technique, it is this recognition, this acknowledgment of the transferences between patient and analyst (with what they carry as effects, causing distraction and discomfort in the supervisee) that is the essential goal, and the guarantee of transformation, of the supervision experience. It is expected that supervisees will gradually listen to themselves talk about their patient without clear awareness – that they will introject, says François Gantheret (2005), “a self-listening function”

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1. A debate of this kind may be found in the issue 103 of the journal Topique. Analyse quatrième, edited by L’Esprit du Temps in 2008. There, readers will find interventions by many representatives of French psychoanalytic associations.
that may also be part of their interpretive activity, without the emergence of inhibiting guilt (a long-term achievement). Such activity rests, then, on the fantasy or, rather, on the formal regression that undoes the prohibition to think.

Some might say, and it is an ever-open debate in our training institutes, that the “supervision analysis” could be considered a resumption of the work of analysis by other means. I do not think so; it is certainly analysts’ desire, and their ethics, and, therefore, their share of the blame that lies at the unconscious root of their practice, as long as the transference toward the supervisor does not lead to an excessive idealization that institutes him or her as a “model” and thus contributes to mask inevitable ambivalence. The work of supervision cannot resort to the true resource of analytic treatment, that is, the rule of free association and the ability to analyze the transference and the recollection of infantile sources. Here we are dealing, above all, with their “use” – to go back to Freud’s term, Handhabung. Yet the transference goes in both directions; there are also supervisees’ elucidations regarding their patients’ unconscious, which supervisors grasp and recognize thanks to their own practice.

References


Supervision is one of the three pillars of the so-called Freudian tripod, to which Freud alluded when discussing the significance of the transmission of psychoanalysis. While it is true that the focus is on personal analysis, it is also true that supervision, or control-analysis, according to Guntrip (1975), has offered the necessary support, along with theoretical seminars, to the practice and transmission of psychoanalysis (of both its theoretical foundations and its practice). Different points of view account for the various ways of supervising, which may depend on supervisors’ theoretical orientation as well as on their historical or institutional context.

There are also differences in form and content; there are those who suggest that supervisions should be classes where we teach what can and what cannot be done; those who consider that supervision work should be focused on the therapist’s transference; and those who prescribe a combination of both. Listening with suspended attention, inferring interpretations, assessing resistance-transference work, and recognizing dynamic lines, insight, and working-through, and so on. Nevertheless, whatever the supervisor’s perspective, my interest when I started writing about this topic was in thinking about the analyst’s function, which is performed in the intimate space of psychoanalytic practice. In this context, I think that a key issue is that this function is necessary insofar as it is the place where the desire of the psychoanalyst may be preserved.

To conduct my research, I started by looking up the word *function* in the dictionary. I found interesting answers in two dictionaries. For instance, the *Diccionario de la Real Academia Española* (2014) offers two definitions: 1) “each of the uses of language to represent reality, express the speaker’s feelings, incite the listener to act, or refer to oneself metalinguistically”; and 2) “relationship between two sets that assigns to each element of the first set one element of the second one, or none.”

With regard to the first definition, I think of that Real that cannot be represented in any form of speech and that inevitably appears when we present a case for supervision. What we do is...
talk about the case, a case that is told to another person, that is, a fiction. The supervisor attests to the irreducible aspects of the material. The peer or peers to whom the case is recounted are more experienced, and something is transmitted in the telling, in the narration, that cannot be said. What happens with what cannot be said? What happens with that irreducible remainder? Of whom do we speak when we tell a story if each practice is unique and always different?

As to the second definition, within the logic of mathematics, I would have to say that there is no supervisee without a supervisor, no analysand without a psychoanalyst, each with his or her history, his or her practice, his or her own experience of the unconscious. It is a relationship between two that involves a third. This thirdness (term coined by Peirce and used by Green, 2004) shows that things cannot be done any which way; we could say that it is a resource for “doing things right.” This thirdness allows us to generate what we may call meaning; we need three for the potential for meaning to exist. Following Peirce (Hartshorne, Weiss & Burks, 1881, pp. 1931-1958), the presence of an “A” is needed which, when compared with “B,” produces an effect of meaning of what “A” is.

Furthermore, if we establish a relationship between them, a middle term emerges that appears as a third and facilitates the preservation of the comparison and the constitution of a chain. Comparing “A” and “B” (judging) involves an anticipation regarding future verification. While I am writing this, the work of thought of the Project for a scientific psychology (Freud, 1895) comes to mind. Its implication is that judgment can take place thanks to difference and allows the emergence of the “no,” which creates difference and gives rise to desire. And from here to the new, to creativity there’s only one step.

Continuing with my search, I was astonished when I looked up the origin of the word function in the Diccionario etimológico de la lengua latina [Etymological Dictionary of the Latin Language] (Ernout & Meillet, 1979) and found that it had a dual meaning. On the one hand, it meant to fulfill, to take care of, to finish, and on the other, it was used as the opposite of “to do” in the sense of “to undergo,” “to endure.” During the Roman Empire it acquired the sense of defunctus, which was used from the origins of the Latin language until imperial times. It means the end of a process, being concerned with something until it is finished, liberating, saving. Cicero uses it to allude to life coming to an end, while Ovid employs the word defuncta to mean dying, being killed. It makes sense to think of the supervisor as someone who “plays dead.” Lacan (1977) refers to the fourth term to talk about death, and it is through this fourth term that the third acts as signifier to make it signify, so that there is no way of identifying with it; if one did, it would be a fraud.

There is no place of knowledge. This would be the supervisor’s function – playing dead in order to illuminate a place outside meaning. The goal is to take distance so that the non-existent Other may be acknowledged. Supervisors’ temptation is to historicize themselves as a third so as to become an identification model. Lacan (1991) tells us that supervisees must not supersede their act; they must not overlay their act with their narcissism and, instead of grasping the dimension of desire at play, attempt to transform this into knowledge. Supervision makes it possible to rectify the position of the subject superseded by his or her act as well as the direction of the cure. In it, every illusion that communication existed is broken. Ultimately, supervision is such when it knows how to preserve, in a good way, the analyst’s desire.

References
Super-vision, super-hero, superego – is it because it is superior, a view from above? Perhaps it is a superpower? Maybe it performs a superego function? It is also called control. These are odd names for a function that refers to another odd practice: a conversation between two people where one lies down with his or her back toward the other, who is sitting behind and to whom a greater degree of health tends to be attributed than to the one who gets up and talks face to face with his or her interlocutor. The thoughts conceived by the minds involved in analysis and supervision can also be odd, or wild, and the more capable these minds are of conceiving these thoughts, the more effective they will be in promoting their development.

When she comes into my consulting room and says hello to me, the analyst turns her face away and avoids the customary physical contact, warning me that she has a bad cold. Then she states that had she known she would be
feeling so poorly, she would have cancelled all her appointments, including her supervision. The first communication of her patient is also about a bad cold, which “wiped him out” and caused him to miss his previous hour. The session gradually unfolds, like our meeting, across other paths. At a certain moment, I start feeling that I’m losing my voice and my respiratory tract is clogged. My eyes tear up; I have rhinitis. I am suddenly and truly sick with a cold. I apologize and get up to turn off the air conditioner, and leave on only the fan of the blessed machine, which gives us some comfort in the humid, intense heat of our city.

We keep talking. Finally, I give her my overall view of the session. It is something I do quite often; I give a name or a title or, we could say, a selected fact – that emotional experience of discovering consistency amid a scattered or fragmented whole. From then on, we can take this as a definitory hypothesis¹ (Bion, 1997). It is a name that brings together elements that were observed in constant conjunction, which proves that this name bears significance and can, therefore, acquire meaning as the supervision unfolds. The impression I convey to the analyst is one of depression.

We go back to the cold, to the respiratory tract obstructed by mucus. Where the gaseous milieu had gained track, the liquid milieu is now restored, like the lost object; we were facing remnant vestiges, very remote experiences that continued to be active in the present. They were so active and intense that, in their search for a container, they had such penetration power that they traversed three containing surfaces, namely, that of the patient, that of the analyst, and that of the supervisor. Communication remained in the somatic sphere, without the ability to transform and reach the psychic universe. It should be added here that, in previous sessions, the analyst had expressed her concern regarding her inability to find the opportunity to talk about her upcoming holidays. She finally did so at the end of this session, at a huge emotional cost.

One of the functions of supervision would be precisely to expand the surface of containment of the unconscious aspects that infiltrate the communication between patient and analyst. In this way, it can create a better opportunity for the transformation of the elements that remain isolated from that psychic universe into dream elements endowed with a psychic quality – elements that can be dreamed. When I talk about such elements, I introduce another aspect of the supervision function. I view this function, in terms of Bion’s (1962) theory of functions, as a function of the personality. There are at least three personalities involved in this process.

Dream, fantasy, and free association belong to the same family. They are all inherent in the thinking process, in thinking the emotional experiences that, when these three activities fail, can drive either of these participants to act or to present somatic manifestations. Supervisors are not immune to such failures, quite the contrary, and this is another of the paradoxes of psychoanalysis. They are permeable, and precisely for this reason they can grant meaning to a characteristic aspect of analytic practice. I am referring to the dynamic of constant oscillation between the world of representation (images or words) and the world of experiences permeated by the senses, experiences that escape the psychic world.

Let us think about theoretical knowledge in the theoretical-clinical articulation, always a challenge for analysts in training. When faced with their patients, they should forget what they have learned from texts, lectures, and especially supervisions. In this way, they can empty their minds of preconceptions and make room for stimuli to infiltrate empty spaces by playing with their imagination, with the imaginative features evoked by the present emotional experience. Only thus will this experience have the opportunity to evolve and acquire meaning in a narrative construction that is spontaneously informed by the theoretical bias. Yet for this to happen, the supervisor,

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¹ Bion resorted to this term as a category in the grid (a tool he created to assess psychoanalytic experiences). It refers to one of the potential uses of statements in analytic communication.
super-hero, super-ego must be confronted and removed from his or her position of authority.

I remember an episode related by Manoel Thomaz Moreira Lyra (Dr. Lyra), a Brazilian psychoanalyst who trained in the British Psychoanalytical Society. Paula Heimann was his analyst, and Melanie Klein, his supervisor. During one of his supervision meetings, he found himself in a tight spot when he realized he had forgotten his notes. When he timidly explained the situation to Klein, she encouraged him to talk freely of what he remembered from the sessions. Lyra did so and was utterly thrilled; he felt he had never received so much help in his work with this patient. Imagine his surprise when he read the notes and found that the material was utterly different from the memories he had related to his supervisor. It seemed as though something much more genuine and fruitful had emerged thanks to freedom of thought.

Freedom to think, freedom to be – in psychoanalysis we seek to present our patients to themselves and to expand more and more their ability to contain the manifold aspects of their personality, whether these aspects please them or not. Supervision involves showing the supervisees the analyst they may be in such a way that they will increasingly take ownership of their original, autonomous style. They should take ownership of a mind that can host the wild thoughts that have been caught in their sensory net without trapping them in a rigid cell made up of theories, clichés, and tics absorbed from the supervisor or the super-analyst and dictated as a healthy imposition in the face of the threat of madness that always inhabits us and looms over us. It is even necessary to become more and more aware of the minimum conditions needed to psychoanalyze, conditions that belong to them absolutely and that they need to dare to know and respect in order to decide whether or not they want to take a prospective patient into analysis. This is a free and responsible decision that rules every association between two individuals, be it a matrimonial, psychoanalytic, or supervising association.

References
A group of candidates from the Córdoba Psychoanalytic Association (APC) want to share with you our experiences with group supervision in our Psychoanalytic Institute. A 2011 amendment to the Institute’s regulations established the group supervision device1 as part of APC’s psychoanalytic training. Such a device was new not only to APC, but also to International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) member associations in Argentina and Latin America. This change in the mode of supervision marked a turning point and a moment of opening in relation to the traditional ways of looking at some issues connected with analytic training. Indeed, the offer to work in groups provided us with an experience of change regarding the classic supervisor-supervisee binomial (a mode of supervision supported by the setting in motion of a demand for knowledge that the supervisor is supposed to have).

Those of us who supported this space call it a *clinical experience of passage*. We leave this designation on hold, as its elucidation is the result of one of the theses set forth in this paper. To implement this experience, we adopted the principle of elaboration as a product of a small group guided by one of its members. This person’s role involved opening the conversation, launching or relaunching the discussion and the work inside the group. The effects of the role enabled us to appropriate it. One of the groups called this person the “plus-One” (Lacan, 1964/1990).

This mode of functioning entailed a first opening move marked by the supervisor’s exit from the place of power. This movement produced a different modality of circulation of knowledge. Almost inadvertently, we rapidly found that each of us was occupying different places, something we only saw later, after the fact, as a favorable effect of this initial surrender. We all came to the group with a background of theories and experiences gathered in different, alternative journeys, and did not

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1. Article 9 of the Regulations of APC’s Training Institute states as follows: “Each of the two supervisions will last a minimum of two years with a frequency of one session a week, and each will be conducted by a different training analyst. One will be a group supervision. The group will comprise two or three candidates, and each will be responsible for presenting material from his or her private practice and for drafting an annual report. In addition, the group must submit a brief report about the experience of the supervision process” (Instituto de Formación, 2011; emphasis added).
know what to expect from our work with our patients within this device. Nonetheless, we all felt the desire to undergo the experience from this new perspective, regardless of the knowledge contributed by each of us. We had to face the challenge of daring to show our clinical work openly before the group and report our interventions, what we said or failed to say, what we thought or felt in relation to a patient.

The freedom with which we worked with the various clinical materials was very productive, for it helped us choose which case to follow and generated true questions regarding how we should intervene in the different cases. The group presented us with a plurality of modes of listening and gradually generated an interplay of transferences with the clinical material, thereby opening the field for the criss-crossing of perceptions.

Certainly, group work involved listening to, and being heard by, different analysts – our peers, who have diverse theoretical frameworks, styles, training, and experiences. In addition, it brought about change from the start; it caused chain movements as well as movements in different directions within the group, in the sessions with the patient, and in each analyst’s mode of listening. We slowly learned that our individual knowledge was shifting into knowledge produced with and among others. Yet thinking as a group does not mean losing individuality. Rather, it means sharing in spaces of participatory construction.

In this way, fragments of sessions, of different patients’ ways of saying, of associations promoted by the group started to flow in enveloping, spiral, rising movements that, in the manner of a whirlwind, spun around an empty space and settled into a knowledge constructed
in a different way and in difference, a knowledge with no owner, a knowledge at fault, a group knowledge. Leaving the place of dogmatic knowledge empty gradually mobilized a power that facilitated the circulation of a living word. Rather than becoming a tool for domination, punishment, and “res iudicata,” which produces stultifying superego interventions, this form of power gave rise to innovation and creativity.

In case-by-case clinical practice, each patient discussed in the group generates a smooth, intense movement. Reading and following the text set in motion a work in which a web was woven. As we progressed, all the modes of knowledge combined. Working with the association networks of the various transferences at play (among group members and between group members and the clinical case, individually and as a group) enhanced effects and multiplied results. Within the various groups, a space of listening consolidated that favored sayings (decires) and stressed not so much subjectivity as the subjections that determine subjects, all of this read in the key of the transference caused by the analyst’s desire.

In this way, each group’s work dynamic gradually took root as a new product in itself. Depending on the case and on participants’ ability to share, each time and in each meeting, every participant could take on a different role based on difference. Each could set the work in motion or channel or rechannel it within the group. This turbulent flow had a strong impact on our everyday work and caused a shift in our ways of asking questions. We no longer asked ourselves, as we did at first, what or how an analyst does, but how the place of the analyst is created in each of us. The crux of the matter was shifted from being an analyst to becoming an analyst, an analyst who knows how to do in that place.

We now return to the first designation of group supervision as experience of passage to say that group supervisions marked a before and an after in our practice. None of those of us who participated in these supervisions will be able to ignore them or to work without resorting to an exchange value that was transferred to us by way of a transmission. We traveled through a different way of supervising that is oriented toward a savoir-faire as analysts, a savoir-faire that is created essentially as an effect of group production. This process resulted in an experience of passage — not of passage to the act but of passage to an analytic act in which the subject who came out was different from the one who entered. We are now subject-analysts whose crossing of the Rubicon turned us into others... into difference...

References

2. “Un saber en falta” in Spanish. There is a play on words here with “en falta,” at fault, and “falta,” lack. (T. N.)
Sigmund Freud instituted supervision as one of the three pillars of psychoanalytic training. The word *supervision* presents the difficulty of evoking a type of work that suggests the superiority of one member, the supervisor, over the other, the supervisee. *Supervision* corresponds to the supervising work that one psychoanalyst performs on another psychoanalyst or candidate, which points to a certain position of superiority occupied by a psychoanalyst who is assumed to know more than the other, to whom he or she is supposed to teach how to work.

This difficulty can be resolved if we understand supervision essentially as a dialogue between peers who meet to study the material obtained from a psychoanalytic session that was conducted by one of them (the supervisee). In this session, (suspended) attention does not stop at the manifest content and is sensitive to secondary details, little-appreciated features, the residue of observation, and secret or concealed things (Freud 1890), and is directed to those aspects of the words of the other that are present in certain fragments of the patient’s discourse and resonate with the analyst.

Besides the analyst’s interventions and work, the dialogue will include the analytic knowledge of the peers – supervisor and supervisee. It involves sharing the analysis of a case between two analysts and knowing that not just any analyst can supervise another analyst, because the analyst who presents the case is the one who actually knows, since he or she is the one who is in direct contact with the patient and with the transference. I think, therefore, that we must ensure that supervision remains in the realm of transmission rather than of the teaching of psychoanalysis and take into account the manifold transference interplays that are typical of psychoanalytic work.

Olga Varela*

Notes on supervision

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Freud (1937) is clear and precise when he claims that psychoanalysis is the third of those impossible professions in which a deficient result may be assumed from the start. The other two are education and government. When supervision has as its goal to teach another person how to work, we are in the realm of impossibility, for we cannot give the other what we do not have. Setting this goal means evading the castration of the supervisor, who will answer questions and solve conundrums and thus be far removed from what we call psychoanalysis. It means believing that we can teach. But, how can I teach someone to work in an analytic fashion? Can I actually teach?

I agree with Freud that we cannot teach or supervise; we can only transmit. I must transmit to the supervisee the desire to work in search of truth and the unconscious. For the supervisee to become a psychoanalyst, the supervisor must convey a promise of newness. What is transmitted, then, is the encounter with the unexpected, the astonishing, with what nobody expects but produces effects, what has effectiveness and potency. For this reason, I consider that a supervision or discussion between peers constitutes a second look at the candidate’s analysis, a process that will gradually develop between supervisor and supervisee.

Supervision reflects the transferences at play, which add complexity to, and call into question, this very particular transmission process that unfolds in the context of the supervision session and must be taken into account. Supervisor and supervisee must work together on the material of a patient with the transferences and counter-transferences of the supervisee. The supervisor must try to understand the patient analytically without intervening in a leading way in order to respect the supervisee in his or her position as analyst. In this way, the supervisee may actually become an analyst. Otherwise, what will emerge will be a technician of psychoanalysis.

Analysts who perform the supervising function will have the advantage of having participated not in the original scene but in the a posteriori of this scene. In this way, they are free from the pressure created by certain modes of the transference and can develop a different viewpoint, given by detachment. They must function as a mediator. In his seminar on the symptom Lacan (1975/2016) explains that, at first, the supervisee seeks the other’s approval in order to confirm that his procedure is right from the point of view of the ethics at play, and later, there is a play with the supervisor’s misunderstanding. It is the unconscious that will reveal the supervisee’s obstacles in the transference. In this way, they enter into the game of the drive, which unfolds both in the analyst’s personal analysis and in supervision.

It is the blind spots of the supervisee that pose the obstacles that will appear in the supervision. For this reason, when supervisors touch on these blind spots, either explicitly or unwittingly, they start learning about the unconscious, even if no interpretations are made in the supervision device. We could say that analytic work is always performed and known in the context of unconscious-to-unconscious communication, where blind spots will emerge as an expression of this encounter. We learn here that there is no resistance but the resistance of the analyst, and that no analyst exists who is free from the potential advent of an obstacle. When the supervisor points to this obstacle, the fault changes, even if there is still a fault.

Therefore, I argue that it is very hard, if not impossible, to set up a supervision without personal analysis, for supervisees discover in the supervision the obstacles they must unravel in analysis. The supervisor will always have the ability to offer that third look and to operate as an intermediary, a third who distinguishes the imaginary relationship that may have developed between the supervisee and the patient. Any other way of working would place the supervisor in the place of the subject supposed to know what he or she actually does not know, with the subsequent harm to the supervisee.

References
Oscar Masotta: An original repetition

* Psychoanalyst. Cofounder (1990) and president of Fundación del Campo Lacaniano (Lacanian Field Foundation).
Oscar Abelardo Masotta is the full name of the man who made it possible for psychoanalysis, from Jacques Lacan on, to be translated into Spanish. And it is clear for everyone that he was not the only one involved, although he did come to be the only one due to the engaged and unique manner, both oral and written, in which he read the return to Freud suggested and indicated by Lacan. Masotta’s journey was unparalleled, and it is due to this lack of peers that Lacan’s entry into the Spanish language was so powerful and decisive. I will not go into the historical and social details of the period when this teaching took place. There are ample texts that discuss them, written by people who are better equipped than I to do
so. It would be an awkward redundancy that would waste the reader’s time. I will just say that Masotta’s work rocked psychoanalysis. While his first article on Lacan dates back to 1964, his transmission of Lacan’s ideas intensified from 1969-1970 until his death in 1979.

As others have shown, Masotta made of his teachings a reading of Freud guided by Lacan’s work. His reading of Freud in German was integral to this process. His teaching was oral rather than written, a key quality that may be read and “heard” in his transmission of psychoanalysis. I say heard to indicate that it was a spoken teaching, and I specify that there is a difference between different modes of saying. Masotta was a master at transmitting a way of reading that was neither erudite (although his written works show that he lacked nothing to engage in that kind of reading) nor elaborate. While he did not “play” with words, he enacted the way words play with us.

The establishment of the Freudian School in Argentina in 1974, to which Masotta invited me, constitutes one of the most important milestones in the passage of psychoanalysis from one language to the other. This was the first Lacanian school in the Americas and the second one in the world (the first one was the Freudian School in Paris). Its creation consolidated and expanded the entry of Jacques Lacan’s discourse into the Spanish language.

What Masotta offered as a path to access discourse was something that was known at the time and that Lacan himself yearned for, that is, transmitting things in a simple way. This is the hardest thing to do in psychoanalysis. Furthermore, we should warn readers that simple does not mean simplified, abbreviated, summarized; rather, it means being able to transmit one’s reasoning about one or another theoretical or discursive element of psychoanalysis by showing what is logically necessary and pointing out, at the same time, the impossible aspects of this element. Masotta was a master at posing the right questions. This is what we read and hear in his classes, and even in his books.

Here is a sample. In Lecciones de introducción al psicoanálisis [Introductory Lessons to Psychoanalysis] (1979), he states as follows:

The notion of “object relation” is not very Freudian. Saying as crudely as we do that the drive has no object constitutes a critical position against any psychologization of theoretical concepts. Post-Freudian authors have talked about development in terms of “a-objectal” and “proto-objectal” stages. We understand that this terminology is equivocal, for there is always an object. What we must study in children’s development is the stages of the constitution of the Other. Freud spoke of primary identifications and object choice. In both cases the object was, first of all, the father and/or the mother. In the same way, those who saw in this first volume of Lecciones de introducción al psicoanálisis an intention of becoming an author by inventing concepts would be wrong. I repeat that the issue is not coining terms but continuing to point out the boundary that the said concept cannot cross without destroying the very foundations of psychoanalytic theory. Affirming that what we are dealing with, first of all, is the “lack of an object” is but a way of drawing this boundary. (pp. 17-18)

This quote shows Masotta’s clarity and his position regarding transmission. He refers, first of all, to a problem that has developed in relation to a concept, that is, the notion of object choice. Then he analyzes the consequences of this problem and situates this concept in the context of Freud’s ideas, intertwined with Lacan’s saying. Then comes the question that I see as the most important in Masotta’s transmission, that is, whether it is possible, or even necessary, to invent, because transmission based on this aspiration (to invent) is harmful. We can thus see the problem
that was so clearly indicated by Masotta, namely, the fact that we cannot cross the boundary that prevents the destruction of the very foundations of psychoanalysis.

It happened to Freud with many of his disciples, and it also happened to Lacan with some close disciples, relatives, and famillionaires. The return to Freud promoted by Lacan found there, in that “going out of discourse,” the cause of the necessary existence of this operation. Perhaps we need to return to Lacan motivated by the same causes; it is something to be decided, to be created. We also consider necessary to lay the foundations for a Lacanian field already established by Lacan as a field of jouissance, an aspiration specified by him in his seminar. Let us repeat the last phrase of the quote: “Affirming that what we are dealing with, first of all, is the ‘lack of object’ is but a way of drawing that boundary.”

This boundary, it is understood, separates what destroys the foundations of the theory from what does not destroy them. We are not saying that “another theory” cannot be developed. Nevertheless, any theory must preserve those aspects of the previous one that are tied to the appropriateness of the theoretical-discursive field that inaugurated this very field. Insofar as it is unconscious, desire, for instance, is one, only one of the invariants of psychoanalysis. This was Masotta’s position when transmitting Lacan’s reading of Freud, which constituted a return to Freud’s ideas.

In his Introducción a la lectura de Jacques Lacan [Introduction to the Reading of Jacques Lacan], written in 1970 (the first book on Lacan in Spanish), Masotta says about himself: “I don’t know if when I attempt to be original I repeat, or if when I repeat, I am being original.” This is a superb phrase that suggests what we should do with the not-knowing – turn repetition into a place for invention.

Why was Masotta’s mode of transmission possible? There are discursive circumstances of that period that certainly “ensured” the cause to a certain extent. I would like to insist on this point of ensuring the cause in another dit-mention, essentially, that of intention. It ought to be pointed out that in every activity of the parlêtre (we must say a parlêtre, it fits the discourse better) there is always a longing to find, to know the cause of what he does. And this effort always fails; it is part of the structure. In fact, this cause is constructed; that is what happens in an analysis. That is the way it is, if we follow Lacan’s transmission in this direction. We will also say that there are two positions in an analysis: the position of the one who is taken by someone who arrives, like the analyst; and the position of the one who, in that arrival and its subsequent vicissitudes, will, or will not, be the analysant in this device.

Lacan repeatedly alludes to the change of position with regard to what one says that one hears in an analysis – whether the speaker is situating himself or herself as a patient or as an analysant. The difference in favor of speaking is clearly represented by the use of the present participle. But, careful, because this does not happen by magic; it happens (because the person listening determines the person speaking) that the person in the place of the analyst is the one who is more responsible for what will happen, for making this arrival happen. To find Oscar Masotta’s
place in the transmission and in the present of psychoanalysis, we must remember the two positions postulated by Lacan in relation to the analyst's position. Yet this is not always possible, because there are situations or people who thwart the analysant’s saying. As I understand it, however, something is clear, and I suggest it as a guiding statement with regard to these issues: **an analyst, anyone can be, but not anyone can be an analyst.**

Situating Masotta’s topicality in the realm of the transmission of psychoanalysis involves arguing that analysts exist at least in two dimensions. The first operates in the transference, and the second one works through, thinks, and tries to convey what is going on in an analysis. Now, is it as analysts that the ones transmitting the consequences of their practice carry out this transmission? The quick answer would be, Yes. But, shouldn't someone be situated in the position of analyst in order to agree to be taken by another in the transference?

There is a clear answer to this predicament. There is an analysant position that exists not only in the analysis but also in its transmission. It is the position associated with teaching how to transmit psychoanalysis. Let us start from a necessary and unavoidable point: to be able to accept a demand for analysis, someone has to have occupied the analysand position. This is unarguable; it refers to the invariants of psychoanalysis. It is called having been analyzed. Analyzed? Now, what does it mean to have been analyzed? Someone has been analyzed insofar as he or she has developed an **analysant saying** (**decir analizante**).

In some cases, these analysants achieve the passage from analysant to analyst in an analysis, a passage that will lead them to occupy (from the place of remainder in which their analyst was left) the same place with regard to others who will demand that they occupy it. Lacan says this. As an analyst, someone is the analysant he or she was. For those who have achieved the passage from analysant to analyst in their analysis, the transference will already be a transference to the discourse of psychoanalysis, and therefore they will carry out the transmission of their experience as an analysant in the transference with regard to that discourse.

Yet once a person has undergone analysis, what is he or she supposed to do to be taken into and by the discourse of psychoanalysis? To my understanding, there is a way, which may not be the only one but is the most consistent with the theory and discourse of psychoanalysis. For those who have chosen this option in their analysis (the longing for that know-how, for practicing it), an opportunity opens for a transference that, being the same one, is already different, that is, the transference to the discourse of psychoanalysis.

The passage as a procedure, as it pertains to the transmission of that experience to the community, is carried out through different potential devices in which the spoken word has its own place. This transmission occurs at a school, which is a transmission device offered by Lacan. With this experience, we attempt, and often succeed, to shed light on this passage about the desire of the analyst. In Seminar 23, Lacan (1975/2016) states that there is a single transference, and that this transference is to discourse. Masotta did what he did in psychoanalysis because he did it from an analysant position. When analysts engage in transmission outside the analysis, they always do so as an analysant in relation to that transference to discourse. The work of transmission performed by Massota was performed in his analysis from an analysant position. He would say to me, “Sometimes my analyst doesn’t understand me at all,” and perhaps it was like that, with that resistance, that he was able to develop his analyst desire. He practiced it from that position, but not in a comprehensive way. He carried out supervision tasks. The “formal” requirements were met.
It is because he placed his analyst desire in relation to the only transference there is for an analyst – the transference to discourse – that Masotta introduced psychoanalysis into the Spanish language in an undisputable, compelling way. In that transference, he was the analysant of that discourse, just as Lacan said of himself. Masotta was neither a professor nor a theorist eager to invent something new. For some, he was a teacher; for others, someone who could not be overlooked if they wanted to be part of psychoanalysis in Spanish; and for yet others, acknowledging the work of Masotta as an analyst and analysant in relation to the discourse of psychoanalysis threatens to demolish the certainties of academic titles, which may or may not have been awarded by a university but which are, above all, hierarchical.

Masotta’s work significantly calls into question the discursive heritage. It locates the cause in a place that differs from social or economic recognition. These forms of recognition may be necessary, but it is not there where the essential aspect of analysis resides; it is not in that dit-mention that the cause is created. This aspect can only be located in the social tie generated by an analysis. Besides being present in the simplicity and seriousness of his texts, of his special style, both clear and beautiful, the topicality of Oscar Masotta consists in his showing that no academic title can make an analyst; rather, there is a dit-mansion, an analysant saying (decir analizante) that insists and is found both in transmission and in the construction of the function of the analyst’s desire. Alberto Cardín, a Spanish literary man, said at the dawn of September 13, 1979, the day after Masotta’s death, in El País daily: “The psychoanalyst Oscar Masotta has died.”

References

5. E. N.: Neologism in the form of a noun by the condensation of dit ("said" in French) and mansion. In French it is homophonous with dimension (dimension).
Outside the Walls
1. Open-air psychoanalysis

This is a proposal to think of psychoanalytic work in different spaces, of a psychoanalytic work ruled by collective listening and oriented toward the healthcare and cultural spheres. We will thus need to explore issues that confront us with the world’s phenomena, even with some that are unusual for us. Instead of “taking” psychoanalysis, “taking” knowledge to other places (such a common attitude in our profession), psychoanalysts are invited to let themselves be influenced by new territories, by the time they live in. It is through our encounter with diverse realities that we will have a chance to revise, criticize, and reinvent psychoanalysis.

Born as an online forum, “Open-Air Psychoanalysis” (psicanaliseaceuaberto@blogspot.com.br) was coordinated by Eduardo Martins and Rodrigo Lage between November 2015 and February 2016. The forum operated by way of videos and written comments, with significant participation by psychoanalysts from the entire Latin American region. Fepal’s VII Symposium on Community and Culture, “The Body of the Body” (Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of São Paulo, April 8th and 9th, 2016), provided continuity. Organized by Fepal’s Community and Culture Bureau and co-hosted by the Associate Members’ Association of São Paulo, this symposium was launched at the Itapeva CAPS public mental health center. The following texts record this event.

Participants in the symposium witnessed the psychoanalytic method in action by listening to the stories of six young colleagues, who narrated their psychotherapeutic experiences with psychotic patients in a free literary form. They showed their ability to penetrate the psychotic world and work with the singularity of each
patient within the specific boundaries of patients’ territories – their homes, the street, or the hallways of the mental healthcare center. Readers will find themselves confronted with scenes that clearly display how psychoanalysis thinks of the body, cares for the body, and produces with the body. They will travel through an entirely visual side, full of objects, voices, smells, dirt, gestures, legs, and mouths, and through another side, the side of the invisible scene of the field of subjectivity, where squiggles of a psychic pattern will sometimes emerge. This work calls into question the analyst’s function, that is, the endless effort to create conditions for the emergence of meaning in that space where body and word meet.

In the exchange with participants, all presentations invariably traced a path that avoided a lecture style so as to build a psychoanalytic knowledge that chooses to describe nuances rather than formulate definitions. We know that unconscious layers can only be revealed in the human event – in the relationship between human beings and the world they inhabit. It was precisely around human events that the entire discussion unfolded, with the freshness of the moment. The emotional density experienced by participants derives, perhaps, from this mode of operation.

The web created by the work carried out by the Fepal organizing committee, the CAPS team, and the Brazilian and foreign attendees generated a meeting full of textures and densities, to which we now add the report in Calibán, a tireless companion to open-air psychoanalysis.

2. The CAPS
Paula Ramalho da Silva

The Centers for Psychosocial Care (CAPS) were created in the context of the Brazilian Psychiatric Reform based on criticisms leveled against the asylum care model, which viewed the psychiatric hospital as the central component of the treatment of psychic pain. CAPS became an alternative public resource that substituted for closed institutions, which relied on an excluding logic and were, therefore, surrounded by walls that separated madness from the social environment. Practices carried out by these teams aimed to understand the health-illness processes beyond the biological and organic viewpoint. They also took into account the material and symbolic elements that contribute to subjective production. For the replacement of an asylum (organic) logic to be successful, it is essential for the teams working in the service network to move their practice outside the facilities’ walls, thus enabling users to appropriate different spaces. This approach distances itself from a “behavior-complaint” treatment.

As a care strategy and feature of this new model, a multidisciplinary team must be put together that understands the complexity and uniqueness of the subjects who come to these spaces. A comprehensive mode of care is thus promoted that takes into account different potential dimensions and interventions. Since the professionals making up these teams have diverse trainings, the unfolding of everyday work processes shows the significance of the “capacity for endless variation that affects each team member, which prevents [the group] from becoming homogeneous” (Vicentin, 2006, p. 13). Our readers may appreciate the variety of styles described in this text, a variety that constitutes the core of our clinical work and reflects its pluralistic composition. The thread that connects the stories in our scenes

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2. For a better understanding of Brazil’s public mental health policy, see Ministério da Saúde (February 2002, December 2011).
is the presence of a listening subject (and his or her truths and singularities) that closely resembles the presence that supports psychoanalytic practice.

Fepal’s Seventh Symposium on Culture and Community, held in São Paulo, started its activities at the Prof. Luiz da Rocha Cerqueira Mental Health Center (CAPS Itapeva). The starting point were six scenes that suggested a particular way of looking at psychoanalytic work outside the consulting room, sometimes even outside the institution. In these spaces, the body appears as an unquestionable, sometimes unprecedented, support for a variety of clinical interventions.

3. Scenes and comments

The following scenes were described by the therapists Germana Morais, Iara Mouradian Pedó, Lucas Hangai Signorini, Luciana Souza Santos, Mariana Desenzi Silva, and Nathália Naldoni. Raya Angel Zonana edited the comments.

**Scene 1: Francisco**

Francisco3 comes to the CAPS and tells us he cannot reach his brother João, a user of the center. João stopped responding to Francisco’s phone calls and would not open the door of the apartment where they both work on dental prostheses. Francisco asks if a member of the team can go with him to his brother’s apartment and try to speak to him.

I go with Francisco. The door is closed but not locked. With some effort, I succeed in opening it slightly. I call the user and ask if I can come in. After about fifteen minutes, he says yes. I have to push the door forcefully to get in because there’s a broken kitchen sink propped against it. João is standing on his bed with an anguished expression, gazing in astonishment toward the window – we’re on the fifth floor. The window is completely open, and there are several broken objects on the way to it. Between João and I lie the fridge, split in half, many books, wooden shelves, and the user’s professional tools and materials.

João starts to say that Facebook spread improper content about him and that this betrayed his principles, including his religious principles. He’s extremely worried about the potential impact of this event on his intimate partner and on his family, and says he won’t survive it. He seems to make up words to express his feelings (neologisms). When I offer my help, he says he can’t accept my offer. These phrases are interspersed with others that show weak associative links. He says he doesn’t want to be hospitalized. He doesn’t want his mother to know what’s going on, and yet he asks for her; he claims he needs her support.

Then I ask him to help me, and he lets me get closer to him. I tell him his brother’s outside and ask him to let Francisco come in and stay by the door. When I get closer, João bursts out crying and says he can’t bear this suffering any longer. Since I already know there are some relatives whom he considers “pure,” I start talking about the possibility of meeting with them. Slowly, João seems to believe what I’m telling him and agrees to get dressed so that we can leave the apartment. He asks me to bring him a pot where he can pee. As he’s giving it back to me, he spills it on my pants.

Once he’s dressed, he grabs on to my body, and we go toward the elevator. He has a hard time walking and keeping his body straight. We go out. I see a cab and

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3. All the names in the scenes were changed in order to preserve users’ identity.
stop it. João gets in with me as if he were stuck to me. Then he asks to go back because the sunlight reveals his impurity, and it has become clear to him that he’s being persecuted. I decide to continue our trip to the center.

On our way there, the user talks about his suffering in relation to the contents that leaked through Facebook, and repeatedly tries to open the car door. When he comes into contact with my body or his brother’s, he starts calming down. As we enter the CAPS, many people approach us. We get to the nursing station, and the user slowly crumbles and lies on my legs in a fetal position. When people start asking him questions, he has that astonished look on his eyes. His scared gaze sweeps over the place, and he runs away. I’m able to stop him at the corner of the CAPS. I ask to be left alone with him. The user sleeps on my lap again for about twenty minutes. When he wakes up, I ask his brother to help me take him to the nursing station. Once there, they give him antipsychotic medication and he goes to sleep. Since I have a network meeting, I leave the scene (exhausted).

Scene 2: Josi

How do we find Josi? Slightly over forty years old, she often visits the CAPS, especially the computer room, where she researches health issues on “Gogle” (her particular name for the search engine) and sends messages with her discoveries to celebrities and businesses. Josi never goes unnoticed. Her presence is marked by the endless advice and requests she spreads through the corridors of the large building: you mustn’t eat onions because they make you cry, how disgusting, food with tears; you mustn’t wear a bun because it makes one think of poop,⁴ and who would carry poop on the head? Much less wear earrings, because ear piercings remind Josi of the piercings the public health system made in her skin without her authorization.

When I call her on the phone, I learn why she hasn’t come; she can’t leave her room because they broke her shoes. She doesn’t know who did it, but she’s sure that “they don’t want me to be out there.” Then she adds, “Didn’t you see on TV that they didn’t let Luciana Gimenez⁵ into a party because she was wearing sneakers?” I decide to request a new pair of shoes so that Josi can move around more comfortably. How can I help her choose? I take pictures of the shoes her size that are available at the CAPS store, and upon a suggestion made by Josi herself, I visit the Social Assistance Center where she lives and bring the pictures with me. I have to climb seven stories to reach her. There’s an elevator, but it has been out of service for a few months, something Josi has clearly noticed. To show her displeasure, she has stood for hours in front of the elevator, demanding that it be fixed.

While she seems quite receptive to my presence and welcomes me warmly, Josi doesn’t like what she sees. Some heels are too high, some shoes are too masculine. She berates me for having only been able to get used shoes for her despite my being a health professional. “Don’t you know they can carry diseases? Did it occur to you that they could have been owned by a murderer, by my daughter’s murderer, and that if I see you with those huge feet I’ll think you’re the murderer?” I agree with Josi to try to find shoes that are better suited for her feet. We reach other agreements as well, and other issues come up. When saying farewell, quite warmly, she asks me to call her again and gives me specific instructions. I must let the phone

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⁴ The words in Portuguese are coques and côco, which sound similar. (T. N.)
⁵ Brazilian model and TV show hostess. (T. N.)
ring three times so that she can hear the entire ring and know that I really want to
communicate with her.

I climb down the stairs to leave the grounds. A while later, Josi is the one look-
ing for me. She wants to talk about many things and, in particular, she wants to
show me her journal. Going over the pages, she finds an image she likes. It’s a
pencil drawing she made of a woman. “It's a self-portrait. It's me. But it looks like
you! It's you!”

**Scene 3: The collections**

It’s not the first time I go to Hugo's house. There, in the short hallway between the
front door of the apartment and the large living room, I find a huge mound of ob-
jects. There are computer screens and CPUs, heaps of cellphone covers, some fans,
empty boxes, and appliances, which are starting to pile up on the furniture – a desk
made of beautifully carved wood and a kind of medium-sized armoire, also in an
old-fashioned style. In the back, amid the clutter, a TV is on. Just as we have and we
will during many earlier and future visits, we hear the morning talk show as a back-
ground soundtrack. Among the objects, partially concealed by some higher piles,
is the couch where Hugo sleeps. He sleeps with his things, as though protected by
them – as if by gathering them, hiding among them, and blending with them, he
could slowly make them part of him.

Mrs. Isabel, Hugo's mother, tells me that the neighbors are planning to throw
them out, along with Hugo's garbage. "Not garbage, Mom, these things are mine!" says Hugo, enraged. She asks us to take him out of the apartment at least for a
few hours. “The neighbor says he'll help us clean everything up.” “It’s not garbage,
Mom,” he insists, and becomes irritated and complains. Hugo goes in search of
cigarette butts and starts smoking near the laundry area. He talks to himself, talks
to the voices, “protects us,” whines. We start realizing how hard it is for this mother
and son to communicate despite the fact that they share this space and their his-
tory and can't just separate. Mrs. Isabel must lock her door, and Hugo must sleep
concealed by his belongings.

Everything in his home is valuable to Hugo. He believes that all these things be-
long to a late cousin whose absence seriously upsets him. His cousin leaves things
for him on the streets of his neighborhood, like an inheritance that cannot be for-
mally bequeathed. Hugo can't understand how his mother doesn't realize the true
value of his things. In this sense, we try to think how we can actually value Hugo's
inheritance. The solution we find is to suggest that Hugo sell his belongings. He
listens to us without fully trusting us. He has been claiming his benefits for a long
time, but his mother has control over them. He wants to “buy something good to
eat, some bread, a cigarette,” or something else he might choose. We tell him that
his things have a value that can be paid, and with that money he would be able to
buy whatever he wants. Hugo seems to accept the idea. We go out into the neigh-
borhood, each carrying something.

We are three psychologists and Hugo, our guide. Intent on finding a place that
will value these things, we go first to a store that buys old appliances. The young
man who helps us takes a look at a record player and a stereo system and says
they're too old, and broken. He suggests that we take them to a scrap yard nearby.
On the way, we pass by a small store. We are surprised at the number of things this
man has behind the counter. They remind me strongly of Hugo's collection. Both
men view each thing as an object with a value of its own, and for the young sales-
man, above all, this value is linked to the capitalist world. I start to understand that this is the reason why he isn't willing to pay for a broken fan or vacuum cleaner; his things "aren't broken, they're just old." He also sends us to the scrap yard.

We walk and walk till we get there. Hugo speaks of his childhood – of memories brought back by the path we follow on our long journey. It's long even in a temporal sense, even though we don't have far to go; we can't walk fast because we are carrying a heavy load. We are three CAPS professionals walking through a São Paulo neighborhood, carrying objects collected from the garbage, but we have a mission: assessing the value of an inheritance. We go into the scrap yard. A man weighs our precious load and decides how much it's worth. Hugo agrees. Upon our departure, he shows us the money. He seems happy. We return to the CAPS. He plans to spend all the money he made on cigarettes. He tells us of places nearby where he can buy loose cigarettes more cheaply. We lose sight of him as soon as we arrive, but I meet him again an hour later. “Did you find the place where they sell single cigarettes, Hugo?” He shows me a piece of cake: “I decided to buy this yummy cake instead!” More than a place of value, his inheritance seems to have given him a place to choose.

**Comments**

**Marcelo Viñar** (Uruguayan Psychoanalytic Association, APU). I'm really moved by the device you created, which made me think of the distance between Charcot and Freud. Charcot is a child of medicine. In medicine, the patient's scene is visible, transparent; it takes place in the open air. The psychoanalytic scene is intimate; it's a scene of the internal world, of secrecy, of what isn't visible to humans. Human beings have both an open-air aspect and an aspect of hidden intimacy. By creating this scene, where patients are present through the therapists' voices, you build a bridge between medicine and psychoanalysis. We can see clearly how the Freudian invention stirs a scandal in psychiatric thought.

The main thing I noticed in these three scenes is that their logic contradicts the logic underlying traditional psychiatric behavior because you aim to welcome, embrace, receive this flood of absurdities shown in the three cases. In psychoanalytic listening, what we have is a flood of filth, garbage, "crap," as you have said clearly and eloquently. To enter the world of madness, to go there, we have to work on ourselves.

**Bernardo Tanis** (Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of São Paulo, SPBSP). What struck me was a moment in each scene where I felt that after a difficult situation, after a moment of anxiety, there was a moment of subjective appropriation on the part of the couple – the individual and the mental health worker. The first one, in the João scene, is when the practitioner says to him, “I need help!” I think in this moment there was a rapprochement, a transformation. In the Josi situation, there is a moment when the therapist listens to the patient's delirious world, a moment of meeting. And in the third scene, where there is talk of garbage, of accumulation of things, instead of throwing everything in the trash, the practitioner recognizes the inheritance value, the historical worth of these things. You showed that the work you do promotes the construction of the internal setting (the analyst's internal setting) described by Green, and with this internal setting, we can face situations that provoke anxiety and thus have a presence, make a difference.

**Víctor Guerra** (APU). It's striking how, in the first two scenes, you pose the key question, which is how we can reach the other's feelings. The first scene starts
by saying that the brother couldn’t reach his brother, and the second one, with a question: How do we find Josi? How do we reach the feelings of someone we call psychotic, who can be inside any of us? And your work, in the open, is a work of support, of tolerating the other’s suffering without confining it in our search for a content to which we can apply a cure. And the body is also there, as well as an element that is common to the three scenes, which is objects. In the first case, the colleague describes that “between João and me there were a lot of broken objects.” In the second scene, Josi focuses much of what is happening to her on the shoes, and to share her suffering, one needs to walk a lot, to climb up seven stories. One has to suffer in the body. In the last case, Hugo’s, there is an aspect that we don’t always consider relevant, and that is the value of concrete objects in the construction of psychic life. Hugo insists that these are emotional objects, they’re not garbage; they are testimonies of his life. In the face of a threatening situation, these are essential elements that accompany his existence; he carries objects laden with stories. This issue requires a multiple listening – we must listen not only to his words, but also to the body of the objects, the status of the objects.

Fernando Orduz (Colombian Psychoanalytic Society, SoColPsi). There is something that called my attention about the play with objects. I will have to do something, a performance, so that we can understand each other. [Fernando takes out the various objects he carries in his bag and builds a path. Then he says what each of these everyday objects means to him, and adds that he assumes that this meaning will be different for each person present. After speaking about each object and its emotional value, he puts them back in the bag one by one. He realizes that as they are all personal objects, there is a common thread that connects their meanings.]

Leda Hermann (SBPSP). I wanted to thank our presenters for their courage. They’re very brave, not only because of the work they carry out, with everything it entails, but also because they’re discussing it with us despite the fact that psychoanalysts are pretty narrow-minded about everything that is done in the open air. You work conscientiously, and have achieved something that was really needed, as Marcelo pointed out, both in formal psychiatry and in traditional psychoanalysis. Thanks a lot.

Scene 4: Rafael

The imminent rain made patient and therapist walk faster as they strolled through the neighborhood. Yet Rafael insisted on taking several steps back and touch his earlier steps with his fingertips. Repetitive behavior was not a new development, but it sometimes became more painful for him. He would repeat the same phrases, or delay his lunch by several hours because he would lift his fork time and time again before being able to put food in his mouth. Furthermore, he would sometimes need to spit out the food in response to the orders of the voices that accompanied him. Nevertheless, there was something peculiar in his persistent need to touch the floor, because it was followed by the words, “Just a minute!” After a while, the therapist, who saw the first raindrops fall, asked Rafael, “Did you lose something there?” “My body. A part of my body!” answered the patient, and went off running, leaving the therapist behind.

In his frantic run back to the institution, Rafael avoided that block and went home, getting in through the gate his mother had already opened. The rain, the open gate, and an escaping Rafael were an invitation for the therapist to go in, an
invitation uttered by the mother: “Come have a cup of coffee until the rain stops.” Rafael was waiting under an awning to protect himself from the rain. Mother and son lived in a building in the back of the lot where Rafael’s eldest sister (married and with two children) had her house. They had only one room that served as bedroom, living room, and kitchen, and a bathroom. Despite being well organized, the kitchen and living room furniture seemed improvised. The beds were particularly striking. There were two twin beds joined together that occupied almost half the room. At first sight, they looked like a huge double bed, for they had the same sheets.

Rafael points to his, and shows the therapist his CD collection. The mother, always very attentive, offers different snacks. She’s the one who suggests that Rafael show me photos of himself since his birth to the present, all gathered in an album whose cover has the word “Baby” written on it. Ultimately, this is the story told by the photos: a long history of mothering that lasts until today. Rafael’s dependency on his mother was one of the main facts of his life story and had justified the implementation of a Therapeutic Project focused on exploratory walks through the neighborhood that were intended to develop his autonomy.

Certain passages of the user’s medical records describe recent actions performed by the team’s professionals, such as asking the mother not to bathe her son, even if he insists, because he’s already an adult. This “insistence” shows Rafael’s participation in the relationship established with his mother; while he yearns for independence, he does very few practical things to achieve it. Selma, Rafael’s mother, has spent her entire life taking care of her son, and she says so as she turns the pages of the album: “Nobody wanted to stay with him. The father didn’t want him, only I did, and very much. But back then, I didn’t know he would have all these problems. All this child does is give me a hard time. God forbid, if I’d known. Although I don’t know what I would do without him.” When Rafael hears this, he goes back to touching the floor after walking on it.

Scene 5: That’s the way it is

Then, that’s the way it is: she was “the last one” to arrive from there, say the siblings’ words. The father talks about her stubbornness; she was stubborn, Lucimara, stubborn; she insisted, she was stubborn in marking her existence... “She arrived last.”

Lucimara’s mother came from there, from the hinterland of a northern state, and there was also the plantation where Luci’s father worked. She, the mother, ran away and reached São Paulo, and was almost lost. Over time, she brought the children who had been left there, one by one. Lucimara, the siblings repeat, “was the last one to arrive, that’s why she got bitter about our mother.” Lucimara has three children, two love relationships, and three grown children. The eldest ran away very early to marry the man she chose, even though this decision didn’t fit with her mother’s views. The other two children are being cared by an aunt because Lucimara flapped her wings and they no longer know how to call her. With this summarized story, I’m attempting to recount another attempt – my attempt to meet with Lucimara.

A few years ago, a statement emerges from a referral by another team in the service network: Lucimara needs care, she’s undergoing a crisis. Yet every day you can find her there, in front of the big window that shows the inside of the bakery that

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6. The Singular Therapeutic Project is a movement of co-production and co-management of the therapeutic process by vulnerable individuals or groups (Oliveira, 2008).
employs Rosinaldo, her partner and the father of her youngest son. She’s anxiously waiting for the money Rosinaldo gives her every day, they say. “How come he doesn’t say he’s my husband?”, complains Lucimara in one of those rare moments when she says something about herself.

I visited Lucimara for seven months. Sometimes she was coming back from, or leaving for, one of her walks, which were so regular they could be qualified as rituals. She would tell me to look for someone else who needed me because she didn’t need me, she didn’t. The team decided to add a second person to make a pair – two bodies, two presences that would mark a togetherness and a difference. The mental health team provided support for Lucimara’s family: the sisters, the father… In that space, we tried to trace the history of an origin. What we heard revealed desperation mixed with helplessness. A way of naming an unease with one’s own existence started to emerge – a “mental discomfort.” The mother, Lucimara’s younger sister, the father, and the twelve-year-old daughter were guided or supported by a team from the network.

Time goes by. We get a call from the sister, who tells us that Lucimara has been hospitalized. Lucimara herself reached out to her eldest sister, the main person responsible for the family, who was able to deceive Lucimara and have her hospitalized. I meet Lucimara at the psychiatric hospital. She agrees to talk to me and to another practitioner about what’s going on with her. After the hospitalization, this poor black woman starts coming to the service, but makes clear from the start that she only needs medication. “I don’t want to talk about my life with anyone.” She only discusses basic everyday issues with the psychiatrist.

Lucimara got better, they said. She was living in the same boarding house as her mother, and had a rapprochement with her children and her partner. Upon her mother’s request and with her support, Lucimara and her partner rented a room in a boarding house in the same neighborhood (the one that had welcomed the family when they arrived in São Paulo and became an existential territory where their stories circulated) to resume their life together. Lucimara didn’t return to the service for approximately a year. After that, we received a call from her eldest sister, who said Lucimara was doing poorly again. She had stopped taking her medication and, after a violent fight with her partner, had left the room they had rented. The children had gone back to the aunt’s place, and Lucimara was unavailable, wandering through the streets of the Balão neighborhood.

Once again, we try to find Lucimara. I don’t go to the house I visited for seven months. Instead, I look for her on the streets she routinely walks. The bakery where her partner works is a potential meeting place, but it hasn’t worked so far. In view of our attempts to approach her, Lucimara states once again that it isn’t she who needs care but her family – that they need care and should be able to admit it instead of saying that she’s the one who needs it. I also live in the Balão neighborhood. In our last attempt to find her, along with a physician from the service, I followed her as fast as possible, dodging cars and people. Lucimara ignored our requests to meet and kept running away from us, hiding in the corners of our neighborhood.

I sometimes go by the bakery. Every now and then, I see Lucimara standing in front of the big window, with a cigarette in her hand, waiting for her partner, who may give her a little money, just as he used to, so that she can get through the day until another one arrives, bringing with him a “new” whole. The family also keeps looking for a knowledge that will promote change in this cycle. In any case, it is still the other who says, the other who can do, and without this know-how, the family asks for a new hospitalization, voluntary or not… That’s the way it is…
Scene 6: Apprehension

During the conversation with Mrs. Roberta, a CAPS user, about her life and the four years of care and treatment she received at the center, she talks about good moments and about other, not so pleasant ones. Yet when she is asked to fill out a satisfaction survey and give her opinion on the center’s departments and services, her immediate reaction is to refuse. I explain to her that it’s a very simple survey but that it’s very important for the CAPS, because it includes all the departments. It will enable us, therefore, to learn about the quality of care and what we can do to improve it. I can feel that Mrs. Roberta is uncomfortable, so I explain to her that her answers will be secret, that her opinion will be included with those of other people who will fill out the survey without mentioning any names, and that this will have no influence on her treatment – that there will be no negative consequences for her treatment as a result of the opinions she offers in the survey.

Mrs. Roberta then agrees to give her point of view about the services offered by the CAPS. Nevertheless, her apprehension about saying what she thinks about some of the departments is evident, for her comments don’t match the answers she provided in the survey. For example, when she refers to her psychiatrist, she states that she would like to have more individual sessions, even though the treatment consisted of group therapy, because she didn’t feel at ease to talk about herself. I ask her if she expressed this wish to her doctor, and she answers that she didn’t because, since the suggested treatment was group therapy, she was worried that if she asked for individual sessions the doctor would decide to discharge her because she was fine. She thus makes it very clear that she’s scared of being transferred. And she adds that here she’s getting care, and that she has “wandered around” a lot of places without finding anything similar.

I tell her that she shouldn’t be apprehensive about discussing the possibility of individual consultations with her doctor, because if she talks things through with him, they will find the right option together. I also remind her that her care is not provided only by the psychiatrist but also by other professionals, such as psychologists, therapists, and nurses. After she completes the survey, we resume our informal conversation, this time in a more relaxed way. Mrs. Roberta, feeling more at ease, tells me that she cannot complain or criticize the CAPS because, ultimately, she’s receiving care here, unlike at the UBS (Basic Health Unit) near her home, where you can’t always find a physician.

Comments

Cintia Buschinelli (SBPSP). It’s incredible how you can narrate these situations, these experiences that are so emotionally difficult in such a way that we can listen and feel, just as poetry does. Psychoanalysts have a very hard time expressing in writing what takes place in our relationship with our patients, and listening to you is a learning experience for us.

Marcelo Viñar (APU). First, I would like to reiterate my gratitude to our hosts for creating this device, which has generated such a rich debate, and for the quality of their protocols, which invite us to think, force us to think, something that doesn’t happen very often. This device was created with these scenes that mediate between the confidentiality, the privacy between providers and users, and constitutes a middle road between the intimacy of the analytic session and the transparency of the medical act performed in the amphitheater. I was very impressed by Victor
Guerra’s comments and by what Fernando Orduz calls a performance – the relationship between subjects and their belongings, and the role of objects in evoking diverse emotional situations. But, and here I will be controversial, the object of psychoanalysis is a lost object. We have learned this with the famous game with the cotton reel, the Freudian spool game. I don't know if we need to describe once again the essential steps of Freud’s great discovery, where the physical, bodily object, the mother’s body, the mother’s breast is traded for a gestural, play scene and for the appearance of language, the outside and toward me.

This leads me to a question: What is the goal of a psychotherapy with a psychotic patient? The young colleagues of this institution have compellingly shown us their ability to enter, to go deeper into the psychotic world. Is this the entire journey, or only half of it? I think that it's half the journey. We can't abandon the therapeutic problem, something that was eloquently revealed by the persevering patient who found the lost object again in the footprints he had left in the rain, and delayed and spat and remained in suspension. I call this the loss of the object because afterward language is always the expression of an infirmity. We are always in the lack of the meeting with the original object, which we will seek in vain for the rest of our lives.

I think that in the meeting with the psychotic patient there’s a tacit promise of reciprocity. I go deep into his or her world and, in doing so, like in any love relationship, the request is that the other enter my world and that I create a space where the mad person will once again inhabit a human world, because the world of psychosis is unlivable. The mad people who come to us know they have been destroyed; they know they are outside the world of rights. And we can see this in all the cases we just heard. They are outside the world where people have the right to have rights. The last one, that of Mrs. Roberta, was an excellent case in point. Then, what we must do to avoid the slide toward assistentialism and charity is create a responsibility in these situations in which psychotic people lose the ability to take care of themselves. I think that in the therapeutic work you’re doing, it is critical to go beyond assistentialism and create a reciprocal space.

**Victor Guerra (APU).** Freud inevitably came to mind when you were presenting, because he said that his case histories were novels rather than medical records, novels rather than cases. Your stories have this experiential facet; they show a special way of narrating, like that marvelous phrase on the relevance of the neighborhood in these times, when we are losing contact with the street: “The neighborhood is the existential territory where stories circulate.” And you circulate through the neighborhood, walking with the patients, with their pain, their anxieties, their persecutions, attempting to generate a meeting. In Scene Two the threat of rain hastens the steps of both patient and therapist. The rain is the threat. And this patient insists on touching his mark on the floor with his fingertips. Ferreira Gullar, a wonderful poet, speaks of a painting of a vase with yellow flowers that seem to explode in the air, and the poem says: “I know that if I touched / with my hand that corner of the painting / where a yellow is burning / I would burn in it / or would forever stain my fingertips / with delirium.” That’s what empathy is: entering into a painting and perceiving it with the senses, working with the patient and keeping a little bit of delirium on our fingertips. It doesn't sound that nice, but it's good to keep some of that on your fingers.

**Marcelo Viñar (APU).** Was Fernando's performance psychotic? No, because it had words. The distance between Fernando and his objects is different from the distance between psychotic patients and their objects, which are a constituting part of their very bodies.
Elizabeth Coimbra (SBPSP). I'm quite shaken right now because I realize that I got in touch with my own history as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. If I could summarize some points that called my attention, I would talk about time and space phenomena, not only inside me but also in the stories. I realized I took shelter between two parts of my history – my psychiatric and my psychoanalytic work. I had an experience as a psychiatrist in the 1970s in which the issue was “the anti-asylum struggle,” which we continue today with you. That experience involved some developments that led the CRM (Regional Medical Council) to prosecute a group of colleagues, I among them. Curiously, not only was my group finally acquitted, but the CRM called the owners of the psychiatric hospital that sued us and accused them of commodifying psychiatry. Yet I had the great opportunity of working in a therapeutic community with young psychology students. And I, a psychiatrist fresh out of a traditional psychiatry school, learned everything from the young people. They knew what it was like to be next to the patients, what it was like to stay with the children, what to talk to them about. And I didn't know. I only had psychiatric knowledge, the power of medical knowledge. I didn't have that familiarity with patients' intimacy that you described so wonderfully. Neither did I have resources as a psychiatrist, at that time, to tolerate the shocks you suffer in the intimacy of life with psychotic patients. The matter of space… you described very interesting experiences concerning how psychotic patients understand the time and space in which they live. Like me, here. I didn't know to what time or space these stories were taking me.

Bernardo Tanis (SBPSP). I realize something strikes me because of the number of associations it provokes. The main issue in psychoanalytic writing is its evocative potential, something that traverses the writer and resonates with the reader. I think that you and your texts achieved that. In the fifth scene, I wondered if the writing form could have something to do with the patient. For the object to be lost, it has to have been found first. If the object isn't found, if it isn't imaginarily, hallucinatorily constructed, it can never become a lost object. And Lucimara “was the last one to arrive,” they say, “that's why she got bitter about our mother.” And what does she do? Something paradoxical. If she couldn't be found back then, she'll do everything in her power not to be found now. And since they couldn't find her, they created a story that would tell us about her. I found Lucimara in her story. We often do something of that sort with psychotic patients – as if we had to build, paradoxically, what was not built. The first scene seems to bring something of the object that cannot be lost but can't be built or dreamed either. There is no space; there is no birth of the object. As such, therefore, the object cannot be lost. Then, I think that both by way of the evocative potential of writing and by way of the object, we make progress in our care for these patients.

Maren Ulriksen de Viñar (APU). First, I would like to thank the group because their stories took me back to the work of my youth, to the possibility to reach the home, to reach the people who won't seek help by themselves or can't tolerate the psychiatric hospital. Generally speaking, psychiatric hospitals are quite violent for people. And I think that this form of care you offer is ground-breaking. I am a child psychiatrist, a teacher of child psychiatrists, and a psychoanalyst. And I think that this form of care changes the way we think, because it's not the same thing to see patients at the hospital, located far away from their home, where we have no more contact with them than the consultation time and we don't know if we actually understood them. Neither does the hospital consultation give us enough time to un-
understand how patients live or what their family is like. Your initiative, then, which I asked if it’s being carried out nationwide and was told it is, is highly significant. I think that the advantage of this interdisciplinary team is also that there are team meetings that make it possible to work further, to understand the patient better, obviously, a patient who needs motivation.

Fernando Orduz (SoCoIPsi). There is something that is addressed in Scenes 4 and 5 – the issue of the double. In both texts we hear about a double bed, a double place. And in that double, Rafael appears with his mother, and Lucimara with hers. In Scene 4 Rafael steps on his mother’s footprints. I think of both Lucimara and Rafael as if they were subjects who could not separate from the mother’s body and were still inhabiting it – as if my history were tied to the filiation of my mother’s history. I think of the Lacanian concept of the name of the father, which would be the last name, but not as last name but as history, an inherited history, in relation to the case of which you spoke in the first section, about inheritances that prevent individuals from becoming subjects, that is, from being themselves. Instead, these individuals end up repeating, reiterating the parents’ history. But a question comes to mind, and I say “but” because it seems to me that in both cases, Rafael’s and Lucimara’s, the patients continue to reside in the mother’s body. Was this type of link with the mother’s body undone? Given the ending of the accounts, my answer would be, no. It seems that the therapy did not achieve this desubjectivation. And I wonder why. I don’t know if it has to do with Marcelo’s denunciation, that perhaps we remain within the play of the patients’ concrete thinking and are unable to break with this concrete element established by them.

The other thing I wanted to say is addressed to my colleagues. Víctor, I’ve been wondering for a long time if you introduce poetry in your interventions with your patients, because when you recite a poem you provide a very interesting symbolic clarity. And I connect this with something I saw when we were walking into the clinic. I went into the music therapy room, and the young woman working there said to me, “I try to find each person’s sound.” And I was struck by this in connection with what you told us, because if I make the mother’s sound, I don’t allow the patient to find his or her individuality. If I find the sound, I argued with her, “What sound? Words have meaning and sound. What do you look for?” And she answered, “I look for both, I look for the sound, the musicality of the words, and also for their meaning.” And I wonder if we don’t often lose the musicality of languages because we are lost in theoretical meanings. That’s why I wanted to go back to Víctor’s intervention, because when Víctor starts to make poetry, he attaches a different tonality to words. I think that meaning always happens between two, between two poles – between what is present, what has been found, and what is absent. I remember a phrase from In Praise for Shadows, by Tanizaki, that says that for music to exist, there must be silence. In other words, musicality stems from both sound and silence. I think, therefore, that we must search for the rhythmic element. I think that this element lies between presence and absence.

References
Invisible Cities
Few Latin American cities deserve to be called invisible cities as much as Lima. Maybe Mexico City is our sister city. The ruins of the Pachacamac dominion are spread throughout Lima, but rarely do people see them. They are the *huacas*. These archeological remains have been ignored by most of the city’s residents for centuries. I myself have ridden my bicycle through a *huaca*, the beautiful Huallamarca, located near my school as if I had been traveling through an abandoned course for the recreation of the neighborhood’s teenagers, unaware that this pyramid, so auspicious for our reckless cyclist tricks, belonged to the same era as the origins of Christianity and had successively been a temple (in the Hualla era), a cemetery, and an Incan village. A sign of the times: the best known *huaca* among all those that crisscross the city like a secret thread of some Inca khipu is the Pucllana *Huaca*. It is marvelously preserved in the well-to-do district of Miraflores (where I live and work, like many other psychoanalysts) thanks to an agreement with a high-end restaurant that is very well known in the city.

In other words, the *huaca* that is well known is actually a restaurant that was established inside the walled enclosure due to the impetus of the thriving Peruvian cuisine. However, it would be unfair to overlook the fact that thanks to this agreement with the private sector, the enclosure receives many visi-

* Peruvian Psychoanalytic Society.
Lima: A concealed city

Nor is it, altogether, the remembrance of her cathedral-toppling earthquakes; nor the stampedes of her frantic seas; nor the tearlessness of arid skies that never rain; nor the sight of her wide field of leaning spires, wrenched copestones, and crosses all adroop (like canted yards of anchored fleets); and her suburban avenues of house-walls lying over upon each other, as a tossed pack of cards; - it is not these things alone which make tearless Lima, the strangest, saddest city thou canst see. For Lima has taken the white veil; and there is a higher horror in this whiteness of her woe. Old as Pizarro, this whiteness keeps her ruins forever new; admits not the cheerful greenness of complete decay; spreads over her broken ramparts the rigid pallor of an apoplexy that fixes its own distortions. (Melville, 1851, p. 191)

Lima has taken the white veil, says Melville, and there is a higher horror in that whiteness that defines her tribulations. And while the New York writer traces back the history of the old viceroyalty capital to its foundation by Francisco Pizarro, in his allusions to that whiteness that keeps Lima’s ruins always new, to its broken ramparts and its apoplexy, I think I can discern the penetrating gaze of the writer, which unwittingly sees beyond the distortions of the colonial order. We know that the white, tearless Lima, permeated by horror and canted anchored fleets, can be read as one of the many images of the whale obsessing Ahab or, in a more prosaic, literal reading, as the effect of the lack of rain and colors in Peru’s melancholy capital. Yet I think Melville’s poetic intuition overcomes these obstacles and penetrates the macular degeneration of my city. Just as Lima lived for centuries with her back to the sea and its cliffs, so does it continue to negate its origins and history, as though it all had indeed started in 1535 with the arrival of Pizarro and the conquistadors.

What was set in motion with the foundation of Lima in the sixteenth century was a hierarchical order that has mutated over time. In each of its variants, it has required diverse combinations of mental mechanisms both at the social and at the individual levels, combinations generated by the cultural production of individuals in each of those historical stages. Mario Vargas Llosa speaks about this issue in what is perhaps the most celebrated
of his passages. I am referring to the striking beginning of his great novel *Conversation in the Cathedral*:

> From the doorway of *La Crónica* Santiago looks at the Avenida Tacna without love: cars, uneven and faded buildings, the gaudy skeletons of posters floating in the mist, the gray midday. At what precise moment had Peru fucked itself? The newsboys weave in and out among the vehicles halted by the red light on Wilson, hawking the afternoon papers, and he starts to walk slowly toward Colmena. His hands in his pockets, head down, he goes along escorted by people who are also going in the direction of the Plaza San Martín. He was like Peru, Zavalita was, he’d fucked himself up somewhere along the line. He thinks: when? (Vargas Llosa, 1969/2005).

Yes: At what precise moment had Zavalita fucked himself, Lima fucked herself, Peru fucked itself? This question underlies the thesis of this text I wrote for *Calibán’s Invisible Cities* section. My hypothesis, which resumes the one I formulated elsewhere (Bruce, 2014), is that the construction of the Creole order required that the indigenous world be rendered invisible and the foreign origin be extolled. And here foreign does not mean just from a different country (Ecuadorean or Bolivian, for instance, would not fit into this definition) but, more specifically, from Europe and the US or any of their variants, like Canada or Australia. Anything except indigenous or black.

The Peruvian sociologist Gonzalo Porto-carrero expresses this idea as follows in his book *La urgencia por decir “nosotros”* [*The Urgency to Say “We”*]:

> Before, Creoleness and indigenousness are like chalk and cheese. Indeed, Creoleness is identified as a local reality defined on the basis of its foreign origin. Therefore, reiterating the Creole name means reaffirming a vow, that is, remembering and vindicating that foreign origin as the basis of one’s identity and self-esteem. Consequently, being Creole implies detaching oneself from indigenousness, devaluing it, and yearning for a whitening process – for a utopian blending...
with the European origin, with the father. Extending Creoleness to encompass the world of mestizaje, then, involves assuming an ethnocidal vocation toward the indigenous world. While redeemable, indigenous inhabitants were valued as abject beings that must assimilate to Creole culture. (Portocarrero, 2015, p. 83)

The acculturation project, however, was not successful, as attested by the survival of huacas in different parts of the city. Rather, since the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors, the so-called Indians responded to the greed with which the Spaniards plundered these monuments with a trick. Since the coast huacas were often used as tombs for the ayllu (community) personages, who were buried with their jewels and riches, the Spaniards disinterred them to take the gold and silver. As chronicler Antonio de Alcedo (1789/1815) relates,

The Indians, in order to deceive them, made frequent mounds of the like nature, without putting into them either gold or silver. Finding themselves thus deceived and impoverished, with pulling down the empty mounds, the Spaniards were compelled to abandon their pursuit. Some, however, were so fortunate as to enrich themselves by this means. (Alcedo, 1815, Vol. V, p. 53)

The resistance against the colonizing process was always there, and still is, but concealed. This ambiguity is one of the main features of the spirit of Lima’s people across the hierarchical order, and is one of the signs of our identity that subverts such order. It is common for us, used to communicate with diminutives and all sorts of softening terms, to feel slightly shocked by the brusqueness of present-day Porteños [people from Buenos Aires] or Spaniards. As the architect and humorist Héctor Velarde used to say, our style is neither to close the door nor to leave it open; we leave it ajar (and Lima psychoanalysts verify this every day in our consulting rooms). This behavior tends to exasperate foreigners living in Lima (even the Bolivians and Ecuadorians I mentioned earlier), because it is often hard to ascertain whether the person who is kindly offering to return your call will actually do so.

Unbeknownst to most people from Lima, such calculated vagueness (“we’ll talk,” “see you soon,” “I’ll let you know,” and so on) is part of the old resistance against the trauma of the conquest, as Max Hernández accurately calls it. The Peruvian historian Pablo Macera, quoted by Gonzalo Portocarrero (2015, p. 40), explains it in the following terms: “Peru is a stealthy country that has always made faces behind its master’s back, whether that master was Chavin, Wari, Inca, Spanish, Gringo, Creole, or Mestizo, turning each apparent courteous gesture into an insult.”

Lima psychoanalysts, largely living in the better-off neighborhoods of the city, such as Miraflores, San Isidro, Barranco, or Surco (as is the case in all the Latin American cities I have visited during institutional conferences), work, paraphrasing Borges (1989) in his Milonga of Albornoz, as if we did not care (we should not forget the key role of “as if” in psychoanalysis). Well-tempered clinical practice serves as a wall against those barbarian invasions, the product of migrations from the countryside to the city, that relentlessly disfigure the face of the city, a process that infu-
irates traditional Creoles. Yet it is a useless effort. We are already witnessing a fourth generation of Andean migrants, who have made Lima into the city with the largest number of Quechua-speaking residents in Peru. If the word province comes from pro vinc, where the vanquished reside, then they are here to stay; Lima is both the capital city and the first province of Peru.

Gradually, furthermore, Quechua-speaking residents are knocking on the door of our consulting rooms in the most distinguished neighborhoods [in the sense Pierre Bourdieu (1984/1979) gave to the word distinction, that is, as an eminently differentiating act of the dominant classes over the subaltern classes]. In this way, patients from the so-called emerging sectors, whose grandparents and great-grandparents left the Andes fields to forge themselves a different destiny in the over-populated capital city, have attained a higher education and acquired a more modern, sophisticated urban culture. Then, some of them increasingly feel the need to resort to psychoanalysis. The dialectic of domination and resistance is thus stealthily perpetuated (just as, while our constitution banishes discrimination, and racism in particular, we see it happen every day). Psychoanalysts find ourselves in one of those crossroads of the maze postulated by Castoriadis. Can we continue to ignore the concealed huacas of our polis?

Since the first issue of Calibán, published in 2012, we have asked the question about the ways in which this situation has changed our practice and whether we see something of the “polis” in our cities (Labraga de Mirza, 2012). In this Lima that, like the covered women of the colony, is wrapped in the white veil that scared Melville, I opt for the stubborn purpose of that resistance, which I wish were less concealed and more straightforward. In other words, if we insist on preventing our clinical practice from become permeated by that buried history, as in Freud’s illuminating archeological metaphor, if we remain wrapped in the cloak of cultural neutrality, we are resigning ourselves to ignoring the faces and grooves of the unconscious. Willingly or not, knowingly or not, Peruvian psychoanalysts are respon-

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**References**


From Memory
There are meetings that promote the emergence of wider horizons, stimulating discoveries, and new perspectives in each person’s path. That’s what my meeting with Silvia Bleichmar was like.

It was the early 1990s. I traveled to Buenos Aires to invite Silvia Bleichmar on behalf of the Psychoanalytic Training Department of the Sedes Sapientiae Institute. We wanted her to come to São Paulo as keynote speaker. We agreed to meet at her place in the late morning to talk about her visit. I was expecting a quick meeting with clearly outlined goals. Yet things do not always happen as we envision them. It was not a for-
mal meeting, and much less quick and to the point. We reviewed the details of her visit to São Paulo, and our conversation became longer and longer. Silvia asked me to lunch. We talked about psychoanalysis, of course, but also about life, about our histories, our exiles, our political conviction, our politics. We agreed on so many things! On that occasion she gave me a copy of her book *La fundación de lo inconsciente* [The Foundation of the Unconscious] (Bleichmar, 1993) with the following inscription: “For Cristina, with affection and the hope we’ll have other chances to meet in the future.”

Indeed, it was the first of many very productive meetings and the forerunner of a lasting friendship. Her lecture in São Paulo was titled “The Heterogeneity of the Unconscious.” I remember the astonishment and the strong impression it caused in many of us. It challenged our notion of primary repression as a mythical, foundational moment for the psychic apparatus. With her usual clarity, and articulating her ideas with truly enviable speed, she transmitted to us her concept of primary repression, which was part of a dynamic and productive metapsychology. Far from seeing it as an original, mythical time, she considered that it could be traced back to individuals’ structuring moments and transferred to the session, where it could be examined in the analytic situation and, therefore, could be the object of interventions and interpretations.

Silvia Bleichmar was brilliant and daring in her theorizations, but her brilliance was even greater in her clinical practice. The analytic meeting was always permeated with enthusiasm, respect, and a particular concern. If something captured the attention of her audience, it was her constant use of examples from her own practice, which made it possible to see how her concepts worked and operated in the analytic session. It was an active clinical practice, a practice that talked to us from the perspective of suffering, a practice that mobilized both patient and analyst.

The same strength with which Silvia fought in her life she applied to her work. When I say *fight*, I’m using the word in a broad sense: political, personal, and psychoanalytic fight. Could we call this passion? Perhaps… Then we should venture to say that she was passionate about knowledge and about its transmission, that she was passionate about life, and that she was generous with her ideas. That is how I formed a group in São Paulo to study her thought and “put it to work.”

It is not easy to make new friends when one has reached a certain stage in life. We become more and more demanding in our choices. Yet our shared intellectual work strengthened and consolidated the space of personal friendship. We traveled to London together to participate in the Jean Laplanche colloquium, and to Porto Alegre when Laplanche came to Brazil. During these trips, besides psychoanalytic work, we shared the touristic, gourmet aspect. A funny Indian food anecdote in London: our eyes were full of tears from the spices and the laughs. Silvia had a great sense of humor. What a pity that many of our planned trips were never realized!

We did not coincide in our choice of soccer teams; she was a fervent Boca Juniors fan. Even in her classes she mentioned Boca’s victories, as well as Zidane’s suspension from the World Cup. These comments, however, were tailored to psychoanalytic issues. For instance, she discussed Zidane’s behavior as a process of abrupt discharge in the face of the dismantling of subjectivity and identity caused by his rival’s insult.¹ I also recall an article on Pelé and Maradona written for a Mexican publication. She really loved soccer!

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¹ In the 2006 World Cup, the French soccer player Zinedine Zidane was expelled from the game because the line judge saw him head-but the Italian player Marco Materazzi. Zidane attacked Materazzi because the Italian player insulted Zidane’s sister. (T. N.)
I had the privilege of participating in the seminars Silvia Bleichmar taught every year in Buenos Aires; she generously made room for me in the coordinator group. In addition, based on my familiarity and involvement with her work, I started the hard and daring task of translating, along with Homero Vettorazzo and Alicia Brasilheiro de Mello, a book that had deeply influenced our clinical work. As a result, Clínica psicoanalítica y neogénesis [Psychoanalytic Clinical Practice and Neogenesis] (Bleichmar, 2000) was published in Brazil. It was an unparalleled experience, because we were able to discuss and improve the translation with her. As Silvia says in the prologue to the Brazilian edition, “a translation is not simply a transposition from one language to the other; it is the retranscription of an order of pertinence that is structurally different. Such a work demands a great effort so that the concepts the translators aim to capture will open in their full dimension, something both author and reader deserve” (Bleichmar, 2005, p. 14).

It is very moving for me to reread the dedication she wrote to me in this book: “For Cristina, with whom I share friendship and History, with my deepest gratitude, which developed throughout the time we worked and fought together, giving our best. With all my love, November 2005.” And thus, in a process of appropriation and metabasis, this entire exchange created resonances that have enabled me to reorganize my own questions from new angles and generate new perspectives for psychoanalytic listening and thought. Thanks so much, Silvia, for this great legacy!

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In the early 1990s an Argentine psychoanalyst, an activist and a member of the Argentine intelligentsia, came to the Sedes Sapientiae Institute. It was an event held at our Psychoanalytic Training Department. We invited Silvia Bleichmar to a meeting and asked her to speak about the heterogeneity of the unconscious. I had the pleasure of introducing her. I opened the meeting by reading her impressive curriculum vitae in front of a full auditorium. I could have never imagined what this event would set in motion. Silvia Bleichmar spoke for two hours about metapsychology, representations, and the status of originary representations. The topic would have been difficult had it not been for Silvia’s enthusiasm and the examples drawn from her vast clinical experience. I can assert that she never looked at any notes. Theory and practice were so well integrated, that we followed her with great interest. In the afternoon, a smaller group discussed clinical cases with her. We thus had the privilege of witnessing the development of her clinical thinking and listening. As she said herself, an analyst creates haute couture rather than ready-to-wear products.

In fact, it was an event. Silvia infected us with her enthusiasm, the rigor of her approach, and her closeness to her patients. Like an opening door, she revived in us the desire to travel with her through psychoanalysis. That night she returned to Buenos Aires. Sometime later we flew there for the Colloquium on Silvia Bleichmar’s Thought. We found groups of analysts from Buenos Aires, Rosario, Córdoba, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. And Silvia received us with Mexican food! She was an excellent cook and enjoyed cooking; she prepared her dishes with the same care and earnestness she devoted to her intellectual work. Her guacamole tacos and the aroma of Mexican seasonings evidenced her love for Mexico, as did the countless clay figures and Mexican paintings, which attested to an important time in her life.

Immediately after, two friends and colleagues from Sedes, Cristina Perdomo and Alicia Brasileiro de Mello, decided to form a working group to study Silvia Bleichmar's ideas. In this way, we began a long, fruitful, and enriching exchange that lasted until her advanced illness prevented her from traveling. I shared that period with a brave woman who fought for her ideals, which she had sustained since her adolescence. She wanted to promote change so that the world would be less unfair.
and unequal. In the effervescent Argentina of the early 1970s, young people were ready to carry out the project of a better world and shared the dream of making the world worthier. Silvia was one of them. Their dream failed, and her fight led to her exile in 1976. Mexico received her with open arms.

That is how this country entered her life and remained in her heart. She was grateful for the hospitality, the new friends, and, above all, the fantastic work she carried out with her husband, Carlos Schenquerman, also a psychoanalyst, with the victims of the earthquake that ravaged Mexico in September 1985. She was an activist, and she contributed her intellectual resources to a joint effort in the public realm. Our Latin America, so outrageously unequal, hurt her to the core.

Back in her own country, she took on a combative position and wrote *Dolor País* [Country Pain] (Bleichmar, 2002), whose title parodies the financial term “country risk” (*riesgo país*). It was her way of showing anger. We should also recall that she got involved in the care of those affected by the attack against the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Her Mexican experience enabled her to carry out an unequalled work at a painful time for her country.

And Silvia, the avid reader? She nourished her thoughts with the writings of a variety of authors, from the paleontologist Stephen Gould to Sartre and Cortázar. The pleasure she found in reading was infectious. She was also an inveterate movie goer. Her classes abounded in references to movies or literary texts. She always had time. She knew life wasn’t long, and hence took advantage of every minute. She didn’t know, however, that hers would be so short. We feel her loss very strongly. We shall miss her.

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By Marcelo Izaguirre
Buenos Aires: Catálogos, 2009

This is a meticulous, comprehensive study of the establishment, development, and consolidation of Lacanian practice in Argentina. It is an essential contribution to the history of psychoanalysis and, at the same time, a map that clearly shows the tracks left by the manifold institutions inspired by Lacan. The relationship between psychoanalysis and academia and the controversial existence of psychoanalysis during the 1976-1983 dictatorship find a place in its pages. (Jean Marc Tauszik)

Clínica psicoanalítica y neogénesis
By Silvia Bleichmar
Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 2000

This book is based on the seminars that Silvia Bleichmar taught every year in Buenos Aires, hence its informal tone. It is a “clinical” text in which the vast and interesting clinical experience of the author goes hand in hand with her theoretical ideas. Clinical practice is called into question from the perspective of metapsychology, and the questions formulated open new paths for the readers to “think themselves/ of themselves” in their own clinical work. We can follow Bleichmar’s thinking and clearly see how she developed her ideas and her own metapsychology in the conjunction between clinical experience and theory. Concepts such as transferring narcissism and neogenesis take shape and acquire relevance in her thinking and in the process of the cure. She formulates and “puts to work” the notion of neogenesis, whereby analytic intervention is not limited to the retrieval of what already exists/the repressed but is directed toward a new symbolization, toward the creation of new modes of representational production. It is a stimulating, creative, and daring text – an invitation to think. (Cristina Perdomo)
We are being summoned to witness and rethink, along with the authors, the special drama of the body in psychoanalysis. We will participate as spectators in an alternating interplay of images and voices. Some were delineated by the embodied outlines of subjects who suffer from psychosomatic disorders, severe somatosis, marks on the body; others emerged from the clinical encounter, where the silent echoes of trauma find words; and yet others were produced by a group of professionals who research into and work clinically and conceptually with the body in the analytic scene. The developments discussed in El cuerpo en escena start from the idea that various psychic modes of functioning coexist. That is why we can see the emergence of different psychic mechanisms and resources in each of the stories told. If readers decide to accept the authors’ invitation to reflect, they will likely be moved by the embodiment of this analytic scene that takes shape in the mise-en-scène revealed through the pages of this book. (Prologue by Norberto Marucco)

This project, implemented in Montevideo, Uruguay, emerges in tune with the Itapeva CAPS (Center for Psychosocial Care) initiative, conducted in São Paulo and recounted in the Outside the Walls section. In Ciprés, a group of psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, and specialists from different disciplines have run a mental health rehabilitation space for several years. “Those who are brave enough to delve into this book may discover the pleasure of wanting this oceanic, diverse encounter with the human mind to last forever.” That is how the eighteen authors of this book, members of the Ciprés Workshops, who are able to transform human conflicts and severe psychic suffering into writing, drawings, colors, and music, summon their readers. “Art belongs to everyone and is for everyone,” sings the polychromy that traverses each of these pages. This art faces madness; it is a “light in the dark,” creates “a world as fascinating as it is nightmarish,” and makes it possible “not to stop dreaming [...] and to be able, someday, to write a story that has characters, a plot. And much more.” A living web that is much more. (Susana Poch, general coordinator, Workshop Area)

We know little about what happens between the sky and the earth. In the Atacama Desert, in contrast with the aridity of the soil, a transparent sky full of stars attracts astronomers worldwide who are looking for clues to the origin of life. The soil and the sky of this desert have something in common: the calcium of the stars contained in the tiny particles of human bones found in the soil by the relatives of those who disappeared during the Chilean dictatorship. The documentary addresses this mystery lurking between the soil that nurtures us and the sky above us. Nostalgia for the Light was created by Patricio Guzmán, a Chilean filmmaker. The sad stories of Latin American reality that are dreamily told in it confirm Shakespeare’s phrase: “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy” — or than our imagination can tolerate. (Raya Angel Zonana)
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