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235 Logbook
In September 2014, we started a new management of the Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies of Latin America. A main objective of our task is the integration of our societies, as we expressed in the work platform submitted in Buenos Aires Congress: “FEPAL is that institutionalism that enables the crossing and exchange of diversities (local, regional, individual). It is a sort of external body (exoskeleton) where the identity as analysts, the identity as a local or regional association comes into question, dialogue, interaction, with other alter identities (which alternate or alterate us)”.

Our federation is a territory that gathers nine countries in Latin America. From the southernmost to the northernmost point of our fepalinic space there are 8192 kilometres, and the names of both points start with the word in Spanish “monte”. From Monterrey to Montevideo we have two languages, three or four races which have miscegenated, territories where colonialism has devastated all the ancestors, and others where the magic of syncretism has created a new form of Latin complexion. In our societies, we configure fraticidal struggles, we fight and distance one another, then we seek new forms of integration. Our way of thinking and acting has been woven by all these elements which have emerged from disruption, displacement and exchanges.

The word “text” derives from Latin texere, which means weaving, intertwining. This idea is one of the most important tasks of our work as a federation: weaving and intertwining various thoughts with that other who is spatially far away. Federating, communicating involves building an interface that allows a dialogicity and interactivity of the various tensions that inhabit us in this vast territory. Due to that fact, words become the tool which gradually enables that exchange and transformation.
Carried by Hermes, Chasquis, real or virtual messengers, words are treasured to cross borders, to pass on our existence to those who live beyond the limit of our fences. Our understandings of the world seek to cross boundaries in which our languages begin to blur. *Calibán* should work as that messenger who operationalise communication. The Latin American journal is the tool which represents this exchange function among our associations.

In a world of faster and faster changes, the written word seeks materials which allow it to adapt and survive. Just like at some point in history we turned from papyrus to parchment, today we see transformation, the passage from paper to virtuality. Just like from the quill and ink we turned to typography, we have gradually turned from the *rasorium* (razor which erased letters in the Middle Ages) to the “delete” key in the hypertextual keyboard. From stone engraving to the virtual cloud; memory struggles against the oblivion we will be.

This issue of *Calibán* which we are presenting is the bet to extend the limits of our thoughts into other territories, spatial as well as material: it is the first issue of *Calibán* in English and, besides, the first version of an online *Calibán*.

The relationship that Walter Benjamin established between the words “translation” and “traitor” has been mentioned many times, but in this case the relationship would be with the idea of transporting, crossing the boundaries that the difference between languages imposes on the transmission of ideas and representations. Within this order of verbal and visual transformations, this *Calibán* seeks a new format: virtuality. Will the lovers of words treasured in pages, which time will turn yellow, resist the transformation from material support into virtuality?

FEPAL Executive Committee  
Fernando Orduz  
President
Stating, a hundred years after the invention of psychoanalysis –and as Freud, Winnicott or Lacan have already stated–, that artists are always ahead of us is a commonplace. However, a truth nests there. Thus, when we summon for each issue of *Calibán* renowned artists to join us, we do not recruit them as illustrators of our ideas, nor are we guided by a sheer aesthetic zeal: we look for them so that they help us imagine the future.

From the cover, a fluorescent bunny looks at the reader, as an enigmatic sphinx. It is not a designer’s trick or a childhood prank but an artist’s work. Eduardo Kac, from Rio de Janeiro, invented Alba when he proposed to use the genes that make jellyfish fluorescent in order to intervene the bunny’s DNA, thus laying the foundations for transgenic art.

That bunny, in which enigma and magic blend, or even fertility, is –as we all are in Latin America– a result of a miscegenation. Alba is mestiza beyond the habitual racial or geographic coordinates that distinguish the infinite tones between black and white. Alba is tinged with the mystery of what is to come; she is future’s mestiza.

It is the future that we are trying to imagine in this issue of *Calibán*, drawing from the thought-provoking conference that Luiz Alberto Oliveira gave in Rio de Janeiro, when we introduced the journal last year, and that we are including now in the section *The Foreigner*. It is also the future the place from which we wish to think the analyst’s tools –the theme of the 49th IPA Congress in Boston and on which we focus in the section *Arguments*.

We analysts love tradition. We have a profession that pays homage to its pioneers like few others and, even when we aim to be on a par with the times we live in, we usually prefer reading the classics. There is perhaps a healthy anachronism in our profession, but the future colonises us in an insidious and inevitable way. Like Kac’s lagoglyphs, those pictograms that overflow the book flaps and invade the inside part of this issue of *Calibán*, which force us to think not only in terms of faithfulness to our origins but also imagining the future.
The other’s language

Since the first issue of Calibán we have published in our Latin American languages: Portuguese and Spanish. We say “our” without ignoring that they are the Iberian languages, the languages of colonisation and conquest. But they are not only European languages, but also the inflection they have received when coming across native and immigrant languages, in its anthropophagic appropriation, in the smuggling of expressions from around the world which have found shelter in our way of speaking and listening. Also in our way of telling psychoanalysis.

After babbling in Spanish and Portuguese, we dare –“daring” is one of the meanings of the cannibal which Calibán ultimately is – to do it in English.

For the first time in the history of FEPAL, we are publishing in three languages at the same time. And this, apart from entailing a significant effort for a great group of people, has intentions and consequences. Political as well as epistemic ones. Caliban returns to English. His name appeared for the first time in that language, among the characters of Shakespeare’s The tempest. In it, Caliban is that who can never speak Prospero’s language correctly; that who is barely able to babble.

Our publication, by starting to be called in English, stops being just an instrument to read us among Latin Americans and is also offered to be read by others. The translation into what is the lingua franca of our days – as Greek could have been and perhaps Mandarin will be – will enable our ideas and our way of articulating them to be known abroad.

But that is not all: just as the passage into Spanish and Portuguese implies a different way of telling and thinking psychoanalysis, the translation into English carries the intention to undermine the other’s language, to make it incomplete. We conceive the source text as a projectile, and the target text as a target, in which, rather than restoring a meaning in another language –the translator’s traditional choice–, it is about disorienting that other language, as Foucault proposes. We intend that Caliban’s return to English will not be without consequences.

Deleuze & Guattari have talked –in relation to Kafka– about the place taken by minor languages. Their role is to deterritorialise the major ones, to introduce a certain “coefficient of underdevelopment” into them. By contaminating them, they fertilise them.

That is what we also intend to do with our own psychoanalysis, which from now on we tell –still with the awkwardness of that who learns a new language– also in English. Not only to tell it again for it to be read in the metropolises of knowledge. Not only to take contents from one continent to another through that new idiomatic vehicle. Also to tell it in another language in order to listen to ourselves in a different way, to think us again from that strange place. Since what is implied in a new translation is not the assimilation of one language or another, but “to make both languages foreign to themselves”.

Foreignness is present in this issue not only in the languages in which we publish, but also in its contents: the section Vortex hosts a discussion –with voices from Asia, America and Europe– regarding translation in psychoanalysis. There, the political consequences of the act of translating find a place –in which choosing

a word can certainly determine a way of practising psychoanalysis—, some vicis-
situdes of Freud's translation into the Anglo Saxon, French and Latin American
traditions, and, last but not least, the way in which translation itself as an act is
thought in different contexts.

In Textual we have interviewed a great English-speaking writer, Siri Hustvedt.
Her passion for psychoanalysis, experienced with the clearness of outsiders, sup-
ports what she entrusts us about that strange form of intimacy we practise daily.

Calibán’s fate is to be a foreigner, so distant from the blood and land references,
which have marked many geographies, as well as from acclaimed analytic genealo-
gies. But this foreigner practises our strange profession in Latin America.

This issue’s Dossier is devoted to explore something that we have been doing in
one way or another since the launch of the journal: to think Latin America without
chauvinisms or provincial spirit. In that section we do it with the incentive of essa-
yists who work outside the psychoanalytic field.

Other two sections, By Heart and Classic & Modern, deal with the recovery of
nomadic psychoanalysts, cultural mestizos: Emilio Rodrigué, who left his mark in
Buenos Aires, London or Salvador, and Ignacio Matte-Blanco, who started his path
in Santiago de Chile to finish it in Rome. This issue is completed by a chronicle
about Porto Alegre in Invisible Cities, and a Logbook of the issue.

It is difficult to imagine the reader of these words: he can read them in Spanish,
in Portuguese or in English. He can read them on the ephemeral and quick sur-
face of the screen or in the sensual encounter with paper, since Calibán is mestiza
also in that sense: analogue and digital, it takes part in the speed of the future and
claims a physical place in bookshelves. It inhabits virtual reality and also the other
one, that of “flesh and blood”. Each time we send final files to be printed, we are
in the same place as Eduardo Kac when, in one of his avant-garde projects called
Genesis, created the model of a bacteria in his computer, sent it via e-mail to a labo-
ratory for it to be synthesized and then sent back in a physical form.

This mestiza journal is edited by a mestizo team, which takes difference and
the wisdom of blends as one of the basis of its effectiveness. I am proud of coor-
dinating this team who learns issue after issue, who makes efforts and fails, but
who passionately strives to produce a journal which, like Alba the bunny, glows
in the darkness.

Mariano Horenstein
Chief Editor - Calibán -RLP
Dilemmas and openings about dreaming.
Reflections about a child who dreams during session¹

Some considerations about dreams

Dreams have been one of the foundational pillars of psychoanalytic theory and there is a myriad of authors who have studied them and many texts have been written about them. At its initial stages, the Freudian theory of dreaming—the classical psychoanalytic perspective—held that the dream that the patient describes, that is, the manifest dream, would be the result of a process of “dream work”, in which the patient activates several intrapsychic mechanisms (displacement, condensation, symbolism, repression, etcetera) through which its original content is distorted, that is, of the latent dream. In accordance with these approaches, the therapist’s clinical performance should be directed into an interpretative task of “translation”, which would consist of retracing the path followed by the patient in order to go from the manifest dream to the latent one, which would be truly significant in the therapeutic process.

Contemporary authors have questioned the classical Freudian theory and have suggested that that perspective of “dream translation” runs the risk of becoming a search for dead codes. That is how, since half of the 20th century, several theoretical psychoanalytic orientations have found a point of confluence different from that suggested by Freud. Their common element is to give the manifest dream the position of true dream (Lichtenberg, Lachmann and Fosshage, Bucci, Bion, Matte-Blanco², in Jiménez, 2012). Therefore, these authors do not support the idea that the therapeutic action requires to translate the dream, as if both forms—latent dream and manifest dream—constituted two languages inscribed in a binary system, conscious and unconscious. They hold, rather, that it is about several ways of experimenting, perceiving and metabolising the multidimensionality of

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¹ Child and Adolescent FEPAL Psychoanalysis Award.
² We must remember that it was Ignacio Matte-Blanco who early reconsidered Freud’s theory of the unconscious, in view of discriminating the various types of the unconscious (grouped by Freud in “Primary Process”).
Dilemmas and openings about dreaming. Reflections about a child who dreams during session

This world view of the dream has generated an interesting turn around the theory with which it had been understood until then, and around the technique that had been included in the therapeutic action. However, it is interesting to consider that Ferenczi (1926), when speaking about the pragmatic communicative interaction between the patient and the analyst, -even then- described different dream interpretation models, which turn out to be surprisingly very related to this theoretical perspective.

The central part then would not be at the level of the contents of the dream but of the dynamic field –expressed in the oneiric- and of the possibility of generating transformations and tools to contain and modify such field. This way of understanding results very related to the view about dreams as a true and relational narrative of the mental functioning of couples, which would be similar to what Bion calls the “private myth of the couple” (Ferro & Civitarese, 2012).

After a long way from Freud to the contemporary stances of dreaming, I have agreed with the current perspectives about dreaming, in which the dream is given the place of a genuine and primary product which must be understood as an open work \textit{per se} and constantly under “construction”, and whose therapeutic approach requires creative work together between the patient and the therapist (Jiménez, 2012). A work of co-creation that leads to new intersubjective understandings of what was dreamt, both for the patient and for the therapist, in which not only the contents of the dream itself take place but also the dynamic field of the session in which the dream emerges and where the process is framed.

The clinical material which I will present next shows how the dynamic field –as a relational system- generates the conditions in order that essential intersubjective events, which can be transformed into new spaces of experience and thought never before explored, take place.

In this clinical description the idea that what is relevant is not the

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3. This apparently simple question of “being in the world” implicitly contains an ontological vertex, which points at a relational dimension.
complete dream but the possibility of dreaming is implicit. Following Antonino Ferro’s guidelines, the core part of the analysis would be the development of the capacity of dreaming and not the work on repression or excision, which means that it is not enough to interpret but it is necessary to transform. That is, the inscriptions of dreams would not be so important, as it results from the Freudian metapsychology, but the emphasis is put on the set of transformations that work in dreaming and that unfold at intrapsychic and intersubjective level. Besides, the fact that the dream can function as a mediator and a linking agent between internal objects, an intersubjective bonding and attachment process and a fundamental internal “metaboliser.”

From a broad perspective of the psychoanalytic work, I think that the treatment that a dream can receive in infantile clinic should not differ from that given to a drawing which arises during a session, to a game or to the narration of a communication (free association) of the patient. All these situations could receive an equivalent technical approach, as long as the theory of dreams and the theory of the mind underlying the therapeutic action are coherent with the approaches exposed here. That is, as long as we accept that there is an oniric level of the mind always active, which is constantly creating images and which is conceptualised in the analytic framework, as a vital agent that generates the favourable conditions that enable the analytic relation of the transference-countertransference and the consequent constitution of analytic objects in the Dynamic Field.

Here we will see how the core ideas of this article arise from the understandings of Baranger, Winnicott, Ferro and Ogden, and from my own experience in the psychoanalytic work with children and adults, together with the vicissitudes which that entails, specifically related to the clinical use of the oniric during a session.

Clinical vignette: A dream dreamt during the session
I will illustrate the psychoanalytic experience of a 10-year-old child, whom I will call Eulogio, with a clinical vignette. The setting is the children’s office, with its box of games, a frequency of three times a week and indefinite end.

The reason for consulting made explicit by the parents is related to the fact that Eulogio shows himself as a very defiant naysayer.


5. The term transference-countertransference refers to an unconscious intersubjective construction generated by the analytical pair. The transference-countertransference are not considered as separate entities that arise one as an answer to the other, but rather, they refer to a unique intersubjective whole experimented separately and individually by the analyst and the analysand (Ogden, 1995).

6. It is worth considering the stage of development in terms of maturity and cognitive processes which the child goes through. According to J. Piaget, in children up to 5 or 6 years old, dreams come from outside and remain external to them; after waking up they feel them as true dreams and they are confused with daily memories. Until 7 or 8 years old, dreams come from inside but they are still external to them. At around 10 years old, dreams are internal and from an internal origin. (Piaget, 1933, quoted by Médici de Steiner, 1994).
mainly with adults (parents and teachers), he questions and criticises them all the time. On the other hand, he is a child whose academic performance is outstanding; he is very intelligent and argumentative so he frequently puts the adult in checkmate. At school he refuses to obey the instructions which he considers to be arbitrary, which causes many problems to him, to the extent that the school he attended proposed that he joined another educational system where he could “fit” better. His parents changed him to a Montessori school but the difficulties persist.

In general terms, the questioning he makes of the “life’s injustices,” including those of the school system, are very valid to me. I see myself empathising with his criticism many times, and I am surprised about how much I have internalised certain social functioning ways without much questioning. When he points it out, I feel interested and stimulated by his thoughts. On the other hand, before the beginning of Eulogio’s treatment, it was necessary to work during a period with his parents to help them elaborate on a very complex and painful family situation. It was about the patient's half-sister who suffers from schizophrenia, and the information about this mental disorder was dealt with in an ambiguous way, as a family secret. The work with the parents was vital to reveal this secret, which jeopardised the patient's emotional stability7.

I will describe now the second session of the week during the first period of the treatment. Eulogio arrives punctually; I open the door for him and I find myself in front of him, who holding an open book in his hands keeps staring at it8. After some seconds, he looks up, greets me and walks towards the children's room. He lies on the couch and goes back to his reading for a while; I accompany him in silence. My mind wanders and I evoke a memory from my adolescence in which I am sitting in a coffee shop staring at my reading; I capture the image and think about how much I have been accompanied by reading and books and about the many ways they have been present in my life. In that memory, the book worked for me as a way to protect me from the look of “others.” And I think that Eulogio’s entrance into session was similar to my feeling about that memory.

Eulogio leaves the book, takes me out of my dalliances and tells me:

E: It makes me feel rejection and contempt…, she is a grown-up and made a mess of her life, she lost her time as an adolescent, she does not adapt to modernity… she is in the mesozoic era so she does not know what to do with modernity. (I understand that at a certain level, he is referring to his schizophrenic half-sister, whom I will call Ana).
I: What is that about the mesozoic era?
E: That of an ancient time… I read it in a book of dinosaurs.
I: It could be that so much rejection and contempt for Ana have to do

7. Throughout the treatment we saw how this family secret was closely related to the experience of injustice experimented by Eulogio.
8. This was a habitual behaviour for him.
with a huge fear to enter into a pre-historic world yourself.

E: It could be. She cannot socialise with modern people. Maybe I cannot socialise with some people of our Era. Anyway, everybody should be able to socialise with their parents, but sometimes it is difficult…. Ana cannot adapt to modernity; her little socialisation bothers me; it is as if she did not understand that she has to adapt to the millennium…

(We stay in silence ……. I think about what to tell him to resume the dialogue, but nothing comes to my mind. My mind is a blank. Silence continues. After some minutes, I see how his eyes begin to close…. He falls deeply asleep).

While he sleeps, my mind wanders and I associate it with a family story which tells that, as a little girl, I slept with a blanket that was in my cradle, which happened to have a hole through which I put my finger (like a buttonhole) and I slept holding the blanket like that. During a journey by train to the south with my mother, as I could not fall asleep, she had to make a hole in the blanket of the train’s cabin. I feel surprised by having remembered that old story which I had not recalled for many years.

Eulogio keeps on sleeping deeply and after a while he moans, which makes me think that he is having a nightmare and I quickly wonder whether to wake him up or not. Countertransferrentially, I feel identified with the role of “mother” and it is difficult for me to know that he is in a “nightmare”, observe him and not wake him up. At the same time, from a theoretical-clinical perspective I think that probably he needs to dream accompanied during session, feeling that the analytic space is safe enough to bring that kind of “nightmare.” I feel confused and a little anguished.

Meanwhile he wakes up spontaneously. I feel he is afraid. He tells me he had a nightmare. I look at him with compassion and invite him to talk about that.

He tells me: “I dreamt that, I don’t know why, I was in the jungle… it was a dangerous place, full of trees; I ran but I didn’t know where I was going. I was running away from something, I wanted to get out but the path couldn’t be seen, only plants. I saw a kind of strong current in front of me. I didn’t pee, just in case, and I dived into the current and started to drown, drown and drown. I fell and put my hand down and took out a book of a centaur… then, I don’t know how I was running again in the jungle up to a precipe, and then I woke up.”

For the sake of this presentation, I will leave the session with Eulogio here.

Reflections about the vignette
I will begin with some reflections that help to consider the analytic session from a contemporary view of dreaming that highlights, at the

9. Racker conceptualises this maternal countertransference, induced transferrentially, as complementary countertransference.
10. Eulogio suffers from secondary nocturnal enuresis.
same time, the binding and the intersubjective in the origin of what constitutes this analytic process. For this purpose, I will focus on the concept of “dynamic field” (Baranger & Baranger, 1961-1962)\(^\text{11}\), as well as on the ideas of Winnicott (1951/1979b), who incorporates the notion of space and transitional object into the analytic situation. I will also include Antonino Ferro’s contributions in relation to the concept of emotional field and its transformations as well as Ogden’s subsequent theoretical-clinical developments, in relation to the concepts of reverie and intersubjective analytic third.

I believe that it is not possible to consider this dream as the dream of Eulogio’s isolated mind about himself, but it would be a dream that emerges and is structured in a specific emotional field with a unique relational matrix given by the intersubjectivity of our meeting. It is towards that matrix that I will try to re-direct the dream, taking the emotional and affective states which we were experiencing as the main vertex.

This way, the dream would be understood neither as intrapsychic nor as bipersonal, in the sense that an essential characteristic of the field model –according to the Barangers- would consist of the fact that, even if the configuration from the perceptual reality is bipersonal, such dualism is surpassed since there is a “third” one. The third would refer to a bipersonal fantasy that belongs neither to any individual, nor to the addition of two internal situations, but it is “something” that is co-created and built between both during the session (Baranger & Baranger, 1961-1962). As I understand it, Eulogio’s dream would be the result of the experience that unfolds in the intersubjective psychoanalytic dynamic field; therefore, it can be understood, according to Ogden, as the **dream of the intersubjective analytic third**, in which Eulogio, as well as I, participate in the intersubjective unconscious construction of this analytic third, but we do that asymmetrically.

Then, a question arises: what is it that boosts this dream to be dreamt? Ogden (2002) points out that the moment previous to dreaming would be one full of desire with a need to give presence (representational) to what is inarticulate, and whose way of existence is not found in the discourse itself.

I recreate in my mind the beginning of the session: his arrival with the book, my association of the coffee shop during my adolescence, his anger and contempt for his maladjusted sister, my interpretation (which points out that Ana represents an archaic area of himself; an area which frightens him and which he fears would frighten other people; the area of madness); afterwards his reflection and then the silence before sleeping. From this sequence, tinged by an emotional climate which increases anxiety, my first understanding of what happened is to think that Eulogio falls asleep as a communicative

\(^{11}\) This crucial concept is presented in the article *The analytic situation as a dynamic field*, written by Madeleine and Willy Baranger in 1961-62. It is one of their most important works, which includes ideas coming from psychoanalysis and social psychology, as well as from philosophy and literature.
act, through which he points out how my own interpretative incontinence (it would be me the one who pees) associated to a subsequent weakening of the function of reverie (represented by my “going blank”) leaves him helpless, faced with the fear of being exposed once again to experiences of misunderstanding and abandonment, such as recreating experiences of parental auscultation of a possible “schizophrenia” or prehistoric-mesozoic mental state. The act of falling asleep could be a defensive way of preserving his self from the intrusion of dissonant aspects (prehistoric mental state - schizophrenia) regarding his own identity. I think about his defensive reaction to what could have been experienced as an “impingement” (Winnicott, 1952/1999) and how this interrupts his continuity of Being. He falls asleep; however, he fortunately dreams thus turning into an opportunity of psychic strengthening what could have had another course.

If we advance a little more through the session and consider the reverie as the main form of receptivity of what is happening in the intersubjective field of analytic experience, then my state of daydreaming during Eulogio’s dreaming has special consideration. The reverie will not be considered as a reflex of inattention, narcissistic retreating or unresolved conflict, but it would represent symbolic and proto-symbolic (sensory) forms of the patient’s inarticulate experience, while he is beginning to form in the intersubjectivity of the analytic pair (Ogden, 1994).

While he sleeps, my reverie makes me evoke the memory of my blanket (a security blanket – transitional object) during my train journey. Such memory can be understood as the childhood experience of loss - and subsequent recovery- of an object that calms down and supports during the experience of an uncertain journey. It would seem that Eulogio can dream because he feels that he is supported/connected to “some thing”; and what is “that thing”? It is precisely the intersubjective weave, that special subject that is the Analytic Third. Neither he nor I or the simple intersection of the sets which define us but a new weave; neither mine nor his, a special loom made with threads that were woven during the analysis and, more specifically, in the dynamic field of the sessions.

The decision whether to let Eulogio keep on sleeping and dreaming was not an easy one (in retrospect). I believe that it was precisely the capacity to experience and bear that anguish what allowed that the nightmare developed in a supportive context and that Eulogio woke up only when he himself felt the need to wake up, getting out of that World Other where he was living. Waking up did not result from an intrusion, since an intense process of being in the presence of another was unfolding (although paradoxically he was sleeping and I was awake but both were “dreaming”). It was an experience which taught both of us that there is a there, between two, where it is possible to manipulate “prehistory,” where the fear of the dense jungle and the turbulent waters can be faced. Therefore, there the dream-nightmare can be dreamt!

In general terms, my technical way of working does not contemplate sharing my reverie or my countertransference directly with the
Dilemmas and openings about dreaming. Reflections about a child who dreams during session

This case was not the exception; however, its implicit presence and its use and elaboration on my part were really useful to get closer to Eulogio from an emotionally understanding place, which enabled the generation of specific and verbally symbolised significations during the analytic process. This led to an intersubjective construction of nuclear aspects from Eulogio’s objectlike and relational world which were pathologically configured.

The dream, then, is being understood as an expression of an attempt to elaborate what was experienced during session from a regressive mental state, which evidences a re-staging of many other moments experienced during his relational history. After he woke up, we were gradually building an experience which allowed us to recover a supportive space, where each of us could look at ourselves and look at what happened without intensifying emotional states of persecution and anguish. Since the dream is a co-constructed product (asymmetrically), Eulogio’s associations and mine—as well as my reverie during the session and the experiences of both—became an important source of understanding of what was unfolded in the potential space of the session.

Since dreaming is considered as a product of the dynamic field and, more specifically, a product of the intersubjective analytic third, then “the book of the centaur” which he picks up from the bottom of the river deserves a special mention. It will be understood as analytic object generated intersubjectively by the analytic dyad\(^{12}\). Applied to the clinical situation, it can be thought that “the book of the centaur” is not the book with which he arrives at the session, it is not the book of the coffee shop which I evoke in my reverie either. However, it is a little of both at the same time. According to André Green, the analytic object would be neither internal nor external, but it would be between both. It corresponds to the Winnicott’s definition of transitional object and its localisation in the intermediate area of potential space, in the space of “overlapping,” separate from the analytic frame (Green, 1986/1990).

Eulogio and I take dreaming as an expression of forces full of feelings and impulses in search of forms to which we attribute a symbolic representation. Thus, the book of the Centaur (a mythological animal) would be a representation of a combined image (half human, half horse) of unleashed passions, which put into a book or ordered in a framework can account for the hope in the treatment and the integration of aspects of himself. It is also a representation of the analytic work together (about family pre-historical mythology) which accompanied us for a long time during the treatment under the shape of a shared image of a Centaur.

Many times the unleashed passions were experienced by Eulogio as a huge fear of falling into a psychotic regression (Ana’s mesozoic disorder). It was a fear which left him frightened (fear of falling over

\(^{12}\) It is worth mentioning that Christopher Bollas develops a term very related conceptually to that of analytic object (Green), he tells us about the “shared generative objects” (Bollas, 1992/1994).
the edge or of being swept away by currents which threatened to
drown him in turbulent emotions). He also experimented perplexity.

He tells us in the dream: “I do not know why I was in the jungle,” that
is in a landscape or relational dynamics similar to an impingement
of his parents, and also experienced in the transference, leaving him
alone and on the edge of a precipice. Transferencially, many times I
tried to calm down, convincing myself that he was “normal” and that
he had not been swept away by the current (of madness).

Finally, there are multiple possible symbolisms, but I would like
to point out that the “psychoanalytic blanket” was a weave that sup-
ported both of us during all the therapeutic process and made it
possible that this dream was dreamt during session and dreamt again
by both, many other times during the treatment.

Final comments
Throughout this presentation, I have emphasised the approach to the
clinical work from a current model of dreaming and a contemporary
psychoanalysis, which aims at integrating the contributions made by
different models and at the same time -at least partially- its limitations.

In clinic, this perspective has enabled the promotion of exploration/
expansion of the relations in and between the intrapsychic and the in-
tersubjective, thus resulting in possible variations of the method.

Within this way of working clinically, the introduction and use of
the concept of dynamic field has a central role since it puts our work
in a place whose nature is that of the transitional between reality and
fantasy13. This is how the dynamic field institutes the analytic space,
which would be a third space that enables the meeting and separation
between the patient’s and the analyst’s psychic spaces and gives way
to the potential space that enables the analytic communication and
the constitution of the analytic object.

From what I mentioned above, I would like to dwell on what I
consider a fundamental aspect within psychoanalytic treatments and
which has been hardly studied in psychoanalytic literature. I am refe-
riring to the emergence of psychoanalytic Objects during the analysis.

The analytic object, that is, the creation of that “something” unique
and specific which develops in the dynamic field, and which
emerges without being called or searched for, allows the transforma-
tion of the events of the transference-countertransference by hosting
them together with the patient, and giving them the quality of living
objects which condense essential aspects of the mental-emotional
functioning of the analytic dyad in a syncretic way.

I think that the emergence of analytic objects in the interior of a
psychoanalytic process is an important indicator of therapeutic pro-
gress. It accounts for the presence of an atmosphere of symbolic hold-
ing in the transference-countertransference relation, and it also
accounts for the generation of a fertile land to access into the unders-
tanding of unconscious aspects.

13. This idea comes from D. Winnicott (1971) in The place where we live, from that third area of
experience.
The psychoanalytic object is idiosyncratic of each analytic pair and specific to a definite moment of the process. It is constructed from the interaction between patient and analyst, and it contains interpretative material inside, which has emerged during the analysis. Such objects express and represent a certain degree of elaboration of some psychic conflict. The presence of the dynamic field, whose hallmark is the transitional, is a necessary condition for it to develop.

Throughout an analytical process different analytic objects can be spontaneously contructed, from which a kind of dialect can be gradually created while such representations -featured in the analytic objects- contain a special meaning, which goes beyond what can be signified with words.

Such representations can be reached through the use of key words or idiosyncratic nominations created by the analytic pair, which function as intimate-private codes when used at certain moments of the sessions, and which enable the creation of a dialect of understanding to access the unconscious more directly. In this way, a private-shared language is built and co-written in the potential space of the analysis from which a path opens, in order to make some of that private madness communicable and shareable (Green, 1986/1990) to enable it to be transformed, through analytic dialogue, in a creative potential space (Saks, 2009).

There is more and more agreement among different authors that the process of change in the analysis entails both the internalisation of the relation with the analyst and the achievement of insight thanks to interpretation (Gabbard, 1997). Well, I think that both aspects are implicit in the emergence of analytic objects.

Going back to the vignette, I think that Eulogio, as well as I, found a special space in the shared world of reading. My curious and interested disposition in his books took us both into a very intimate territory, from which I believe the figuration of the analytic object is born. The book of the Centaur represents an experience of auto-hetero-relationality in a syncretic and poetic way. The Book of the Centaur seems to be the “exit,” the space among the trees of the dense jungle without spaces. Without that object, it seems that the options were schizophrenia or overadaptation, drowning or nameless terror of staying expectant on the edge of an abyss which predicts a fall which never takes place. Such object emerges from a transitional space; it emerges in the dynamic field of the analytic process, and that is precisely what opens a possibility of exit from the entrapment of the impasses of the duality.

**Abstract**

A vignette of a child who falls asleep during session, dreams and later tells what he dreamt of is presented. A dream that has the particular feature of being dreamt while some memories and fantasies of the analyst are mobilised.

This dream, which emerges in the context of the transferential-countertransferential experience of the session and is unfolded in the psychoanalytic dynamic field (Baranger & Baranger,
1969/1993), is understood as the *intersubjective analytic third’s dream* (Ogden, 1994). The analyst focuses her attention on the patient’s and the analytic couple’s oneiric functioning as a central element in the process of construction-elaboration of unconscious conflicts.

This way of working puts ourselves in an area whose nature is that of the transitional, where the *dynamic field* institutes a third analytic space which enables the meeting and separation between the patient’s and the analyst’s psychic space, thus giving way to the constitution of analytic objects.

**Keywords:** *Dreaming, Field, Reverie, Transitional Object, Object.*

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**References**


Recovering psychic apparatus

Altamirando Matos de Andrade Júnior*

In this paper I intend to describe the work of recuperation of the psychic apparatus of a patient as way of achieving the elaboration of psychotic parts and of making possible the development of the capacity of thinking and feeling. This recovery which was actually almost the construction of a psychic apparatus allowed the development of the capacity to think symbolically and to establish object relations. I will report a case maintaining what is pertinent in relation to the issue addressed, leaving out other elements present in the analytic process.

I will try within the scope of this Congress to stick to the use of the psychoanalytic tools that we have today, when in the very XXI century we are faced with the challenges brought by patients who cannot even inform what they feel or think. These patients live in a world where action prevails and conflict is not experienced and where few relations are established which makes it necessary to help them build a psychic apparatus capable of symbolizing and consequently thinking and establishing relations. In this case these features are radicalized by the psychotic state presented.

Freud differed from the psychiatrists of his time being able to listen to what his hysterical patients said and revealed enabling him with this listening to see beyond what was said and known. Listening allowed contact with a whole world of feelings and emotions that until then were not understood. I believe that nowadays we have to

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1. This pre-published text will form the basis of one of the keynote presentations at the IPA Congress in Boston, “Changing world: The shape and use of psychoanalytic tools today”, to be held from 22 to 25 July 2015. All rights reserved by the author.
take this lesson of Freud as an example of listening to patients who came to us with various complaints or even without knowing what they complain about or feel. Psychoanalytic listening remains a major psychoanalytic instrument.

Bion (1962a) called alpha function the transformation of rudimentary emotions into alpha elements. That is the function that the object has of containing rudimentary emotions and experiences that are projected by the subject so that they can be slowly digested psychically and thought by the object. In his model container/contained Bion (1962a) calls our attention to the object that receives the projections of the baby, metabolizes them and returns them to the baby giving a different meaning to the projected. In this model the baby introjects an object that receives and understands its anxieties. These experiences, common to humans, form a pattern of object relations that develops throughout the individual’s life. This pattern of relationship is what arises in the transferential context of an analysis.

I agree with R. Levy’s assertion (2012) that Bion’s great contribution to the formation of symbols occurs within a bond. Levy:

“Bion examined the entire process of symbol formation from its very beginning to its functioning in the thinking apparatus. However, Bion’s greatest contribution was his assertion that the entire symbol-forming process occurs, and only occurs, within the heat of a link.”

But if in our model we encounter situations of mismatches between infant and mother due to difficulties in one or the other, or even in both, then we have a model of object relationship that can become troublesome. Certainly, we will have different experiences in the transference relationship with one model or the other. These differences are fundamental to the understanding of the relationship between analyst and patient.

So we have here elements to say that the constitution of a baby’s mind can occur through a combination of characteristics coming from the baby itself with those experiences coming from objects. In this sense I believe it is of fundamental importance to separate a real relationship with the object, that is, a realistic perception from a phantasy that an individual has about an experience with the object, a perception permeated by excessive projective identification. It is not always possible to distinguish one experience from the other, which requires the analyst's attention in the interaction with the patient. This wealth of experiences between the individual and the object is well described by Brenman (2006): “As I understand it, there is an intercourse between the mother and the baby, physical and psychical that results in a new creation, the relationship.”

Rosenfeld in his later works (1987) postulated that for traumatized patients it would be of much value to reconstruct the traumatic experience in order to give new meanings to the emotional experience of the trauma. He considered that the analyst should be mindful not to repeat the trauma through his interpretations. These ideas of
Rosenfeld brought many discussions among Kleinian analysts. For some there was an excess on Rosenfeld's part on placing trauma as a constituent factor in the patient's pathology, without considering of equal value subjective aspects of the own patient, thus placing more emphasis on the analyst than on the patient's subjectivity. This discussion is found in Steiner's comments in relation to Rosenfeld's work in the book: *Rosenfeld in retrospect*. Steiner says:

“...he became concerned that some analysts, particularly some Kleinians, interpreted in a manner which traumatized their patients. He believed that when patients had been deprived or traumatized in their childhood, they were likely to be re-traumatized in their analyses unless the analyst took special care to avoid this.”

In my experience with severely disturbed patients, I understand much of what Rosenfeld understood about trauma that is relived in the analytic experience when the analyst insists on a certain model of interpretation where the emphasis lays on the subjective world of the patient. These patients tend to take interpretations as accusations and attacks from the analyst, recreating then traumatic experiences.

In relation to the interpretive work and the patient's difficulties in receiving and understanding transference interpretations,
one may perceive difficulty in the interaction between analyst and patient that is present in the giving and receiving interpretations model. The analyst may give interpretations and not feel that he is overwhelming the patient, but the patient can understand interpretations as a form of the analyst showing superiority and even humiliating him.

Several interactions between analyst and patient regarding giving and receiving are possible between analyst and patient and we can find a detailed description of them in Spillius (2007): “One crucial factor seems to me to be the conscious and unconscious feelings of the giver about giving, and the way these feelings are perceived or misperceived, consciously or unconsciously, by the receiver.” These problems are at the root of the incapability of certain patients of tolerating transference interpretations. Examining the unconscious fantasies becomes perceived as an accusation of the patient and also a way of the analyst showing his superiority.

Some authors as Rocha Barros & Rocha Barros (2011) have studied difficulties in understanding and communication that certain patients present due to disruptions in the ability to think and form symbols. These authors postulate the idea of an attack by the patient on the structures or forms of mental representation before or while they are in symbols. They say: “Symbols can lose their plasticity and thus silence the emotions and therefore cut off the patient from their meanings”.

Still, the authors describe how the symbolic function has characteristics that can serve the recreation or restoration of lost objects. This last statement is of paramount importance to what I describe in the present case.

The patient I will describe complained of having no memories of important and traumatic facts of his life and attributed this difficulty in remembering to be the cause of the problems that afflicted him. I was able to examine with the patient that there were memories that could not be recalled because they had not been repressed nor represented, that is, they were kept in a pre-symbolic level or even pre-representational level. I believe that these difficulties were due to the fact that the patient had a precarious psychic apparatus that did not help him to process his experiences. These experiences are not represented in the mind of the individual and remain as a foreign body, without meaning and without representation, but with a high degree of disturbance. This disturbance tends to be expelled on objects and especially on the analyst who receives them and tries to decode them, returning them to the patient in the form of an interpretation that makes sense to his experiences and feelings. Joseph (1985) shows us in her work *Transfer: Total situation* that much of what patients communicate in a session is not in the representational content of words, but through words trying to provoke something in the analyst to react doing something to the patient.

Ogden (1980, 1994a, 1994b, 1997) in several papers describes very clearly the relationship between the subjectivity of the analyst and of the patient and emphasizes the role of the analyst’s reverie during the session. Ogden relies on Bion’s concept of reverie. Reve-
rie means everything that goes on in the mind of the analyst during the session. Avzaradel (2011) citing Ogden (1994, 1997): Ogden emphasizes the role of reverie which he considers to be everything that goes on in the analyst's mind during sessions. He includes all kinds of daydreams and fantasies, not just those that seem to be related to the patient's material. He even takes into account analysts' physical sensations during sessions and considers them to be manifestations of reverie. Ogden's proposal is to scrutinize in detail the analyst's reverie in order to reach the unconscious reflections of the mind of the analyst and with this attune to what goes on in the analytic relationship with certain patients.

**Case report**

The patient whom I shall call Peter came to me five months after his second psychotic episode. He was referred by the psychiatrist who was treating him with medication. In his first contact with me, during the interview, Peter showed that he was very frightened and suspicious; he spoke little and remained attentive to my movements as well as to noises coming from the street. I remarked that it seemed that he was very frightened by the fact of being there with me. He told me he was afraid of the voices that tormented him with accusatory phrases as to his honesty and sexuality. He asked me to talk with his mother since he depended on her to make a decision about the treatment with me. In the second interview he came accompanied by his mother and through her I learned about his story.

Peter, age four, was driving with his parents and suffered a brutal accident where he lost his father, his mother was seriously injured and he suffered few bruises. His mother reported that he suffered a lot at that time, could not sleep, cried for his father and was desperate a lot. She said that he had been a happy and healthy child, but after the accident he became anxious, sleepless and fearful. He struggled in school with learning and presented behavior described as bizarre, where he isolated himself or was very aggressive. The patient interrupts the mother and tells me he does not remember anything and that a piece of his life is missing. He also tells me that he hears voices saying that he lost a piece of himself. At this moment I recognized despair stamped on the patient's face and felt compelled to help him.

He further commented that he lost himself in time, not being able to concatenate events that happened in different periods of his life, a serious discontinuity seemed to exist. He had a first psychotic breakdown when he was seventeen, having been admitted to a psychiatric hospital and treated only with medication. Peter was nineteen when he started his analysis.

After about four months of analysis, he arrived for a Monday session very distressed, appearing to having been followed. He told me he heard voices during the weekend and that he had had some strange visions, deciding to have a tattoo on his back to calm down. I told him that he put the anxiety he felt due to my absence over the weekend on the tattoo, that he feared he would lose me. He then gets up, takes off his shirt and shows the tattoo of an eagle and says that he
calmed down, but when he came to the session he thought someone was following him on the street.

Through this material and the like I realized that tattooing was a way of controlling anxiety of persecution and fears he felt. He sometimes had tattoos done on him and always associated with weekends, holidays and vacations. We examined that he needed to tattoo me on his body so that I would not disappear, leaving him alone with his fears. A tattoo on the body does not separate from him, it accompanies him always.

Fears that he would fall or disintegrate to pieces were very common. I believe that the use of tattoos as an expression of affects shows that Peter possessed severe difficulties in symbolization and, at this time could only express his affects through concrete action. Avzaradel (2011) also describes something similar: "Matters of clinical importance become paramount because in the case of patients with severe pathologies their thought is clearly prejudiced. It is concrete, with no symbolic content. We can see this in compulsive behavior where symptoms involve something concrete, for example, food, alcohol, and drugs. Such patients spring into action without thinking".

Avzaradel (2011) even proposes an interpretive technique where one should try to interpret in small doses and in sensory levels what one perceives of the patient's material, in order to help the patient develop symbolic capacity to enable him to understand the analyst's communication. The patient's understanding lacked symbolic development where he could put into words feelings and thoughts. He communicated through a language of action in the body, such as the tattoos, and he had an understanding where facts and words were experienced as concrete. The fact that he experienced himself as having a hollow, empty part of himself, with a piece missing, contributed to Peter not finding ways to express himself through words and thoughts, but condense his affects in a tattoo, for example, causing the same to have a character of concreteness.

In the first years we worked intensely on his persecutory fears in relation to me as well as his intense attachment and dependency on me. It was a very difficult period because the patient experienced a high degree of anxiety when we examined his relationship with me and with his internal objects.

Fragment of a session:

P: Everything strange… seems to die, everything hurts, fears and the voices don’t stop. Saturday bad! Alone!!!

A: It is like I would have disappeared and you’re left without help and also without someone to protect you from the voices.

P: You think you’re so important to me… but you don’t help me much. I don’t understand why you think you’re so important to me. You always say that I’m alone on the weekend without you. I’m afraid of everything and there is no one, it’s not just you.

A: When I say that you miss me you understand that I am making myself important to you, that I am saying that you cannot be without me. In this way you feel that I chase you, that I am a voice tormenting you.
P: I understand… But it’s all so confusing. How can you help me?
A: Helping you understand what is happening and what you feel.
(Silence)
P: The voices are not clear, but they accuse. I’m afraid of being a murderer and be arrested.
A: The voices accuse you of having killed someone and this frightens you.
P: Yes… I’m scared and I can’t sleep… afraid to die.
A: I understand that you feel afraid experiencing feelings and thoughts and fear that I can’t help you. Whenever I show the relationship of these feelings for me you feel I’m putting these feelings in you. And this makes you frightened.
P: I don’t understand certain things and I’m thinking that you want to take advantage of me.
A: How?
P: Making me think certain things.
A: Like what?
P: (Silence) Fear that your thought gets into my head.
A: If you have thoughts that bother you, you have to express them. If I say something about this to you then I am putting these thoughts back in your head.
P: You can make me feel crazy, without the possibility of healing, and with the head full of stuff.
A: When I talk about what you feel.
P: When you say that I think certain things.
A: So you feel that we are in a relationship where you try to communicate something to me and I put stuff in your head.
P: Yes, that is what happens. It happens with other people too, I speak and they put stuff in my head.
A: I understand what you want to say. Maybe we can try to understand why these feelings are present in you.
P: Because there’s a piece missing in my head, I’ve always thought that there was a piece missing.
A: Which one?
P: I don’t know… it’s missing.
A: A piece that was lost, maybe evacuated.
P: Tattooing calms me down.
A: It gives a meaning.
P: I only tattoo when I’m anguished.
A: And it always has been related with my vacations, holidays, something like that.
A: When you’re anguished you put the agony out and a void exists, with a piece missing.
P: A piece is missing.

In the beginning my interpretations were felt as an attack on my part or even rejection. It was necessary to work on the way the patient felt and related to me and to others, in this way trying to establish a setting and trust that would allow advancing in the psychoanalytic work. I also started not to make long interpretations being more precise and also dosing
transferential interpretations, a model proposed by Avzaradel (2011).

In the third year of analysis the patient was less tense, slept without medication and there was a great diminishing of paranoid fear. At this time his mother underwent a reconstructive surgery to repair consequences of the accident. Peter had a new breakdown characterized by great fear to leave the house; he locked himself in his room refusing contact with the mother and also with me. After about two weeks he agreed to return to my office and we recommenced analysis. I thought about the possibility of seeing him at home, but he refused and he wanted that only the psychiatrist see him at home.

In the first session after he returned he arrives with a new tattoo with the drawing of a coffin. I mention the fear of losing the mother and he tells me that he heard voices saying that his mother would die during surgery, fear was on his face and he said again that he had lost a piece of his life. When we discussed the accident when his father died he told me that he could not remember anything, his head was a blank, he repeated continuously. I tried to see with the patient what had happened that brought about this new breakdown and we were able to understand that he had, in a certain way, lost the analysis within himself and, alone in front of the threat he felt of losing his mother in surgery, despaired. He says that hearing voices and seeing things is still much better than feeling a void, a walking dead that wished to feel exalted rather than dead or almost dead (Andrade Jr. 1991).

One of his delusions was the idea that he should follow a passage of the Bible where, according to him, it was said that the humble will be exalted and that the humble will reach the realms of heaven. For him the worst humiliation a man could have was to be a homosexual and having relations with another man. From this fantasy came the homosexual fears, the voices accusing him of being a homosexual and his fear to relate to me and having to be sodomized by me in order to heal.

I started to understand that what he said he had forgotten was alive threatening him internally. Any approach in this sense was refuted by the patient; he even threatened to leave the treatment if I touched on something related to the accident or his lack of memory or even about homosexual feelings.

A vignette:

P: I think I ’ll just be saved if I am humiliated the way I told you. If I have a sexual relationship with a man.
A:  I understand that you have the feeling that you have to undergo a big humiliation in order to be saved. It seems you have to be punished for something that happened.
P: There is nothing of that, you’re making things up, accusing me of being bad and a murderer.
A: You understood what I said as putting something bad in you.
P: You really accuse me. I am not a bad person.
A: Perhaps we can understand how you understand what I say. What meaning is being given to what I talk with you.
P: The voices accuse me, I’m afraid of getting mentally sick.
A: You fear the meaning you give to what you feel and fear that I’m putting ideas in you that are not yours. So you refuse to examine what I say for fear that I’m accusing you. Have you already noticed that what you say I put in your head has to do with what you feel?

P: I think everything is very strange. I believe that you do not want to harm me, but I’m afraid. I don’t understand many things. Everything is missing in my head.
A: You’re right a clear sense of what you feel is missing.

P: I think that you can only help me if you control the voices.
A: If you control my voice.

P: I don’t know if I talked with you or if I thought, but I think I am attached to you, I come here every day. I need to be more myself.
A: I understand that you need to feel mentally separated from me and that your contact with me leaves you without knowing who is who here. Like a baby suckling at the breast of the mother and cannot discriminate who he is and who is the breast.

P: Causes confusion.
A: Yes causes confusion between what you feel and think and what I tell you.

P: Sometimes I’m not sure whether it was you or I who said certain things.

Upon returning from a vacation I had taken, the patient arrives for the session with a bag full of newspaper clippings, photographs and school notebooks that he deposits on the floor near my armchair. He says that he’ll show me a number of things, but that I should not say anything, just look. Following the ideas of Honigstejn (1990) based on Klein (1952a) about the impulse to integrate where, according to Honigstejn, the patient needs an object that helps to integrate. I thought that when Peter asked me to just listen and say nothing he needed to go through the experience of contact with an object that served as a continent that would help him to integrate.

A change in the contact with me occurred; he started to greet me with a handshake on arrival and departure. There was a large decrease of homosexual fear. The work undertaken about both the dread in feeling himself a living dead and the feeling that it was preferable to have delusions and to hallucinate than to perceive himself empty and dead provided good results. This enabled the patient to realize how he emptied himself through massive projective identification (Almeida Prado, 1983).

A fragment of a session from this period:

P: When you talk about the accident you accuse me.
A: Of what?

P: I don’t know, but you accuse me as if I wanted to have had this accident. I did not want it, do you understand?
A: I think that when I say something to you I’m giving voice to feelings that you have, but you cannot think about them. Maybe feelings related to the accident.
P: I don’t like to think about the accident. I feel a big hole in my head, a piece is missing.

A: The piece that is missing is what scares you. It is a void, but also a presence.

P: There is a big hole and I feel that thinking about these things is going to make me feel bad. (Silence)

P: Do you remember that I told you that hearing voices and seeing things at times is better than feeling empty? Because empty is death, I will fall and die; I’m not sure how, but I’m afraid of getting all fragmented, as you once said.

A: Fear of fragmenting and falling into the void, so seeing things or hearing voices fills the void, maybe a meaning to something terrible. Maybe to something imagined.

P: It’s all very dangerous. There are a lot of ways to die. Falling into the void is dying of despair.

P: Feelings of death.

A: Feelings related to what you experienced in relation to the accident, for example. Feelings that arise here in relation to me and that leave you fearful that I may die because of your thoughts.

P: I never had friends and was always afraid of relations. I was agonized with relationships with many bad ideas in my head.

A: As if having a bad idea in the head was going to make it happen. If you relate to me and feel this relationship, something may happen to me because of your ideas.

P: The ideas are always bad…

Here at this time in the session there was a depressive feeling in the patient, a little more integrated and experiencing pain in relation to what was happening with him. Pain that we continued to investigate in the following sessions. I think that the fact that I had dosed transference interpretations and had helped him think about his emotional experience contributed to the beginning of integration. There was a greater interest of the patient to talk about facts of his life and a feeling of being able to link experiences that gave meaning to his feelings of fear and confusion. It was the beginning of a more evolved object relation, where he experienced me as someone who did not threaten him so much. I realized how important it was for Peter to relive traumatic events of his life. At first everything seemed to sum up the accident, later other themes emerged.

A fragment of a session of this period:

P: I want to have friends and to do things that I don’t do.

P: To have a social life without fear; today I woke up thinking I had dreamt with a friend I had. He was calling me and I answered. I did not become terrified thinking that he wanted to harm me.

A: You realized that the voices diminishing, diminishes your fear to relate?

P: Yes. I think there’s a hole, but it’s not so big. In the dream there was also a bridge. I don’t remember anything else.

A: A bridge that linked what?
P: I don´t know. Maybe it has to do with the voices that diminished and then I calm down.

A: Maybe the bridge links your different aspects, for example, a feeling of emptiness to an understanding of this emptiness. You, your story.

P: I´ve been able to speak more of the things that happened to me.

At the end of a Friday session he hands me a photograph and goes away. When I examine the picture I see him as a two year old sitting on the floor playing with a small car. His name and age were written at the back of the photo: he was two years and two months. His expression of sadness called my attention. In the following Monday session he asks me if I saw the picture and says that his mother said that during this period in which the photo was taken, she had had an abortion and a subsequent hemorrhage that caused her to be hospitalized in a hospital for a few days. He told me that his mother reported he was very upset during this period and that he also reacted strangely, isolating himself when she said she was pregnant. I said that maybe his expression of sadness was related to the reported events. Some sessions later he complained that the patient before him was evil looking and left the session with an air of owner of the house. Peter had never referred to any other patient with whom he came across in the office. I told him that he might be feeling jealous of my relationship with the other patient and the fact that the other patient seemed to be the owner of the house might give the impression of some intimacy between us. I linked this fact to his mother´s pregnancy and his troubles regarding his fantasies. He told me he was afraid he could cause me to get hurt and even that I could injure myself.

He then began to speak of his father and during several sessions felt very moved and distressed with chest pain, thinking he was having a heart attack, even seeking the emergency of a hospital for tests because he thought he was dying. It was a very difficult period since he accused me of uncovering dead things to provoke his death. I interpreted that he was afraid to think about the death of the baby in his mother´s womb and also about the accident for fear of already feeling guilty since he felt responsible for what had happened. We also saw the fear of encountering the accident that he felt within himself, that is, his fear of perceiving how he had attacked his internal objects damaging them.

I understood the voices that resurfaced, at this time, as an expression of persecutory guilt that harassed him, accusing him of being a murderer. I also thought about the fear of retaliation by the attacked objects. When I interpreted these understandings to him over a few sessions he showed relief.

In a session a few days later, he brings a toy car and tells me he got it when he was about two years old and that he was with this car when the accident happened. Since then he had never again played with the car that was kept locked in his desk. I realized the impact of his feelings on me and decided to tell him that he sought to rescue feelings towards his father that were kept locked. I believe that this type
of experience helped Peter to think and relive the trauma with me, thereby gaining insight into his emotional experience. There was, in my view, a recovery of the relationship with the father that had been impaired by fear of his feelings about the accident. This is an example of the construction of a psychic apparatus that can think and relate.

A fragment of a session of this period:

P: I’m sorry for not having spent more time with my father. I think I wouldn’t be sick if he were alive.

A: You mean to tell me that your father kept a healthy part of you and that you were deprived of this part and without it you became ill.

P: I know this is not so, but it seems this is what I feel. I think that when he died something mine also died.

A: You show that you remained with a dead father inside your-
self and that this dead father may have remained as a deceased who
disturbs and makes you ill. A deceased who was not buried. He re-
mained a deceased more alive than dead.

P: I think that he can’t die.

A: He could not be regarded dead by you, so there was no pos-
sibility to mourn him and find a place for your father in you. There
remained hatred for the father that left you. A feeling that you and
your dead father were enmeshed.

P: It could be, but now I’m talking more about all this and I’m
afraid to die, but I also want to talk more about all these things. I
never thought I could talk about all this.

In this session it is possible to perceive a shift in Peter’s lan-
guage and understanding, he seems more able to think about and
understand what I interpret. When making contact with feelings
related to the father’s death and the baby in the mother’s abortion,
Peter was taken by strong paranoid-schizoid and depressive anxie-
ties. There was death anxiety and fears that he would have another
breakdown; I was worried and tried to make contact with Peter’s
feelings in order to understand the model of object relation that
was established. That is, he anxious and I worried about him. He
tells me then that his mother said that in both the abortion and
the accident she had become very depressed and sought psychia-
tric help. He also says that at this time his maternal grandparents
took care of him what intensified his fears that he had also lost his
mother; this seemed to me what was being experienced transfe-
rentially with me through his despair and my worries about him.
With the continuation of these themes, he tells me that his mother
said she was a little depressed when she nursed him at the breast
because of pain in the nipple. He says his mother panicked with
fear of not being able to breastfeed him and that he cried a lot. It
was necessary to call upon the pediatrician to intervene for her to
recover confidence and continue breast feeding. I also think that
the anxieties present at this time remained without adequate re-
presentation when the mother’s abortion occurred and following
the accident, with an increase of these experiences, leading him to
the strange behaviors, isolation and aggressiveness. This is what the
mother described when, at the patient’s request, she came to talk
to me at the beginning of the treatment. The fact that the mother
had had depressive episodes in the early times of Peter’s life, to-
gether with how he experienced and fantasized about these facts
constituted the core of Peter’s delusional and hallucinatory activi-
ties. Also, in my view, from this emerged a quite disturbed model of
object relation. These facts caused the fragmentation of his psychic
experiences and the difficulty in having continuity in time. Expe-
riences were experienced not only menacingly, but also as concrete
facts that would destroy him and the object with which he related.
We may conjecture that it may have been possible that his mother
may have projected her anxiety on Peter and that these elements
may have remained as something undigested, unable to be thought
or understood. In fact, the projected elements invade the patient’s mind and become persecutors. Avzaradel (2011) in the work cited above, describes something similar: “When mothers project their alpha elements they do it holding their babies in their arms, sheltering them, making them feel peaceful, loved, calm. All of this favors their babies ‘healthy development. When mothers project beta elements, in a track contrary to what we normally study, they may not only fail to digest beta elements for their babies, they may also invade their babies’ mind with something that cannot be digested since it has not undergone any thought process because none was available.”

In a session around the eleventh year of treatment he appeared wearing a watch for the first time. He seemed like a small child learning to tell time. And he was, for he began weaving continuity in relation to the facts of his life. His speech was more articulate and he already thought in terms of past, present and future.

A session from this time:

P: I have been speaking about many things here that were not possible before. I think that the fear of dying, of splitting in pieces, passed. But it is very hard to talk about all this. It makes me sad.

A: I understand what you mean, but despite the sadness you feel you don’t seem to be feeling desperate.

P: It is true. I come here without that feeling that you will hurt me and I know this made me understand a lot of things. But I’m sad. Not desperate, sad.

A: It seems a sadness that may be bearable and also thought about. Maybe something to do with the bridge of the dream.

P: The other day you said something about connecting different facts of my life, past with present, I think it was this.

A: It was this.

P: I feel I have a life and it seems that in life there is suffering too.

Abstract

Starting from the analysis of a psychotic patient it is the author’s intention to discuss the construction of a mental apparatus capable to symbolize, think, feel and have object relations. Technical questions that support ideas developed by the author in the paper will be considered. Bion’s idea about alpha function is also considered, as well as reverie and the development of thoughts. Some post Bion authors that have written about the capacity to think thoughts and to create symbols are taken in consideration. The recovering of the past experiences through the construction of a mental apparatus allowed the patient to have access to symbolic thought. Main focus on transference and countertransference relationship will be considered in order to understand the development of the ideas presented and the evolution of the process of analysis.

Keywords: Thought, Psychic apparatus, Transference, Countertransference, Symbolism.
References


Luis Campalans Pereda*

Analytic cure as a handmade product

“In fact we are using a very special type of handcraft, a handcraft made with thinking clay, a handcraft of the intersubjective relation, a handcraft of conviction”
Willy Baranger (1994)

We will discuss the issue of the analyst’s tools, instruments and devices, in other words, those resources which work and intervene during the cure in the production of typically analytical effects and which are defined as subjective effects (“neo-creations” Freud said in 1937) beyond mere improvement or symptomatic remission, which would be the common goal for all psychotherapies.

“In-dividual” is the one who arrives at the session, from which—if there is analytical operation— they will be able to make some experience out of their division; that is, of the radical discontinuity of the repressed unconscious as an “interior foreign domain” in relation to the Ego; a subject of the unconscious that did not exist “before” and which will be a production in transference, eventually generating effects on that individual who will return “afterwards”, with some difference, to leave the session.

As a starting point in our approach to the topic, we will pro-

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pose a premise which we will later attempt to expand, support and question and which we will express like this: *the sum of the analyst’s tools and instruments are condensed and supported in only one: the analyst himself as a tool, but on condition that his person be gradually removed.* The establishment of transference, more than a tool, will be considered as the very condition for the possibility of effectiveness of any tool.

On the one hand, this formulation echoes and refers to that Freudian maxim expressed in “Advice to Doctors on Psychoanalytic Treatment” (Freud, 1912/1980b) when he holds that the analyst “should be in a position to use his own unconscious as an instrument for analysis” demonstrating that the analyst’s unconscious, a “receptor” says Freud, or it is better to say, the experience with his unconscious, is the privileged instrument of his operational activity. On the other hand, we are not forgetting the paradoxical and contradictory character of this formulation, one of the many ways of attempting to describe or grab that impossibility or aporia that is entailed by or inherent to the analyst’s position.

**Analyst’s position: place and person**

In this regard, when we refer to the “analyst”, it is always necessary to distinguish or discriminate between the place (or the role) and the person to be able to hold the question about the specificity of our position keeping its complexity and demands. What is an analyst? A sort of father or mother, a guide, an educator, a friend perhaps? Which part of him operates generating analytical effects? His theoretical knowledge, his feelings, his understanding, his values and ideals?

In spite of its division, these two dimensions, the one of the “analyst” as a place and role granted by transference and the one which his person lends in order to embody it, are blended in the experience. Not only would they be strictly inseparable but their relation would be rather inversely proportional: the more the “person” interferes (as an “appearance”), the more prominent the analyst’s Ego is, the place will be more blocked and viceversa: the less “personal” the cure becomes, the more operative the role will be. We also see that there would be three (the analysand, the analyst and the place) in the apparently dual “analytical situation”, which enables us to think it as a triangular structure beyond the elemental perception of the “you and I, here and now”.

The insoluble problem lies in the fact that the person is the one in charge of holding and supporting the transference that the role promotes. Not only in relation to transferential vicissitudes and the difficulties of its “management” but also the constant temptation to forget that “the subject that supposedly knows” must know that he does not know; the pygmalion temptation to believe that we know what would be better for or what each one of our patients needs. Beyond good intentions, that tends to work in the transference as a superegoic mandate, with its anguish correlate in the analysand.

Inevitably, then, the analyst cannot hold his role without getting involved; he is engaged and must know that; he puts his body, his
being as a person and his lack of being as a subject in a completely particular relationship for each analyst and for each analysis. We can name the issue that concerns the analyst’s place or role as “The analyst’s desire” while the problem that concerns the person of the analyst or, more accurately, the relation of the person with the role can be named as “Countertransference”. We will go back to this later.

**Listening and interpretation**

Even though there has always been broad consensus when distinguishing interpretation as the instrument *princeps* within all the analyst’s interventions, its conception is far from having been univocal since, be it known or unknown, it is inseparable from the conception of the unconscious, on the one hand, and the analyst’s role, on the other. For instance, J. Strachey’s (1948) classical proposal about “mutative interpretations” responds to the idea of an analyst who would work taking the place of the analysand’s “Super Ego” or “Ideal Ego”. The overabundance of transferential interpretations that marked a whole period of Kleinism resulted from placing the relationship with the person of the analyst as a central part of the cure, where, through the real experience with it (“here, now and with me”), corrections regarding primary object insufficiency could be made. In this regard, we make it clear that even though every interpretation is in transference, since its deployment is a condition for the effectiveness of the former, it does not imply that it must be, necessarily, interpretation of the transference. In relation to it, we consider valid Freud’s (Freud, 1912/1980d) premise that holds that as far as the patient’s account flows without stopping “the issue of transference must not be touched”, preserving this task, “the thorniest of all”, for the moment when it becomes resistance; that is, using his terms, for the moment when transference turns from “positive”, “tender” and “sublimated” into “negative”, “erotic” and “pretended”; that is, as an acting-out. This is the most difficult area for the analyst, where the aporia of his position lies in the fact that even though the analysis is not and cannot be a “cure for love’s sake”, at the same time it cannot be without love.

On the other hand, it is necessary to consider whether we define interpretation by its format, which would support several intervention figures (signalling, punctuation, question, pun, cut or scansion, construction, etcetera), by its content, that is, the relevance of the significations it contributes or conveys or by the production of a subjective, medium-term or immediate, effect, always after its formulation. In this case we could talk, at the risk of a tautology, of “interpretative effect” and distinguish “listening” as an operative tool from “interpretation” as an eventual effect of that operation. In this sense, interpretation also resembles a joke in that it is defined more by its *a posteriori* effect than by its *a priori* intention; apart from the fact that its explanation cancels that effect since the latter is produced by the surprising shift of meaning. Let us put it like this: if there is laugh as an effect, then we can say that there was a joke; if there is a subjective effect, then there was interpretation. In other words, validation or approval of the Other is necessary for the effect of subject to take place.
We then define “listening” as a reading operation about an account to produce an effect of subject which does not exist before such operation and whose paradigm in Freud’s work still is, in our opinion, the interpretation of dreams. As dreaming is not the oneiric phenomenon as such, but only its account or wording, the interpretation operates the other way round as wording and aims at the unconscious desire underlying it. Therefore, listening could not be the implementation of previous knowledge since reading what is latent comes during a second moment which cannot be previous to what is marked by what is manifest.

Such reading consists neither of the hermeneutic quest for a hidden or ultimate meaning nor of the interpretative mechanism of paranoid delusions. Listening as reading consists of cutting out and punctuating aspects of the account as signifiers appealing to misunderstanding, polysemy and multivocity of the language, so that with its shifts, substitutions and associations, they provide a basis for producing another expression in what is actually said, something connotated in what is denoted. Similarly, we see that interpretation as a tool would not have another reference outside the account itself, which would be, thus, the substance on which it works since from the empirical fact or event we can only get, and always afterwards, its chronicle or account.

It is also clear that we do not consider that “subjective effect” as a synonym of a rational accumulation of information or knowledge about himself but as the production as a metaphorical effect of a truth that concerns his “psychic reality”. An cutting effect that marks a “before” and “after” state and that could range from surprise, the flow of new associative material to a repositioning in reality since it is not a “real” or “pure” reality but one that is constructed by fictions, of the subject and his context, and thus accessible for revision and re-reading. If the interpretative effect is then an effect of truth for the subject, it will be a discursive truth, that is, not empirical but made up of words and, as a consequence, subject to the ambiguity of language, to how it deletes what has just been said and to the impossibility of saying it all, including the last word. It is necessary then to abandon the illusion of certainty, of being able to tell the “real truth” since it is just about what is believable, which is relative and changeable. Certainty would remain rather on the side of the unconscious ghost or delusions, which insist on the conviction of oracular knowledge.

To sum up, it is interesting how Lacan (1964/1986) places interpretation between “a quote” and “an enigma”. A quote because it relies on the cut-out of a text or a statement that involves the author; an enigma because, as a reading or enunciation, it remains open when said halfway, avoiding the excess that blocks meaning. It is also useful to quote Edward Glover (1970), who wondered about the “accuracy” of interpretation and Heinrich Racker (1981), who considered a “complete” interpretation which comprehended and specified the historical as well as the transferential dimension in order to propose, from our view, that every interpretation could only be inaccurate, as discursive truth that is not certainty, and incomplete, as it would not be possible to tell Everything.
**Fundamental rule and setting**

When Freud proposes the “technical rules” of analysis in that classical text of 1912, he presents them as a result of his experience and, particularly, of the failure of the other attempted paths, hypnosis and suggestion, to make the past emerge in the present. He also presents them as “advice” since they proved to be the most suitable for himself, leaving them open so that other analysts can revise and adapt them. However, he points out that they are summarised in “only one precept” which he names “the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis” composed of that conjunction between “free association” of the analysand and “evenly-suspended attention” of the analyst. This consists of listening to the account “at random”, Freud says and similar to Picasso’s way (Lacan, 1964/1986), like the one who does not search for anything but rather finds. We see then that the “technical rules” are precepts and not requirements, that is, they are conceptual and not instrumental since concepts found or establish a field but they do not close it as there is a singular real, specific for each case, that prevents the closing and making a series. The rule as a precept comes to found a clinical practice, the analytical clinic, according to which devices at the service of its deployment are established. The analytic device would thus have an invariable and unmovable part that is the precept as it cuts out and keeps the specificity of the analytic cure and where are strictness and a variable or movable part that would be what we call “setting”.

We define the term “device”, which has a strong Foucauldian and also informatic resonance, as an organisation of heterogeneous discursive and non-discursive elements that serve a strategic goal, which in this case is the analytic cure. Even though the device can be assimilated into a power relation, that is, one capable of inducing behaviour, we consider it as a sliding depending on how it is used and the contexts. For instance, the device of “didactic” in the institutional context when it functions to transfer and maintain hierarchies, values and ideals that will be left out of the analysis.

The “setting” would be composed of a series of elements: spatial-temporal format (session frequency and duration), use of the divan or “face to face”, according to what favours association in each case, presence or absence of parents in the case of children, etcetera, which make up a setting or container (that is, which contains) inside which the “situation” or analytic “field” takes place, thought as a Gestalt (ground and figure) or rather the analytic “scene”, whose edges could spread even into our dreams like when we dream about the analyst.

The term “setting” is only mentioned by Freud in an obituary for Sandor Ferenczi in 1933 and it is well known that he presented his norms of setting under the title “advice”, that more suitable for each individuality, and that he always opposed what he called a “mechanisation of the technique” since it ignores the “extraordinary diversity of psychic constellations” (Freud, 1912/1980d).

Undoubtedly, the issue of “setting” was promoted to the forefront by theories, clinical practice, tradition and post-Freudian politics, commonly as a sacred ritual, that is, untouchable and on whose strict observance would depend what can be called “analysis” or not, a zeal.
particularly marked concerning what is called “didactic” analysis or “in formation”. Nevertheless, and in that same context, some analysts such as José Bleger (1967) in our environment, suggested that the setting “rigidity” would become a “mute” receptor of the patient’s most primitive or repressed aspects, which tend to remain unanalysed or outside the process. What is rigid as mute is what is not talked about, the sacred as it is not touched by words. He also questioned describing as “resistence” or “attack” any deviation from the setting and illustrated with a well-known case how sometimes its spontaneous variation or rupture “makes it problematic and forces re-elaboration”.

We dare say, due to all that, that the history of psychoanalysis has been and continues to be greatly marked by the confusion as to where to place strictness, which moved from concepts to setting, which changed from being a means into an end in itself. We think that the idea of keeping it at all costs is linked to the need of an illusion of reassurance as to being able to keep the analyst’s position and that he relieves the doubts and anguish of his work, maybe due to the lack of better resources. Is not that, perhaps, part of the role of all liturgy? In it and in the illusion that it covers and that becomes massive, we also include the systematic and ritual use of a tactical resource such as what is called “session scansion”. It was used by Lacan as an alternative to the scansion of the account, easing the end of the session so that he “should not be indifferent to the analysand’s discourse storyline” and should be able to hasten a conclusive moment. It is clear that the end of a session, be it ruled or variable, if it is cut, does not take place without subjective effects. Has it not ever been heard something like “how short the session seemed to me today!” or rather an anticipated “I feel it has been enough for today”? It will be in any case about not depriving oneself a priori of its usefulness due to an attachment to some analytic ideal, in this case, that of the inviolability of the setting.

In turn, the dogma paradox of making the variable fixed can lead to another: that of restoring the master, not only of knowledge but also of time, who was attempted to be removed; threatening to erase the difference between what is inevitably arbitrary in any session length and the mere and simple arbitrariness.

As regards time, the analytic cure undoubtedly needs the time of clocks, successive and diachronic in order to unfold, but also other temporal categories operate on it. Apart from recalling the Freudian premise about the “timelessness” of unconscious desire, “a posteriori re-signification” (Nachträglich) should be placed like the proper time of the analytic operation. It consists of a reading as creation that is built retrospectively to what is read; in this way, the past and history are produced from the present and remain open into the future; a circular time, if you will, but without a closure; asymptotic, as Freud (1937/1980a) took it from geometry.

The time of the analysis is also a time that we can call a time of elaboration, the time of the Freudian “Durcharbeitung” that is a task that escapes chronological time; of a “working through” that concerns the analysand and that could be defined as a “doing something different with repetition”. On the one hand, we link it to logical time and its three moments: seeing, understanding and concluding (Lacan,
1945/1979b) and in particular to the “time for understanding” that can consist of months or years. The puzzle also demonstrates that there is neither knowledge prior to the act nor more certainty than the anticipated, in other words, without a guarantee. On the other hand, we also connect that time to the Freudian (1920) pattern or game “fort-da”, that is to the necessary succession of the object’s presence and absence for elaboration to take place, which would lead to the alternation of sessions and intervals between them as scansion, questioning the idea of “the more frequent, the better”, also generalising this prescription to all cases.

To sum up, there would not be an analysis without some kind of “setting” or “device” that rules it, however flexible it might be, even if it were an “anti-setting” and which needs certain determination as well as willingness to change as deemed necessary.

Desire of the analyst and countertransference
The notion of “Countertransference” has been overloaded throughout the history of analysis, becoming confusing and inaccurate. The term was coined by Freud in 1910, introducing it as an obstacle and interference of the person of the analyst in the cure, of his feelings and values, that is, as a resistance on his part, thus becoming one of the foundations of the need of the analyst’s analysis. We should not forget that Freud placed resistance in the Ego and not in the unconscious. It seems even more transcendental to us the legacy of his own countertransference, sometimes acknowledged by Freud himself and some other times not: ranging from the pressure on Irma for her to accept his solution, passing through the prejudiced anticipation with Dora and the “Homosexual Young Woman” to the subjection exerted on Sergei Petrov, “The Wolf-Man”, whom he later recognised having pushed too much. Yet it was after the ’50s that the notion is taken up again and valued by several authors (P. Heimann, M. Little, H. Racker, D. Winnicott, etcetera), acquiring a new tone that promoted it, also with different nuances, into the status of one of the privileged tools for the cure.

We think “countertransference” as the effect of one of the dimensions of the analytic situation which is the dual relation, of symmetry or complementarity between the Egos, which refers to the reciprocal, “intersubjective” aspect of transference and implies essentially the analyst’s Ego. But this leaves in the dark its asymmetrical aspect, the essential constitutive disparity of transference from which the analytic operation depends and in which the analyst is not a person but a place, evoking rather the role of the lost object.
Freud (1912/1980b) says that the analyst must be like a mirror, “showing nothing but what is shown to him”; Lacan (1955) adds that he must not be “a living mirror but an empty one”. If this place can be designated by a signifier that refers to a subject, like that of “subject supposed-to-know,” it is only about an artifice subject, of the trick that transference entails, since unconscious knowledge is by definition a knowledge without a subject who knows it. This characteristic dimension of the role would be exactly what the Lacanian notion of “desire of the analyst” attempts to formulate and think.

Thinking the analytic role in terms of “desire” has several implications. For the time being, it does not place “the analyst’s knowledge” as the main tool, which would be expectable in the logics of the subject of knowledge and thus questions the role of referential or formal knowledge, the knowledge of theories, in the operating aspect of the role. Besides, it is distinguished from everything that can be formulated as “the analyst’s needs”; that patients be happy with our help, that they confirm our theories or our prestiges, etcetera. As desire will only be enclosed or partially said, leaving a part unsaid that, working as an enigma, will promote transference. It has always been said that, during analysis, one dreams for the analyst; it can also be said then that the “desire of the analyst” is the cause of dreaming.

Even though Freud (1937/1980a) does not call it that way, what he will emphasise as the analyst’s essential tool is his “conviction” in the unconscious, which is the result of his experience with it. A conviction is not knowledge (it does not replace it either) and is rather linked to not knowing and believing. One believes because one does not know; if one knew, it would not be a belief but rather certainty.

It seems to us that the notion of “desire of the analyst” realises that joint or border better than any other, something that joins and separates at the same time, between the role and the person that holds it, emphasising that it cannot work disembodied, that it cannot be without this implication. An embodiment that is not a covering either since the place goes beyond the person as we know there are analytic effects that take place beyond the analyst and even despite the analyst. For his relief or his concern, the analytic effects exceed his capacity to control or direct them. It will have to be evaluated if the analyst trusts his unconscious and the experience he has had with it.

What is under discussion regarding countertransference is not certainly the inevitability of its happening: can we just stop having feelings for patients? Neither the eventual use of confession as a tactical resource. The problematic aspect would be to turn it into a sort of privileged “formation of the unconscious” of the patient but functioning in the analyst, thus giving systematic basis for interpretation and for thinking that analysis takes place and makes progress by the warmth of the dual relationship. Certainly it happens that an analyst dreams about a patient, but in that case he would already be in the position of the analysand. Even less it seems to us that countertransference might be a “via regia” for a hermeneutical and intuitive unveiling of some kind of split unrepresentable archaism.

Perhaps a good summary for this debate could be asserted by Bion (1974) “with countertransference only one thing can be done:
analysing it” which can be expanded into supervision. Nasio (1996) proposes to think it not so much as the relation of the analyst with his patient but as the relation of the analyst with his place. There are things about the person which are not tools of the analyst: for instance, his ideology, altruism, envy or anguish; which does not mean that they cannot be exploited or used in favour of the analyst during an analysis, in particular to place himself in that gap between the place and the person, in order to have clues about how he occupies it, how he enables or blocks it; an issue in which a large part of the analytic effectiveness is at stake.

**Tactics, strategy and policy**

Certain questions about the analyst’s proceedings have become classical, such as: “is it correct to give personal information to patients?” or “is it right to change the timetable every time they ask for it?” or even “is it analytic to visit patients in their houses?” Nowadays questions derived from technological development could be added, such as: “is it valid to attend to patients by phone, via chat or videoconference?” Before just like now, the possible and insatisfactory answer is the same: “Well, it all depends”; on the stage of the analysis, the circumstances and the goals. For instance, it is not the same during the stage of “trial period of analysis” or “entry into analysis” as its final stage; that transference deployment or, on the contrary, its dissolution be what is at stake. Regarding this, Freud's analogy with chess and Lacan's analogy with bridge are well-known in order to think the analytic operation.

In “The Direction of the Treatment”, Lacan (1958/1979a) also borrows from Von Clausewitz, a Prussian war theorist, his distinction between tactics, strategy and policy to consider the use of the analyst’s tools and resources. Each level is distinguished by its goals, which assume decreasing degrees of freedom in the analyst’s actions, being tactics the freest level. We can place tactics at the same level of the analyst’s interventions and operations that would be at the service of maintaining the transference and keeping the analyst’s position operative as strategic goals, at the same time, subordinate to an end of analysis as a political and ethical goal of psychoanalysis. This must not be mistaken for psychoanalysts’ policy and their institutions, which concerns what would be psychoanalysis “at length” and its relations with the socio-cultural environment.

As an example we can raise the issue of “neutrality” and “abstinence” (which Freud presented as a technical rule) and that, precisely, are part of how a person acts in relation to the place of the analyst. We think neutrality as a position, that of suspending the own Ego, its values and prejudices and abstinence as its clinical correlation faced with the request for love. But both concepts are inscribed in the analysis strategy, momentarily leaving aside the problem of “always” and “never” at the tactical level, which can take away freedom of action from the analyst in situations such as responding to an acting out or overcoming a transferential impasse.

We think similarly as regards the use of technology, the telephone and the Internet, whose devices introduced to maximise mass com-
communication seem to produce paradoxically a mass of self-absorbed people. At the strategic level and in agreement with Freud’s intriguing last phrase in “The Dynamics of the Transference” (1912/1980c), “no one can be slain in absentia or in effigie”, we consider that the analysis cannot work with its effectiveness without the real presence of the analyst. If, as Rodríguez Ponte (1996) does, we place at the same level “In absentia” and the symbolic as it is just representation, and “In effigie” with the image, the real dimension of the transference is excluded; what it personalises and not only what it represents, the person of the analyst. We should not forget that what is virtual on the web is not absence but presence, which does not mean to be deprived of its use at the tactical level every time it is deemed useful or necessary with regard to the strategic purposes.

The problem of the psychoanalysis policy as a discipline is that it implies that there is a necessary and permanent need to show its specificity in relation to the other discourses (science, psychiatry, sociology, philosophy) without assuming that it cannot have a dialogue and exchange with them. Particularly, there is a need to show its differences with the policy of the objectifying paradigm, supported by powerful interests, which presupposing a possible direct or pure grasp of what is real through a universal knowledge that is its copy, unfolds categories and classifications that aim at covering all its presentations exceeding what is unique, which assumes as a paradigm the disappearance of the subject. Consequently, that specificity of psychoanalysis also implies the permanent need to question and test its fundamentals and the logical guideline that stems from them: the peculiarity of its object, the unconscious, conditions the specificity of its clinical practice, which is a practice of effects and not goals, determining likewise the specificity of its transmission and teaching.

Training of the analyst
Lacan’s (1964) assertion regarding “the status of the unconscious is ethical” is always interesting. In other words: the unconscious only exists if it is interpreted, for instance, to transform a slip of the tongue into a Freudian slip is a matter of reading, and it is only interpreted if one believes it; it is, to use Freud’s term, conviction-dependent so to speak and is only believed and something is learnt about its operational activity as a result of the experience of being analysed. Finally, what results from this is that the existence of the unconscious basically depends on the analyst’s analysis. It can be said then that the most important tool for an analyst would be his training, which certainly implies but also exceeds the institutional frame or school since it would ultimately be each analyst’s ethical responsibility.

Drawing from its peculiarity as a discipline and from that aporia inherent to the position of the analyst, it becomes clear that psychoanalysis can be neither transmitted nor taught like any other “education” or professional “training” at the risk of diluting its specificity and devaluing it as a discipline. A conviction, just like a desire, where Freud (1937/1980a) holds the “aptitude” to be an analyst is neither entirely rational nor certain, cannot be taught but transmitted in transference, and it cannot be guaranted by validating it with a de-
gree or diploma either; one has it or does not have it and it can even be lost. This impossible bottom line has been historically attempted to be solved by means of meeting various requirements and regulatory demands of the training models, confusing them with their fundamentals.

The correlation of the objectifying paradigm at the ideological level has been, at the level of psychoanalytical training, the idealisation of “academic excellence”, which has promoted the assimilation of some institutes into university and the formalisation of training as a university course of studies. This tends to erase the insurmountable difference which exists between the transmission of an experience and the unconscious, and the teaching of a theory about it. We wonder if this “remedy” comes to veil and unveil, at the same time, a “vocational” crisis, of credibility in psychoanalysis that underlies it and whose initial known effects seem to be rather geared to deepen it. Let us also agree that it is not necessary to demand the acknowledgement of the State to include it in the academic field since other groups or institutions do not even need to be validated; they are established as a university knowledge themselves.

We often listen to or rather read papers, presentations and comments by various analysts in which clinical interpretations or interventions are presented and substantiated “from” or “based on” the ideas of such and such analytical author, sometimes even including the bibliographic citation (no matter whether it may be Bion, Lacan, Aulagnier or Fairbairn).

Honestly, it is difficult for us to believe that such thing can actually happen during a session, in which an analyst usually does not know why he has said what he has said or done what he has done, being his experience rather like “I found myself saying” such and such a thing. In other words, we can say that, during the session, his unconscious and the experience he has made regarding it are accountable for him. We wonder if the appeal to referential knowledge of the theories is not used sometimes as a fetish that intends to conjure the analyst’s hesitations and anguish.

A different scenario is that an analyst needs to render account, share, agree on or validate his clinical experience, which can only be done after it and admitting a non-transferable remainder as a loss regarding that experience which takes place in solitude. This not only includes the appeal to and the work with the texts but also implies the supervision stage and mainly the different situations and spaces for exchange and dialogue among analysts.

**Handmade product vs. standard cure**

We have said that unfolding the account generates production of the unconscious and its interpretation generates production of the subject. This production, though, does not pre-exist the session, which puts on hold previous or referential knowledge about the theories the analyst thinks he possesses in order to bring to the foreground his “savoir faire”; that is, the use of resources, abilities and instruments, usually *sui generis*, in the here and now of the session and which we compare to a handmade product. We also said that operative knowle-
dge in the transference is, above all, the “supposed-to-know” attributed to the place of the analyst, which does not mean that there is an analyst’s “know-how” about how to keep that assumption in operation, how to maintain it so as to generate transference. In connection to this and as another example of how paradoxical the role is, if it is true that it is not convenient to interpret until transference is established, then it is not less true that it is not established if unless it is interpreted.

If we could reproduce exactly what caused a subjective effect in a case with the same result in the following session and with the following patient, there would be a universal technique in the instrumental meaning of the term; but experience tells us that there is nothing but a case by case and session by session pattern. In a handmade product there is a dimension of real which prevents the production of two identical objects, that is there will not be two identical analysis and a series or set will not be constituted with them, for instance: “the analysis of the obsessive” or “the borderline”, in other words what would be a “standard” analysis (see that despite that some people still speak of “standards” for the analyst’s analysis). The opposite to a handmade product would be then the series or mass production as a paradigm; the assembly line or chain produced by a model or prototype or rather a “standard cure”. Regarding this, sometimes Lacan’s “mathe-mes” are considered in that same sense of standard cure, as a common identity which all the clinical practice of the analysts of a group or institution would uniformly refer to.

In connection to this, we have also heard people say that “there is no technique” in psychoanalysis, whereas from our point of view we put emphasis on technical rules as concepts (“Fundamental Rule”). In any case, it could be said that there is no universal technique in the instrumental sense (téchnē) of the term. It is interesting to distinguish here “practice”, which would be the implementation of a theory by means of ruled procedures and which aims at standardising; the universal as a paradigm; from “praxis” defined as a “proceeding with the symbolic over the real” which emphasising what is unique re-creates and tests the theory in each case. It can be said that our paradigm would be that in each analysis and each analyst something of Freud’s original experience could be re-created, in which departing from a position of not-knowing moved from clinical practice to theory, which was a set of hypotheses constructed a posteriori and which changed every time that experience imposed it such as in 1920, when a shift changed the theory. The uniqueness of the subject also imposes that what is good for one is not necessarily good for everyone, in other words, analysis is not a common Good; not only because not everyone is analysable according to the case and the moment but also not everyone is willing to be analysed, not everyone is willing to lose the benefits of suffering.
Just like the carpenter works wood and the goldsmith clay, the artisan analyst’s raw material is the account in transference, text detached from its references and on which he works to cause analytic effects such as: producing and revising history, discovering fixations and losing pleasure, recognising identifications and gaining mobility. Then we see that also some part of the task of historians, men of letters and even orators, coincides with the task of the artisan, a part of rhetorical well-speaking as a style which attempts to convince the interlocutor. Besides, it is obvious, we inherited the general intention to relieve suffering from Medicine, but in the strictly analytical sense of the therapeutic, just like Freud (1912) established and emphasised it. Not only the healing effect of analysis is inseparable from the production of the unconscious in the cure, but this production is the very condition of such effect.

At the end of this journey, we think we have attempted to provide evidence that taking the place of the analyst, or better said trying to do it, is, believe me, quite a difficult and complex task, which does not exclude its thrill, though, to the naked eye, it would seem that it is just a matter of settling down on a sofa while people tell their life stories.

Abstract
This paper discusses the analyst’s tools and resources that operate in the production of analytical effects. As a premise, it is proposed that the sum of those tools are condensed into one: the analyst himself as an instrument. A journey is proposed where different topics are deployed. The position of the analyst split in the dimension of the role and the person. The question of listening and interpretation defined more by its effect retrospectively than his intention a priori. The device for the cure constituted by an unchanging precept, the “Fundamental rule” and a variable part: the “Setting”. The distinction between tactics, strategy and policy to think the use of the resources of the analyst. The importance of his training as an essential tool and the conception of analysis as a handmade product that makes it impossible to establish a standard.

Keywords: Countertransference, Desire of the analyst, Setting, Psychoanalytic training, Interpretation, Fundamental rule.

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If psychoanalysis discoverer had imagined life in this millennium, with such radical changes fostered by developments in science and technology, could he have envisioned that notions of time and space would be disrupted? That people from different locations would be connected by means of a new form of presence, in real time, in spite of millions of kilometres in between? Could any inhabitant at the turn of the 20th century have been able to imagine that intimacy would lean towards once unthinkable ways of sharing everyday life, even its most trivial details with thousands of individuals at the same time, just as it is happening in this Cyber Era? Probably a century ago, when Freud wondered about the future of psychoanalysis, it was difficult to foresee the characteristics of such future. Throughout a century, his visions sparked off a movement that instead of remaining in clinical practice has mixed with culture and has extended in many countries around the world. Surely the first IPA members would be happily surprised to know that the institution they founded in 1910 currently has members from more than fifty nationalities who, from different continents, are working together through what now is part of our everyday life: virtual networks. What a hundred years ago, even thirty years ago, could be thought of as science fiction, is now part of our daily life in which little by little we all get immersed, since new ways of relationships enabled by technological advances have undoubtedly led to a shocking twist in contemporary social configurations. For my generation, this has implied a rapid change, but for children born in the 21st century, the immediacy of any encounter, which can also be simultaneous with countless people, is just a usual situation. Virtuality as part of life and life affected by virtuality in

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many ways now make up an important element in the subjectivity of our era, in which the modes of relation and sense are being radically changed.

We only have to notice the way the infinite multiplication of video and photographic images has become the modality in which many times capturing the image rather than the having an experience seems to be what matters. In this sense, the image, the screen, in different virtual means including Skype, impose the issue of image as presence, as tale, as “mirror” in countless “selfies” that circulate in the networks, and as a way of being connected with the whole world through shared images, many times in “real time”. This permanent and constant connection among thousands of people is giving another meaning to farewells since with virtuality, someone’s absence can be somehow disguised. Between the illusion of the screen and spatial reality, a new form of presence has been created. The immediacy of any communication, access to and, usually, excess of information, including the most trivial details of almost anyone who wishes to exhibit their life online, gradually change the public-private criteria, through the more and more indispensable use of thousands of devices through which a sort of window to another space-temporary dimension has been created; a dimension very different from the one in which we move around in the absence of technology. Virtuality does away with frontiers and geographic distances, while other maps are outlined, now in the cyberspace, whose points of encounter make it possible for people from different countries to be at the same virtual point at the same time via Skype. All of this has an inevitable incidence in the field of culture in which we are immersed, which we are a part of and which is part of us as well. The possibility of virtual relationships opened up a new chapter on reflection, research, experiences gathering and probably theoretical developments emerging from this situation which, as analysts, we cannot refrain from without elaborating on the scopes, limitations, possibilities or risks implied in a virtual psychoanalytical relationship. However, given the fact that this type of relationship imposes itself as a new mode of being in contact with one another, it is not surprising that more and more often we know that remote relationships have also extended to the practice of colleagues who analyse or supervise on Skype.

The circumstances in which you access this type of situations are peculiar, but they are embedded in the practice that we perform in an era when, in all kinds of relationships, virtuality has come to be a part of life. Contemporary language is filled with new terms that account for the use of countless devices and it is common for analysts to talk about their virtual relationships or their experiences on the web, whether on Skype, Facebook, chat rooms, Twitter or any other. There is not the slightest doubt that in the last years, technology has radically changed the usual modes of relationships with all the implications that affect the form of subjectivation in the modern world. There are many studies on the way culture impacts, with its changes, even on symptomatic configurations and on multiple issues that we, as analysts, face.
A few years ago, for example, people started to talk about “new pathologies”, to include understanding of symptomatic manifestations different from the ones that prevailed at the dawn of psychoanalysis. They talked about psychoanalysis boundaries and boundary psychoanalysis to account for new theoretical conceptions and modifications in the technique that enabled a psychoanalytical approach for issues that are far from being the neuroses on which Freud based his theories. Nevertheless, we can say that we are on the verge of other frontiers behind which there is still plenty to explore, to outline the theoretical mapping on these new virtual territories and thus to be able to establish some points of reference that allow us to keep the specificity of our practice in a changing world.

Opening the research on these cases can only happen through experience. What technology is promoting now as a way of life opens up a new chapter in the history of humankind. Now we can repeat, at the dawn of the 21st century, the same question Freud posed at the beginning of the 20th century: what is the future for psychoanalysis? For the time being, what is happening in these new virtual spaces within our field of action is facing us with a completely new situation for psychoanalysis practice. Faced with the possibility of a remote analytical relationship, does it only have to do with a new possible framework? I believe the issue is much deeper and more delicate than that. Relationships on Skype have revolutionised the notions of space and time, the main cornerstones of human experience. Guidelines and rhythms in contemporary world life, so marked by an ever more rapid speed, have turned immediacy into a feature that alters waiting time and subjective perception of time. Virtuality makes distances disappear and new ghostly geographies that obliterate absence open up.

This is the world we live in. In this world we are part of, even if we wanted to oppose the advancement of technological developments, it is inevitable that little by little psychoanalysts will have to find new ways to “inhabit” the new spaces which everyday life is leading us towards. This era’s challenge implies new paradigms regarding time and space, presence or absence, reality or illusion. As for psychoanalysis practice within those new coordinates, an unprecedented chapter is opened. Resistance to change can make it difficult to open the possibility of going into the experience of analysis by virtual means, at least to know it and be able to have a more accurate opinion or standpoint with respect to the scopes, limits and risks of analysis on Skype. Nonetheless, as I have already mentioned, such experience is necessary as any other clinical experience from which theories are later withdrawn. There will surely be those who consider it is impossible to initiate or maintain a kind of relationship in this
way, although undoubtedly the study of virtuality and remote relationships, analytical or not, poses new questions for psychoanalysis.

As a starting point, there is all that implies a change in traditional notions of presence and absence, closeness or distance, or the adding of new notions such as “virtual world” to the notions of inner and outer world. Illusion drawing from images is no longer only an issue of perception, but of experience, and the amount of hours people invest on relationships on the computer account for it. New forms of relationships open the issue on narcissistic or object bonds from a different perspective. Space is no longer only real space, or transitional spaces, virtual spaces count on another logic opened to this new form of being with the other. When logged on Skype, a given person is alone in a room, but at the same time is with someone who is actually not there. How does one deal here with the issue of internal-external, self-not self, specularity and otherness, based on another one who is, but at the same time is only an image projected on the computer? Predominance of the visual, the form and the word do not substitute for presence, but at the same time replace it. It is and it is not, and not only as regards possible projections, but as a presence that is neither internal nor external, but located in a space created by new technologies: cyberspace. Can we, psychoanalysts, ever inhabit that space? I remember very well the work that a Brazilian colleague, Marcio de Freitas Giovannetti (2004/2006)¹, submitted a few years ago at the 25th Conference organized by the Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies of Latin America (FEPAL for its acronym in Spanish). In his work, he mentioned different situations in contemporary clinical practice in which a traditional analysis could not be implemented and therefore it was necessary to gradually build, with each analysis, a possible analytical setting. The idea behind his paper was the necessary hospitality concerning the openness to otherness, foreignness or difference. In this sense, hospitality in relation to new things in psychoanalytical clinical practice that constantly faces us with unknown situations and pushes us towards new paradigms, highlighting the subjectivity inherent to this era of no places², acceleration, lack of permanence and referents deprived of intimacy spaces. With this in view, he argued that if psychoanalysts are capable of creating the necessary conditions of intimacy so that associations can be free and that attention can float, there is no reason why the possibility of approaching the human soul cannot exist. I completely agree and I think that even when he did not refer to Skype, this also applies to the possibility of creating the necessary conditions to hold a remote analysis, although the complexity of everything that is at stake in these virtual spaces takes us into yet unexplored areas. But, is it not

¹ Marcio de Freitas Giovannetti is member of the Brazilian Psychoanalysis Society in São Paulo. His work “La hospitalidad, hoy, en la clínica psicoanalítica” was read at the Plenary of the 25th Latin American Conference on Psychoanalysis and published on Revista Brasileira de Psicanálise in 2006.

² Term coined by Marc-Auge to refer to anonymous and temporary places. It alludes, by opposition, to the sociological concept of “place” associated by the ethnological tradition with that of culture located in time and space.
based on these situations that exceed the frontiers of our knowledge that psychoanalysis remains valid? However, besides the dimensions of presence-absence, close-far, image-person and so many others that have to be re-thought, the issue of virtual encounter has multiple spatial possibilities.

In the usual psychoanalytical frameworks, an important aspect has been the location of the analysand in the space of the office. Divan or chair? Face to face or without eye contact? When considering the possibility of Skype analysis, new situations can be posed. Where should the screen through which the analyst is present be placed? Far away? On a chair or desk? On the analysand’s knees? Many possibilities arise. No doubt the transferential maintains the guidelines of the encounter and what can still determine these positions, in which everything is at stake with each movement, just like any other analysis modality based on interpretation, though with the lack of corporeality that limits the perceptive field of encounters. What is imposed with the perceptive limit is the real body that is left out, but in my opinion, this could strengthen the creation of ghosts.

We are used to thinking, drawing from the transferential logics, that an analyst “is and is not” at the same time. Now we have to add the fact that he “is there, but is not there”. In this sense, we are talking about unprecedented situations, not only in the history of psychoanalysis, but in all fields of study that work around the human being. For us, psychoanalysts, the necessary research entails the possibility of using technology as a tool in the encounter between an analyst and an analysand in situations that would not be possible otherwise, but without attempting in any way to make it the same as a “traditional” analysis. Tools can be used to build different things; now with psychoanalysis and technology tools, we are in the process of building something that will never be the same as what we have done so far, even if it can, with all its differences, have much in common. We are on the verge of a new frontier: the limits of what is possible, with the implicit renouncement, faced to new possibilities opened to a new way of analytical intervention that may require some term to mark its specificity. “Psychoanalysis” or “psychoanalytical therapy” probably do not include in the same names the dimension of a virtual framework. However, regarding whether it is possible or not to work psychoanalytically in a remote relationship, I think there cannot be rigid or general schemes here. That is part of the hospitality that entails opening up to every encounter in the possible conditions of different rhythms and possibilities of each process in itself. There are those who adapt very well to this model and those who could never establish it. Some time ago, the debate revolved around analysability or lack of analysability in some people, according to their structures or characteropathies. I have always been on the side of those who think that the possibility also depends upon each analyst’s capacities and limits when faced with a particular analytical situation. Similarly, I think that in virtuality there are cases when an analytical process can be triggered and cases when it definitely cannot, just as it happens with analyses
where the real presence of two participants, analyst and analysand, does not guarantee either the process to be triggered.

I have no doubt that some analysts manage to establish true analytical fields with their analysands in a virtual space while others cannot, or will not, implement this resource and also think that not everyone can be analysed under these conditions. As in any relationship, love quality and depth do not depend upon the frequency with which one person is with another one, nor the distance or position they adopt, but upon the quality of the established bond. The divan or the chair is the form, but I join those who think this does not guarantee the background. It may be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition. In the case of virtuality, the quality of the bond that is established depends upon many conditions that are at stake through one by one in each situation. For example, if there was a previous experiential process before the circumstances that lead to virtuality. If virtuality intersperse with face-to-face sessions. If the possibility of a session on Skype is a helping tool that enables the continuity of a process when some external factor really makes it impossible or if, on the contrary, serves the resistance or incapacity to tolerate the absence, as it would be to block the fruitfulness of some cut, such as holiday interruptions, travels, and so on, bypassing the frustration or anguish of separation by turning to Skype. Like in all situations, I think that each one of these possibilities, if they are part of an analytical relationship, must be approached from the transferential situation. There is absolutely no way to establish a pattern that can be generalised. It is true, however, that in order to enable a framework, it is necessary to find a way of continuity that frames all encounters and, as in any analysis, the framework must be clearly established and, if altered, it will also set guidelines for interpretation.

Nevertheless, faced with the doubt about the way transference could be deployed, is a virtual presence not filled with ghosts and projections? Does the frustration inherent to the impossibility of the real encounter not play an important role, too? There is no doubt about the deployment of transferential passions. If all sorts of loving relationships are held remotely through virtuality, why could transferential love not be deployed? We know by experience that the possibility to create intimacy does not depend upon physical closeness, but upon emotional closeness, words, gestures, silence that make the other person in the screen, in this case the analyst, the holder of the same projections when there is a possible relationship.

Vignette

We usually talk about clinical situations using vignettes of analysands, who we keep anonymous. In this case, it is the analyst who will remain anonymous and I will share something of my experience as a patient, or analysand, in a virtual modality, something that only a few years ago seemed impossible to me. Previously, throughout many years, I had long periods of analysis and, when considering the idea of going back to it, I could not conceive the possibility of there not being a divan. However, several years ago I started having some supervision on Skype with colleagues from other countries and thus I began to get immer-
The experience of this form of analysis has been very rich, though completely different from my previous analytical paths, of course. Unquestionably, the process took place and has helped me with something I had not been able to approach before; I believe this was possible because, despite the unreal presence, but virtual, my analyst's listening and ability of empathic closeness have enabled, not only a form of remote analysis, but also the crossing of my own psychic boundaries at the limit points in which during previous experiences I had stopped. Perhaps many of the specific conditions of this analysis in particular have fostered this. I guess I will only know that a posteriori. So far, I can say that after two years of virtual analysis, I have recently been able to visit the country where my analyst lives and had my first face-to-face session. The first thing that called my attention when I saw him outside the screen was his height and eye colour. With this, it became evident to me that imagination imposes on the analyst's real presence that under these conditions can be even more ghostly than behind the divan. Even if the relationship takes place face to face behind a screen. Thus, undoubtedly a subject of my imagination in the manifest field and surely holder of multiple projections determined by the transferential relationship, in my experience his listening capacity and his enlightening interpretations have enabled the analytical act to be the engine of a process that has shaped a particular framework remotely and, mainly, a possible analysis. Nonetheless, I do not know if lack of an initial real contact would work in all cases. I am not sure that all analyses of this kind can be held without a prospective real presence. In my case, previous years of analysis have probably been important to be able to sustain such an experience. Usual frustration in analysis, in view of the necessary lack of gratification from the analyst, is put into practice on the distance by means of the ordinariness of an encounter which, in my case, could not happen any other way.
What I intend to highlight is that I do not believe generalisations can be made and that the scopes and limitations of this new framework must be posed on the one-by-one feature of individuality. To me, it has been a process of transformation on aspects that could not be approached in my previous analytical experience. I confess it does not cease to amaze me. However, I have no doubts about the limitations and the emptiness that are left by non-corporeality of real presence and everything it precisely triggers and that should be examined, at some point, as an aspect that gives way to others, unprecedented and specific to this type of relationship where though being literally alone, you are at the same time accompanied.

New subjectivities, new pathologies, modifications to technique, new tools, with their scope and limitations. We cannot make an analogy with traditional psychoanalysis, even when the bases are the same. It may be suggested, as at one point it was with psychotherapy, which was said to be copper and yet due to its results is an invaluable help for many people. As I have already written, analysis on Skype may deserve to coin some term that provides it with its specificity. It is definitely not an analysis according to the parameters established by Freud, but an unprecedented new situation. The analytical relationship on Skype is one of the many forms of human relationships in the modern world. The capacity to open spaces of intimacy and closeness overgrow the precision of a situation in which, on the other hand, the office as a shared space fosters it, but not necessarily guarantees it. I happily remember that André Green (2003/2005) claimed that in view of variations in the technique, the way to keep an analytical listening depends more upon the analyst’s internal framework than upon formal circumstances. This is obvious with Skype. As a tool, the approach has some serious limitations, but it also poses unprecedented scopes in front of which it is necessary to cross our resistance to new things in order to be able to position ourselves within the subjectivity typical of this millennium, and what is yet to come.

I will finish this paper with a phrase posed by conceptual artist Claudia Rodríguez, who in one of her works played with the verb “to be”, in such a way that it seems to reflect the different meanings of ‘being’ in virtuality. She says: “Though sometimes you are not there, you are, and though sometimes you are not, you are there”.

Note: In September 2014, the Remote Psychoanalysis research team, an independent team subsidised by an IPA Research Group sent members and candidates a survey designed to gather opinions regarding the practice of psychoanalysis using communication technologies including videoconference. This is where the motivation to write this paper and to share an experience came from.

Abstract

Relationships by Skype have revolutionised the notions of space and time, fundamental pillars of human experience. Virtuality makes distances disappear and ghostly geographies are opened and they obliter rate absence by means of a virtual space that enables new and unprecedented forms of presence and temporality. This has become part of
today’s everyday life. For psychoanalysts, the new technology tools open up unprecedented possibilities in human relationships, which are inaugurating a new chapter in the clinical, technical and theoretical research of our praxis. We are on the verge of new frontiers behind which there is much to explore in order to outline the map on these new virtual territories, and thus, to be able to establish some landmarks that allow us to maintain the specificity of our practice in a changing world.

**Keywords:** Psychoanalysis, The virtual thing, Absence, Space, Framework.

**References**


Miguel Alejo Spivacow*

A tool from our therapeutic arsenal: Psychoanalytic couple therapy

Psychoanalytic couple therapy has consolidated as a therapeutic option in our discipline and constitutes a habitually used tool. Many colleagues recommend this kind of treatment and also many couples request it spontaneously, posing the idea that what “doesn’t work” has more to do with the relationship than with them as individuals.

Several questions arise from this re-configuration in the toolbox of our therapeutic resources. Does couple psychotherapy have any clinical usefulness that distinguishes it from an individual psychoanalytic therapy? In which cases does it constitute a more convenient option than other kinds of therapy? Which are its main theoretical references? How does one work with it? Perhaps, before dealing with these questions, it is worth making it clear what is understood by psychoanalytic couple therapy since there are different kinds of treatment related to couples. It is a kind of psychotherapy which is supported by the set

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of theoretical-clinical developments that make up psychoanalysis and which uses self-knowledge as well as knowledge of the partner’s and the bond’s psychic functioning as a path to reach psychic change; it is neither directive nor does it propose that the couple adapt to any operating model. Its goal is not to “save” the couple from terminating, but to promote the mental growth of its members in the sense that Bion gave to this concept and it is to that extent that it favours the convenient functioning for the relationship. It shows a series of characteristics, then, that we will gradually describe.

Now, before dealing with the specific points which characterise psychoanalytic couple therapy, it is important to point out that clarifying its usefulness is a significant issue. We are still close to the times when for many colleagues the only psychoanalytically legitimate therapeutic proposal was a treatment with divan of three or four weekly sessions, with the sad consequences that brought about for our discipline, mainly that of losing some of its place in contemporary society. The issue that concerns us is more than a discussion about a psychoanalytic practice, it is basically about discussing how we imagine psychoanalysis in the current world; if it seems suitable to us or not that it meets today’s men and women, adapting the therapeutic proposals according to the needs and possibilities of the present time; if we want to promote or not a psychoanalysis integrated to the contemporary society, thinking it, thinking ourselves and offering solutions in the therapeutic field. The issue is how much we listened to Freud (1919/1990) when he said that it is to “our therapy that we undoubtedly owe the position we have in the society of men…” (p. 155).

The consultation. Analysis of the clinical situation.

Let us imagine a couple who makes a consultation and asks for an opinion about which kind of treatment they should undergo. The suffering that motivates the request for help can be varied —birth of children, “empty nester”, the so-called communication problems, violence in the bond, etcetera— but what is essential in order to decide whether it is appropriate or not to undergo couple treatment is not related to suffering in itself but to establish in which psychic functioning they take root. In fact, they can take root in issues that are predominantly placed in the intrasubjectivity of one or both members—duels, traumas— as well as in predominantly relational issues—disagreements or violence between them— and, in general, they are mixed situations, in which the individual and relational aspects intertwine in several ways. In that complex clinical situation, the central key to decide what kind of treatment to propose involves establishing the relative weights of the intersubjective and intrasubjective in the problem at stake. More colloquially, if it is about problems in one or both members or problems between them. Actually, what happens between people is different from what happens within people; the bond dynamics and the intrasubjective aspect constitute psychic dimensions that cannot be reduced one to the other and —let us add— in the special case of the couple it frequently happens that during the individual treatment of one member it is not possible to faithfully...
Psychoanalysis proposed at its beginnings that the intersubjective is completely expressed in the transferences with the analyst, but this has not been demonstrated in the clinical practice. In the bond analyst-patient that unfolds during individual treatments, the varied repertoire of feelings and behaviours that the patient experiences in the couple as well as in other bonds is not completely reproduced. And this, in fact, is quite logical: if the bond is co-constructed in the exchange, will the position of the analyst who does not react emotionally, like the couple, not establish a limitation in the range of possible transferences? It is evident that the relationship with the analyst cannot cover all the range of emotional experiences of the patient (Gabbard & Western, 2003).

At this point, then, the question as to how to define the intrasubjective, intrapsychic or singular and how to define the relational, intersubjective or plural is raised. Here are highly complex questions whose answers are different within each theoretical framework.

Very briefly, the intrasubjective is that which—regardless of its constitution—defines its current characteristics in the internal world (Freud, 1940/2004, p. 207) of the subjects and whose properties, though partially coloured, are basically altered neither by the interaction with the other nor in the bond. Obsessive or hysterical symptoms can be an example: it is about functionings that although are influenced by the intersubjective context, on the basis define its features in the inner being of the person who suffers them.

The intersubjective, on the other hand, is constituted in the exchanges between the members and its functionings acquire their features according to the relationship between two people linked in such a way that the participation of one modifies and redefines the participation of the other, building between both a functioning that, as a result, cannot be understood taking into consideration only one of the participants. This is so because the exchange transforms both participants' subjectivities.

In the peculiar intersubjective context the couple conforms, the concept of bond becomes necessary in order to specify the characteristics of the intersubjective, due to the fact that the encounter is long-lasting. A bond is a space constituted by the investitures between two or more subjects; these investitures have a certain intensity and duration and configure a form of encounter with some relatively consolidated characteristics. The inclusion of a subject into a bond partially determines its individual functioning according to the long-lasting transformations produced in them.

Now, let us resume the question referring to whether analytic couple therapy can be useful or not as a therapeutic tool. Let us see a vignette:

Laura, at 20 years old, fell in love with José, ten years older, who was her professor at the School of Sociology and always valued Laura's admiration and her readiness to satisfy him. They decide on the wedding a short time after Laura's mother dies and she says that
emptiness hastened her wedding. José’s mother has always lived with them and although the relation mother-son entails a huge hidden violence, changing this cohabitation has never been posed as an issue. José says about himself that he is a workaholic.

The last of the three sons leaving home causes a crisis in the couple, and aggressive situations in which they come to hit each other, though resulting in only some bruises and scratches, appear between them. While Laura wants to make up for the duel for the empty nest by intensifying her relationship with José, he wants to restore his narcissistic balance by increasing his work activity. He works more and more, he begins to suffer from excesses with alcohol and day after day has more aggressive behaviour with Laura, who develops intense jealousy for a young executive woman who is José’s colleague.

Laura is undergoing individual treatment once a week and, for 18 years, José underwent treatment from which he was released 5 months ago. In this context, both ask for a couple treatment “because we’ve reached the limit. We fight over anything”.

Laura and José represent the majority of couples who make a consultation. There is no doubt that it would be appropriate to suggest individual treatment for José, just as it would be convenient to evaluate what is happening in Laura’s treatment. Yet, in our opinion, it is also appropriate to propose couple treatment; an opinion which is based not on a personal preference but on certain theoretical concepts which we will gradually put forward.

**Intersubjective aspect. Bond dynamics**

The couple, as it has already been said, makes a consultation due to a variety of sufferings emerging from intrasubjective as well as from intersubjective aspects. Now, in general terms, it is convenient to indicate individual therapy when the purpose is to work intrasubjective functionings since the best way to catch them is by means of individual interviews, which allow a better unfolding of free association. On the other hand, when the intention is to work bonding functionings, the indication is usually couple treatment because as the couple session makes both members meet, it promotes the unfolding of bonding dynamics.

In the analysis of bonding dynamics a series of functionings matter but in a preliminary approach it is worth making reference to the unconscious bi-directionality, to bonding functionings and to unconscious alliances. What constitutes the backbone of intersubjective dynamics, its core, consists in how each one receives the other, in which complex action they meet: the way of treating the other, disagreeing, receiving, holding, rejecting, interpreting, resounding, reaching agreements, softening, enriching, expelling, tuning in, validating, mirroring, manipulating each other. These different actions, depending on which are valid to characterise the encounter, account for how each subject connects with the other. The task imposed to the clinical professional is to establish the signifiers that characterise the bond, that is, to analyse the way of connecting between the members. In this task, a very common activity is to show how each mem-
ber frequently treats the other as a passive object of their fantasy and/or inner world to which the other is fixed in an object representation or relation inherent to that inner world, while the other raises their differences giving rise to a set of psychic work. This range of psychic events is what must show bonding intervention, which we will deal with later.

Intersubjective dynamics is expressed during the session as joint discourse (Spivacow, 2011, pp. 79-80), a term which designates the associative chain that a couple in session produces and which must be distinguished from what Freud called free association. While this is a production of the subject that in theory is interfered by others the least possible in order to better reflect the inner world of which they speak, joint discourse constitutes a weave in which what one says and does gives meaning to the other’s production, each one giving a new meaning to the other’s behaviour and words. Thus, the other’s interferences, their disruptive presence, constitute the material as they reflect the intersubjective. At times, in joint discourse there are paths in which a sort of free association on the part of one of the members flows. But the presence of the other –the couple– is soon evidenced; other who is not the analyst and who answers and interacts spontaneously: not ruled by the rule of withdrawal. Defined in this way, joint discourse must be distinguished from intersubjective dynamics. A couple’s functioning is not the same in the context of their cohabitation as the way they are reflected in session. Couples who experience physical violence, for instance, many times produce a trivial and evasive joint discourse, very different from the aggressive intersubjective dynamics that characterises them. A great deal of technical problems is placed in these gaps.

As a matter of fact, the focus during a couple treatment usually aims at intersubjective dynamics, that is, at what both produce and/or impose on each other as psychic work. Yet –we will go back to this issue later on– clinical situations are always mixed, with intersubjective and intrasubjective functionings and during a treatment things change from one moment to another so that on many occasions the couple analyst must focus on intrasubjective functionings. The intrasubjective aspect does not die during the couple session and cannot be disregarded by the analyst in any sense.

In the case of Laura and José, each one gives feedback to the other’s violence and the importance and empowerment of the aggressive functionings displayed between each other composes the emergency point to be dealt with. Due to this and other reasons we will state that, in our opinion, the therapeutic strategy must begin with a couple therapy, regardless of what can be done in terms of individual treatments as well. What should be done in the first place is to try to stop a circuit in which each member empowers the other’s aggressiveness.
In the following sections we will deepen into the analysis of bonding dynamics in order to clarify that we will be supported on three concepts:

a. unconscious bi-directionality,

b. intersubjective or bonding functionings—which are also called plural—, and
c. unconscious alliances.

### a. Unconscious bi-directionality

The study of bonding dynamics leads us exclusively to the concept of unconscious bi-directionality. In fact, in a bond between two subjects, these are mutually conditioned not only in a conscious-preconscious interinfluence of the kind that works between an answer and a question but also in the unconscious ground. In this way, there will be adjustments and conflicts at the conscious level, while at the unconscious level there will be adjustments stemming from the characteristics of the bond and the subjects. Consequently, certain behaviour of one of them will only be understandable in relation to the behaviour of the other; an issue that becomes essential in a psychoanalytic intervention since the aim is to understand people’s behaviour and especially their unconscious determinations.

Bi-directionality, then, is the quality of psychism according to which the investitures of the participants of a bond suffer mutual modifications, at the level of conscious functionings as well as at the level of the functionings produced in the unconscious, what Freud called deep psychism.

The consequences of considering unconscious bi-directionality in clinical practice are great in all the fields. For instance, just to mention one item, when studying the origin of fantasy, its characteristics depend not only on drives and everything related to psychism which psychoanalysis has typically described, but also on the interinfluences with the significant others in the context, on the semanticisations that they offer the subject and how bi-directionality works among them. A subject’s fantasies do not emerge uni-directionally from deep layers of their psychism.

### b. Intersubjective or bonding functionings

Intersubjective dynamics is just a weave composed by functionings called bonding. They are constituted as such according to the participation of both members and comply with Kaës’ condition: “neither one without the other, nor without the bond that ties and holds them” (Kaës, 2007, p. 248). The redefinition of the subjectivity of the other which is verified in them according to bi-directionality is particularly important at the unconscious level. An example of this kind of functionings can be the problems which Piera Aulagnier (1979) described as alienations in which a subject’s desire of self-alienation

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–supposedly the victim– coincides with a desire to alienate another subject –supposedly the victimiser–. Another example can be violent couples in which one supports and gives feedback to the other, such as Laura and José.

Postulating the existence of functionings that cannot be covered considering only one subject means distinguishing us from other theories of psychism, in the first place from Freudian theory, which does not describe this type of events. On the other hand, it implies a strong proximity to Winnicott when he asserted that “a baby cannot exist alone, but they are essentially part of a bond” (Davis & Wallbridge, 1988, p. 48).

The description of these functionings allows us to place more clearly the specificity of bonding approaches, in which they unfold with their true breadth, while they do not work in the same way in an individual framework. The bonding session, unlike the individual one, enables a vivid approach focused on them.

The rigid and stereotyped interactions for which couples very frequently make a consultation usually arise from bonding functionings.

César and María argue during the session in a quite monotonous and repeated way.

Maria: I’m fed up with cleaning the mud which they bring from the garden. I’m his and the boys’ maid, and he doesn’t even say anything to them. At least he could say something to the boys. The girls are better companions.

César: (approaches his body provocatively) Listen to me, in general I pay attention. It happened once, on Sunday. And, besides, you won’t die if you have to clean the mud just once. I work fifteen hours six days a week and I don’t complain. The rest of the week I was paying attention all the time and telling the boys. Even you recognised on Friday that I was trying to change my behaviour about this. And truth is (he changes the tone and speaks more softly) that I am better, and you too... We are much better (looking at the analyst).

Maria: (in a loud and piercing voice) You don’t complain??!! Come on!!!

Maria usually complains all the time about everything César does with the boys, as if they were an opposing team. Every time something like this happens, César fights back in some way, without stopping to consider where the complaint comes from. Attack and counterattack make up two poles of a rigid bonding functioning in which María complains about the boys and César physically provokes María.

Most of the time, couple treatments are devoted to clinical work about bonding functionings, making bi-directionality explicit, that is, the different meanings that the other’s behaviour acquires for each one and keeping the corresponding unconscious alliances on the horizon.

Raquel and Alejandro have been married for thirty years and make a consultation because Alejandro’s third extra-marital relationship has
just been discovered.

Raquel: He wants to do whatever he feels like doing. The other
day he said in a meeting that I was to blame for everything. Now he
says that he will change the cell phone's password and he won't give
me the new one. Then, how can I trust him?

Alejandro: If she wants the cell phone, here it is.

Raquel: But he removed all his stuff! He doesn't receive any mails
or text messages there anymore!

The argument goes on for a long time with Alejandro avoiding
and trivialising and Raquel accusing him fiercely. She gradually pla-
ces herself as a frenzied prosecutor and he gradually takes the place
of a wet chicken.

This kind of dialogues are very frequent. Raquel is all the time
accusing Alejandro, who at the beginning ignores her and when the
situation is about to get out of control, he obeys. Alejandro's suppo-
sed obedience infuriates Raquel, who makes even more accusations,
thus reviving the vicious circle.

c. Unconscious alliances. Roles
and distribution of psychic work
Clinical work on intersubjective dynamics, bi-directionality and
bonding functionings lead to the intersubjective formations that
constitute their support in the unconscious: unconscious alliances.
In fact, when a relationship acquires some intensity and duration, co-
des, ways of being, forms of behaviour which reach a certain stability
start to be generated, that is, bonding functionings which characteri-
se that bond gradually consolidate: shared semanticisations and gui-
delines regarding what is allowed and what is prohibited, similarities,
differences and oppositions. In a couple bond then, on the one hand,
there is an association centred in a shared interest, that is, a conscious
alliance (to start a family, to be partners, to live together), while, on
the other hand, there are unconscious articulations and attachments
that underlie the conscious alliance.

These varied attachments, by consolidating, generate forms of
distributing the psychic work, like the work division described in the
production processes in economy. In small groups, the most univer-
sal phenomenon that can illustrate this distribution is the leadership
function that some members assume and others delegate, while in
the couples one can see that one member is in charge of the hou-
se, the other of the economic income, one of the relationship with
friends, the other of health issues, in a nutshell, one can see that there
is such an organisation that some members assume certain tasks that
others delegate on them, that is, a role distribution gradually sett-
les, partly consciously and partly unconsciously; an assignment that
many times acquires the form of polarisations (passionate/rational,
spender/thrifty, fighter/peaceful, active/passive, etcetera). They also
imply a peculiar distribution of power; the axis around which many
bond conflicts revolve.

These processes take place based on what each member contri-
butes as background previous to the bond and also based on mutual
adjustments which do not exclude violence. Like cogs or constituent parts of an articulation, each subject gradually places themselves in a certain subjective position which balances with the positions of the other, so that they adopt and/or discard certain ways of being and functioning, they do certain things and do not do others. According to these assemblies, each member reaches a certain level of narcissistic, trophic or destructive homeostasis in the bond with more or less stability.

Kaës has called these unconscious knots of investitures or hidden articulations unconscious alliances.

I have called “unconscious alliance” an intersubjective psychic formation built by the subjects of a bond to reinforce in each one of them, and to establish, on the basis of that bond, the narcissistic and objectal investitures necessary [for the bond], the processes, functions and psychic structures they need [ ... ]. The alliance is built in such a way that the bond acquires a decisive psychic value for each subject (Kaës, 2007, p. 248).

Unconscious alliances constitute the basis of the repetitive bonding functionings that take place in a bond and, at the same time, consolidate as a result of these repetitive interactions. There is another part of the interactions between the members of a bond that are never organised in repetition phenomena. Thus, in a bond two modes of relationship are verified: some forms of repetitive interaction and other forms of interaction that cannot be sent into repetition phenomena. Obviously, when we speak of repetition it must be clarified that it is never an identical repetition, but a repetition in difference, an event that has a core of repetition but also components that show a difference.
Therapeutic project

Having specified the fundamental concepts that as couple analysts we add to our traditional psychoanalytic background, we are in a better position to answer the key question that arises faced with a couple that makes a consultation: what kind of treatment should we propose? Individual, couple or another kind?

The main part of the answer has already been anticipated and it is that it can only be answered on a case-by-case basis. But couple treatment is especially useful when bonding functionings prevail in the conflicts that trigger the crisis since the session allows a vivid and focused approach on these functionings.

However, the idea is not that faced with any relational problem a bonding therapy must be proposed. The choice of this kind of treatment must consider a set of factors and, in fact, there are cases in which a bonding device is not the best, as it usually happens in the couple crises arising when relationships with third parties are discovered. In these situations the possibility of psychic elaboration is usually very fragile within the bonding framework due to the difficulty in speaking and thinking freely before the other member.

There are also cases in which the conflicts that cause the consultation are mainly intrasubjective, but the one who suffers them neither suffers for them nor recognises them as problems – addictions, characteropathies – and the one who “denounces” them is the other member. In these situations, bonding treatment constitutes the best possible option since otherwise there would not be any treatment.

Unfortunately, there are many exceptions to any rule and this is what is meant when asserting that the decision must be made on a case-by-case basis. Another issue to be considered is the desire of those who make the consultation. If they strongly want to undergo couple therapy we must have very good reasons not to accept their desire. There are psychic functionings that are only envisioned and understood during the treatment.

On the other hand, it is important to make it clear that it is not a valid project for a psychoanalytic therapy to perpetuate a marriage or to avoid a separation. The proposal is to work with what happens to them and to help them think and decide about that. Regarding this ... which are the couples with more possibilities to continue together and with a better dyadic adjustment after a bonding treatment? In my experience, the best result is obtained with the couples who keep mutual enthusiasm beyond the conflicts and say “we kill each other but we love each other”, “we want to be together but we can’t talk, we need a translator”, “we don’t know what is happening with us, but we fight a lot”. They are partners who, in some way, are “prisoners” of the love for each other, and the desire to be together and to make a difficult relationship more pleasant is the great engine of the therapy. The desire to be together does not prevent them from being overwhelmed by aggressions, misunderstandings and confusions. In a great number they have undergone or are undergoing individual therapies that due to several reasons have not led to improvements in the conflicts between them. An explanation for this, which is valid many times, is
that in the individual framework the intersubjective functionings between the partners cannot be tuned in all their complexity, and only the presence of the other with the consequent unfolding of exchanges that do not appear in the individual session enables an elaboration of the bonding conflicts.

**Bonding interventions**

When the clinical need is to work bonding functionings, the most specific technical resource is bonding intervention, whose features we will describe here.

The central goal of this form of intervention is to clarify and/or modify the way in which several members of a plurisubjective group contribute so that a psychic functioning adopts the shape it adopts, which is a great difference with the interpretation described by Freud, which aims at working the way in which a unique subject participates in a psychic functioning. While the Freudian interpretation aims mainly at the intrasubjective dynamics, bonding intervention aims at the intersubjective dynamics. Its main goal is to clarify and work on the participations of both members of the couple. It is not targeted at one subject but at both, whom are considered protagonists of the psychic functioning in question and tries, with an adequate timing, to enlighten the functionings responsible for the conflict, paying special attention to how this is built by both. While the Freudian interpretation aims at deciphering the singular desire and conflict coordinates, bonding intervention aims at showing how a subject influences the other, consciously as well as unconsciously, how each one activates or deactivates certain functionings in the other, how a psychic functioning is built and fed back between both of them. This is a great difference between bonding intervention and other psychoanalytic clinical tools, which only analyse a singular psychism. A usual way of bonding intervention is to tell them that “when you –X– do that, which does not have consequences for you, you don’t realise that it results in her/his reaction. On the other hand, when you –Y– react like that, you don’t realise that it results in her/his reaction... Then it turns out that both, nobody knows why, suffer for being in a bond with such and such characteristics...”.

The act of addressing two people at the same time, who are generally in conflict, implies a multiplicity of technical issues. The main one is that faced with the analyst’s words one person may feel supported, offended or misunderstood, while the other may feel just the opposite. The options are infinite but, in sum, the intervention is addressed at two people who react differently and interact in an environment of confrontation, with different defensive systems, so that the analyst’s words are always included in a field of alliances and powers at stake; a situation to which he needs to pay attention all the time.

The act of addressing two people, both present and in conflict, many times, results in the fact that when the analyst wants to show one’s way of functioning and consequently intervenes, the other makes a contribution which unbalances the chances of a peaceful insight. The partner, let us remember, does not work like the analyst in
the Freudian device, that special interlocutor ruled by abstinence. In a plurisubjective device what happens is what Kaës (2005) points out: “Every difficulty and every bet of the process attempted in the group psychoanalytic situation lies in the fact that the others ‘respond’, while that ‘other’ who is the psychoanalyst does not respond, or not in the same way” (p. 43).

Bonding intervention, due to the fact that it constantly considers the intersubjective dynamics, usually focuses on psychic functionings in a way somehow different from the Freudian interpretation. It is common, in fact, that the members of a couple are stereotyped when relating with the partner disregarding their condition of an external other, assimilating them to an internal object, and it is also common that this fundamental aspect of intersubjective conflicts cannot be properly deepened in the individual device. Bonding intervention especially focuses on detecting and showing whether the internal objects tend to be replaced or not by subjects in which an autonomous internal world is recognised.

Apart from that, as regards what constitutes its formulation and design, bonding intervention may acquire the most varied forms and is not characterised by any formal feature. We can say about it what Freud (1911/1980, p. 87) said about technical issues: there are many ways to do things well but there are also some ways to do them badly and from this point stems the relevance of discussing and comparing the different options.

Bonding interventions are by no means the only which are used in a couple treatment. At different moments, it is necessary to implement interventions addressed at working what is unique in one partner. Those interventions must take place taking the precaution of
keeping in mind how they impact on the intersubjective dynamics. Couple therapy tends to place the intersubjective dynamics in the foreground and to focus clinical work from it, but a focus at all costs can artificially distort the understanding of psychic events, by not giving the adequate value to the weight of the intrapsychic in bonding functionings and in psychic events in general. In a bonding treatment the intrasubjective cannot be disregarded in any sense, an intolerable position in a psychoanalytic approach and, it goes without saying, adequate knowledge of the intersubjective is not possible if the intrasubjective is disregarded and vice versa.

The Freudian interpretation and bonding intervention constitute an analyst's tools that aim at promoting psychic change through different paths and, consequently, the clinical management of transference is different. In individual analysis, the transference with the analyst is given a central role and from the work done on it the most significant results regarding psychic change are expected. But the situation is different in couple treatments in which the proposal is to analyse relational problems and the partners should work on issues between them. The result is an interdiscursivity, joint discourse, which allows a privileged approach to transferences between partners, which we call intracouple transferences and which will be described in the next section. The other forms of transference are present and, of course, have effects, but they are deployed in a more limited way.

The issue of transference/s and psychic change

It is widely known that psychoanalytic theory closely correlates the possibility of subjective change with the establishment and interpretation of transference but, we should not forget, it is understood in many different ways in our discipline. Of the many attributed characteristics, there is relative agreement that the possibility of psychic change closely depends on the analyst being transferentially vested. His words are heard and in the patient's universe he acquires an authority position since he receives –through repetition– the investitures that the authorities of childhood received. Likewise, there is relative agreement that the transferences signal the focus on which unconscious desire is updated more intensely and, thus, they constitute points which the analyst must consider.

Having said that, though it is usual for analysts when referring to “the” transference to allude to the transference with the analyst, transferences are vested in several people from the subject’s universe so the analyst is not the only person who acquires a transferential value in the analysand's life. Thus, it usually happens within couple life that the partner is vested with representations corresponding to a parent or some relevant figure in a repeated, stereotyped and timeless way, so that such investitures constitute transferences, false links with the features of a child prototype. It is easy to find these functionings in several situations: a paradigmatic one can be observed when the partner is idealised and it is considered that only him or her can solve a problem. Another common one is when certain negative characteristics are attributed to the partner in a rigid and unchangeable way,
almost independently of what he/she does, a situation which Abelin–Sas (2011) calls “pre-made images” and Berenstein y Puget (1982) described as “reproach”.

These transferences between partners –which are called “intra-couple transferences” (Spivacow, 2011, p. 83)– are the most habitually worked on during couple treatments. They are bi-directional, unlike the uni-directional character given to transference in the Freudian description, that is, such a bilateral determination that the transferential investitures of one on the other are re-shaped by the regulations established between both poles. Given the fact that they constitute the unconscious support for many exchanges between the partners, they occupy a central place in the bonding session, which constitutes a specificity of couple treatments. In fact, according to its bi-directional support, they are weakly expressed in many individual analytic treatments since the analyst, with his abstinence, does not provide the stimuli that the partner provides.

Of course, in couple treatments other forms of transference are also present so the analyst finds a wider variety than the one managed by the individual analyst. Scharff & Scharff say:

During practice of couple therapy, the therapist faces a wider range of transferences from what is typical of an individual therapeutic relation. Couple therapists must not only understand and work with the individual transferences each partner develops with them, but also with the individual and joint transferences that they lean between them, as well as the transferences that the couple as a group establishes with the therapist and the treatment in general. (Scharff & Scharff, 2014, p. 4342).

In the case of Laura and José, described at the beginning of this article, the intracouple transferences, which constituted a fundamental aspect of the exchange, established a certain balance between José’s protection and Laura’s admiration (parent-child transferences). When the children leave home the established bi-directionality loses balance and transferential and dysfunctional qualities appear: Laura’s desire to revive her relationship with José is loaded with orphanage feelings and filial abandonment just like José’s anger is loaded with parental authoritarianism.

Keeping in mind the concept of intracouple transference, with its bi-directional support, will enable the understanding of the mutual empowerment of the violence between them.

Couples in the current world. Health and illness criteria

Many central issues within couple clinical practice depend on the beliefs or opinion the analyst holds. Which level of harmony can be expected between the members of a relationship? How to think the romantic encounter in times like these, which lack the norms that regulated the encounter between the sexes some time ago? Is it possible to think a love bond that is not framed by neurosis functionings? Is it possible to “heal” love suffering? The position with which the therapist faces these
questions will greatly determine the treatment’s and the couple’s fate.

Regarding the couple and love, there are different positions in psychoanalysis. Several authors have spoken of genital love (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1968, p. 173) and considered that mental health culminates in a fulfilled heterosexual relationship, ruled by harmony. In a recent version of this position, Otto Kernberg (1995) speaks of mature sexual love and proposes a series of items (pp. 69-70) whose fulfillment places the partners in a sort of loving harmony which, in his opinion, is attainable and is part of mental health.

The perspective is completely different in other authors. Lacan, with his famous proposal that “there is no such thing as a sexual relationship”, believes that there is no direct, unmediated relationship between the male and female sexual positions because “the Other of the language is between them as a third party (S20, 64)”, with all the misunderstanding and disagreement which that entails. “Relations between men and women can never be harmonious: ‘the most naked rivalry between men and women is eternal’ (S2, 263). Love is no more than an illusion designed to make up for the absence of harmonious relations between the sexes…” (Evans, 1997, p. 166, the references to Lacan belong to Evans).

The difference between the positions has consequences in clinical practice: if for Kernberg relationships with third parties and/or certain conflicts will be a disorder to overcome, for Lacan they will be another difficulty in the endlessly hard encounter between the sexes.

Deepening into this problem and into the different positions, finally takes us to ask what love between a couple is, an unanswered question, but about which it is worth considering some issues. Freud (1921/1979, pp. 86-87) proposed to subsume all kinds of love in a unique category, and thus encompass in the same item love between a couple with love for the children, with love of God, sacred love and sexual love. Yet other cultural traditions clearly differentiate these kinds of love and, undoubtedly, love within a couple works with codes very different from love for the children or, for religious people, love of God. In this last kind of love, sincerity is a central component.

Now, is sincerity possible in love within a couple? Is it possible to defer oneself, so commonly done in love for the children, in love within a couple? Warkentin and Whitaker (1967) say:

…the usual rules of social human conduct apply neither to marriage, nor to intimate relations. [...] equality is not appropriate. ‘All is fair in love and war’ [...], consistency is impossible in sentimental relationships. Besides, other elements such as decency, appearances and true sincerity have little significance... (pp. 275-276).

The more difficulties a clinical situation presents, the more necessary an interdisciplinary perspective usually is. A 35-year-old woman with normal intellectual ability requested legal permission to marry a boyfriend who had raped and physically attacked her, the reason why he was being prosecuted by justice. The judge granted the permission and after certain time the ex-boyfriend, now her legitimate
husband, killed her. Which was the mistake in court? Where does individual freedom begin and end? Hopefully this example will evidence the difficulties to design a therapeutic project supporting only on psychoanalysis and need, on many occasions, of an interdisciplinary perspective. In my opinion, only an ethical and legal approach provides the necessary elements to understand the mistake that led to such an unfortunate ending.

It is not easy, in sum, to give conclusive opinions about love within a couple. Yet, it is evident that in psychoanalysis there are very different opinions as regards that. When deepening into the enigmas of couples, we get closer to a key question for a psychoanalyst. Where should psychic change aim at when we receive consultation about a couple conflict? Should couples have a given pattern? Where should we place the dividing line between a dysfunctional and a functional couple? What should we consider a good dyadic adjustment? How should we decide whether to contribute or not to a call for help? Should we help a couple who use sadomasochistic practices to stabilise their relationship? Should we help a psychotic or perverse person—male or female—to have children through assisted fertilisation techniques? The new forms of couple and family which multiply in contemporary society, the shaking ground on which cultural and ethical references lie, pose the analyst difficult questions when we are asked for help in projects which are completely new in the history of humankind.

Analysts do not collaborate on any project. We do not help in sadomasochistic projects, we are in favour of responsible parenthood, we are against unnecessary violence. On the horizon of our clinical practice there is always what is called the acceptance of castration, making reference in this way to a law that sets limits to desire. And in these grounds is where today the compass does not point at clear coordinates. Where is the law, the limit which the psychoanalyst is interested in nowadays? Let us remember that for psychoanalytic tradition, the law refers to the prohibition of incest and not to a fragment of circumstantial legislation. And let us remember also that with the new reproductive technologies today, in 2015, it is not clear what is understood by incest. The law which the analysts are interested in, Silvia Bleichmar (2005) proposes, is that which symbolises in the interdict of incest the protection of a defenseless other (pp. 115-117). Resuming the issue, then, how should we think today, in these grounds, the issue of the law and our eventual acceptance or rejection to take part in a therapeutic project?

The health and illness categories are not useful to work with the couple bond because, as Stoller (1997) said, in the field of love we are all abnormal (p. 25) and these categories are frequently not so different from social conventions. A compass, instead, can be the concept of destructiveness. Faced with a consultation related to atypical projects to form a couple or family, procreate or adopt, in my opinion, the first evaluation must refer to the type of destructiveness operating in the members and the couple's pattern. This is more significant than whether they are homosexual or heterosexual, whether they want to
have children with eccentric techniques, whether they live together or not, and so on and so forth. Another functioning that serves as a compass is the record they make of others’ subjectivity: how much and how the other is considered as a subjective entity in which different and autonomous desires, feelings and functionings are recognised. If the record of the partner as a subjective and autonomous entity is absent, probably the future of the bond will not go out of the highly regressive limits of perversion and/or functionings.

To conclude
I have attempted to describe the main characteristics of psychoanalytic couple therapy, a complex tool from the analyst’s arsenal. Due to space reasons, we have not mentioned many significant issues, among others the influence of different cultures with their rules and values as regards couple life, the reformulations of psychoanalytic theory which bond practices lead to, as well as many diverging developments by important authors referring to the topics we have dealt with in this article.

What cannot be overlooked is that psychoanalytic couple therapy inevitably works on a slippery clinical ground. Couples are always sui generis and establish their dyadic adjustments on the basis of passionate and regressive functionings. Lemaire said it many years ago: Though it is not worth arguing about some pathological aspect of love relationship because that always leads to a conventional debate on the limits of pathology, instead we should understand what is fundamental of the love movement in its origin as a regressive attempt to recover, though in an illusion, the previous fulfillment. This entails, up to a certain point, a true “de-differentiation”, without which this structural reshaping, dialectically opposed to the efforts of progressive differentiation imposed by the needs of social and biological life, would not be possible (Lemaire, 1979, pp. 163-164).

The analyst, then, must be cautious and keep in mind how much we ignore about couple life. And he must also remember the difficult environment which we work in: between regression and progression, in the grounds of unstable dyadic adjustments.

Abstract
The author proposes that psychoanalytic couple psychotherapy constitutes an essential therapeutic tool in current psychoanalytical therapy, and it is suggested that it is mainly indicated for those clinical situations in which it is essential to work on suffering or conflicts derived mainly from bonding or intersubjective functionings. The latter are defined as psychic functionings that require the participation of both members in order to define their fundamental features and that comply with Kaès’ condition: “neither one without the other, nor without the bond that ties and holds them”. For this reason they are distinguished from intrasubjective functionings, traditionally described by Freud, which define their fundamental features in the psychic space of a unique subject. The paper describes the main fea-
tatures of the specific technical resource of psychoanalytic couple psychotherapy, bonding intervention as well as the references on which the analyst can base a therapeutic project. The crucial influence of the analyst's beliefs and values regarding couple relationships on the clinical approach of love suffering is discussed.

**Keywords:** Couple psychotherapy, Bond, Psychic change, Intervention

**References**


The toolbox of the analyst’s trade: interpretation revisited

Introduction

The invitation to reflect upon the form and the use of the Tools of Psychoanalysis in our time (to reflect, in fact, upon the psychoanalyst’s profession) is a challenge that may be summed up by the following question: which are the tools that we, as psychoanalysts, use? What is our ‘tool box’ composed of? Furthermore, this question -such as we are formulating it today- enables us to go one step further and to test out a counterpoint between the mode of thinking of that toolbox in the present day and over one hundred years ago.

Of course, this counterpoint is not merely intended to be an exercise in historical comparison. Rather, it takes as its starting point an historical ascertainment: the procedural tools of psychoanalysis, as with any human construction, are conditioned and affected by the hegemonic codes of each epoch. And in this respect, when we think and rethink our tools as psychoanalysts, it proves necessary to question both the epochal variation of which we are part, and its consequences.

Freudian theory was one of the most revolutionary events for early twentieth-century culture. More than one hundred years after its early formulation and against the backdrop of a series of vertiginous changes in the social institutions along with powerful technological developments with high impact on subjectivity, a re-examination of these variations and their effects upon the analyst’s task seems less a minor sociological concern and more a necessary condition for the practice of the profession.

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1. This pre-published text will form the basis of one of the keynote presentations at the IPA Congress in Boston, “Changing world: The shape and use of psychoanalytic tools today”, to be held from 22 to 25 July 2015. All rights reserved by the author.
Within this context, the current review, in various forums, of the classical texts of psychoanalysis may be understood as a healthy exercise geared around this issue. A ready example may be found in the discussions on modes of conceiving the analytic setting yesterday and today. Although perhaps formulated more tentatively, questions surrounding the validity of theoretical concepts central to our discipline also form part of these debates. Along these same lines, developments in reproductive physiology as a result of advances in technology in this area, new and heterogeneous familial configurations, the decline of the hegemony of the paternal function and other variations in subjectivity give rise to new lines of questioning. For example, in relation to the validity of the Oedipus complex in its classical configuration, the place of repression as principal defence mechanism, or the Freudian determinism in what could be called the “archaeological” model of the cure.

Our question for consideration now duly introduced, I would like to introduce two further concepts that I shall explore in this presentation. Firstly, the notion of the ‘tool’. In any of the editions of the dictionary of the Real Academia Española – at least the most up-to-date ones – the word ‘tool’ is associated with: (I) an instrument usually made of iron or steel, with which craftsmen work; (II) a set of such instruments. Both meanings associate the tool with a simple, manual component, the purpose of which is to make something, such as a craft object. And yet we may supplement this definition with another, one that focuses upon the characteristics of the tool (the objectivity of the object) but also upon its use (the subjectivity of its use). In the case of the psychoanalytic profession, there is no equivalent to the carpenter’s hammer or the surgeon’s scalpel. However, it is possible to identify a set of resources (visible or otherwise) the psychoanalyst counts upon in his or her toolbox.

Secondly, the notion of ‘device’ which, as a matter of fact, appears frequently in the psychoanalytic literature of the last decade. Without seeking to undertake an exhaustive analysis of the literature on this concept, it is worth considering a tentative definition. Michel Foucault (1980) asked the question of what constitutes a device, constructing a genealogical response in The microphysics of power. For the French philosopher, a device is a network of relationships between heterogeneous elements (discourse, institutions, languages, ideologies, aesthetics, etc.) explicit and implicit, spoken and unspoken. However, this relationship is not stable – quite the contrary. Inter alia, because it emerges within a situation of urgency.

Now, why revisit these concepts (tools and device) when we are questioning our clinical practice? Perhaps we may consider psychoanalytic clinical practice as a device consisting of a series of heterogeneous elements which, like any device, comes into being in relation to a situation of urgency, or at least a new situation. In our case, furthermore, a situation linked to suffering, which changes and transforms,

2. It is worth noting the significance of Giorgio Agamben and Gilles Deleuze’s contributions with regard to the theoretical consideration of this concept.
as does subjectivity. In regard to these variations, what consequences do they have for our psychoanalytic device? How could that structure elaborated by psychoanalysis over a century ago endure? Considered in such a way, the questioning of the tools and the device is a questioning of the psychoanalytic profession and the toolbox of its trade.

Determining the tools with which a psychoanalyst works is by no means straightforward. That said, one could not possibly work without the notion of unconscious, of transference, the concept of analytic neutrality or of free association. Freud’s lecture “Recommendations to physicians” (1912/1980) is an excellent introduction to this theme, as here we may discern the efforts made by the founder of psychoanalysis to convey to young analysts his experience of how he uses, in his words, the “instrument”.

To attempt an equivalent exercise in synthesis is not an easy task. However, we shall endeavour to do so over the course of these pages. First of all, we shall reflect upon the epochal variations and their impact upon clinical practice. Then, and secondly, once we have examined the setting as the analytic device that allows the transference to unfold, I shall focus upon interpretation as the principal tool of the analyst.

Part one

I. On sociocultural changes and their impact on subjectivation processes

Let us begin with a self-evident assertion: we are contemporaries of a series of transformations in subjectivity. Because of my specialty in clinical practice, and because, in my view, it is here where the changes in our present-day subjectivity may be most powerfully observed, I shall focus on the description of particular alterations in adolescent subjectivity which, furthermore, may be regarded as a challenge when it comes to considering our practice. As we know, adolescence is a process of marked changes that call into question the rigid structure constructed in the “latency period.” This period involves a damming up of libido and enables the child to devote him or herself to learning. This is how the child enters into culture. Later, the models offered are questioned, sexuality makes its appearance at the forefront and great confusion and turmoil reigns.

Psychoanalysis has concerned itself extensively with this stage of the life cycle. The young person is faced with the task of “emigrating” from the world of the “child in the family” towards the construction of an adult subjectivity. While from newborn, and also before then in its “prehistory”, the self is interwoven with the other and with the world surrounding it; it is in adolescence when the individual comes up against the task of finding his or her place in the world by means of the task that Freud (1912/1980) would describe as “detachment from parental authority”.

Institutions –starting with the family and followed by school– served as external regulating and identity-shaping forces acting upon the subject, helping to regulate this passage. It does not escape our attention that both have been, and to a large extent continue to be, producing a collective imaginary which came into existence more
than two hundred years ago. Perhaps as a consequence of this gap in time, these institutions have lost power in their regulating function.

When we come to examine the most diverse historical situations, we see that each society constructs rites of passage to accompany threshold situations such as birth, death and/or marriage. These ritual ceremonies accompany insofar as they announce and certify an event that has occurred. In ancient times, as well as in some tribal societies today, rites of passage exist from childhood to adulthood. If we consider these rites, we see that society provides young people with ceremonies establishing their status as adults.

We could say then that contemporary society does not provide institutionalized rites of initiation. The rituals of the modern day, created by the young people themselves – and strikingly similar across different parts of the Western world – are more comparable to the tests of bravery which pepper our nursery tales. They may consist of kissing someone they have just met – not necessarily of a different gender – taking alcohol until they pass out, smoking marijuana or ingesting other substances, amongst other things.

Bound up with these variations, another trend acquires a significant presence in the spaces of psychoanalytic discussion: this has come to be known as the demise or the decline of what we know as the "paternal function".

While this decline has a long history – some historians in fact link it to the birth of early Christianity – it is the modern State, through its institutions, which limits the father and governs the rights of the son (note that these are no longer rights over the son, but rights of the son). Against this backdrop, in which psychoanalysis also comes into being, a model of the bourgeois, monogamous and heterosexual nuclear family emerges. This familial configuration, in combination with the dominant practices of child-rearing, clearly account for Freud’s choice of the oedipal myth as nuclear complex of the neuroses, as well as its central place in the structuring of the personality and in the organisation of human sexuality. As we know, Freud, in addition to formulating its centrality, also proclaimed its universality.

But the formulation of this universality does not prevent us from observing the variations in the familial configurations and the strategies of child-rearing. For example, in pre-modern societies, the model of child-rearing was not child-centred. Adults and children lived together with relatives and neighbours, without there being differentiated and mutually exclusive spaces for adults and for children. Within this context, incest regulation was the responsibility of Church and State, not the family. By contrast, the modern family – the applicability of which as a model extends as far as the mid-20th century – is centred on the conjugal couple. Love should run through the couple, passing between them and their children. According to

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3. The paternal function does not come assembled all of a sudden, one becomes father. This is the slow, silent construction, reformulated at every turn, of the function that is put to the test at the same time as it is constructed and carried out. As such, today it proves more pertinent to talk of parentality, a term encompassing an area between two intersecting circles yielding common ground: the two circles would represent ‘becoming mother’ and ‘becoming father’. 
Moreno (2014), “in this new modality of child-rearing, the physical and affectionate closeness of loving parents and children was most certainly looked favourably upon, and held up as the ideal” (p. 61). This tendency, which in fact may also be understood as a practice of enclosure, had a curious upshot, which the author brings into prominence in the same chapter. The modern family at once fulfilled a double and paradoxical function: that of the prohibition of incest and the nurturing of sensuality in the bosom of the family. It is not surprising, then, that Freud should encounter the prevalent neurotic symptomatology of the day (hysteria and phobia), or that it should prove natural, in his formulation of infantile neurosis, to situate the Oedipus complex as the central complex of every neurosis.

However, the crisis of modern society also involves the crisis of the practices of isolation with the simultaneous stimulation and prohibition of endogamic sensuality. The model of the present-day postmodern family is a far cry from the modern ideal. On the one hand, patients who consult us may belong to diverse familial configurations: blended families, single-parent families, same-sex partnerships, amongst others. Neither is the contract between spouses based upon a permanent union.

Similarly, the attribution of authority to the father has been undermined, as we noted earlier. At this juncture we no longer – or at least we should no longer– confuse the paternal function with the role carried out by a man who, generally speaking, is called ‘father’ and who lives in a family in which he is parent to the children and husband to the wife, for example. Nowadays it is not necessary for this role to be fulfilled by a man who is, at the same time, the father. It may be another person, and not necessarily of the male gender.

A series of questions surrounding filiation also acquires centrality, starting with the technological developments that are beginning to call into question what once seemed irreducible: biological paternity and the concept of incest.

Furthermore, isolation within the family is no longer a prevailing tendency in this day and age. Nowadays, an accelerated pace prevails, one that imposes the pressure of the culture by means of a kind of race towards promised success. But we would be hard pressed to say what this would look like. We are part of the whirring cogs that make us run without knowing where we are heading. The educational institutions are also affected by this pressure. Today they suggest schooling should begin for pre-verbal children who are still in nappies, securing them, they say, a place at particular schools and later at university. Parents are also affected by it, demanding quick results of psychoanalysts in order to get their child or teenager “back on track”.

As part of this climate of change, we see that mothers, who formerly suffered through having to return to work after maternity leave, at times return before the established period. It is easy to condemn such behaviour if we do not understand something of what is happening. As maternity has been delayed in age, postnatal women have left career positions they are afraid to lose, and not without good reason. But it may not be that alone.
Technology, with its advances in communication, has “broken” or “broken through” the modern enclosure. What characterizes our age is direct access to immediate discourse over the internet, offered readily and abounding in options. Today, the meeting place is predominantly a virtual one: text messages or SMS, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram, Snapchat, Tumblr and blogs are just a few of these possibilities. The meeting territory may also take place on cell or mobile phones that are packed with ever increasing features.

With these descriptions, my intention is not to provide an exhaustive summary of all epochal variations. Nor is it to attempt an exhaustive analysis of present-day teenagers. Rather, I seek to highlight some of the variations in subjectivity in general, and in the adolescent in particular, which have implications for psychoanalytic clinical practice and which require us to overhaul our toolbox.

In light of the above description, certain lines of questioning emerge. Namely: How does subjectivation occur and how is sociability constructed within a context such as today’s; one that is strongly mediatized, with the preponderance of the image, exhibition, visibility and celebrity exalted by the mass media? Clearly, these questions call for a temporal perspective that we don’t yet have. As historians say, one cannot write history while it is occurring; a certain distance is required to observe changes, describe them and reflect upon them. That said, my impression is that the mental mechanisms used by children, adolescents and technology-conversant adults are closer to those related to splitting than to repression. It is not that I think that repression is not used, but the type of media interaction by means of which a young person can be simultaneously watching television, instant messaging, watching a YouTube clip and sending an SMS, seems to me to be analysable in terms of splitting and dissociation of various levels of the self allowing him or her to focus, or perhaps to ‘unfocus’, attention upon multiple things at the same time.

Confronted by these situations, psychoanalysis is faced with the unenviable task of finding the definition of the mental mechanisms prevalent in our time, in order to account for what we see in our clinical practice with young patients. With relation to sexuality, for example, the characteristics of the world in which the adolescents of today find themselves is very different to that of the young people treated by Freud, such as Dora, Catalina or the young homosexual. Here too we have to wonder if the idea of sexual repression belonging to the Victorian conception –so present in Freud’s time– continues to be the principal mechanism nowadays.

Let us move from the most visible to rather more conceptual terrain. The relationship between the visible and the hidden of sexuality, clearly observable in the gradual changes in styles of dressing, indicate that if in the Victorian era the order of the day was to hide or conceal, in the present day – with the prevalence of the image and the desire “to be seen” – the motto seems to be to show all. In another field, Marcelo Viñar (2014) points out that, “where once the social mandate of chastity ruled and the phobia of defloration was encouraged, today (in the collective imaginary) the mandate of early sexual initiation governs.” (p. 4).
If we return to the concept of intimacy, so significant to adult sexuality, we see that this was strongly affected by the revolution in information technology to the point where there has been a complete about-turn, and intimacy has become spectacle, as the Argentine author Paula Sibilia (2008) puts it. Without losing sight of these variations, I believe that although privacy is invaded by the media, there is a space for intimacy that can be nurtured and preserved. This is a mental space that affords an individual the possibility to make contact with an area of the mind through which emotional relationships and creativity in its entire dimension pass (one of which, dream-production, is very valuable to us). In our time, for some people the analytic session represents their only space for privacy and it is here where the construction of the notion of intimacy may begin.

When we review these variations, the analyst’s profession seems shaken. We look at our (old) toolbox and at times we do not find what we are looking for. Or at least, what we do find does not fit the task. Children, adolescents and young people, adults and families too, generally speaking, do not resemble those conceptualized by Freud. Consequently, the questions hover: what is the status of these variations? What do they consist of? What type of language is at play (a key dimension for us)? How do we conceptualize the temporality of these links? And so on. Once again, we psychoanalysts are faced with the necessity of re-questing our tools so that an encounter becomes possible.

Part two

1. Variations in devices and tools: on interpretation and its changes

Seeking to emphasize the transformations in the analyst’s toolbox, in the first part of this paper we reflected upon certain social and cultural changes in subjectivity and in familial configurations. These descriptions are not intended to be exhaustive, by any means.

By contrast, in this second part, we intend to move more closely towards our aim of considering the present-day profession of the psychoanalyst. If, as we have noted, those figures presenting themselves at the consulting room are changing and are no longer what they were, what consequence does this trend have upon our task? What effects do we observe on the toolbox we have become accustomed to working with?

This question may be approached in various ways; focusing upon certain devices and/or tools or concentrating on others. In this case, I decided to focus on a key tool for our profession; one that I suspect is affected by the variations we have considered: namely, psychoanalytic interpretation. We are looking at one of the possible modalities of intervention by the analyst in the session. But this is not just any modality. Rather, we are looking at what is considered the principal tool of the analyst.

I shall focus on the setting as device to then consider, by way of my own becoming as a psychoanalyst over recent years, in what ways the tool of interpretation has changed.

Let us begin with a self-evidence for analysts: establishing the
The toolbox of the analyst’s trade: interpretation revisited

analytic setting is a *sine qua non* for the development of transference. It is worth clarifying that by 'setting' I am not referring to the formal conditions of it, rather to the setting as condition to be internalized and as such closely connected with what we term the *analytic attitude*. Thus defined, the analytic method is the safeguard we have as psychoanalysts against any technical transgression we may commit. Furthermore, the method is also what we offer to the patients who consult us. Indeed, according to Freud’s definition, in the method there is a confluence of research and therapy. And this last aspect comprises the theory of the cure that each analyst upholds according to his or her theoretical reference points.

That said, the setting has undergone changes in its formal aspects since the birth of psychoanalysis: the number of weekly sessions, forms of greeting between patient and analyst, fee amounts and payment methods, amongst other things. Beyond these variations, we also register changes in more internal and subtle aspects; in modes of communication, for example. In Argentina, as it happens, the widespread use of the informal 'tú' [you] second-person form of address as opposed to the obligatory and more formal 'usted' of years gone by, has become rather commonplace. Furthermore, analyst and patient are not always alone in the consulting room, since many are accompanied by all the things technology has to offer. SMS, Whatsapp and emails are brought in as ways of requesting changes, notifying absences and announcing, “I’m on my way”. Not so long ago, I was contacted by telephone for an appointment. Face to face in the interview, I asked how the patient had come by me. The reply, without skipping a beat, was: “I googled you, doctor”.

As I emphasized in the introduction, to consider the variations we ourselves are part of involves considering the transformations in present-day subjectivities but also in the working conditions for analysts. In this regard, I can take into account my own experience which, incidentally, is representative of a wider tendency. I live and work in Buenos Aires, a city that has been the backdrop for a boom in psychoanalysis during the 1950s and ’60s, one that seems very difficult to comprehend from other latitudes. To give a brief example, when I wanted to make an appointment to begin my didactic analysis in the late 1970s, I called five analysts and four replied that they would be pleased to see me after two, three or even four years. I don’t need to add that this situation is inexistent today.

What is more, and as part of a wider social and cultural process, our age is characterized by the questioning of authority, including that which is connected to knowledge. These changes have permeated through to teachers and professors, and to school in general. So too to the analyst. Now, this questioning has effects that may be observed both in the devices and in the tools used by the psychoanalyst. Faced with this change of status, a first reaction might be to consider any effects to have necessarily been negative. For example, faced with the growth in offers of rapid relief from suffering, we have lost ground. Nonetheless, from my perspective, personally I think that psychoanalysts have become more sensitive to the circumstances of
their surroundings and to their own resistance to psychoanalysis. In such a way, this has enabled a critical re-examination of attitudes towards the task and a somewhat non-participating isolation.

If psychoanalysis is questioned from without, why not question it from within? Why not question ourselves about our tools? About their validity and meaning? As this is an enormous field of problematization, I shall merely focus upon one element: interpretation, as the principal tool of the psychoanalyst. Through this question perhaps we may find a way to question ourselves about our own practice.

2. Psychoanalytic interpretation yesterday and today

Psychoanalytic literature on the subject of interpretation has been wide and varied since the beginnings of psychoanalysis. A brief snapshot is called for, for the purposes of introducing the theme. Let us start then with the master, R. Horacio Etchegoyen.

Etchegoyen (2014), who has taken up the theme in such a thorough and in-depth way, considers psychoanalytic interpretation to be the essential instrument to the task of the analyst. From his perspective, this is the tool of the therapist in so far as it is a necessary and sufficient condition for its practise. The fundamentals of psychoanalytic technique (Etchegoyen, 1986) and his invaluable Essay on psychoanalytic interpretation (Etchegoyen, 1999) are indispensible to any enquiry. Now, in chapter five of the aforementioned essay, the author defines transference interpretation as “the most unique and specific element of our work” (Etchegoyen, 1999, p. 53). Furthermore, the complete interpretation comprises in successive steps both the transference conflict as well as that which is not strictly-speaking bound up with the transference. And this may be current or historical conflict, both infantile or indeed the earliest forms, including the experiences of the pre-verbal period.

One last point deserves our attention. According to Etchegoyen (1999), interpretation may be tested during the analytic session, and this entails “including, within the analytic dialogue, the judgement on what we have interpreted” (p. 66). This does not, as he indicates, refer to rational judgement; rather it comes from the unconscious and emerges without the patient knowing what he or she is doing.

This position (which regards psychoanalysis as a science) may be contrasted with an approach maintained by various authors4 who view analytic practice to be closer to an art form or a craft. Considered in this way, interpreting is not so much explaining, giving meaning or “discovering” the unconscious contents, rather it is an activity closely related to describing and conjecturing imaginatively in an interpretative work brought forth by analyst and patient. We shall return later to this question, which is for various reasons a complex one.

Let us take up the notion of interpretation once again—in this case, with a classic psychoanalytic text by James Strachey (1934) on mutative interpretation. When Etchegoyen reviews this work, he suggests that this is perhaps the article that best describes the dialectics

4. Bion, Meltzer and Ferro amongst others.
of interpretation. To briefly summarize, we could say that Strachey explores the therapeutic effects of psychoanalysis and maintains that interpretation depends upon the dynamic changes it produces, in particular mutative interpretation.

In this context, the author postulates the creation of an auxiliary superego which is the result of the projection of the analyst's own impulses and archaic objects. The presence of the analyst as auxiliary superego thus gives rise to impulses directed towards the analyst. The analyst, however, by not behaving like the original object, will cause the analysand to become aware of the distance between the archaic and the current object. What is more, this is what will enable us, in Strachey's terms, to breach the neurotic vicious circle. Of course, for this to occur it is necessary to maintain the analytic setting and to intervene with interpretation.

According to Strachey, mutative interpretation produces a structural change, the archaic object is modified, allowing it to be reintrojected as a more benevolent one, changing the savage nature of the superego.

Today, 80 years after the publication of one of the most oft-cited and debated papers in psychoanalysis from various theoretical perspectives, it is worth considering the present-day applicability of the ideas presented. Furthermore, this question is closely connected with the expansion of the field of psychopathological symptomatology treated with analytic therapy. In this sense, it is no longer possible to make generalizations about the use of the tool of interpretation without singularizing the patient, the analyst and his or her theoretical models.

Drawing upon studies on early psychic development and the analysis of young children from a wide variety of conceptual approaches, the approach to interpretation comprises all aspects of non-verbal language (gestures, mime, tones of voice, silences, and so on).

In any event, the question regarding the therapeutic action of psychoanalytic interpretation continues to leave the matter open, constituting the germ of potential future developments at a time when psychoanalysis has opened up spaces for discussion on the current conditions of our work, the possibility of long-distance analysis using technological advances and the viability of the use of our tools within wider contexts.

After exploring Etchegoyen and Strachey's ideas on the notion of interpretation, I would like to make a brief incursion into other disciplines.

The term interpretation also has a long history outside of the
sphere of psychoanalysis. In the field of philosophy, for example, the relation between perception and the genesis of knowledge has been the subject of long-standing interest. This debate is currently shared by the hard sciences, for which not only would the observed object not exist without an observer, but the observer would produce effects upon the observed.

Interpretation is also closely related to art, whatever its expression. Susan Sontag (1961/1996), in her noted essay “Against interpretation”, calls into question the role historically attributed to criticism in its effort to interpret, translate and reveal what a work of art expresses. The central point, for Sontag, is that this type of criticism confuses the work of art with its content. According to her, this leads to the demand for art to account for its meaning, which in turn leads to the demand to interpret it. This essay, which had a galvanising and crucial effect upon the thought of the 1960s, continues to be significant today in its questioning of the absolute value of interpretation in art.

For Sontag, the processes of interpretation of the work of art –the attempts to render a particular text or a work in general intelligible– conceal an attempt to alter: the question is not to “read” the textual body (be it literature or the visual arts), rather to reveal its meaning, its secret content.

This essay, which would merit more space for discussion, proves stimulating when it enters the terrain of psychoanalytic interpretation, as it encourages us to consider our practice from an attitude of questioning and wondering. Likewise, Sontag’s criticism invites us to rethink our own practice in light of present-day alterations. For example, do the clinical tools developed in the late-19th century allow us to intervene in clinical practice in the same way? What has changed? What remains? In what sense may a tool cease to be a tool?

Now, the ability to look again is not straightforward. I would go so far as to say that, at times, it is just as hard –if not harder– for us as for our patients.

That said, we must not lose sight of the fact that interpretation as the principal tool of the analyst continues to hold true. As we stated earlier, the impact of the cultural, social, familial, subjective and technological changes makes itself felt in our consulting rooms. The presentation of psychopathology has changed, and the analytic setting accepts new modes of communication, with digital reality now present in the analytic bond. However, it is necessary to rethink the tool in question.

If we increase the focus with greater magnification, we detect changes and mutations suggesting profound transformations in the way of conceiving the analytic dialogue. If we return to the question of interpretation within the context of the consulting room, we find nothing that may be equated to “the correct interpretation”. If, as analysts, we construct an opinion on what is taking place in the transference relationship, we will become increasingly dependent on our contact with our countertransference which, following on from Bion (1962/1987) will test our negative capacity, namely the capacity to tolerate doubt, uncertainty and not to embark upon the ‘irritating
reaching after facts and reasons. We might conclude that this would be a *construction* that can operate and function but which is always tentative, conjectural and contingent.

To further this description, it is worth entering into a little more detail upon two technical aspects: the content and the formulation of the interpretation. Making an observation, with regard to content, upon my own work over many years of practice, I can detect various changes. Within the framework of the tradition connected with the Kleinian model—in which, incidentally, I trained—it is assumed that there is a prevalence of hostility at the beginning of life, along with the perception of the death instinct and its subsequent deflection for fear of annihilation. This approach had an impact upon a mode of interpreting—which admittedly was not in keeping that of Melanie Klein with Melanie Klein’s mode of interpreting—focused upon hostility across a varied repertoire of anxieties. This model, which Meltzer (1984) named “theological”, makes the conjecture that from birth we are threatened with “hell”, and through certain mental operations, such as splitting and idealization, we embark upon the road to development. The anxieties at play in this paranoid-schizoid configuration give rise to a particular climate in the consulting room atmosphere, one we might call, in consonance with the model that Meltzer (1984) refers to as theological, the “climate of descent into hell”. This climate may have been able to make the interpretative work of the analyst in somewhat of a hurry to confer meaning appear natural. Perhaps, with the prevailing countertransference feelings in such a climate, it is always better to enter hell with a valid line of argument than without one.

This tendency has lead, to my understanding, to the genesis of closed circuits of a paranoid nature in the analytic interaction. In my view, there has been a tapering off of receptivity, which furthermore should open the way for the impulses that come into the transference field. It is important to clarify that I am not saying that negative transference does not exist. On the contrary, I consider its interpretation to be essential, but always in counterpoint to the libidinal impulses that, ultimately, allow the patient to be in the session talking or playing with us.

If we read papers containing clinical material older than thirty years, there is notably much more interpretation than today. Perhaps a certain interpretative furore may have as its cause a defensive need on the part of the analyst who, through the action of speaking, may respond to his or her own anxiety in the face of contact with more primitive hostility. If we now explore the area of the formulation of interpretation, placing in counterpoint the aesthetic model I postulated (Ungar, 2000b), a different interpretative modality may be deduced; one that is based, in my view, more upon the possibility of observing and describing than of explaining. From my perspective, this interpretative modality also ‘metacommunicates’ an attitude of observation, reflection and conjecture.

Here we shall once again return to the discussion that we touched

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5. In child, adolescent and adult analysis.
upon earlier regarding whether psychoanalysis is an art or a science. The analyst presents conjectures to his or her patient in the form of interpretations. With these, the patient must then undertake psychic work. Interpretation, thus conceived, is an invitation to work. Unlike the scientific hypothesis, which is emphatic, the imaginative conjecture involves an opacity that gives rise to a more modest attitude at the moment of interpreting. In this sense, the type of formulation: "It seems to me that...", "I think that" or "We might think" is not a diplomatic strategy for the analyst to appear more unobtrusive, rather an enunciation that reminds us of the essential impossibility of knowing everything.

3. A visit to the consulting room yesterday and today
To account for the changes in my own way of working, I have looked over clinical material from the early days of my work with patients in analysis and other more recent material from an attitude of observation. This experiment in comparison has allowed me to come into contact with the transformations in my practice in a very vivid way.

Now I shall present two vignettes from my own clinical practice in order to explore in what ways it has changed. The first comes from the analysis of a boy that took place thirty years ago, and the second from a patient, a university student, in a recent session. This counterpoint will allow us to observe the marked changes at the centre of interpretation.

The first example is a brief fragment from the first session of analysis of Andrés. The subject is a five-year-old boy who was treated for an intense stutter and impairment in the standard of graphic ability expected for his age. His analysis was carried out at a frequency of four sessions per week.

He arrives and has little difficulty parting from his mother (who brought him here). He comes in eating fizzy sweets that make a noise in his mouth. He opens his mouth and says to me, "Look at how they explode". I take a look. He begins to speak at great speed in a high-pitched tone, he stutters a lot, and he coughs and sneezes. He tells me that he was given a bicycle as a gift and that at a barbecue the day before, "my parents ate outside".

I make an interpretation: As this is the first session you are frightened, you want to fill everything with words because inside you have ideas that you feel are things that are exploding in your mouth like the sweets.

Andrés adds: "they're exploding in my mouth like bombs".

I interpret: you are scared of me, you don't know how I am going to receive what you feel are bombs inside of you.

Andrés: 'Tell me: what am I here for? Oh yes... I came here for you to tell me that I have to come. But I play basketball and today I missed it."

I make an interpretation: On one side you would like to find out with me why the words are exploding in your mouth and they get cut off and you stutter, but on the other you are afraid and you would prefer to stick with what you know, which is the basketball.
This brief exercise in observing my interpretative modality when I was a young analyst proved revealing. By reading the interpretations I made to Andrés in his first session, I agree with the content (it seems to me that they indicated the point of maximum anxiety, as Melanie Klein teaches us). At the same time, I find the formulation very assertive. It confers meaning but does not open up pathways. Instead it presents hypotheses that hardly leave room for any other new ideas.

Coming into contact with Meltzer, through his work and in person, above all in formulating an aesthetic model (Ungar, 2000b), had a profound impact upon my way of understanding the psychoanalytic craft at work. In the aesthetic model, the analyst’s knowledge will always be exceeded by what the patient transfers; there is no chance of total or complete knowledge given the unobservable qualities in terms of the sensory experience of what we term the psychoanalytic object. In this way, a style of psychoanalytic interpretation emerges, one based primarily upon the possibility of observing and describing, not of explaining.

If we return to the brief clinical example of the first session with a five-year-old boy, we see that the first interpretation assigns feelings and even intentions to the child. “As this is the first session you are frightened, you want to fill everything with words because inside you have ideas that are exploding in your mouth like the sweets.” When I re-read these vignettes today, I see myself as a very enthusiastic young analyst, but somewhat lacking in circumspection. Now I would take a more descriptive stance with greater acceptance of the fact that the interpretative work involves sequence, dialogue, a series of conjectures. If, in a kind of exercise, I were to imagine my present-day modality of intervention, the following comes to mind: today I would pause at the beginning of my interpretation. Then, I would talk to Andrés about his fear of beginning an experience with someone he hardly knows while his mother stays outside (taking his material about how yesterday, at the barbecue, his parents ate outside). Today, nor would I rush to interpret the “ideas that are exploding in his mouth”, and I would not do so because I understand that this fantasy is not here. It continues to be clear to me, as it was at the time, that there is a strong relationship between aggression and his symptom (his words come out cut off). However, I would hope that the child would have the opportunity to arrive at this in some form or another: in short, with my help but coming from him.

Furthermore, Andrés immediately accepts my suggestion that something is exploding in his mouth and adds, “they’re exploding in my mouth like bombs”. This causes him greater excitation, and he tries to use omnipotent manic defences in possessing explosive material that he can deploy. After my second interpretation related to his possible fear that I may not be able to receive his aggression, confusion arises and just then he seems to be wondering where he is and with whom. “Tell me: what am I here for? Oh yes... I came here for you to tell me that I have to come.”
The child wonders and perhaps is unable to wait for a response. He answers himself with something that may calm him: that I am going to tell him why he must come to analysis. And it is this invitation that today I would be careful to accept: the invitation to respond rapidly at the service of attenuating the anxiety of us both.

During Andrés’ treatment, which was intensive and not very long, his hostility was acted out on various occasions, which included throwing objects that hit me. We had to break off sessions before time, with the mother present in the waiting room until the session finished, working there with him. Slowly, his potential for drawing emerged and after a lapse of time his symptom diminished. This patient, like nearly all my patients, taught me much about technique with children, and especially about following him in his potentialities to move towards the focus of his anxiety and mental pain. This has been useful to me in my work with patients of all ages.

The question of the invitation, which I referred to in my introduction to the vignette of Andrés’ analysis, allows me an entryway to self-observe working in a session some years later.

A young patient, during the course of her fourth year of analysis and recently starting a Monday session, informs me with great excitement, and in a questioning tone, that she has decided to invite me to her university graduation ceremony, which will take place within the next two months. Then she remains silent.

I do not respond with anything, neither do I feel the need to do so. After a time, she continues to talk about how difficult it was for her to come to the decision to invite me, but she feels that my presence will be important to her. That it would never have entered into her head to invite me to a party, her birthday for example, but that this is different.

She falls silent again for several minutes. She then says that she was talking to her boyfriend and they felt sure I would not want to go, because that would be going outside of the setting. Another silence, this time more lengthy, and she says that, thinking it over, perhaps I will not want to go because I think that I might make her more anxious.

I should say that over half the session passed during the course of the sequence described.

Then I interpret that perhaps she needed my concrete presence at her graduation ceremony because she did not trust relying on me from inside of herself. Following this she reached the conclusion herself, firstly, that I would not go because I am bound to the rules of the setting, to then consider that perhaps I would not go in order to look after her analysis and therefore her.

The session continued and the climate of relief the patient felt was evident. Shortly afterwards she told me that now she thought that perhaps she felt obliged to invite me because of something connected to her own feeling of exclusion in different groups since she was a child.

This transference situation opened up the pathway to continue
exploring aspects of her oedipal conflict, as she immediately associated that her parents had told her that during her first visit to the hospital at the birth of her brother, who was three years younger than her, she fell over at the entrance and had to have minor treatment at the same place.

After a brief intervention of mine with regard to it seeming that, at that moment, her anger at feeling displaced had turned against herself, the patient continues to remember how difficult it was for her not only to find her place within the family –she is the middle daughter of three siblings– but that this situation was repeated within groups of girls during her childhood and early adolescence.

From this brief fragment of a session and with the question of interpretation as our main point of reference, I wonder about other possibilities in view of that invitation that I might have developed over the course of my own history as an analyst. I could have remained silent, according to the model that the analyst should not answer questions. I could also have interpreted to the patient in connection with what my presence at her graduation signifies as a projection of her infantile self onto me, present at the primary scene. The fact is that I did not respond to her. I now think that I used my countertransference as an indicator, as I did not feel any pressure or necessity on my part to do so. I did not talk at that moment because I did not feel it was necessary. I think that I decided to take her question and to think. Above all, to think about what I could offer for her to continue thinking about her desire to invite me. Now, this was possible after maintaining an attitude of silence up to the time of formulating an interpretation which would allow the patient to make a trajectory: from her idea of inviting me to the point of reaching, alone, the decision not to do so.

The purpose of this brief tour of the clinical situation, focusing upon the interpretative operation, is not to synthesize the complexity of our setting, both in terms of the variations in subjectivities and of the craft of the analyst. However, I believe that it allows us to think about a substantive variation in the status of interpretation. By exploring this counterpoint, which is furthermore also part of my history as an analyst, I cannot fail to observe the variations when it comes to interpreting. With the benefit of hindsight, I see differences that describe my position, as well as that of other analysts too, I am sure. Today I see myself as interpreting closer to the patient and to his or her state of mind. I see a joint task. This is an invitation to a process of thinking that, to remain alive, must be rethought.

To conclude, let us once again take up the question relating to the toolbox: which tools of our clinical practice must we call into question in order to continue working as psychoanalysts? In the case of interpretation, the principal tool, this question is complex as it does not involve substituting one for another as the artisan might do whilst looking in his workbox. Rather it involves looking again at its use in light of and in tension with present-day variations. There is no doubt that this is not a straightforward exercise. Be that as it may, it proves a necessary one. One that is fast becoming an invitation we cannot pass up.
Abstract
In the last 50 years infant, adolescent and adult subjectivities have undergone greater and greater modifications due to changes in the surrounding culture. This paper is focused above all on the resulting modifications in family configurations, modalities of upbringing and the advance of technology. These transformations have had a significant impact on psychoanalytic practice –both in the clinical matter we encounter in our everyday work and in technique– and there will also be possible modifications in psychoanalytic theory. This panorama leads us necessarily to consider whether the tools forged in the times of the birth of Psychoanalysis retain their validity, or whether they have been affected by changes in the intervening period and of the present day. The topics of psychoanalytic interpretation and the setting will also be dealt with.

Keywords: Interpretation, Setting, Transference, Culture, Technology.

References
The Foreigner

Photographs: Flávia Palazzo
And so, my place here today is the place of Caliban, the place of the foreigner. I will be completely irresponsible; I will present you with a series of ideas in a completely “jazzy” way. The goal is that we are able to have and promote a discussion on “tomorrow and its fate” in two registers: a more theoretical one and a more practical, more historical one.

The title clearly refers to the well-known essay by Freud (1915/1996), “As pulsões e suas vicissitudes”[^2], written in 1915, when psychoanalysis consolidates as thought that aims at and practises heterodoxy, in other words, that moves away from mainstream Western thought and innovates in a quite radical way. Why? Because Freud will conceive functioning and structuring of the unconscious from an element unyielding in itself to any kind of structuring; an element that is in itself of constant impulsion and dispersion.

In that sense, he departed from a conceptual and historical field characterised by mechanism, and one of the central elements of this paradigm –that ruled in the historical context in which psychoanalysis was generated– is precisely the concept of equilibrium; a concept that regulates the functioning of nature’s and the world’s systems. Freud, when introducing that almost –we could say– Epicurean element, that founding clinamen, that diversion that, however, is the source of every organisation, anticipates what would be the theory of complex systems and thermodyna-
mics in the 20th century. Far from equilibrium, what is aimed at and what, in fact, is worth thinking and describing are not the final stages of processes but processes themselves. Such processes necessarily involve the abolition of equilibrium, a distance from the notion of equilibrium. From this perspective, then, psychoanalysis is a deeply innovative and anticipatory process. And it will necessarily contradict two categories that we, as Western and modern people, are deeply used to dealing with: good sense and common sense. Common sense is the articulation mode of the causality of the world, according to which we think that certain effects follow certain causes. And good sense is an associated category, which entails the appropriate direction of causality; a direction that goes from causes to effects. We are trained, from our earliest years, to use those two categories as a structuring mode of world experiences. We operate with the logic of exclusion; we practise that good sense, that good direction of our activities and actions, even dealing with our internal life, our intimate and spiritual life according to those operators.

When psychoanalysis establishes not only a notion of the unconscious, but an unconscious whose foundation holds something that is always escaping, something which cannot be in any way restricted into any framework, it inevitably contaminates those practices of our consciousness. Psychoanalysis necessarily has to be non-Cartesian. In that sense, it will offer us deep variants of temporality which will move away from good sense, and articulation modes of cognitive thinking that will, necessarily, move away from common sense.

In the same way, we can think that contemporary sciences will problematise those two notions, though in a way that, from my point of view, psychoanalysis anticipated. Good sense and common sense will also be questioned by different fields of contemporary science knowledge, particularly by those which deal with
what we can call complex systems: systems with many components and a great deal of density of relation between those components.

These systems include the three areas of our terrestrial existence: material, physical existence; biological, systemic existence, and our existence as cognitive beings. Then, the reductionist logic, of exclusion, the “logic of or”, will not rule in these three areas any longer, but the “logic of and” will, as Quilelli Corrêa (2014) pointed out. In the same way as in dreaming there are articulation modes that exceed habitual causality and temporality modes that completely escape the causal order of good sense, also contemporary sciences begin to recognize that, in the very functioning of reality and in the kind of processes that operate at those three levels of our existence—material, vital and cognitive—, logics that escape the monotheism of exclusion and the unitary directionality of good sense also rule.

These logics, which will operate in another way and with another articulation field, are those which will make us reflect on the predominant notion of our times, truly totalising and unitary—thus, totalitarian—, that there is a unique figure of time. The idea that there would be a unique figure of time works as if the whole culture had agreed that, from the innumerable and diverse varieties of experience to which a sense and concept of time could be attributed, only one is effective, real and non-fictional: the one which nature exhibits; a figure of unique time, defined by a succession of three dimensions—past, present and future—already predisposed and established. From this figure, what we call reality, what “happens”, would be travelling on board a spaceship that would move along a route of time, always at the same pace, with the same tread, in something called now, that is, in the present. The whole reality would travel inside that spaceship, all that is real would happen now. The past would be former “nows”, former presents. The future would be unknown presents. And good sense would be precisely the recognition that such vehicle always moves uniformly forward, it never stops and, let alone, moves backwards; that all this reality of innumerable bodies and countless components, of a myriad of things, beings and happenings, co-exists altogether in an infinitesimal
of time that we call instant or moment. From this perspective, the now would be like a marker that would go from one point to another along that straight line of time, and we would understand and act as if reality travelled on board that spaceship. Anyway, that spaceship would ultimately have a null dimension. It would be a point itself. From one point to another, from now to now, reality keeps moving. This way, then, time would be that uncontrollable force that pushes worldly things from the ignoble past to the remote future.

This image became predominant during our time. Think about how many times each one of us has looked at the clock today. Make an estimate. Think, since we woke up, apart from the clocks of dreams, how many clocks we were exposed to, each of them saying “you are here”, which is as if it said “you are now”, not “you are here, in this position of this straight line”.

It is that, since the 17th century, Western way of thinking was invaded by the force of one of the most extraordinary devices designed by human inventiveness: the mechanical clock. What the mechanical clock does is to consolidate an extraordinary transformation: the transformation of durations into distances. It is a machine that transforms duration-time into distance-space. In each movement, in each position of the hands, we are told that we are here, in this place, at this point of the route. We have passed the previous points, and we will find the following ones. We base our time experience on that amazing transformation of what is the deepest instance of living, the experience of lasting, and we constantly and unconsciously turn it into the apprehension of a space separation.

Evidently, other cultures do not do the same. Among the Navarres, for instance, now, the present, is a moon cycle: 28 days. What happens during those 28 days happens now. It is clear that such conception is completely immeasurable and incompatible with our notion of this now which became instantaneous, of this indefinitely prolonged straight line of isolated instants that we believe is the very nature of time. From this perspective, if there is a unique time route, there is only one tomorrow. There is only one future and it is a future that is already marked, a
fatality. We just have to reach it because there is only one path, only one route: a bell will toll and we will be in a given place.

By this conception, all the experiences that life and art can offer us, so different in their duration, lose their value. The enthronement of this idea of a unique completeness of time, of a true and final reality of time, is extraordinary. Mainly when we understand, by revising history, that such concept of time, which I will call “chronal” time, as well as its image associated to a line over which a mobile and present marker moves, are constructions. Certainly, contemporary sciences currently understand that we have not taken that image from nature but, on the contrary, we project it over nature. It is an operator from which we construct a series of social and thinking fabric just to define for ourselves what nature is and our relation to it, as well as to define our position in relation to others. A certain image of the world rules over us, like scholars usually say, and that chronal image oppresses us every day and makes us experience a reduced and unified time.

But if we can think and reflect on the fact that contemporary clocks do not allow us to discriminate a variety of processes of the natural world, we will confirm, firstly, that such image of time is not unique, and, secondly, that it is an essentially fictional image in the sense that it is a device and a way of performing a certain practice, but that there is another variety of images of time that are, indeed, efficient and that will allow us to establish new interrogation and exploration lines; that there may be new tomorrows.

I will give an example related to our own body: we are a set of approximately 100 trillion human cells, that is, cells in whose nucleus there is a *homo sapiens* genome, so we would have almost 30 thousand genes. An actual instruction manual written in deoxyribonucleic acid that specifies that in each individual's organism there is a *homo sapiens* organism. Besides, we are also a habitat for a quadrillion of other organisms that do not have human DNA. Thus, we are an ecosystem ten times bigger than the amount of cells that make up our own body. And it is thanks to the fact that
we are the habitat for that heterogeneity that we are healthy, that we digest food, that we react to illnesses. At the same time, each one of those cells is a prodigious artifact that has a surrounding film, a membrane essentially made of fat, which, consequently, not only does not dissolve in water, but is able to keep water inside and circulate in any humid or liquid environment. Water inside and water outside, with that parting film. However, we know that such separation cannot be absolute. It is necessary that fluxes of matter, activity and formation that come from outside enter, surpass, cross that border and circulate temporarily in the internal architecture in order to be a part of the system composition and eventually be recycled into the environment. If we closed the membrane completely, if it were invulnerable, the cell would die of entropy. Such opening must exist. Therefore, the cell membrane separates what is inside from what is outside the living thing and, at the same time, connects what is inside with what is outside the living thing. Now, inside the living thing lies the past of the living thing; that instruction manual where the way of constructing replicas of such organism or cell is specified. And outside the living thing is the future of the living thing. It is the encounters that the living thing will have; its fate. Some encounters will be nourishing, others will be toxic. If inside the living thing is the past and outside it is the future, we can think of that membrane as a present: inside the past, the membrane as the present and outside the future. But that present does not travel on any route but it connects the past with the future. By that cell opening, the future encounters can affect the intimate content of that being. The future can modify the past. At the same time, that organism eventually reproduces with a mutation so that a new edition of the instruction manual be published. This way, life turns into an amazing mode through which nature produces more and more shapes, more and more different architectures, speeding up the formation modes of merely physical nature in an unprecedented way.

Due to all this, we are observing that in each living organism, as well as in our own bodies, a temporality which has nothing to do with the chronal image or with
the moving present rules. On the contrary, this is a present of mode, a topological present, a present that tells the past and the future; past and future unfold from that present. Then, if in fact we find heterogeneous temporalities, which have nothing to do with the image of chronal time, even in the biological register, though in many other fields too, then it is fair to think that we may have to conceive a new way to implement a more effective conception of time, which can cover many spheres of what is natural because we have already seen that chronal time only operates in that macroscopic field, already formatted by what is symbolic and structured by words and technology.

There, at the bottom of bodies, at the heart of nature’s processes, we will have to re-think which the essential elements of time would be. We can resort to a great artist such as Jorge Luis Borges in order to think how he conceives what would be the ultimate foundation of temporality: the essential distinction between the before and the after. Borges will conceive that distinction in terms of a point, not in terms of a line or a segment any longer. He will say that the elementary unit of temporality is the labyrinth and the elementary unit of the labyrinth, its conceptual usefulness, are forking paths.

Now, what are forking paths? Forking paths take place when in a line two alternatives open. The labyrinth supposes an indefinitely long concatenation of forking paths. Borges says that forking paths are the very act of the labyrinth; its elementary unit. The concept of forking paths necessarily combines two categories which, in the traditional mode and in common sense, are dissociated: need and the unexpected, chance. For example, a traveller is faced with forking paths. Forking paths are marked, are necessary, are placed there. The traveller’s choice is needed to know if they are going to move towards Thebes or if they are going to head for Corinth, and that is not determined by the route. There is an arbitrariness in that combination. Depending on the opportunity, that is, the synthesis between occasion and place, one traveller is going to follow a given direction and find a sphinx and another one is going to follow another direction and we will not obtain any history or myth from them.

Then this idea of the elementary unit of temporality, in other words, the unit from which it is possible to define, in a general way, a before and after, would no longer consist of an oriented line, but of this association between need and chance, between determination and indetermination. That allows us to conceive a new mode, a new figure of temporality, which we will be able to apply in an endless number of spheres, including the field of our tasks as members of a civilisation.

What is characteristic, what is going to be essential so that we take a step beyond these theorisations, and thus approach a more effective and practical discussion, is to recognise that what life does is to make contact between infinitesimal durations of molecular reactions, there in the deepest part of cells, and vast environmental transformations. In this way, a billonesimal part of a second links with a million years. Without life in between, those durations would remain heterogenous. What life does is precisely to conjugate those durations. Life invents a new territory of rhythms, a new mode of movements; it generates new labyrinths, new opportunities of routes to follow and in each of them a distinction between a before and after will be established; each of them will generate a field of opportunities from which new shapes will be able to arise.

From this point of view, we can think that it would be convenient for us to conceive human time, the time that we practise as a species and as a civilisation, not following a totalitarian and unitary line any longer, a line of chronal time, but as a Russian nesting doll, within which other modes of synthesis and association could
emerge. In other words, as if we could think the labyrinth in an even broader way. In the labyrinth, if we take the opposite journey, we verify that from each decision we make, from each synthesis we make, from each before and after—that is, from each structural differentiation we establish—, something new can emerge. Thus, trying to think like that, we can conceive a temporality in which the three dimensions rule: past, present and future. But the past should not be just a reservoir of presents that are over. It should remain within the present, as the source and directrix from which the next deployment will take place. And the future should not be something to be achieved, but the presence of the future at the heart of the present should be something that can configure the choices and opportunities; something that can establish the forking paths to be activated. And the present should be a place of action, like a territory where the most precious and delicate filigree of life, that is, time, is constructed.

Then, let us think a tomorrow that is not marked by the fatality of a strict deterministic causality, but by the potentiality of innumerable possible configurations, which flow among the choices made at the point of countless intermediate forking paths. From each choice that is made, a given configuration of the future is promoted. If the excluded actions were different ones, different would be the promoted futures as well. The idea is that tomorrow is a construction; a construction always made on the basis of today. Today is always the place of action. In turn, that construction will be made by us as persons, as citizens, as members of the human species, as participants of a civilisation that is currently living a unique moment.

It is very common for some cultures and generations to think that the moment they are living is decisive, that it is a very significant moment. Beyond the permanent risk of hubris, I would dare assert that in the current case that is supported by strong evidence. In other words, today we are experiencing a situation of great tension, in which there is a plethora of possible futures. We find ourselves in a kind of state of pregnancy. And why? Because, thanks to historical processes and concrete material transformations that were speeding up during the last two centuries and a half, since the Industrial Revolution, we became, first, a planetary, and then a geological species. A planetary species means that we expanded; our ancestors come from 200 thousand years before—4 thousand generations—, which is a very short time. Four thousand generations occur, more or less, in one or two days of bacteria, that is, the number of generations of our history is the same as that which results from the multiplication of a bacterium in two days. Then, in 200 thousand years, during that really brief period, we left a region, north-western Africa, and we expanded throughout the whole planet. To begin, we settled on the remote Pacific islands, separated from one another by thousands of kilometres. It is difficult to imagine how those Melanesians achieved that miracle of navigation! But today we reach all the territories of the Earth. We live in valleys, in peaks, in serrões, in greenwoods, on coastlines, in icelands. Only cockroaches and us achieved that earth coverage, and to compare ourselves with cockroaches is an honour. Cockroaches have 250 million years of evolution while we have some ridiculous 200 thousand. And if we told all our history since the primates, we would hardly have five million. In this way, we are “planetised”—an extraordinary biological fact in such a short term—and we became geological. In what sense? In that all our activity not only transformed every region of the planet, but it left a legacy of a vast geological depth. For example, nuclear detonations made in the atmosphere in the years 40, 50 and 60 made the wind scatter radioactive particles that settled on all the continents as a very thin layer of radioactive material with components such
as plutonium, which has an average life of 24 thousand years. In other words, if
today we have 100 atoms of plutonium, in 24 thousand years we will have 50, and
in 48 thousand years we will have 25. In this way, our actions became capable of
lasting beyond, a lot, the typical temporalities of our culture: days, weeks, months,
years, decades, centuries. The consequences of our acts go beyond, a lot, the typical
temporalities of our institutions, our churches, our political system. The longest
political system that we have is the Japanese Empire, which is only one thousand
years old. All the other political systems are more recent, more ephemeral, shorter.
Then, just as we achieved that biological effect of “planetasing”, we are, due to all
our activity, leaving a long-lasting legacy of transformations, which implies that
our descendants will not live in the world where our parents did any longer. They
will live a world deeply transformed by this planetary and geological species which
we have turned into. Let me repeat: unlike what the poet said, we will not be the
same, we will not live like our parents (Belchior, 1976, song 3). We will live a deep-
ly transformed world. This will be the world we will bequeath; a world in which,
in this same century, the sedimentation patterns of all the great rivers and water
basins have been strongly altered by dams, irrigations, etc. In the future, young
people will reflect on this period and they will wonder: which titanic agent was able
to, in such a short period of decades and centuries, alter all the flows of the world’s
great water reservoirs? Would volcanoes have done that? Earthquakes? The sun?
The answer is “no”: it was all human activity.

On the other hand, we are changing the composition of the atmosphere. If we com-
pare today’s atmosphere with the one which was captured in the air droplets of Antar-
tica’s eternal ice, we can see that human activity altered its composition. We change the
climate patterns. There is doubt neither about that change nor about the fact that hu-
man activity is the decisive factor in that transformation. We are dramatically altering
biodiversity, moving the species from one place to another and causing their intense
extinction. We even alter the functioning pattern of marine life, which is the basis for
the functioning of life on Earth. There are already more than four hundred deserts
in the oceans that are like scarified marks on the surface. In this way, we became that
deeply transforming force and it is the context of these transformations and these vast
cultural, economic, social, material movements that our children and us will live.

That is the essential understanding of our times. Today we are experiencing a
new geological age, the age of man (Antropoceno [antropos: man, cenus: age]: the
age of man), in which a given species, human species, became planetary force with geological scope. Therefore, the actions we choose to take today will decisively shape the settings of the future configurations of civilisation itself, and perhaps even of all life on Earth. Depending on the choices we make today, we could be decreeing a sixth great extinction for 2100. During the 4500 million years of history of life on Earth, there were moments when up to 95% of the living species disappeared due to a variety of factors: distant exploding stars, asteroid collisions... But at this moment there is a very concrete chance that a given species, the human species, causes, from now to 2100, the extermination of 30% of the total of the other species. It would be a new great extinction, determined in this case by the action of only one species. This is an unprecedented experience in life scale.

Then, there would be a series of directrices, a series of tendencies, that we can identify at present and that would shape the next decades. Faced with such a range of tendencies we will have to make choices because from the choices we make today, different paths will open for tomorrow. And those choices will not be our parents’ or our grandchildren’s choices, but we ourselves and our children will be the ones making them. Thus, I will emphatically assert that it is true that we are living a unique moment because we are understanding that we will live on an Earth deeply modified by ourselves and because the future paths and developments of our present actions will have a deep planetary and historical impact. Nowadays, for the first time in our history, more than 50% of humanity is literate. Perhaps the greatest psycho-social transformation in the history of humanity was, in the 20th century, public education for adults and, in particular, education for women. Literate women were a minority at the beginning of the 20th century. Nowadays, women are more than half of the university population and more than half of the literate population. Then, currently the required material conditions are met so that the common legacy of culture, the common legacy of our creations, could be shared beyond nationalities and localisms. This might act as ferment, as a catalyst for the acts which will be undertaken so that we can still travel the next decades, so uneven, so potentially rich, so risky; so that, maybe inspired by that tomorrow we wish to construct, we can fulfill our destiny of sailors of the Pacific, our destiny as a bridge, to connect what came before us with what is to come afterwards. If we could carry out that task and turn into those mediators ourselves, the future will remember us wistfully.

References
Textual
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Novels:

Essay:
That strange form of intimacy

Interview with Siri Hustvedt*

You speak from a foreigner’s place, living in cosmopolitan New York, with a Scandinavian origin and speaking Norwegian, working as a writer... The role of an outsider, the one you played before psychoanalysis can be the best place to observe... Don’t you think so?

I completely agree. I’ve often thought about what it has meant to me to grow up in two languages, to have a Norwegian mother and an American father. He also grew up speaking Norwegian. I think two languages allow you to have two different perspectives because words delineate one thing in one language that are not necessarily delineated in the other. I’m sure you feel this with Spanish and English all the time, that you suddenly recognize how perception shifts from one language to another. And even though I could never have articulated that division as a child, I grew up with a sense of “here” and “there.” I had a “there,” which was Norway. And when I was in Norway, I had the other “there”, the United States. There are many writers who, for one reason or another, find themselves in the position of an outsider. They write to the other, but from a marginalized point of view. I think I definitely have a sense of being perpetually outside, yes. But marginality as a perspective is often more interesting than holding court at the center of things.

But, don't you think that to be placed in the margin is, for an analyst, more a structural feature than an accidental one? As to writers…

I think the story of psychoanalysis is dependent on the culture where it finds itself. In the United States, Freudian psychoanalytic thinking was taken on with gusto. From the 1950’s into the 1970’s, psychiatric departments were dominated by Freudians. In the 70’s, when the first generation antipsychotic medicines came in, there was a radical shift to what is now called biological psychiatry. I have a feeling, however, that change is again in the air.

I’m at the very end of a book called *The delusions of certainty*, which is about our ideas of the mind in the West. In the book, I’m critical of the lack of philosophical grounding that is often part of neuroscience research, not all of it, but much of it. The more I know, the more critical I have become. I’m very interested in the workings of the brain, but a lot of research in brain science uses a dualistic, Cartesian model of mind and body without even being aware of it. You have psychological traits on top and then you have neurons, hormones, and neuro-chemicals at bottom. The psyche floats on top of neural correlates or underpinnings as if the two can be separated. The scientist draws a line between anger and a region of the brain, say, the limbic system. This is philosophically naïve. It’s not a useful picture. Nevertheless, finding a good theoretical model for how the brain-mind works is extremely difficult. I support a monist, embodied vision of mind.

Connected to that, you have referred to our era as the “neurobiologist”…

Yes, everything has a “neuro” in front of it now, at least in the U.S.. Neuro economics, neurophilosophy, neuro-everything. This is an era of the brain because so much new data is being produced. Research has exploded.

Perhaps we can refer to the 20th century as the “unconscious” era? Because… Do we live in an age where the Freudian unconscious —which is at the same time dynamic, sexual, repressed, connected to language, antisocial— seems vanished? Don’t you think?

Well, this is so interesting. You’d have to search high and low these days to find a scientist or a philosopher who doesn’t believe in the unconscious. That is something to note. And how does what science understands as a cognitive unconscious relate to the Freudian unconscious? Well, there are some scientists, Mark Solms, Georg Northoff, and Karl Friston, for example, who have used the Freudian model of the mind and applied it to a neurobiology —what we now know about the brain. Freud’s fantasy in the Project was to unite the physiological reality of neurons and the psyche. He gave it up, but some feel that his early hope can now be realized. Mark Solms has started neuropsychanalysis. Friston’s desire is to bring mind and brain together in an economic model like Freud’s. Another scientist, the late Karl Pribram, born in Vienna, loved the Project. He taught it as his own theory in the 1960’s, and everyone was excited by the ideas, until he told his audience of neuroscientists that it was Freud’s theory, not his. They were astounded. He said, “No, absolutely, I just taught the *Project* to you”. Pribram argued that because Freud’s concepts had different names—he didn’t use neurological terminology—scientists found them alien. I think there’s more to it than that. I think *Freud became one of those figures whose ideas were regarded as a case of all or nothing*. Why is it that with other thinkers people are allowed to grab a concept here or there? For example, Hegel. Think of how important
Hegel has been to philosophy. But no one thinks that in order to read Hegel, you have to believe that the Prussian Empire was the ultimate synthesis of the dialectic. Rejecting that idea doesn’t mean rejecting Hegel’s ideas about everything, his theory of self-consciousness, for example, which is still important. But with Freud, it has been different. If there was a single thought that was discovered not to be true, he had failed completely as a thinker. I don’t understand such reasoning. Freud himself wrote over and over that his ideas would probably be revised by future knowledge. Part of the problem might be that psychoanalysis has been pretty ferociously dogmatic in corners from the beginning. There were many factions. Think of Adler. Think of “wild analysts.” Think of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein facing off in London.

…There has been a revivification of psychoanalysis in the sciences, and I don’t think this is a bad thing. I think that what you don’t want is for neuroscience to eat psychoanalysis. But you can look at the mind from two points of view, first-person and third-person. This is what I believe: the subjective experience of the brain-mind or whatever is in our skulls, is irreducible. In other words, you cannot reduce my experience or your experience of consciousness (and unconsciousness) to a third-person view, no matter how precise. This does not mean that the neurosciences and psychoanalysis cannot have a dialogue. They can. Freud would have loved to engage with contemporary neuroscience. He was a neurologist, after all. Does that make sense? …I’ve been worrying this philosophical problem to death, but I think you cannot reduce subjective experience to neurons. Simply put, it doesn’t work.

You have asserted that nowadays nobody denies the existence of the unconscious. Even within psychoanalysis, the conceptualization of that fundamental concept varies quite a lot. And outside it, in other therapeutic currents as well as in the cultural field, the idea of an unconscious rich in its effects, sexual and conflictive, let’s say even subversive, it is not usually found… or is it?

This is true. In cognitive science today, no one would deny unconscious processes. That said, the nature of that unconscious is a subject of debate. However, computational theory of mind that has been in ascendance in cognitive science since the 1950’s is probably in its death throes. The mind is not a logical digital computer, and greater numbers of scientists are turning to another paradigm, not a strictly psychoanalytic one, but one that has to acknowledge the importance of sensation and emotion.

It may be that I have a synthetic bent because I love putting together ideas from many disciplines that rarely interact. This satisfies my desire to play and keep playing, but also to bring ideas together in unlikely ways. Surely this is related to personality or character, unifying gives me greater pleasure than dividing.

Some decades ago, a series of articles by Janet Malcolm were published in The New Yorker. There, the rather typical portrait of an orthodox psychoanalytical practice in New York was depicted. Close both to certain stereotypes and also to what can be seen in some of Woody Allen’s films. Has that image of strict and neutral analysts, mainly medical doctors, some of them with a European accent, changed? How do you find analytical practice today in New York?

I think the Viennese accent business has tapered off because many of those European exiles who came to New York in the 1930’s are dead. … So I think that old guy with a beard stereotype has faded somewhat. There are fewer Lacanians in New York than in Paris and Buenos Aires, for example, and a number of different psychoanalytic programs. The elite institution here remains the New York Psychoanalytic Society, however.
But people usually go here to the analyst as it used to be? It was a very popular habit…
I think there are many fewer five-day-a-week-lying-on-the-couch patients than there used to be. If you ask analysts in New York, they will tell you that they have some true analytical patients in the old style, but it’s usually a small number, two or three.

What is a true analytical patient for you? In your opinion?

I have been a patient in psychoanalytically-based psychotherapy for six years. I have an analyst. You have been a “true analytical patient” for six years?
I have been a patient for six years, yes, but not lying on a couch. Still I must be as “true” as any other patient. I said to my analyst the other day, “you know, I’m beginning to see the arc of the process, an end to it. I know that it will be over at some point”. What I’m saying is that the classical idea of lying on the couch five days a week and talking to your analyst happens much less than it used to. Many people who have a psychoanalyst, someone trained in psychoanalysis are like me. They’ll go two or three times a week for psychoanalytically-based psychotherapy.

What kind of reasons, in your opinion, for that change… not so many people going…

For five days a week?

Yes…

Well, it’s an old story in psychoanalysis. Part of it is money. Analysis is expensive, even though in New York, many analysts have graded scales, depending on what their patients can afford. It’s also a matter of time and the current idea that psychopharmacological answers are as good as talking. I happen to think this is not true. Antidepressants probably were so successful in the nineties because the placebo effect was far greater then. There have been several studies that show the difference today between antidepressants and placebo is almost non-existent. I’m fascinated by the placebo effect. What does it mean, for example, that they now know –this is why I’m interested in neurobiology– that a placebo treatment given to Parkinson’s patients causes dopamine to be released in the brain? Think about that. Or, if you are given a sugar pill and expect it will help you, endogenous opioids are released in your brain that make you feel better. Furthermore, contact with the doctor is terribly important to the effect. If a physician brusquely hands you a sugar pill, it will not work nearly as well as if he or she sits down with you and talks about the sugar pill in a comforting way. There are different ways of looking at the phenomenon. I suspect it is an intersubjective phenomenon related to early attachment. There are certainly pharmacological treatments that are beneficial. I am not anti-pharmacology. But placebo is a startling example of how the nervous system can aid itself through contact with another person.

Another main intellectual figure, also a woman and a New Yorker, Susan Sontag, called our attention to some aesthetic features of the analytical session. She also said that psychoanalysis was a form of art not recognized as it. What do you think of that? Could psychoanalysis be at least at the same distance from art as from science?

I happen to think that the actual work of doing art or science is not nearly as different as people like to assume. Doing good science also involves intuition,
imagination, and emotion—these unrecognized aspects of science are essential to science. But psychoanalysis is an art in the sense that analysts who are good at what they do are able to call on deep unconscious places inside themselves that are extremely hard to put into words, and making art is also generated from the unconscious. Unless an analyst is able to play with these unconscious forces, he or she is not going to be proficient at what he or she does.

I don’t understand why my own analysis works. …I can’t say what’s happened. There is a beautiful essay George Perec wrote about his analysis called “The Scene of a Stratagem.” He was in analysis with J-B Pontalis, and he says nothing about the content of his analysis. He traces its arc. Endless talking, talking to himself, endless, endless, boring, boring, boring, boring. And then he says, which is exactly what I have felt, that he doesn’t understand how it happened, but suddenly—he uses the phrase, finding his voice, and finding his ability to write. And the strange thing: the experience of it is how change happens, but you can’t track the course of it. Perec’s essay is one of the most wonderful pieces ever written about analysis. And then there’s Hilda Doolittle, H.D., the poet. She was Freud’s patient and wrote a lovely little book called “Tribute to Freud.” She also says very little about her life. Neither of them detail the content of their analyses. They talk about the movement and the form. If you could track the course of an analysis, there would be a certain formal quality to it, a shape. The difference between making art, say, writing a novel or making visual art, and doing an analysis, is that in an analysis there is a real other. All art is made for another. It’s always dialogical, but the other is imaginary. In the analytic space, there is a real other who can intervene, comment, interpret. This is not true of the novel.

In this direction, there’s a point that you have written about… psychoanalysts appear very often in your work…

Yeah, they’re all over the place…

But you say something which is certainly true, that they rarely talk about themselves as subjects, they appear as objects… A “real other”, yes, but a real other who appears, himself, not as a subject, but as an object.

You could say the analyst is also an imaginary creature. Because the nature of the transference includes a kind of projection onto the analyst, the relation changes. One day he or she is your mother, another day your father, sister, brother, or some other intimate person. Nevertheless, the reason why a person can change through analysis is that there is a “real other” who intervenes at crucial moments, or maybe intervenes over and over again, and then a time comes when the interpretation hits. Even if you’ve heard an insight a thousand times before, suddenly the words have meaning. That meaning has to have a bodily meaning as well as a semantic one. An emotional, physical meaning must be present. We can all intellectualize. I’m very good at that. You take an idea, you spin it around, and see it from different angles, but real change has a deeply emotional, physical quality to it. It’s amazing.

…I think psychoanalysis is about...
dredging up objective truth, or finding the real story. This, to me, this is an absurdity. The nature of memory simply doesn't bear out that possibility. Even if you've had a film crew with you every day of your entire life, which nobody does, you might know “the facts,” but you would be in the wrong perspective. You'd be looking at your life from a third-person point of view. Both novelists and psychoanalysts have a profound concern for the first-person narratives of human beings.

One of your characters talks about the way everyone rewrites his own life through an analysis, and the way in which everyone's reality is distinguished hardly from fiction. Please tell us more about the relationship between reality and fiction, and the masks as a way of exploring truth in your last novel.

Yes… well, the more I think about it, the more difficult it is to extract a so-called real story from any person's history. I'm not saying there's no such thing as memory or that we're complete blanks about our pasts. I believe that memory and the imagination are one faculty, not two. The mental images we have in memory and the mental images we fantasize -- as in what's going to happen next Thursday-- are not different in kind. And I believe this unified faculty of memory-imagination is what one draws upon to make art. …The story that you come into an analysis with is usually one that has been hardened into a myth. It is like a carapace or shell. The story you arrive with is one unconsciously devised to cover the pain. It allows symptoms to flourish because it's a defensive story. The job of an analysis is not to get the story “right,” or to find “the real story,” but to find a narrative that is more emotionally true for the patient. So it's emotional truth we're looking for, not the particular details of a narrative. That's why Perec and H.D. wrote so well about the process. They did not dwell on the particulars: “Oh, and then the analyst said that, and then I suddenly understood this fact about my mother, father, or whomever…” There's a process of emotional unbinding that becomes liberation. And when people leave analysis after years of “working through,” they are more free.

In your last novel, The blazing world, fiction and reality, is in the focus.

Oh, yeah, the masks, we didn't talk about those…

And masks, yes. The fake and the mask enables people to say the truth.

Yes. I think, The blazing world is itself a parable of the novel as an art form. What happens when you write a novel? You put on personas or masks, which are characters, and through those personas, you discover aspects of the self that you could never have discovered if you hadn't become those other people. One of the questions I've also asked myself is, what is the difference between writing a novel, especially a novel like my last one, and having multiple personality disorder? When you're writing as others, you are playing the way actors play roles. I remark on this in the book I'm finishing now. When an actor plays a role very different from him or herself, are there measurable physiological changes that take place, for example, altered heart rate, different patterns of galvanic skin response? You could do all kinds of tests, EEG's… I bet you would find changes. The difference is that the poor people with multiple personality are not in charge of their personas. A novelist can withdraw from his characters without being taken over by them. I call this “the aesthetic frame,” a protective sanctum offered by the form. It
makes it possible to go to dangerous places, to travel into psychically dangerous terrain because you're safe inside the frame of the book or the frame of the play where you can let your imagination run free and make perilous excursions into other selves.

As it can be inferred from your stories and essays, you have a deep and genuine interest in psychoanalysis, and even a unique commitment to study it. Could you tell us more about your early wish— with a recent PhD— to become an analyst yourself?

I thought I would make a good analyst, but I couldn't afford the training. At the time, the New York Psychoanalytic Institute took one or two candidates without an M.D., so that didn't bode well for me at the time. A part of me wishes I had had the luxury to train then, if only because I would have gotten myself an analysis earlier than I did. It was never a question for me of not becoming a writer and becoming an analyst instead. I made the decision to write when I was thirteen and started doing it right away. The problem for me was how to write and make a living so I could eat and pay rent.

It seems strange to us the fact that you study psychoanalytical texts, since it’s usually analysts who study artistic texts or works…

I am fascinated, in general, by this question: How does a person become or continue to become who he or she is? Certain scientific psychologies, for example, evolutionary psychology, which is founded on neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory does not include the story of individual development. That which is so significant in psychoanalysis, is missing. Evolution over millennia is important, but the story of one person has no significance because neo-Darwinists employ a static model of an evolved but mostly fixed mind. If the mind is not dynamic but merely a genetically determined entity, it becomes merely a question of calculating heredity vs. environment. If you lose a developmental model, a narrative for subjective reality, then I think you’ve done a fundamental injustice to the nature of human experience.

Something remains out of this model: the subject. The unconscious subject is out…

Absolutely… I think one of the reasons I’ve written this little book (The delusions of certainty) is that it’s in part an attack on computational theory of mind, the idea that our minds are computers. In fact, this idea goes way back to Pythagoras, to number as truth…

It’s pre Freudian…

Way, way pre-Freudian… The idea is that there is an eternal Platonic realm, a mathematical reality that is not of the human mind but out there in the universe itself. The mind and thought become a symbol system that can be stripped of all meaning and all context. Chomskyan linguistics is founded on a Cartesian idea— an abstract generative grammar. I don't believe that's how the mind works. I don't think it's reducible to digital computational form, and it's an error to suppose that it is. It has become increasingly clear that the model is wrong because its use in artificial intelligence—the attempt to create robots like you and me with feelings, consciousness and emotions—has failed. In popular cul-
Harry Burden refers to, speaking about her analysis, “that strange form of intimacy.” I found this definition at the same time vague and precise. What do you think about this strange form of intimacy in our contemporaneity, where something related to intimacy seems to have vanished. Everyone is exposed everyday.

Oh, yes, I think this is a bad thing. I met with a young analyst. She’s now in New York, but for some years, she was in Seattle practicing, and she said that people do all sorts of things before they finally go to an analyst. They garden, bicycle, get massage, acupuncture, what have you. She said the difference between patients in New York and Seattle was that after she’d been with her west coast patients for a while, they would say things like “It’s so amazing. I had no idea that just talking about this and being here with you, coming back to you, would have this enormously important effect on me.” The culture has become stupid about our essential need for others, not in the self-conscious mode of the Internet, but the genuine human need for dialogue. In analysis, safety and trust are most important. No one could have a therapeutic cure of any kind without privacy and safety, without this strange form of intimacy. The patient knows very little about the analyst, but you know that you’re safe and that through the process you are getting better.
Can you talk a bit more about your analysis without breaking “that intimacy”?

Yes, of course. Now that I’m deep into it, my experience is that I have actually been changed. I keep thinking about it. I’ve said to my analyst, “It’s so remarkable.” Freud was right about neurotic patterns. Once you become conscious of the neurotic patterns, you are in a position to act on them. But I’m still amazed. Analysis does change people. It has changed me. And I am immensely grateful that even though I began very late—I was in my fifties—I’m sixty now—I feel as if I have been unleashed. I’m not sure The blazing world would have been possible without it. I’ll say that.

I remained with the analyst I write about visiting in The shaking woman. It has proved to be nothing short of a great liberation. I also have a neurologist. I was and am a person in need of both an analyst and a neurologist. I will always have a sensitive nervous system. I continue to have neuropathy, which I have had since I was in my thirties, and migraine, although far less often than when I was younger. I am not tormented by shaking. Interestingly, the shaking has not been central in my therapy, and although it may sound perverse, I am glad it happened because it opened up an avenue for writing about a subject that has deeply interested me for a long time. It was also the shaking symptom that finally pushed me into analysis.

We, analysts, appreciate you as an interlocutor. We interview you, we invite you to congresses, and we publish your ideas… There the search that you have undertaken is turned around, among other things, in the knowledge that psychoanalysis can contribute, and we appear asking and you in the place of who knows. How do you experience this situation? With any kind of strangeness?

When I present my work to the psychoanalytic community, I do it from the point-of-view of an interested outsider, an artist, and now someone who has spent years in therapy herself. The fact is that despite my admittedly extensive reading in and knowledge of psychoanalysis, it’s not at all clear to me that my knowledge has had much to do with the journey I have made in my own therapy—that has been my own walk into the cloud of unknowing with an able guide. I have come out into clearer weather, if you will. I am better. This I can testify to.

It is remarkable how broad your psychoanalytic readings are: Freud, Bion, Winnicott, Lacan… How and from which point of view do you read psychoanalytic authors? You read their texts as if they were scientific essays or in a personal search for meaning, or as if you were reading fiction…, in the sense that Borges maybe gave it, when he equated psychoanalysis with a branch of fantastic literature…

I read to find out, as I said before, why we become who we are or why we are continually becoming who we are—I mean as human beings. I never reach the end of this question, but I can say I find the search enlivening, exciting, often joyous. No theory can bear the whole truth and complexity of what it means to be human. Psychoanalysis comes closer than many disciplines because it dares to consider so much of what we are and how much of it is hidden from us.
To what extent has psychoanalysis, as you have written, changed our way of conceiving ourselves?

Freud's greatest legacy may be the incontrovertible value of two people sitting in a room while one listens intently to the other, sometimes for years, and the astounding fact that from those years of talking and listening, the patient can leave the room at last feeling better, feeling freer, feeling more courageous and wiser than she was when she began.

How do you see psychoanalysis at present and how do you imagine it in the future, the place that it will occupy in culture in the future?

Let me put it this way: My hope is that psychoanalysis will again be part of what I think of as the reform of psychiatry. In other words, **psychoanalysis has a lot to offer what has become, at least in the United States, a very biologically oriented form of psychiatric treatment that has yet to define what it means by psyche and soma**. Patients are collections of dispersed symptoms, not beings with pasts. Because psychoanalysis includes the idea of narrative, the developing narrative of the patient; because it cares about infancy and childhood and their relation to maturity; it can broaden what has become a narrow psychiatric approach. Also, I think people in psychiatry are getting sick and tired of static models of mind and the brain and primitive ways of thinking about treatment. Psychoanalysis can be part of the resurgence of a dynamic model of the mind-brain.
Vortex
Translating in psychoanalysis
Echoes of a knocked-down tower: reconstruction of Freudian discourse

Lúcia Palazzo*

The main feature of the section called “Vortex” is the possibility to enrich the debate about the topic “translation in psychoanalysis” making use of the plurality of ideas and authors coming from different countries with different tongues, languages and cultures, as it can be confirmed by reading the articles.

We are facing the disturbing and pleasant movement of discovery and, surely, the reader needs to be present as the creator of the process that ranges from translation to interpretation of Freudian psychoanalytic language.

In 1930, Freud won the Goethe Prize for his literary style and his poetic richness, a resource broadly used for the theoretical transmission and argumentation that he yearned for. In each selected word, the elaboration and construction of the fundamentals of psychoanalytic theory, as well as the master’s sagacity to catch the reader’s attention, were implicit. As a master and a learner, Freud would write while he travelled around the imaginary settings he created. In this way, he challenged the reader to move between the field of language and the grounds of traumatic events. A risky literary tour given the impossibility to avoid being touched in the soul and in unspeakable emotions. He knew, better than any other person, how to provide intellectual discovery together with an emotional response. He was interested in self-knowledge and not in knowledge towards an external truth, which could lead to metaphorical oedipal blindness, as Bettelheim (1982/1984) holds.

He intended to touch people in their humanity, so he chose metaphors that would break his supposedly scientific mechanistic dehumanisation. Bettelheim provides blunt criticism and thoroughly demonstrates how a work can be altered by translating it. He refers to how the English translation of the “Standard edition” by James Strachey (1953-1974) systematically moved away from the human dimension of the ordinary language with which Freud wrote in order to reach the deepest topics and, at the same time, he could affectionately touch his reader.

This translation favours distance, for instance, by replacing words of common use with technical terms. The most important mistake would be to translate Seele, “soul” in German,
as “mind” in English, which emphasises the intellect. Another example of tendentious translation is the title of the first American edition of the text “A questão da análise leiga” (Freud, 1927/1996), translated as “The problem of lay-analyses”. We could ask: a problem for whom? This mistake was not corrected until 1947. On that occasion, Freud strongly argued against the tendency to “convert psychoanalysis into a mere servant of psychiatry” (Bettelheim, 1982/1984).

The unconscious is the immaterial patrimony of psychoanalysis. How to translate that experience?
At the beginning of the 20th century, most analysts came from Central Europe and German was the main scientific language. Therefore, the psychoanalysis circumscribed to that reduced territory did not offer the range of versions that we can enjoy nowadays. The interest in the new discipline was fundamental in the dissemination of new versions, and the upsurge of wars, with the rise of Nazism, led many analysts to move within Europe and also into other continents. In spite of everything, the master’s word was kept and spread, even with imperfections, terminological variations and conceptual inconsistencies.

We return to the question: How to translate that experience? Because reading the Freudian text is, above all, a unique experience, and translating such an experience with style and preserving the conception that the unconscious is no man’s land turns into a trip with uncertain destination. Thus, another question is revealed for the debate: if the initial translations intended, on the one hand, to open and settle the field of psychoanalytic knowledge, they could, on the other hand, have limited its understanding and impoverished the communication that Freud had left us as a legacy, distorting his discourse and confining it into a scientific biologist knowledge.

Which power-submission relation was implicit when certain translations that, at the same time, served as a matrix for publications in other languages, removed the analyst’s soul? Might they have used the popular saying “advertising is the soul of business” and transformed psychoanalysis into a globalised product with market ambitions? Which consequences have been predicted for that event?

The call for reflection of the authors present here reminds of how much we still need to walk to understand and not to explain the reasons for human suffering any more. Indeed, that seems—or should be—universal among us: respect for differences and desire of approximation to what we cannot cover completely. The future of psychoanalysis is intrinsically linked to the capacity we will have to spread a knowledge that took its first steps in the 20th century with the ambition to have a dialogue with cultures and fields of knowledge, trying to avoid its crystallisation in an idealised and closed construct, forged on the conceptions of the European culture of the 19th century. We need to make progress in Persian, Afrikaans, Mandarin, Japanese and other languages. To care about the memory and the history of psychoanalytic movement in the present to build a bridge between past and future.

At this point, it is worth remembering Walter Benjamin’s (1921/2011) warning: “If the original does not exist for the reader’s sake, how could the translation be understood on the basis of this premise?” And, if Freud addressed his reader in German, how to translate and transmit the specificity of the object of psychoanalysis aligned with the original Freudian thought? How to preserve the intimacy and the emotional nature of Freud’s word without the intimidating presence of a recognised text and without converting it into the medical scientific model?

Here is the vortex of the issue: the psychoanalytic diaspora of the 21st century!
The transformation of languages throughout centuries is inevitable. The dilemma between faithfulness to the original and freedom of interpretation in the “target language” is confused throu-

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gh shifts in meaning. There is a well-known pun in Italian that says “traduttore, traditore”, that is, “translator, traitor”, since every translator would betray the original text in order to re-write it in another language. We also find this issue in the current virtual tools, such as Google Translate which, while shortening geographical and linguistic distances, creates aberrations of meanings. Thus, we can infer that even today translation is a human activity par excellence, since infancy in the mother’s care, who interprets her child in an act to lead them forward and in the experience of that paradox.

For Benjamin (1921/2011), “the task of the translator is to release in his own language that pure language which is exiled among alien tongues, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of that work (Umdichtung)”. In his text, he quotes German philosopher Rudolf Pannwitz (1917): “the basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign language”. This is the great challenge not only for translation in psychoanalysis but also for our own clinical experience: to allow oneself to be shaken by the other’s language and reject the role of a mere reproducer of meanings. Interpretation takes place at that unique and untranslatable instant, whose meaning built by two people is only recognised by the analytic couple.

Psychoanalytic clinical practice is rich in meanings and they cross all languages through experiences, in a translation made in the analytic process. Let us go towards what authors say so that we can continue reading:

Sudhir Kakar, a psychoanalyst from India, opens the section revealing his initial conflict in relation to his clinical practice and experience in India’s Hindu culture. He reflects on the different psychoanalytic conceptualisations originated in Western bourgeois values and its culture’s conceptions: “there are fundamental differences about the nature and realisation of human life and experiences”. He asserts that culture “is not a late substrate in the formation of psychosis but is present since the beginning of life”.

Carlos Tamm L. de Sá, a Brazilian psychoanalyst based in England, tells his experience in clinical work with people from different countries and origins, since London is a city that harbours a multiplicity of languages. This represents a special situation as analyst and patient may have different mother tongues and the analysis takes place in English. He mentions the case of children and youngsters with difficulties within the autistic spectrum and poses questions about the vicissitudes in relation to experiencing the inevitable estrangement from the mother tongue.

Laurence Kahn, a French psychoanalyst, presents an overview of Jean Laplanche’s understanding of the translation of the Freudian work into French. She reveals her effort to justify the creation of neologisms in two senses: “inhabited by the use of the target language, but also inhabited by the pulsion that comes from the source language and perhaps from beyond it” (Laplanche, 1987/1992; Laplanche, Bourgignon & Cotet, 1989). Etymologically different, the German and French languages intertwine in meanings of the universe of translation, a project that entails the paradox: “on the one the hand, to get closer to the enigma of words; on the other, to confine it in the network of a stable signification...”.

Irene Agoff, an Argentine translator and psychoanalyst, discusses the controversies of the field of psychoanalysis and all the other translations. She approaches the translation of Jacques Lacan’s texts with their neologisms, etymological and conceptualisation puzzles. She mentions the problems of the different positions, the analyst’s as well as the translator’s, faced with tongues and languages She warns that the translator must be attentive to the siren call of free association, in a supposedly free game between languages, and seek ethically, that is, in their own language, what the author expresses through their “unconscious lalangue”, in their unique language.

Gohar Homayounpour, a university professor in Teheran, through an imaginary dialogue with a friend about Jorge Luis Borges’ poetry, explores the infantile experiences that involve translation and access to the world of translation...
“Translation requires a separation, the mother’s death, from the happiness of a pure fusion”. She elaborates her text around psychoanalytic concepts such as castration, triangularity and the possibility of duels, as well as the “hospitality created for the singularity of the newcomer, the unexpected visitor”, as Derrida (2000, p. 83) invites. And she challenges us to read Borges’ poem in Persian.

Felix de Mendelssohn, a professor of the University of Vienna, recalls his childhood in post-war England. He tells that the infantile experiences with parents, who were translators, imbued his clinical listening in the field of dialogue of the analytic couple, many times invisible and “without losing the sensation of the ghostly difference, that some part of what the other says could be definitely untranslatable”. Drawing from his experience in North Africa and other cultures, he highlights the importance of giving value to the narrative style and form, without following it “to the letter”, in an interpretation according to Western models and away from socio-cultural differences. Besides, he questions the violence of the current conflicts between civilisations.

André Medina Carone, a Brazilian translator and philosopher, whose research is centred on Freud’s work and its relation with philosophy, writes about the historic debate on translations. With his critical view, he deals with several controversial issues, such as projections and blind spots in the readings of Freudian texts. He stimulates questioning about the “academic culture of bibliographical notes and productivity”, summoning psychoanalysis to take part in this debate. In the same way, he also questions the primacy of the visible word: “Psychoanalytic concepts exist but they are neither tangible nor invisible; they are much more elusive, evasive and vague than our vain terminology dreams”.

Gastón Sironi, an Argentine translator, understands translation as “making life (writing of life) cross through time and space”. This tour is doomed to fail and is driven by dissatisfaction in the search for the desired and lost object. He reminds that translations grow old, according to Umberto Eco (2003/2008), but there will come new interpretations and there will always be something of novelty and discovery. “If all navigation is defeat, it is also a new beginning, a better failure”.

Steve Ellman, a university professor from New York, asks: “which are the necessary conditions to translate through cultural and linguistic borders?”. He tells some experiences with colleagues that were able to add value to the translation they made of other analysts’ works, with the intention to link the concepts “by integrating or posing them as alternate perspectives”. He highlights the narcissistic difficulty among our colleagues to embrace perspectives of another culture, which would lead to the theoretical and clinical impov...
We are all American, are we all brothers and sisters?
The resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba, in December 2014, brought about a wave of joy due to the openness to dialogue. A historic, unexpected and surprising moment with consequences for all Latin American countries. “These 50 years have shown that isolation has not worked. It’s time for a new approach. We are all Americans”, said Barak Obama in his announcement speech about the resumption of the relations interrupted in 1961. However, we still have the feeling that ignorance of the countries of the American continent is huge. Little is known about what worked or did not work in Cuba as well as in the rest of the countries that are neither part of Western European Axis nor North America.

Thus, translating and launching *Calibán* in English is also a historic moment. Broadening the spread of Latin American psychoanalytic thought is vital and a source of richness for everyone. We are all brothers and sisters, but few know and value what we produce.

As the hegemonic world language, English crosses continents and leaves a trace of advancements and shifts in translations. Yet, will it be the one through which we will be heard just as our masters were at the beginning of the 20th century? Unbelievably, we go back to the old starting point.

Nowadays we can perhaps carry out this task of transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge without making a repressive translation that omits aspects that supposedly could not be said or experienced among our peers. And with the freedom of thought that allows us to make a toast to the future with drinks such as *cubalibre*—rum with Coke—, Brazilian *caipirinha* or Argentine wine, Chilean *pisco sour*, Peruvian *chicha morada* or French *champagne*, German beer, Italian *Prosecco* or Japanese *sake*. No matter the vehicle if the destination is to reach the island of unconscious fantasy. No matter the psychoanalytic tour and the theories adopted if we are able, ethically, to respect the origin and emotional experience of each one of us.

To the colleagues that join us in *Calibán*, the wisdom of poet Manoel de Barros:
… that the importance of something is neither measured with measuring tape nor with scales or barometers, etc. That the importance of something should be measured by the glare it produces on us. (Barros, 2006).

At the beginning it was the verb. Only afterwards came the delirium of the verb. The delirium of the verb was at the beginning, there where the child says: I listen to the colour of little birds. The child does not know that the verb *listen* does not collocate with colours, but with a sound. Then if the child changes the function of a verb, he raves. And so, in poetry that is a poet’s voice, that is the voice of birth. The verb has to become delirium. (Barros, 1997).

References
As psychoanalysis travels

Sudhir Kakar*

At the beginning of my practice in India, I was acutely aware of the struggle within myself between my inherited Hindu-Indian culture and the Freudian psychoanalytic culture that I had recently acquired and in which I was professionally socialized. My romantic Indian vision of reality could not be easily reconciled with the ironic psychoanalytic vision, nor could the Indian view of the person and the sources of human strengths be reconciled with the Freudian view—now also mine—on the nature of the individual and his or her world. With Faust (Goethe, 1808/2014), I could only say to Western colleagues:

Your spirit only seeks a single quest
so never learns to know its brother
Two souls, alas, dwell in my breast
And one would gladly sunder from the other
(Goethe, 1808/2014, p. 29).

Finally, I took comfort from my Hindu view that every contradiction does not need a resolution, that contradictions can co-exist in the mind like substances in water that are in suspension without necessarily becoming a solution.

Even people who are well-inclined towards psychoanalysis are often skeptical whether psychoanalysis is at all possible in a non-Western society such as India, with its family system, religious beliefs and cultural values that are so different from those of bourgeois Europe in which psychoanalysis had its origins.

I do not give the easy answer to my skeptical friends that Indian analysts practice in the enclaves of Western modernity in Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Bangalore. Here, among the upper and upper-middle classes, there are enough patients, Westernised to various degree, who are attracted by Freudian model of man and the causes of his suffering and look towards an analyst as their best ally in the realization of their full individuality. I know that the questioner is seeking an answer to the relevance of psychoanalysis for the majority of Indians who are still firmly rooted in their civilization. My answer is that, yes, traditional India is indeed very different. There is an emphasis on extended rather than a nuclear family, mother

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goddesses are vastly more important than a father-god, the nature of a person is not viewed as individual and instincual but as inter- and transpersonal. Further, there are fundamental differences on the nature of human experience and the fulfilled human life. Psychoanalysis, we know, is informed by a vision of human experience that emphasizes man’s individuality and his self-contained psyche. In the psychoanalytic vision, each of us lives in our own subjective world, pursuing pleasures and private fantasies, constructing a life and a fate that will vanish when our time is over. This view emphasizes the essential complexity and tragedy of life whereby many wishes are fated to remain unfulfilled. The psychoanalytic vision is in contrast to the Indian, specifically Hindu cultural heritage, which sees life not as tragic but as a romantic quest that can extend over many births, with the goal and possibility of apprehending another, ‘higher’ level of reality beyond the shared, verifiable, empirical reality of our world, our bodies, and our emotions. The Indian view further asserts that belonging to a community is the fundamental need of man. Only if man truly belongs to such a community, naturally and unselfconsciously, can he enter the river of life and lead a full, creative and spontaneous life. And, of course, Hindu-Indian myths are very different from Greek myths or the Christian and Jewish legends that have irrigated the terroir of psychoanalysis for the last one hundred years.

And yet my experience with traditional Indian patients teaches me that psychoanalysis is still possible, if (as the Indian astrologer said on being asked how he cast horoscopes when new planets have been discovered which are absent in his ancient system) “one makes the required adjustments.” In other words, if the translation of psychoanalysis gives equal value to both the languages, of psychoanalysis and of the culture in which psychoanalysis is being received.

Some of the adjustments are theoretical. The Indian analyst needs to recognize that many psychoanalytic propositions on what constitutes psychological maturity, gender-appropriate behaviors, “positive” or “negative” resolutions of developmental conflicts and complexes, that often appear in the garb of universal truths, are actually the incorporation of Western middle class experience and values into psychoanalytic theory. But the most important adjustment one needs to make is to recognize that culture, as a fundamental way of viewing ourselves and the world we live in, is not a later substrate in the formation of the psyche but is present from the beginning of life. In other words, the cultural unconscious flows into the same river that also receives the stream of the dynamic unconscious.

Alfred Margulies (2014), in a discussion of an earlier version of this essay pointed out, at deep levels of the psyche culture and unconscious co-create each other and that we know this to be true neurobiologically. He illustrates this by taking the example of Muller-Lyer illusion where lines of equal length give impressions of different length, an illusion, created by the orientation of the arrow caps placed on their ends. This illusion is a consequence of our depth perspective shaped by the rectangular cues of buildings we live in. Children who grow up in round huts rarely experience the Muller-Lyer arrows as an illusion.

In other words, Margulies goes on to say:

“… our cultural environment in its everyday structures, practices and aesthetics shapes the way our brains process visual information. And, if this is true for neurobiological non-conscious visual processing, it seems almost certain it would be true for psychoanalytically relevant unconscious processes and the impact of culture” (Margulies, 2014, p. 5).

My own project of ‘translation’ in the last forty years of work with Indian and Western patients has been guided by a view of the psyche wherein the individual, dynamic unconscious and the cultural unconscious are inextricably intertwined, each enriching, constraining and shaping the other as they jointly evolve through life.

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Calibán’s invitation to reflect on “translation” in psychoanalysis came to draw on my experience over the past few years in two fronts. On the one hand, being a Brazilian analyst settled in London, Brazilian colleagues occasionally ask me: “What is it like to work as an analyst in a foreign language?” Working in a foreign language already causes fright but some people are even more astonished faced with the evidence that, in a city like London, the English in which the analysis takes place might be neither the analyst’s nor the analysed patient’s mother tongue. On the other hand, the experience with patients who do not speak much or speak idiosyncratically requires the search for another kind of “translation.”

If we consider all the linguistic journeys we had to make for the spread of psychoanalysis, the importance of the “invariant” (Bion, 1965/1977) seems to stand out amidst all the translations and linguistic changes: the psychic reality that is the focus of attention shared by analysts and the analysed patients. The focus on language specificity seems to avoid the greater issue of ordinary language limitations to express the emotional reality and the language of the unconscious. In the case of children and youngsters within the autistic spectrum or with other difficulties that
involve verbal communication, that problem appears in an extreme way.¹

In those cases we frequently deal with patients who do not have anyone to talk to in their minds. It is necessary to make challenging and sometimes very sharp efforts in order to try to understand the internal states and strange and idiosyncratic expressions used by patients whose difficulties prevent the proper development of communicational language.²

As regards this language, Meltzer (1975) proposed five essential factors: the formation of “thoughts-dream,” their transformation into language, the construction of vocabulary to describe the internal world, the discovery of an object in the external world with psychic reality and an appropriate distinction of the self and the desire to communicate. I would add a sixth factor: the hope to be understood by that external object.

The research in developmental psychology and neurobiology coincide with psychoanalytic observations in that they point out that the first non-verbal communication experiences between the baby and their mother pave the way for verbal language development (Fernald, 1989; Trevarthen, 1993; Tomasello, 2003; Malloch & Trevarthen, 2009). Over the abyss of the separation that can be accepted by the baby and their mother, both try to build a bridge of gestures and expressions that will be crucial for subsequent verbal language. Resorting to Wittgenstein’s expression (1953/1997) in his Philosophical investigations, we can say that it is the non-verbal “language games” between mother and baby that set the basis for verbal language acquisition and development.

In any case, language learning also implies a loss. The “mouth void of breast” (Golse, 1999), the distance from the primary object that can be tolerated and that is necessary for the development of symbolic and linguistic abilities. What is more, such development implies the acceptance of verbal language limitations to represent the internal experience.³ The difficulty to tolerate “spaces between” can manifest itself in different ways. A young patient that at the beginning and at the end of the session would enter and leave the office in an extremely abrupt and hasty way recognised during a session that when he had to move from one place to another, once he had left the starting point, he needed to reach the arrival point very fast. His way of speaking matched this singularity: even if he used structured language, he would speak fast, without emphasizing the consonants, with a strange diction that made his speech almost unintelligible, as if it were a continuum of sounds linked among them and without clear division between letters, words and syllables. Besides, he would try to always begin the sessions by discussing what had been discussed at the end of the previous session, which generated an illusion of continuity throughout time between sessions.⁴ It was very difficult for him to tolerate the

1. I dealt with this issue in a more comprehensive way in the doctoral dissertation Autistic functioning and language development (Tamm Lessa de Sá, 2014).
2. In the analysis of children with social interaction and communication disorders, the same limitations that appear in verbal exchange are also present in the ability to play with the analyst.
3. This aspect may suggest future investigations into the factors that block, for some linguistically competent individuals, the possibility of learning foreign languages: would the distancing from the mother tongue be an intolerable repetition of the feelings linked to that first loss?
4. This case is dealt with in depth in the work There is no one there: Some aspects of autistic functioning in adult patients, presented in the Bridge Foundation/Bristol, January 2012 (Tamm, 2012).
space between us in which communication occurred.

Chaz, an eight-year-old child with more serious difficulties, skipped, when speaking or writing, the last letters or the word endings generating what seemed at the beginning a mass of sounds or letters, in which, in fact, the traces of the words were found.

The panic aroused by the recognition of the presence of another, separated and uncontrollable, is evidenced when, throughout the development of the analysis, it can be observed that the absence of anxiety inherent to children within the autistic spectrum gives rise to primitive and terrifying persecution fantasies. Fred, aged 6, during his second year of treatment arrived at a session quite frightened saying that he had to hold his tummy so that it would not fall down. Then, he remained in silence for some minutes. When I told him that maybe he was afraid of losing parts of his mouth when he spoke, he answered that he would also lose a part of his eyes when he saw and a part of his ears when he heard. Eyes and ears, channels of perception of the external world, seemed to be versions of the mouth that might be lost when he spoke.5

The translation of the emotional reality into apprehensible language, as a phenomenon that takes place in the analytic process, involves the expansion of mental space. However, the shadow of the losses involved in such process astonishes many candidates for analysis in different ways.

If the translation of the emotional experience implies the risk of loss, it is its power that allows the movement between languages and cultures beyond cultural and linguistic differences. Psychic reality cannot be apprehended directly; it is that which we can only access through its “transformations” (Bion, 1965/1977), even those which occur in the context of psychoanalytic work. Thus, we are always searching for a language to describe a phenomenon that can never be contained in it. For all of us, the unconscious is a foreigner. We just have to continue searching for the language that seems to translate it better.

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5. About the primitive fears in mouth-nipple contact, see Tustin (1986).
The “translation project” that has led the translation of Freud’s *Complete works* (1893-1895/2009) edited in PUF was clearly defined by Jean Laplanche and his team: faithfulness and lexical coherence; truth should not be sacrificed in order to get good linguistic turns, “the text, the whole text, nothing but the text”—taking into account that “every great work of thought embraces its destiny with the concepts it creates itself” (Laplanche, Bourguignon & Cotet, 1989). Another demand was added to the need to circumscribe “each word that makes a concept” (Laplanche et al., 1989) in a strictly determined lexicon: to make the language foreignness of the source language resound in the target language. This is how Laplanche justified the creation of neologisms. These, constructed according to the derivation modes of the French language similar to those seen in German, had to ensure the “reminiscence of meaning through etymological decomposition” (Laplanche et al., 1989), since “the neologism is projected in order to be inhabited on both sides at the same time, inhabited by the use of the target language, but also by the pulsion that comes from the source language and perhaps from beyond it” (Laplanche, 1987/1992b; Laplanche et al., 1989).

It is necessary, then, to wonder about the consequences of that exploitation of the etymological sources of French, since the roots of our language are mainly Latin (unlike German that speaks on the basis of its own background). In order to make what is unuttered in the original resound, is it not necessary, at least, that the etymologies be recognisable? However, who recognises in *éconduction* the Freudian term *Abfuhr*, usually translated as “discharge”, where it would be necessary to perceive *ex* and *conducere* of *ab-führen* (as opposed to “dis-charge” of *ent-laden*) (Laplanche et al., 1989)? How to discover that the systematic translation of *Erfolg* as “success”, when the meaning, instead, is usually “result”, comes from the “restoration” of the “original meaning” based on *succéder*—which would pair it with *folgen* (“follow”) of *Erfolg* (Laplanche et al., 1989)? Which are the effects of translating *seelisch* as “emotional” and not “psychic”, a
translation that not only does not distinguish vitalism from anima and the intellectual properties of animus, but that comes so close to the adjective “animistic” as to confuse them, thus reinforcing the suspicion of a magical primitivism of the Freudian theory of psychism?

Freud’s language seeks its strength in restraint, respecting the ideals of the classical culture, “without exaggeration” (Mann, 1936/1960). Yet the ethics of the German Klassik cannot be assimilated into the position according to which the work of thinking would take place directly on the original background of the language. It is a romantic issue, where unveiling of the spirit of a people already has its place. And it is a Heideggerian issue because the word contains the treasure of its source, language or, more precisely, the Dite, die Sage, is the holder of an original trace that is not-oblivion and truth at the same time (Heidegger, 1954/1981a, 1931/2001). It is precisely from Heidegger that Berman borrows the title L’épreuve de l’étranger (Berman, 1984) –being Berman the author whom the translators of Complete works (Freud, 2009) refer to. The fact that the translation “does not lead to itself”, that “it is oriented towards the other” and that, hence, holds a “close relation with the goal of psychoanalysis, which is an attempt to translate the unconscious”, demands that we resist the “temptations” that would consist of “de-Germanising” the Freudian language, elucidating and embellishing it (Laplanche, 1988/1992c; Laplanche et al., 1989). Demands in which we find Berman’s criticism to ethnocentrism in translation (Berman, 1999) and that lead Laplanche to vindicate syntactic heaviness –a mark of faithfulness to Freud, from whom he would try to discover even the smallest inflection of thought (Laplanche 1988/1992a; Laplanche et al., 1989). Thus, the option was to modify the construction of phrases as little as possible, despite the radical difference between French and German syntactic structures, and to consistently put into practice the suffixes, the details of the prefixes, as well as the countless short words that scan German prose.

In fact, these options lead to the corruption of the French restitution of the natural German cadence. But, above all, they raise the conflict, inherent to every translation, between the strict textuality of units-word and the shift of meaning in construction-phrase (l’assemblage-phrase) (De Launay, 2006; Wismann, 2012). Because the unique making of each language is at stake in that construction, that is, in grammar. It is syntax that in a unique way for each language holds the direction of the phrase, in other words, of discourse. However, Laplanche does not hold this aspect –only providing as argument the high level of tolerance to syntactic flexibility and to etymological procedure from the translations of Heidegger (Laplanche 1988/1992c; Laplanche et al., 1989)–. He does not hold this axis because he refers to “the task of the translator” by Benjamin (1921/1971). A text which allows him to relate the movement of detranslation-retranslation to “repatriation” in the target language, of what has been separated or repressed in previous translations –and with his theory of the unconscious conceived as the mass of signifiers untranslatable by the child, imbued with opaque sexual meanings, established by the adult (Laplanche 1990, 1987/1992b, 1988/1992c). Drawing from his interpretation of Benjamin, he argues that the untranslatable would lie in the word, not in the fact that it designates an object (its broad sense) but that it “points” at the object according to features unique to each language: what Benjamin calls the “emotional nature” of words (Benjamin, 1921/1971). For Laplanche, there would lie a “crucial translating”, a true “categorical imperative” for the translator: “You must translate because it is untranslatable” (Laplanche, 1987/1992b).

I am puzzled by the use of that reference because nothing, in that very complex text by Benjamin, justifies resorting to etymology. Instead, Laplanche’s treatment of the original –a treatment that necessarily calls for words in the sense of an over-accentuation denied by Freud’s native language– seems to me to come mainly from the Heideggerian tradition, at least at a crucial point: the idea that the relation between words and things is altered, as regards the degradation of words due to their use (Heidegger, 1954/1959; Laplanche
For Laplanche, it is that use which wears down, which would mean translating as closely as possible to the signifiers—a Heideggerian issue that we find again and again throughout the work: the word contains the treasure of its source; the Dite, die Sage, is the holder of an original trace that is not-oblivion and truth at the same time; what is “remote” intrinsically entails the background which is essence (Heidegger, 1951/1973, 1954/1981a, 1950/1981b, 1931/2001).

I ignore if Laplanche measured the risk involved in that practice of “primary meanings”. But in any case the paradox that governs the translation project of the Complete works (Freud, 2009) can be measured: on the one hand, approaching the mystery of words; on the other, confining them to the network of constant signification; in the third place, postulating its unity so that the perimeter of its use be delimited without ambiguity; and in the fourth place, backing on etymology with the idea that it would reflect “the pulsion that comes from the source language and perhaps from beyond it” (Laplanche, 1992b).

References
Between polysemy and nomenclature. Dilemmas of the translator in psychoanalysis

Irene Agoff*

Translate, in Spanish, in French, in German, is a polysemous word. And it is not exactly of those whose polysemy would blur behind the priority that usage could give to such and such of its meanings. It is the other way around: translate, translation, in the three languages, are terms with a broad and varied use whose meanings are in general stated in dictionaries. There would be, however, one of those uses that, in our view, would remain outside the usual definitions. That is the use of the term translation by Freud, Übersetzung, in letters 46 and 52 to Fliess (Freud, 1892-1899/1982) and in the article “The unconscious” (Freud, 1915/1979). None of these Freudian uses would seem to be directly considered in dictionary descriptions or show anything that allowed to assimilate them in interlingual translation.

For certain analysts, however, Freud's Übersetzung would be one of the thesis bases according to which the translation of psychoanalysis texts would constitute another aspect of psychoanalytic doctrine and praxis; a perspective that entails a sharp separation between translation in the field of psychoanalysis and all the others. Furthermore, there are practitioners of analysis that approve of the mix of languages evidenced in certain lapses and some narrations of dreams, as well as in certain literary productions, with translation strictly speaking, that is, between languages. A derivation of this perspective is the controversial assimilation of the respective positions of the analyst and the translator faced with the linguistic acts they have to deal with.

The central place that the name of Jacques Lacan acquired in psychoanalysis since mid-20th century exponentially increased the questions and difficulties of translations in this field. Here we will refer especially to those

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1. In both letters Freud calls Übersetzung the psychic operation of re-transcribing "signs" (originated in the initial perceptions) between the different stages in life. The "no translation" in some of them explains the outbreak of neurosis. In "The unconscious" Freud says that the unconscious is only known as conscious once it has been translated into it.
2. Postulate supported in the, somewhat subtle but at the same time sophisticated, resource of elaborations that fairly link the productions of the unconscious to the substantially poetic character of every language phenomenon.
posed from French to Spanish.

If we ask ourselves what Lacan’s translator wants to translate, we will see that what matters are usually concept names, the French words that Lacan uses in a designing way using usual terms of his language or through neologisms. In many cases, the translator does not seem to care in the same way about the structure of the languages at stake. There are signs that the issue is worrying but it is not strange that it is avoided. Should it be understood that the centre of worrying is semantics? But, does semantics only concern about terminology? Delving into the etymology of a Lacanian term, going deep into a few or no valid resource -since analysts are not, usually, philologists- in the labyrinthine history of a term in a foreign language, resorting to any kind of mediators with that purpose-language sciences of unmanageable diversity- with whom the analyst does not need to be familiarised, shuffling glossaries of the most varied disciplines, tracing in its meanders the thoughts of philosophers, logicians of languages, sociologists and countless other specialists in order to solve enigmas of nomenclature; all that would provide translators with the sedation of fair conscience. They have done everything in their power to clear away the mystery of the given term. As regards the structure of languages, then it is ultimately only, some would say, a support and, as such, can be transferred almost mechanically. We can see then how volumes of French forms accumulate in texts usurping our territories of Spanish language and oblige us to read writings that an ordinary person would not understand. We cannot resist quoting Walter Benjamin here when, making comments about the famous case of the translation of Sophocles by Hölderlin, he said: “The fidelity in the reproduction of the form ends up complicating that of the meaning” (Benjamin, 1923/1971).

In any case, we are far from minimising the terminological problem, not only in the translation of Lacan but also of Freud. Because terminological problem is another denomination for conceptual problem. A postulate that acknowledges its origin in a philosophical movement developed at the end of the 19th century that starts to equate thought and language to pose afterwards the pre-eminence of the former over the latter.

The Lacanian re-reading of Freud’s work is inscribed in the context just been referred to (though providing it with new arguments). Having to convey in French the German thought of Freud constituted a first-rate factor when establishing core concepts of psychoanalysis. Central examples of that are the Freudian terms Verwerfung, Verneinung and Verleugnung, which gave rise to, according to
the authors and the periods, many different translation solutions. As regards the strictly Lacanian lexicon, it is widely known that terms such as *semblant* and *sinthome* have not yet had any satisfactory translation solutions due to many etymological and semantic reasons. Not to mention its neologisms, headaches not only for the translator but also many times even for the French speaker.

We mentioned beforehand the problem regarding the diversity of positions of the analyst and the translator when faced with the language phenomena with which both have to deal with. In our view, what the analyst must listen of “thelanguage” -as one word- from their analysand is functionally distinguishable from the elements of “language” or “speech” with which the translator has to deal with. We even consider it more worthy of consideration to conceive the texts to be translated as samples of an *idiolect* (a term from Linguistics defined by *Diccionario de la Real Academia Española* as “an individual’s distinctive and unique use of language”). Unlike that the-language (Lacan, 1974, 1975-76/1988, 2006) that the analyst must listen to, the translator must perceive and transfer the complexity of one language with the *idiolect* of the author. Thus translators will avoid being tempted by the always close siren call of free association. A siren call that could make them conceive a supposedly free game with languages, another name for the deleterious lack of their ethical duty: that of “expressing well”, in their own language, what the original text has stated as it could, as the unconscious thelanguage of its author led them to express themselves in their unique idiolect.

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I was having a conversation with a dear friend whose mother tongue is Spanish a few weeks ago. She and I are both Borges fans; hence we were talking about Borges generally, and his poem “The other tiger” (Borges, 1964/1970) specifically. I have used “The other tiger” previously in my work and it is a poem I attempt to re-find and re-turn to on various occasions. Thirty minutes into our conversation and a glass of grape juice later she said: “You can’t really understand Borges unless you read him in Spanish, in his primary language, in the language of his mother-tongue, in the language of his native land”. I thought what does really, and understand, mean in this context? What is it that cannot be translated that Lucia was referring to? Where is this desirous place that I do not have access to? In short was she not talking about translation, hospitality, foreignness, paradise and paradise lost, mourning and separation? When we fall into the traditional way of working with translation, in which one should read poetry in the language it was written in, are we not talking about the remains of our infantile wishes for a paradise, one where we were united in a non-foreign union? Can we say that translation requires the capacity to mourn our paradises lost, where there is not a complete understanding of anything?

Translation requires a separation, a killing of the mother, of the bliss of our pure fusion. Translation requires letting our fathers in, letting the paternal function (Lacan, 1981/1993) in. To access language we need the capacity for translation. Of course there is an Un-translatable region of the mind, the part that remains inaccessible. This is the limitation of language, the failure of signifiers; it is in a sense Lacan’s barred subject (Lacan, 1981/1993). We tend to project this Un-translatability, which is clearly not solely a non-translation but an untranslatability. So we say: only if I could read Borges in Spanish would I be able to avoid this fearful territory of castration, of triangulation, and of the pollution that comes the moment we exit paradise.
The pure paradise where there are no signs of parasites, no possibility of mourning and a club privé of the melancholic. Can we elaborate further and say: Let the Farsi-speaking father come into the blissful union of Lucia and her Spanish-speaking mother and vice versa? Very strange children will be produced, very calibanesque offspring, foreigners with strange features and accents from far-away geographies, but can we be hospitable to them? Can we be a poetic hospitable host? As such, can we let Caliban “in” not only because of our humanitarian ambitions, but because we cannot envision a Caliban-less world, that world we find utterly boring, the violent kind of boredom. The boredom of psychosis, of father-less states, where there are no minor languages, as Mariano Horenstein (2014) reminds us. Caliban is born out of foreignness: is this foreignness not the same foreignness we experience when we are thrown out of the paradise of our blissful unions with our mothers, motherlands and native tongues? The same foreignness of getting to know our unconscious, of getting to know the other, of the woman, of this absence within ourselves? Let us envision a hospitality, for “Hospitality—this is culture itself” (Derrida, 2002, p. 361), not with the illusion of conquering this un-translatable space of our mind nor in the vain attempt of complete understanding, and of course not to adhere to cultural relativism. But to grant hospitality, This unconditional law of hospitality, if such a thing is thinkable; would then be a law without imperative, without order and without duty. A law without law, in short. For if I practice hospitality “out of duty” (and not only “in conforming with duty”), this hospitality of paying up is no longer an absolute hospitality, it is not longer graciously offered beyond debt and economy offered to the other, a hospitality invented for the singularity of the new arrival, of the unexpected visitor. (Derrida, 2000, p. 83). Lucia said there was something missing, but why is it that we forget that it is precisely because of that missing thing that we have a mind. If not for that absence we would not be able to think and to play, so I invite you, in the name of hospitality, to host a few lines of Borges’s poem Untranslation in Farsi:

References
“I am a ghost in this house....”
On the joys and perils of (mis-)translation

Felix de Mendelssohn*

Growing up as a child in post-war London, I realized that most of my parents’ friends were like they were - writers and intellectuals from Central Europe who had been driven there into exile from the Nazi Regime. Some of them had tragic problems with language – often their chief or only tool for earning money! – since they had over the years become less fluent in their native languages, without ever having gained a full command of English. This was often the subject of jokes in the family, for example about the Austrian writer who was staying as a house guest of an English family in order to work on a book and answered a phone call in the middle of the night by shouting into the receiver “Leave me alone! I am a ghost in this house, and I’m walking!”

It sounds like an ironic misstatement of what it means to be without a real mother tongue any more, but also of how the translator, oscillating between two languages, can sometimes feel. My parents, who were both writers, did translation work for money – some of it they loved, some they hated. My father cursed and swore while translating Exodus by Leon Uris (1958) into German (“It is so badly written!”) and delighted in doing the same for Steven Runciman’s (1951/2001) History of the crusades. In a sense I grew up with the notion that the content of a book was important indeed, but nevertheless still secondary to the style in which it was related.

Some of this has followed me in my work in psychoanalytic practice. There is a constant, if not always outspoken, dialogue between analyst and patient, which undergoes a process of translation, each converting the language of the other into one’s own language, to make it understandable, without losing that sense of ghostly difference, that something of what the other is saying may remain ultimately untranslatable. The “third voice” (Cheyne and Tarulli, 1999) in the dialogue, the whole social and cultural background that has gone into forming the utterances, needs also to be shared and heard. The best medium for this, as Vygotsky (1978) has ela-

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borated on, is a “Zone of Proximal Development” between the talking pair.

Psychoanalysis conducted in a transcultural context has many pitfalls where this socio-cultural context of common experience is lacking. The pressures of globalization seem to offer us at least “the ghost of a chance” to co-construct it gradually between individuals and groups that are in many ways still very foreign to one another.

In folk cultures in North Africa, among other places, many disturbances and mishaps are attributed to djinns or spirits, which are seen to influence one from outside. “Translating” this into the dominant Western psychological view that these are psychic projections of our inner impulses (and not really existent outer entities) can be a fraught enterprise. I have had experiences in groups of this process of “translation” leading to violent eruptions that were hard to contain (Mendelssohn, 2014).

It became apparent to me that it was more important to take the style of the communications seriously than the objective content. Opinions are often harder to change than the style in which they are delivered. Unconscious slips of the tongue, unknowing mistranslations like that of the Austrian writer who turned himself from a guest into a ghost, can reveal zones of communicability that bridge the social and cultural divides of entrenched stylistic approaches. If we misunderstand something, or think we may be misunderstanding it, we tend to ask questions, which is good; if we feel sure we understand everything anyway, we can forget to ask, forget to learn.

So we are constantly in need of translation, elucidation, elaboration etc. in order to understand better and yet this process too, if it becomes too demanding, can sometimes feel impoverishing and counter-productive. Sometimes we long to understand and be understood unambiguously in our mother tongue.

It seems clear to me now –though clarity itself can be an evanescent quality!– that Freud’s (1900/1996) pioneering work of engineering a translation from unconscious primary process to conscious secondary process in his *The interpretation of dreams* also gave rise to some misconceptions about the practice of our discipline. Content here might often appear to overrule form or style, as if it were enough to interpret a patient’s dream to her as if one were translating a version of Livy (1919) from the Latin to the English, in order to make the basic content of the text clear. But we miss here not only the historical and cultural context in which Livy was writing, but also the personal style and allusions of his narrative. In his critique of this approach, Meltzer (1983/2009) advocates an exploration, rather than an interpretation, of the dream, including a kind of dreaming one’s own dream about the patient’s dream while listening to it, and exploring that too.

The translator as interpreter –live and on the spot– is a ghostlike presence (sometimes sequestered in a glass cabin) between the politicians or business people he is mediating for. The protagonists of the later novels of the Spanish writer Javier Marias (1992/2002), who taught translation at Oxford University, are often translators or interpreters. He says about them “They are people who are renouncing their own voices”. Their art can however, for diplomatic or for pusillanimous reasons, disguise or even falsify the style or the content of what was actually being said and how. It all has to be done on the spur of the moment. As analysts we are sometimes in a similar position.

I believe from my own experience that in general we can still do the most profitable and consistently constructive work with individuals and groups who share with us a similar social and cultural background in our upbringing. But it was also the trauma of exile and deracination that thoroughly changed the parochial landscapes of psychoanalysis during and after World War II. Since then the problems of the clashes of cultures and civilizations and the violence that they can unleash have hardly relented, seeming to call ever more on our psychoanalytical capacities for translation: How can I emotionally digest this experience in a way that I can then give meaning to it, for myself and for others?


References


The sign of authority: the Brazilian debate about the translations of Freud’s works

André Carone*

The history of the translation of Freud's works in Brazil is marked by a unique destiny: we had two editions of his complete works that were translated indirectly in the '50s (from Spanish and from French) and in the '70s (from the English version by James Strachey) and a few translations made from the original in German, which for many years had restricted circulation or remained unpublished. Thus, before Freud's writings were launched into the public domain in 2010, the translation activity had remained outside the consolidation of psychoanalysis in the country, except for some isolated cases. One of the direct consequences of this historic development was the transformation of terminology to refer exclusively to this discussion in such a way that psychoanalytic concepts ended up conquering in this debate the condition of autonomous theory in relation to the text and the translation activity itself. Before several publishing houses launched the new translations in 2010, there was a deep-rooted conviction that psychoanalytic concepts demanded a strict treatment that could not be softened in view of the smoothness or the elegance of the text due to the risk of distorting Freud's theoretical thinking or even psychoanalysis itself.

Beyond these circumstances, it cannot be denied that the terms of this conviction have relevance and are present in the controversies of many other foreign editions, such as in the critical reading by the Argentine translator José Luis Etcheverry about the former Spanish edition by the translator Luis López Ballesteros y de Torres (Etcheverry, 1978). Yet, in the Brazilian case it is not criticism of an existing translation but, on the contrary, the current Brazilian translator of Freud must respond to criticism of the translation prior to his own work.

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1. Original text: "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean -neither more nor less.'

'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'

'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master -that's all.'

2. Some of these new translations are, among others, La interpretación de los sueños (Freud, 1900/2012) by Renato Zwick, "El hombre de los lobos" y otros textos (Freud, 1918/2010) by Paulo César de Souza, La concepción de las afasias (Freud, 1891/2012) by Emiliano Rossi and Duelo y melancolía (Freud, 1917/2012) by Marilene Carone.

3. The paradigm of this autonomous treatment of terminology was established by the Diccionario comentado del alemán de Freud, by Luiz Hanns (1998).
If, on the one hand, this apparent paradox increases the translators' responsibility, it requires, on the other hand, criticism that considers the barriers that limit their own perspective. In the end, what do we mean by using terms such as accuracy or conceptual acuteness? The desire for accuracy is not evident on the part of psychoanalysts and readers but rather it seems to be something as vague or indifferent as the unique inclinations and preferences of any of Freud's translators. Speaking with clear concepts or dealing with well-established translation options is not guarantee of unbiased thinking, and much less of an accurate translation.

The conceptual acuteness frequently appears linked to the issue of the effects that it might have over the psychoanalytic clinic. It is asserted that each different choice made by translators would not only have semantic implications but, above all, they could have an impact on the practice of psychoanalysis itself. However, the concept does not reduce itself to the terminology and does not depend on these key terms to produce its effects but, rather, it depends equally on the integral reading of a text, its discussion and also, in the case of psychoanalysis, on a clinical practice. At this moment, when the academic culture of bibliographical notes is heavily criticised, maybe psychoanalysis could make a great contribution when questioning the allegedly objectiv e value of what can be immediately quoted, acknowledged, identified and quantified. Nevertheless, what can be observed between us is the reverse movement, in such a way that an editing and translation job is supported, above all, by the use of an agreed set of key terms. This primacy of the visible word reminds us of the thesis of the Portuguese historians according to which Brazil would have never been a colony of Portugal since the term 'colony' could not be found in all the documentation of the Portuguese crown. Psychoanalytic concepts exist but they are neither tangible nor invisible; they are much more elusive, evasive and vague than our vain terminology dreams. The defence of terminological accuracy at any cost has as a counterpart the subordination of all the other contents to the clarity of the concept: all the rest that exists in the language -the careless speech, the resource of the metaphor, the literary allusions- automatically begins to be defined as what is not a concept yet and, thus, lacks value. It remains to be seen what would be genuinely psychoanalytic in this normative impetus that wishes to completely control language by means of terminology.

Another argument in defence of terminological and conceptual accuracy asserts that a long time ago certain use of key terms such as Ego, Id, repression, drive, a posteriori, motion, among others, consolidated. Yet the definition of these terms, beyond representing a limited
conquest faced with the integral task of translation, is not evident in itself either and can lead to errors. It would be useful to resume at this point Marilene Carone’s comments about the presence of the term ‘insight’ in *Edición standard brasileña* (Carone, 1988). During the ‘70s this word had a broad penetration among Brazilian analysts and was, in fact, as it still is, a psychoanalytic concept present in the British and American psychoanalytic schools that had great influence in Brazil. The adoption of the term was not controversial and was not received as an intervention over Freud’s original text because it was supported by a clinical practice. How many blind spots, unnoticed misunderstandings and silent projections would there be today in Brazilian analysts’ readings of Freud? How much would we be losing with the imposition of an agreement to the detriment of a multiplicity of perspectives, and everything that it could reveal? Which were the effects of this long-lasting forced co-habitation with the indirect translations and the import/borrowing of concepts from the English and French languages about the production of our psychoanalysis? I believe that we are faced with the chance to rescue the experience of reading beyond the terminological façade since the technical terms have also become part of the public domain and since in this adventure the translator is not the only only who is bound to errors. What grounds would we have to establish norms in psychoanalysis through a “good language” since that could be implemented by the clinic?

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Forbidden translation: psychoanalysis and parapsychology

Richard Reichbart*

If I had to live my life over again, I should devote myself to psychical research rather than to psychoanalysis.

Sigmund Freud, 1929 (Jones, 1957)

Obscurity is the fate of one part of an equation when culture determines that part is forbidden, and as a result even an attempt at translation between the two parts of the equation can be misunderstood, forgotten, ignored or denied. For example, most contemporary commentary on Shakespearean drama succeeds in obscuring the fact that Hamlet (Shakespeare, 1603/2009) is a psychic researcher. Hamlet attempts not only to determine whether a ghost is “real” rather than an hallucination and if real, whether the ghost is of that of his father, but whether the information the ghost imparts (which the ghost could have known only parapsychologically as no one other than the King is privy to how Hamlet’s father was murdered) is accurate. The entire thrust of the play is of Hamlet trying to translate the message of the ghost, and he attempts to do so in a variety of ways, including with a scientific experiment – the play within the play, in which he closely observes the King’s reaction as evidence of the veridicality of the ghost’s message. But this translation is obscured from our understanding, because modern culture and modern commentators prefer not to see Hamlet this way. They prefer instead to explain it all as poetic license or as Shakespeare playing to popular belief. The stunning parapsychological exploration depicted in one of the greatest plays in English literature is largely ignored.

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More often than not, in this respect, Shakespeare was not only wiser than his commentators but intuitively more familiar with things parapsychological. Take as another example, the famous predictive warning by the three witches to Macbeth: “Macbeth shall never vanquished be until/ Great Birnam wood to high Dunsinane hill/Shall come against him” (Shakespeare, 1623/2010). Macbeth translates this as impossible, and indeed literally it is, but when the soldiers of Malcolm and Macduff are adjured each to take a bough from Birnam wood to obscure their numbers, it appears “as if” the wood is moving. And so the psychic prediction is now considered a “hit”, the term used in psychical research to define whether something parapsychological has taken place. The translation proves to be accurate after all. Why do I bring this up? Because the issue is not solely one of poetic license or dramatic surprise: it has been a constant one in parapsychological circles, where a researcher is asked to evaluate whether there has been a psychic communication; in fact the communication appears to go directly to a person’s unconscious. When it becomes conscious it has often become peculiarly transformed, yet recognizable.

For example, is it a “hit” when the American muckracking author Upton Sinclair draws an Alpine hat with a feather and his wife without seeing the drawing, draws a similar shape, with an unattached feather, which she translates instead as a “chafing dish”? Is this telepathy or a failure? (Sinclair, 1930/1971, p. 115). The example is from the now forgotten book Mental radio with a preface by no less than Albert Einstein that recounts the telepathic drawing experiments between Sinclair and his wife Craig. I could not resist choosing this particular “hit” because the Alpine hat reminds me so much of the famous drawing by the pilot-narrator of Saint-Exupery’s (1943/2000) The little prince that he made when he was six years old: grownups see it as a hat, but the pilot-narrator as a child saw it instead as a frightening drawing of a boa constrictor that has swallowed an elephant (Saint-Exupery, 1943/2000, p. 1). In fact, the same shape translates differently for different people -- and in the same way, direct psychic communication between the unconscious of two people necessarily undergoes a transformation when the communication becomes manifest.

And of course, Freud knew this, suggesting that psychoanalytic dynamics could determine such a transformation—that is, he explained the distortions of a “hit”. Yet his knowledge has become obscured and even forbidden— in a sense, even forgotten by Freud himself, ambivalent as he was about telepathy, who failed to remember that he had written a letter to Hereward Carrington in 1929 in which he stated that if he had to do it all over again, he would become a parapsychologist (Jones, 1957, p. 392). The knowledge appears most importantly in his first 1921 paper on telepathy in dreams (Freud, 1922/1955, pp. 195 -220). In
this case, a man dreamt that his wife gave birth to twins at the same time as at a distance his daughter gave birth to twins unexpectedly and prematurely. Freud entertains the idea of telepathy and says that it would be understandable if the dreamer's unconscious, receiving a telepathic message in the same manner as it would a day residue, then proceeded through the dream work to replace the daughter with his wife in the manifest content of the dream, thereby disguising (and in translation expressing) the dreamer's incestuous wish:

A telepathic message will be treated as a portion of the material that goes to the formation of a dream, like any other external or internal stimulus... In our example it is evident how the message, with the help of a lurking repressed wish, became remodelled into a wish-fulfilment... (Freud, 1922/1955, p. 206).

This insight, as I say, has been all but ignored by both psychoanalysts and parapsychologists (who generally are not psychoanalytically informed). Many psychoanalysts prefer to attribute to Jung an interest in parapsychology that Freud himself also entertained. I have no room here to discuss how parapsychological phenomena can be and has been explored in clinical work with patients, but there are many who have done so before me (Balint, Servadio, Gillespie, Pederson-Krag, Ehrenwald to name a few) and most significant of all, Eisenbud. But Eisenbud's (1970) seminal work, *Psi and psychoanalysis*, has been dismissed and ignored; and the forbidden nature of parapsychological exploration by psychoanalysts continues. Sometimes parapsychological insights to clinical work are briefly resurrected, as if newly discovered, only to be forgotten again, like fireflies in the night. In fact, one could say the study of parapsychology can be career-threatening for the psychoanalyst who shows too great an interest in the subject.

Years ago, late one summer evening when I was reindeer trekking above the Arctic circle, in the mountains between Sweden and Norway, an acculturated Sami guide from Stockholm, massaged my bad knee that was giving me problems. He was reluctant to tell me that his grandfather had been a shaman with the capacity to heal; the fear and trauma that attended the oppression of the Sami, their shamans, their culture, and their language, still existed for him. There was a moment when both he and I felt a seeming spark between his hands and my knee. Whether it was that, or just the massage, the fact is in the morning my knee was fine again. My point is that this translation too can be forbidden, sometimes as part of life-threatening cultural oppression. Under these circumstances, it can be difficult indeed to freely explore psychological translations of the sort described here.

So I will end where I began, perhaps cynically but I think realistically, and with respect now to this very article in a journal named appropriately after Shakespeare's (1611/2008) Caliban, and that is: here too—“Obscurity is the fate...”.

References


The journey through languages: a lighthouse to the other

Monica Horovitz*

Try again. Fail again. Fail better.

Für mich - For me - Formidable...
Charles Aznavour (1964, canción 2),
Für mich - For me - Formidable.

Psychoanalysis invokes the unique relationship that each one maintains with speech. The languages known, forgotten, repressed, or learnt with more or less gentleness come to pose, to contrast themselves, to become skin, to find their place... Errantly and tearingly it responds to a unique ability to move and feel moved between words, and languages change into the territory that is crossed; it is taken over, in those which one watches becoming one and determining a life.

Thus, the interpreting task in psychoanalysis offers creative moments since the moment we place ourselves on the edge of the body and words, in their ephemeral encounter. In this way, the psychoanalytic experience enlightens the moment when, silently, it opens up to us apparently in an imperceptible, temporary and inexpressible way: an interior space on the edge of words invites us to embrace and try to tell a thought without words. It is only then that words start to think and can translate a thought without a thinker. (Bion, 1997).

The analyst must get ready to listen to that almost nothing in order to perceive the echo of what is still untold or remains silent. There lies the mystery of the encounter.

Which language, which bond are we talking about? The journey from the known (the language, the earth) to the unknown is an experience from which one does not emerge unharmed. Faced with the disorders of external reality, the most varied reactions might take place, from a feeling of disturbing strangeness to the deepest trauma. Deprived of the identity lost in the silence or within a foreign language, how can one survive? How can one reconstruct oneself, word by word, step by step? How can one knot History with the unique history of each one?

These questions lie at the heart of our work as psychoanalysts: how to hear, to create, to trace what is alive after an experience of exile or loss, be it imposed from outside or from the individual’s internal world?

* * *

Without knowing, we are traversed by languages. What is printed in us, what is hidden in the body, so that a given language, a maternal or paternal one, a foreign one, a familiar

one, insinuates its traces in us, allowing us to dream, to think, to create with it, to integrate it and make it our own one? Is there a princeps language that speech travels around in order for that to speak in it?

If the mother tongue is an essential element of the vicissitudes of the endopsychic separation-individuation and the individual's identity that results from it, it can only be recognised as such in the encounter of the individual with other languages. Only at the moment of learning a second language can we distinguish our mother tongue and its emotional roots, bodily and sensory, its thinking processes and its prosody.

The adopted language takes root in the body in relation to the mother tongue that serves as a source. Multilingual dreams, forgetting words that come in the other language because that way they are closer and precise regarding what one wants to express.

Is it possible to "forget" in a language and "remember" in another one? How are the relations between representations of things and representations of words articulated between the conscious, unconscious and pre-conscious levels (Freud, 1915/1968), when these can deceive languages and in many languages? Under which modes are the internal translations organised for the individuals who have learnt to use several linguistic codes?

These questions are a call for reflection about the game of languages in the therapeutic relation and in the dynamics between the pair psychoanalyst/analysand.

Just like the word incarnates, we move from one language to another in a relation with the original pair, that of the mystery of the procreation bond. As the basis for every bond, we receive the gift of life and of the mother tongue, which enables the art of speaking in foreign languages.

Being the mother tongue the place of the nascent Ego and of the words “that blend” with reality itself, we can say that they are sweet or bitter, colourful like things themselves, and that thanks to them the world is born for us. Yet this metaphor enables us to go beyond: we are and we are not our body, between us and the world the universe of language and its distances open up: what is said and what is not, the possibility of misunderstanding and deceit, the hidden significations or those implicit to reactivate or rediscover. Since the moment we start speaking, we are no longer one. The first person singular is in fact plural: there are many I, as we learn in the psychoanalytic encounter. The analyst-translator is faced with a sensory auditory or visual-auditory presence, a forced passage to the access to meaning, a bond between the body and the psychic representation.

Similarly, in analysis words touch and say... The words-body become ethereal, elusive, open to the other as a desire of communication to receive the impact and try to represent the meaning of this encounter impossible to communicate.

We speak in order to find meaning and to give meaning. We are permanent translators, always failing when faced with the untranslatable but without losing the hope of being understood.

My verbal body opens up to other languages since it opens up to humanity and its history. Speech does not exist outside a diversity of languages. The power of things to be said and of human beings to say appear prima facie as a captivating and irremediable dispersion. There is no gift of language without diversity of languages.

I will conclude with a personal exchange with Jeffrey Eaton, American psychoanalyst, who wrote to me regarding the issue discussed here:

I have "read" your article and could hardly make out what you express so elegantly. But what I glimpse are brief moments of "light" in the darkness of my ignorance of your adopted language. Maybe it is a much deeper evocation of the totality of our human experience, when we stop clinging to what is familiar to us and we open up to the new as it arises.1

References

1. In English in the original (Translator's note).
Although Freud marked a turning point in the conceptions about subjectivity at the turn of the 20th century by focusing his study on the relation sexuality holds with the body and with culture, it was only after a return to his work, promoted by reading it in a foreign language, that another aspect could be focused on: language. With Freud, the medical clinic of perceiving the body becomes clinical practice of listening to discourse. His three founding works: *The interpretation of dreams* (1900/1996a), *Psychopathology of everyday life* (1901/1996c) and the book of jokes (1905/1996b) were already evidence of the central role of the experience of language and representation in the formation and transformation of the subjective, but that did not become clearer until the return proposed by Jacques Lacan, who, at the same time, supported his reading on linguists, such as Saussure and Jakobson, among others.

A lot has been said and thought about the experience of language in founding postulates of psychoanalysis, but today, with the coming of Freud’s work into the public domain and the consequent new translation proposals after 2010, the debate about the linguistic elements in its production is renewed. Thus, issues about style, vocabulary, terminology, analogies, relations with other specialised languages, etc., arise.

As a result, we seek, in fact, to take advantage of the renewed discussion in order to demonstrate certain issues that are specific to “cycles of passage between languages”, as regards the translations and readings of Freud from each one of the most influential languages of psychoanalysis, namely: German, English, French, Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese. Which consequences did the paths and detours promoted by the reception of Freud’s work have in each one of those languages and cultures, and how did they mutually influence in the reception of the author in Western Europe and America?

While currently managing a new collection of Freud’s books in Brazil, together with my colleague and psychoanalyst Gilson...
Iannini – *Obras incompletas de Sigmund Freud* (Iannini, 2013-2015)–, here I would like to account for the terminal points of that “cycle of languages”, Freud’s German and the Portuguese into which we pour his work, without leaving aside the fundamental contributions of the other three languages, which thoroughly influenced the reception of Freud in the West. Chronologically, we begin with Ernest Jones’ English, a great politician of psychoanalysis after Freud’s death, as well as James Strachey, a sort of “Saint Jerome” of the Freudian work, with his sensible translation and elaboration of *Standard edition* (Strachey, 1953-1974). At the same time, but with a later impact in South America, we find the French of pioneers such as Marie Bonaparte and, later, of Jacques Lacan, who was to a large extent responsible for the return of Freud’s German; we should not forget the lexicographers of psychoanalysis: Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, the former having a central role among French translators. Last but not least, since Brazilians were at the mercy of indirect translations made from English and French and of a quite dubious quality during the 20th century, it was vital for them to read the founding texts from one of the two great translations of Freud into the sister language: Spanish, in Ballesteros’ Spanish edition as well as in Etcheverry’s Argentine one.

Currently, though a century behind, new versions of Freud’s work are simultaneously offered to the Brazilian reader, and this time they are, at last, direct translations from the source language. Those who are interested in the analysis of said translations can refer to my book *Versões de Freud* (Tavares, 2011).

For a long time, Freud’s readers in Brazil were at the mercy of certain conceptions of foreign readings drawn from indirect versions. What happened with the *Edição standard brasileira* of the publishing house Imago (Strachey, 2009) was symbolic. Beyond the great deal of criticism, mainly from Marilene Carone (1989) due to the recurring mistakes in James Strachey’s translation from English into Portuguese, it is also true that the English translation depicted Freud from an excessively medical-biologist perspective apart from softening the force and aesthetic qualities of Freudian style, thus converting his prose into something more mechanical and, as a result, more similar to the scientific discourse spread in the English language. As regards terminology, neologisms sheltered by the classical languages (Greek and Latin) are used in order to translate everyday words from German. Thus, the Freudian Self (*Ich*) became Ego, and Freudian slips (*Fehlleistungen*), were transformed into *parapraxis*. As for syntax, the present time in the description of dreams became a distant past.

To solve those problems, Brazilians decided to read the edition translated from English with the help of a dictionary made in French (!), *Vocabulário da psicanálise*, by Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1999), the former being one of the coordinators of the most widespread French translation of his works. If it is true that the lexical reference solved many of the problems caused by the biologising reading spread in English, it was not free from another bias either: that of aligning Freud with the philosophical vocabulary spread in France during the time of its production. In this way, the term *Angst* (fear/anxiety/anguish), for instance, started to be read invariably as a single concept, with the apparently unmistakable meaning of *anguish*. Besides that, the translation overly concerned about the “faithfulness” to the author made the French reader miss its unadapted linguistic constructions, which were literally translated many times.

Fatally, the translation of Freud, a multifaceted author, has always tended to privilege a cut in the reception: the theoretical-clinical, the medical-scientific, the philosophical-epistemological, the literary-essayist, etc. The best translation will be, for readers, that which is closer to the proposal they believe is fundamental for their reception of the author. The translation coordinated by Paulo César de Souza for Cia. das Letras, for instance, as the translator himself made clear (Tavares, 2011), depicts Freud as an important name of the German culture and literary expression, not always considering the debates promoted by psychoanalysts.

If Freud has, in German, a crystal clear and easily accessed writing, ironically his mastery
of language and the astute use of his potential posed singular difficulties to his translators to transfer to readers in other languages the combination of conceptual rigor with the almost poetical ability of a talented prose writer. Particularly, in our translation proposal for *Obras incompletas de Sigmund Freud*, we decided to preferably head for the psychoanalysts and Freud’s readers committed to the accuracy in the treatment of his vocabulary. Thus, faced with the need to choose between beauty and rigor, we went for the second one. In fact, this author, in a surprising way for his time and means of expression, always perceived aesthetics as an ally of reason, instead of an enemy, in the construction of his written work. Here follows a proposal difficult to translate.

**References**


Wind of defeat - regarding translation

Gastón Sironi*

In the etymological delta of the word translate several rivers converge: conduct, transfer, help cross or move from one side to the other. The idea of travelling lies in those origins: someone who travels and finds another one who speaks another language, singing a different tune. If it is hard to find in the sea of words those which express what is precise –what is accurate, and also what is necessary–, those words which tell us; if it is difficult to help us understand in our own language, how to do it in a foreign one?

Translation is an eternal transfer: taking and bringing versions, turning, changing, returning. Helping life cross (life writing) throughout time and space.

The journey of that sailing, whose course is known as defeat, is an endless journey which finds wind in dissatisfaction: when do we get to say what we mean? “I do not find: I search!”, Lacan called upon Picasso (quoted by Meschonnic, 2009), inverting -translating- his phrase. “Rather than capturing the object we are losing it all the time, like any object that is offered before our desire”, says Susana Romero in Consuelo de lengua (2005). Desire and loss, search and nostalgia: the harbour is reached, and once at the pier, fate seems to be different from the searched one. Together with the impossibility of equivalence comes the anguish of the decision, the elusive ocean of freedom.

And, yet, we travel, and yet, we translate.

Translation in psychoanalysis is a journey within the journey. To a kingdom of language. To a kingdom where language is the king, and a subject, and law. Interpreting is translating. Understanding is translating, Steiner (1975/1995) said in Después de Babel [After Babel].

Paul Ricoeur (2005) compares the work of memories and duels to the task of the translator: “the double front of a double resistance, which comes from the source language as well as from the target language”. Diving into the memory of one’s own language in order to deal with a text in the other. And bringing it into our own, knowing that there will be anguish and loss. But also gain: one’s own language is enriched when hosted by the foreign one. And it will continue to be enriched, when someone proposes another version, at another time, in another space even within the same language. Borges (1932/2011) establishes this clearly in “Las versiones homéricas”: “the concept of definitive text corresponds only to religion or fatigue”. Also to copyright, if we think about the “authorised” translations of Jacques Lacan’s seminars. But nothing in language is stable, nothing can be “established”: “A language is an entity in a constant state of movement, in constant transformation; it is immensity; it is a river. Unstoppable”, says María Teresa Andruetto (2013). There can always be other versions, other journeys. Because translations grow old, as Umberto Eco (2003/2008), in whose surname a theory of translation seems to be encrypted, postulates. Freud’s German is always the same, but the river of Spanish went on flowing after López-Ballesteros and Etcheverry. In the theoretical and academic establishment the translated text is naturalised, in an effacement of the translation process which gives rise to the illusion of reading Freud, Lacan (consider, for example, why “Etcheverry” is less visible than “Amorrotti”).

Since the representation of language

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1. Free translation.
changes, as does its listening, Shakespeare, Cervantes are translated again. Then, what about Freud, what about Lacan?

Then: keep on translating them. Today, and also tomorrow, from Córdoba or Porto Alegre or Tacuarembó. From the margins, with irreverence against the canon, like Borges provoked. The task of writing a new text, here and now, based on another one written in another language, far away and long ago, paraphrasing William Henry Hudson (1918/1953).

If every sailing is defeat, it is also a new beginning, a better failure, the discovery of a hint for a new discovery: “The best translators achieve the same as a work of art: faced with an impossibility, they find a stunning way out which does not solve it”, says Jorge Santiago Perednik (2012). Faced with the misty river, faced with a distance which will never be zero, Uruguayan poet and translator Circe Maia (2013) proposes “that we get closer, make an echo. It is always better to see a distant city through thick mist than not to see it. At least we see it coming, we get closer”.

In medieval Spanish the term trujamán, of Arab origin, was used to refer to both the translator and the interpreter. Translation and psychoanalysis are tied in interpretation: a transfer of oneself into another in order to listen to oneself, in the sea of transference, a word in which the origins of translation also resound. A translation of listening. “Interpreting is translating. Even within the same language. Because translation is a problem of the language, not of the tongue”, Meschonnic (2009) holds.

Monica Horovitz (2015) recalls in this same issue of Calibán: “We speak in order to find meaning and to give meaning. We are permanent translators, always failing when faced with the untranslatable but without losing the hope of being understood” (I open a long parenthesis, which returns to the invisibility of the phenomenon: I quote Horovitz according to my translation/interpretation of her French, which at the same time is her second language; let us say a first version, in which the inverted commas must not imply “Monica Horovitz says”, as if it were a transcription, but “this is my 2015 version in the Spanish of Córdoba, Argentina, of what Monica Horovitz wrote in French in Paris in the same year”).

Translation has to do with reading, that is, with listening. Thus, a word is a voice. The translator and the analyst will cope with it. The former, transferring meanings and sounds, turns, rhymes and metrics, music and spelling. The latter, scrutinising dreams and lapsus, free associations and repressed memories. Both with words, voices.

To conclude, a version of “Liminaire”, by Quebecer poet Gaston Miron (1970/1998), which perhaps tells us about this endless journey:

> I made from further than me a delirious journey
> I had not seen myself for a long time
> here I am in me like a man in a house
> which has been made during his absence
> I salute you, silence
> I have not come back in vain
> I have come to what begins.2

References


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2. Free translation.
The importance of translations

Steve Ellman*

I have previously written (Ellman, 2010) that psychoanalysis has entered a time that is best thought of as an inverted tower of Babel. In the Old Testament G-d created many languages and there was confusion. In the new testament of psychoanalysis, we use the same language and there is often confusion. It is unclear whether authors from different theoretical perspectives when using the same term are actually using the same concept. This leads to serious difficulties in translating concepts from one perspective to another. This new tower of Babel can be seen as making it difficult or impossible to communicate, or as a precursor to developing new theoretical concepts and ways of describing clinical experiences. The question that is posed in this communiqué is what are the necessary conditions to adequately translate from one theory to another and then what are the conditions necessary to translate across cultural and linguistic boundaries?

As many authors have stated translation is always interpretation and the psychoanalyst even stating other analyst's concepts in their own language is always a translation and interpretation. Clearly in a mono-linguistic society the need for translations should be acute and urgent at all times. The danger is that such a society might become insular and in effect implicitly reject translations because of the dangers that other perspectives entail.

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Before engaging in the difficulties of translation let me first comment on a positive experience in Mexico City where I invited Dr. Bolognini to be the discussant of Dr. Sheldon Bach's work (2006). Although Dr. Bach gave an excellent presentation, the key part of the panel was Dr. Bolognini's translation of Bach's work. It was a careful explication of the work but in addition Dr. Bolognini translated the work by placing the concepts that Bach utilized within a framework that is Italian in character. It is beyond the scope of this missive to enter into Bach's illuminating concepts that help us understand narcissistic states. Here the point is that Bolognini's explication was the first part of an excellent translation. Dr. Bolognini's use of these concepts to bolster and amplify some of his work was the second aspect of the translation and this greatly strengthened the meaning of the translation effort. In effect he showed the symbolic value of Bach's concepts and how these concepts might be linked with other theoretical perspectives.

A good theoretical translation then is both a careful explication and more importantly an attempt to link concepts in terms of either integrations or as alternative perspectives. The extent of linking is a way that we might assess the symbolic value of a concept.

Let me go to another experience where Albert Mason, Elizabeth Spillius, Judy Chused and I were on panel comparing contemporary Freudian and Kleinian concepts (IPTAR conference in New York). We met in 2004 and there was interest in comparing our different points of view. One question that arose involved the timing of interpretations and perhaps more importantly the criteria for the conditions of interpreting unconscious material. There seemed to be few points of convergence until we looked at an article by Ron Britton. Britton (1997) wrote about a patient who could not tolerate interpretive efforts. When Britton stopped making interpretations the patient sensitively but vehemently told Britton to “stop that fucking thinking”. The patient could
not tolerate another in the analytic situation
but rather needed Britton to only receive her
tortured experiences. When he intervened he
could only reflect the patient’s states. In 2004
conference, Spillius talked about Britton’s con-
tribution as a type of breakthrough in analytic
thinking while we thought that Britton was
responding to states that many analysts in the
United States (Kohut, Bach, Ellman etc.) had
written about in similar terms. In fact (per-
haps with the exception of Rosenfeld) it see-
med as if this group was unaware of or uncon-
cerned with the experience of clinicians who
had frequently encountered and written about
the type of experience that Britton (1997) elo-
quently described. His experience gradually
helped us think of how aspects of Bionian
thought might be translated into clinical con-
cepts that were put forth by other authors who
had previously written about similar expe-
riences. My concept of analytic trust was an
attempt to translate across Bionian and Con-
temporary Freudian theoretical boundaries.
I have also noted that Cassirer’s theory (Cass-
irer, 1944) of the movement of sign to sym-
bol is a theoretical model that can account for
Bion’s view of the movement of beta to alpha
elements (Bion, 1962/1967).

Let me now add a word about the more
normal meaning of the term translation. The
fact that I am writing as a member of a mostly
mono-linguistic culture should indicate
a need for a greater number of translations.
However what at times has happened is the
development of almost a difficulty in accep-
ting the other (of course with the exception
of Freud) that emanates from another cultu-
re. It is almost as if there is (Frase repetida)
narcissistic vulnerability being exposed by
welcoming another cultures perspectives. I
wish it were otherwise in the United States
and I believe the times indeed are changing.
We can in part overcome our mono-linguistic
disability by trying as fully as we can unders-
tand the culture the work comes from and try
to aid the translator by efforts to understand
the history and the context of the translated
work. We can in addition find a home for new
concepts within our theoretical perspectives
and hopefully when appropriate develop new
theoretical avenues.

To summarize this brief communication a
good translation needs both a translator who
provides a deft explication but also provides
linking to allow the reader to contextualize the
translated work. Of course this may come in
stages and it is often difficult to provide both
stages in a single translation. Moreover a good
translation needs a receptive audience where
there are active attempts to link the translated
concepts with ones that are more familiar and
home grown. It is clear from the impetus provi-
ded by the editors of this journal that we need
more translations among our varied societies.

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historical integration of psychoanalytic concepts. London: Karnac.
Imago Mundi (2012-2015) is a project in which data associated to the ways that have attempted to represent the world throughout the history of thought are transferred into the representation formalism offered by geographical maps. It is a visual tool that allows us to organise information in a unique way in order to propose new and possible relationships between one event and another.

Imago Mundi XI. Wheel Map, 2012. Acrylic and graphite on canvas, 340 x 300 cm

Imago Mundi VII. Independent Thinkers, 2014. Acrylic, graphite and silver on canvas. 200 x 200 cm (fragments)

Claudia’s Path. Graphite on canvas. 140 x 210 cm (fragments); River Map, 2014. Acrylic and graphite on canvas. 40 x 600 cm. Pages 164,165,166.

World Mapper. Graphite on canvas. 360 x 140 cm. (fragments)

Imago Mundi XIV. Positivism - Magical. 2015. Acrylic, graphite and copper on canvas. 260 x 180 cm. Page 170
Latin America? Nosotros and we, the others

America, the new discovered land, populated Europe’s fantasy from an imaginary world full of expectations, fostered afterwards by the discoverers’ tales and, later, by the travellers who got lost in its geographies. Its richness and fertility could already be envisaged in Columbus’ letter, when he said about the discovery:

I discovered that the world is not round as I have described it, but it has the shape of a pear (…), something like a woman’s breast (…). I am convinced that this is the spot of the earthly paradise, where no one can go but by God’s permission. (Colón, 1498).

We are familiar with the richness of the fantasies that pervade the image of a “woman’s breast”. Also the beings found in this paradise –described as free, naive in their misteries– fascinated the discoverers:

Their skin is brown, a little bit reddish. They have a nice face and nose, and a well-built body. They go about naked, without anything to cover their bodies (...) and they are just as innocent then was when showing their faces... (Caminha, 1500).

Thus, the Europeans who arrived, the natives who were already here and the blacks who were brought, created a world of peoples with some similarities and many differences.

The characteristics that make up the identity of a people can be investigated and described in several ways. One of them, the one which is visible to the naked eye, is their skin colour. In

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America there is a universe in this regard.

In this sense, “which is your colour?” was the question, unheard until then, posed in the census carried out by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) in 1976. It was not conceivable that the answers would be even stranger than the question itself: 136 terms to name the skin colour that interviewees attributed to themselves. The creativity of the answers—some of them with hints of humour—cannot cover up the wound opened by speaking about one’s own skin colour in a country claims to be mulatto but would like to be white. The resulting colour palette reveals the subjectivity of the issue, which resonates on the work of Brazilian visual artist Adriana Varejão. “Pouco clara”, “encerada”, “morena bem chegada”, “retinta”, “cor de cuia”, “fogoió” and “burro-quando-foge” are some of the answers for which Adriana displayed different tones of oil paint which, disposed in tubes in a box, make up the work Tintas Polvo. As it happens many times, artists show us indirectly what we do not see or avoid seeing clearly.

How many terms would we use to designate (how many tubes of oil paint would be needed to express) all the shades of skin tones of the peoples that inhabit Latin America?

But it is not only on the skin colour that the continent diversity is verified. This diversity provides countless visions and approaches, some of which we attempt to explore and discover with the articles of this Dossier.

The proximities and distances among the countries that gradually formed here can be already perceived in the words that Pedro Juan Vignale (1926) wrote to Mário de Andrade in his letter of October 4th 1926, in which he referred to the inhabitants of the geographical space called Latin America: “We live very close to, but we greatly ignore about one another!”.

In this sense, in the text by Fernanda Peixoto, “Brazil and our America”, the author highlights Brazil’s ambiguous position in Latin America: even as part of the continent, it remains far from it in many aspects, which are not only linguistic. America, that which is Latin due to the origin of the languages that populate it and which arises in opposition to the other America, is made up of countries with different cultures and which know very little of one another. The first records of its name—“Latin”—date back to the 19th century, when Napoleon III uses this expression to, by means of the ideology of latinity, ensure the dominance over Mexico and other Spanish speaking countries, preventing them from falling prey to Anglo Saxon power.

It was also sung like that by José María Torres Caicedo (1857) in the poem “Las dos Américas” [The Two Americas], as Gabriela Pellegrino writes in her article. Drawing from the idea of the denomination of this physical space, the author outlines essential aspects of the formation of the identities of Latin America. Beyond the name, is it possible to speak of a Latin American continental unity in cultural terms? Would that constitute an identity? Will this common origin—Iberian colonial—establish cultural similarities? The questions that arise are many, and perhaps the answers that can be found are few.

Unanswered questions, following Laura Hosliasson, taken from the point of view of Latin American literature. The author highlights the richness that results from a “fragmented” literature, non-uniform, with many differences, in Portuguese as well as in Spanish—and, in this case, with many regional nuances, though with a common language—. Regarding its multiplicity, a literature “without a line that crossed it or that intended to translate the continent into a mainstream”.

Taking into account the concepts of identity and otherness, so dear to psychoanalysis, and accepting the idea that the recognition of identity comes through the other, we can read in Tzvetan Todorov (1982) that it is the discovery of America what creates “our identity”—but there “our” with regard to Europe. Would it also create that of “we”, the others, or nosotros, the Latin Americans? In that book about the conquest of America, Todorov observes that Columbus crosses the Atlantic Ocean and

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1. Translator’s note: the different colour tones mentioned, roughly translated, would be “not very fair”, “waxed”, “tanned dark”, “dark brown”, “pumpkin colour”, “fire colour”, “beige”.

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believes to have discovered “man as he is”, simple and natural. Rousseau’s noble savage. The primitive man who, due to his obstinate will for happiness, opposed the brainy dominance of theologians and professors. This is what Columbus saw in the people he finds in America:

As soon however as they see that they are safe, and have laid aside all fear, they are very simple and honest, and exceedingly liberal with all they have; none of them refusing any thing he may possess when he is asked for it, but on the contrary inviting us to ask them. They exhibit great love towards all others in preference to themselves: they also give objects of great value for trifles, and content themselves with very little or nothing in return. (Colón, 1493).

To that “happy” native people a colonisation which, more than sensible, was in fact sad and deadly, was imposed and it meant the loss of its own culture. The church and expatriated people, new and exiled Christians, Spanish as well as Portuguese, were part of the colonisers who, upon arrival, joined the many already existing civilisations. Later, slave-ships tell another unhappy story. And also the “colour” of the many colours of a Latin America fragmented in identitites which create borders is made up by those traumatic stories, the massacre of the natives and the slavery imposed to African peoples.

Yet, beyond the visible historical, geographical and linguistic borders, which other invisible borders exist among Latin American countries? And which exchange of cultural productions help or hinder such borders? The geographical proximity between countries that make up this physical space is insufficient to be able to speak of a Latin American culture.

The cultural identity of those young Latin American countries was gradually shaped, and continues to be shaped, as a complex process which implies, on the one hand, an ambiguity between the denial or the abolition of the “savage” origins and its exaltation, and, on the other hand, an eternal filiation to the old and “wise” European countries, more precisely, the colonising ones, Spain and Portugal, as well as the always dreamt and idealised France. After the wars for independence, there still remain economic dependence and, furthermore, cultural dependence, since the culture and languages that survived were those of the coloniser. The other from whom we wanted to free ourselves was nestled in us, just as read in two important Latin American authors: Borges (1983) and Mário de Andrade (1930/1987). The first one feels like “a European born in exile” and the second one perceives himself as a white man: “fatally a being of worlds I never saw”.

In this scenario 20th-century avant-garde movements will emerge in some Latin American countries, in search of a culture of their own, such as the “anthropofagia” coined by Oswald de Andrade in Brazil. That search takes place in paradoxical, inharmonic movements which are fed on the culture of the “metropolis” and at the same time oppose it, since they value the culture of the so-called primitive peoples. Movements which, in turn, are carried out differently in each region.
These issues are still present in the 21st century. In his article for this Dossier, Rodrigo Cañete, in quite a controversial way, writes “Argentina's and Brazil's art: placing the low over the high”. Drawing from the analysis of some of the works of art of certain artists, he makes remarks on both countries’ contemporary art in order to discuss up to what extent the “north” still influences it.

The political, economic, linguistic and cultural movements after the formation of the national States, the individualist and globalised cultures that we are currently beset by, make up a multifaceted picture that makes the network of Latin American countries more and more complex. This is what Jorge Lanzaro shows us since the beginning of his text. He says: “At the dawn of the 21st century, Latin America displays a novel political scene. (...) democracy has become widespread in almost every country in the region and governments commonly result from free elections”. Following his analysis, Lanzaro gradually outlines the different ways in which each country creates and lives the democratic governments which, in turn, “are of different quality and type”.

By forging our own path of 500 years of existence, we, the inhabitants of the countries that make up the construct that is Latin America, that idea created by the Other, are still strangers to ourselves and for ourselves. For that purpose, in an attempt to stop observing us from the standpoint of the Other, but without intending to be the project of an hegemonic desire coming from abroad, our question is posed: Latin America? We and nós, the others.

As psychoanalysts, we specifically catch a glimpse of the issues that are presented to us, just as physicists or sociologists observe world facts from their own perspectives. The texts included in this Dossier were written by thinkers from different fields of knowledge. Fernanda Peixoto, an anthropologist, Gabriela Pellegrino, a historian, Jorge Lanzaro, from political sciences, Laura Hosiasson, a scholar of literature, and Rodrigo Cañete, an art reviewer, attempt to think and explore the similarities and differences that inhabit and compose this “continent’s” cultural aspects. And, as Fernanda Peixoto sug-

cepts, we should not be satisfied by “confirming similarities” but we should take “difference as the springboard to reflection”.

Psychoanalysis also landed in Latin America from Europe, and here acquired new characteristics, new and different colours proper to each region it reached. Let us, then, rest our gaze on these texts to apprehend something of what shapes us and marks our skin.

References


Latin America and the symbolic resignifications of space. Between identity dynamics and historic temporalities

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*Latin America* is an acclaimed notion among the categories we use daily to name world regions. It refers to the part of the American continent located to the south of the *Rio Grande*, in North America, and which extends through Central and South America. Societies with common historical marks live together in this vast space, roughly speaking: the European conquest of the territory and the native peoples, started during the transition from the 15th to the 16th century; the colonisation by Iberian empires throughout more than three centuries; the incorporation of African slavery at different scales; political independence and national construction since the second or third decades of the 19th century; the cultural exchanges which intensified during that time, especially with France and, later, with the United States; the effervescence of the artistic avant-gardes between 1920 and 1930; the attacks around economic modernisation, democracy and the revolutionary movements over the post-war period...

On the other hand, the spatial cut-out of Latin America, defined in this way, shelters huge problems and discontinuities. Surinam and the Guayanas, for instance, in the north of South America, had a colonial and national history quite different from that of their Portuguese and Hispanic-American neighbours. Canada, even being partially “Latin”, is unquestionably “American” and is not framed as an integral part of the region.

The Caribbean also represents a controversial border: its islands are frequently assimilated into the projections that shape Latin America, at the expense of the diversity of historical experiences and linguistic matrices that coexist in them. Between the prominently Latin American countries, other borders also overlap with “Latinity”: the borders of Ibero-America, Hispanic-America, South America, the Andean and Amazonic regions, the most circumscribed economic blocs...

How do we understand in the first place, then, that the term *Latin America* could have been asserted and spread?

The issue dates back to the middle of the
19th century and to the political and ideological disputes that involved the American continent, already free from colonial domination at that time. There is disagreement as regards who would have first proposed the concept. For a long time its authorship was attributed to Michel Chevalier, a French intellectual, politician, economist and explorer, who presented the view that the history of the western world would be a product of confrontations between Latin and Anglo-Saxon “civilisations” or “races” in his account of the voyage to the United States, published in 1836 (Chevalier, 1836). Latin people, associated with Catholicism; Anglo-Saxon people, with Protestantism. For Chevalier, being France “the first of the Latin nations”, the defence of the Latin societies which was already taking place in Europe should be transposed into America.

Michel Chevalier’s ideas gained strength during the government of Napoleon III, who was elected president of the Republic in 1848 and founded, after the coup of the 18th Brumaire, the Second French Empire. In fairness to the imperial regime, France insisted then on expanding its power into other parts of the world in order to go back to the golden ages such as that of the colonisation of Haiti. One of the attacks in that sense was the failed French invasion in Mexico in 1863, which attempted to pave the way for the establishment of Maximilian of Habsburg’s empire. Likewise, other French strategists such as Chevalier spared no persuasion efforts so that France could repeat what it had done with the Suez Canal, now building an inter-oceanic canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific at some point in Central America. In other words, the notion of a “Latin” America capable of linking the history of France with the history of the colonial Iberian past societies was convenient for the Napoleonic pretensions of settling in the American continent, as a counterpart to the power emanating from the United States. In 1870, the Second Empire was finally defeated in the war against Prussia.

Even though Michel Chevalier’s role was undoubtedly important to project the concept of Latin America in the nineteenth century, an article published by Arturo Ardao (1965) in the Uruguayan weekly newspaper Marcha argued that the complete term Latin America was first used by Colombian essayist José Maria Torres Caicedo (1857), in the poem “Las dos Americas” [The two Americas]. Torres Caicedo might have captured in his verses the concern to urge Latin American countries to integrate, so that, together, they could face the pressures that kept flowing from the United States into the region. We should not forget that, in 1840, Mexico lost almost half of its territory at the hands of the great neighbour from the north.

Since Arturo Ardao’s article, different historians have been drawing attention to the fact that Latin American writers and artists played a decisive role for the concept of Latin America to be widely accepted. In this process, the idea of a union between “fraternal” countries against the North American threat gained importance.

It is possible to perceive in the road opened by Ardao that the notion of Latin America was planted by Torres Caicedo (just as, driven by other reasons, Michel Chevalier had done before) mainly as a cultural and political project. A project of raising awareness, of self-assertion against an external and imperial force.

The bet for a symbolic construction carrying political mobilisation and energy was well analysed by Edward Said (1995/1997) in the classical work Cultura e imperialismo, in which he studies the challenges faced by colonised societies, since their emancipation, in order to “remap and occupy, instead of the place reserved for subordination in imperial cultural ways, the place of self-awareness, struggling for it at the heart of the territory formerly governed by an awareness that supposed the subordination of the Other considered inferior. Therefore, re-inscription.” (p. 266-267).

During the work of re-inscription, emancipated societies face “pre-established forms” or at least “forms permeated by the empire’s culture,” in weaves necessarily complex, slow and woven in the ups and downs of history.

Unlike what Said proposes, however, who in the book mentioned focused on the relations between imperial Europe and its colonies and ex-colonies in Africa and Asia, the
Latin America where Torres Caicedo lived ranged between the recent overthrow of the old Iberian empires and the announcement of the emergence of a new imperial centre. The re-inscription demanded, in this sense, complex identity elaborations.

Since even though considering Latin America as a unity was something new, which met the mid-19th century demands, considering Americans as a unity, beyond the political divisions of the colonial world and National States, rested on an imaginary repertoire that had long been developing. A repertoire formed on the basis of an effort of domination of the New World by the European; of the invention of America, as Mexican anthropologist Edmundo O’Gorman (1958) defined it. Thanks to the expectations and references already mobilised by men at the dawn of modernity, it was possible to define a symbolic place for that unimagined fourth part of the world.

The first representations of America were imbued with medieval utopias and images referring to East India, sprinkled with spices and wealth that aroused greed and the senses of the merchants. Over the years, the representations of America were replenished and reworked by the new discourses coming from chroniclers, soldiers, travellers or missionaries. The imaginary cartography was loaded with monsters and paradises, and revealed, mainly, the observers’ expectations. Fantasies coexisted with texts of another kind, embodied at the crossroads of theology, the coexistence with indigenous people and the learning of their languages.

In the 18th century, with the publication of the work *O sistema da natureza*, by Carl von Linné (1735), the views of America were imbued with taxonomic purposes. La Condamine’s expedition which penetrated through the rivers of the Viceroyalty of New Granada is considered the frame of a new position. On the other hand, as Antonello Gerbi (1996) showed in *A disputa do Novo Mundo*, the 18th century was also a producer of visions deeply opposing the American nature, like Buffon’s, a French naturalist who wrote about the issue without ever crossing the Atlantic.

The disparaging perspectives were later darkened by the extraordinary impact made by Alexander von Humboldt’s voyage to the Spanish portion of South America, the Caribbean and Mexico, between 1799 and 1804. In *Le voyage aux régions équinoxiales du Nouveau Continent* (Humboldt, 1807), published in Paris, the American nature gained, from a romantic perspective, strong, vigorous and inspiring colours. As Mary Louise Pratt (1999) showed in *Os olhos do Império. Relatos de viagem e transculturação*, the images built by Humboldt had a founding meaning for the inhabitants of Americas, who sought to consider America in “new” terms, in the middle of the emancipation processes. Simón Bolívar, for instance, following in the footsteps of Humboldt but going beyond him, climbed the peak of Mount Chimborazo, in present-day Ecuador, to reach from the top a view symbolically comprehensive of a free America.

Renowned for being an insightful and skilful thinker, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1845/1997), exiled then in Chile due to Juan Manuel Rosas’ federalist government, published in 1845, in a newspaper, his exquisite *Facundo: Civilización y barbarie*. The borders of literature are constantly overflowed in the construction of the text. The work –later edited as a book– as well as Sarmiento had a career path with an exceptional projection since then. It is about a widely discussed topic which I will avoid developing here. I will stick to the issue, vital for this analysis, that Sarmiento placed the notion of barbarism in the centre of an in-
interpretation about Argentina; a notion which was suitable to consider Latin America too. The work made the federalist chieftain of La Rioja province, Facundo Quiroga, the driving force to illuminate the political, social, cultural and geographical conflicts that caused friction in Argentina.

Much was discussed regarding the structures from which Sarmiento builds the text (city/country, civilisation/barbarism, Córdoba/Buenos Aires) and the permeability of these dichotomies. Thus “and” instead of “or barbarism.” In its preface to the Brazilian edition, Maria Ligia Prado (1997) highlighted the romantic matrix that was discerned in the “barbarism” —our gauchos, our countrymen—; landmarks for the construction of a nation.

Like in Argentina, other Latin American states in the process of formation in the middle of the 19th century concentrated on the symbolic attributes of their men of letters or artists when defining the outlines of the concept of national.

In Mexico’s Porfiriato (1876-1911), after defeating France’s Napoleon III’s imperial pretensions in “Latin” America, there were lively debates about the mestizo character of the nation, which assimilated indigenous civilisations from the past into the Spanish colonial project. The independence revolution, started by priest Miguel Hidalgo in 1810, made its way towards a national society imbued with the great legacy from past times, which walked towards progress.

The Latin American identity claimed by Torres Caicedo in 1857 hardly echoed in Mexico during the second half of the 19th century. It would circulate more forcefully since the beginning of the 20th century, driven by the winds of what was called “arielismo.” The term refers to the work Ariel, published by Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó (1900/1962). As Maria Ligia Prado and I (2014) define in Historia de América Latina:

In this book, Rodó built an opposition between Latin America and the United States, which marked the differences between both worlds, and therefore it had a great impact among the readers of Spanish America. Rodó took over the central characters of Shakespeare’s play The tempest (1611/2008) and drawing from them created cultural and political metaphors about the Americas. In the original play, Prospero is a lord from an island who owns a servant in the shape of a winged spirit, Ariel, and a malformed slave, Caliban. The author made of Ariel —the representation of beauty, philosophy, the arts, the feeling of the beautiful and spiritual issues— the symbol of Latin America; and of Caliban —linked to matter, money, the immediate and the ephemeral—the mark of the United States. For Rodó, it was essential to seek in the Spanish past the cultural traditions that formed Hispanic America and to go back to classical Greece, from which we inherited the values of beauty and art. The colonial past was revisited and the Spanish heritage, with its language, values, customs and traditions, was regarded as positive. However, it is important to emphasise that in Rodó’s elitist vision any participation of indigenous, black or mestizo people in the development of the respective national cultures was ignored.

The approving vision that Rodó professed about a Latin America spiritually superior to Anglo-Saxon America was at the root of an important turning point evident in the Americanist representations over the first decades of the new century.

After the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917), José Vasconcelos, a prestigious thinker of the
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1. Translator’s note: Possibly the most popular character of Brazilian folklore. A young black or mulatto man with only one leg, considered an annoying joker in most parts of Brazil and a potentially dangerous and harmful creature in others; however, he could grant wishes to all those who were able to catch him or to steal his magical hat.

2. About the First World War’s impact on Europe’s image in the eyes of the intellectuals in Latin America as a cradle of civilisation and on the increasing movement towards searching for indigenous repertoires and ways, see Compagnon (2013).
ters and artists from each country nurtured a growing interest in the cultural atmosphere of the neighbouring nations. An avant-garde magazine like Amauta, for instance, created by José Carlos Mariátegui in Peru in 1926, published contributions made by avant-garde Argentine authors, among others, at the same time that it was mentioned and debated by readers beyond the borders of Peru.

In Brazil, the same Monteiro Lobato who made the research about saci tried, as the owner of Revista do Brasil between 1918 and 1925, to include Latin America in his projects, particularly Argentina. The magazine insisted on supporting the literary production of that country, while it accounted for how the Brazilian works had an impact there. During the centennial year of the Independence of Brazil, the magazine published articles about the homages that different Argentine institutions paid to the country and, at the initiative of its representative in Buenos Aires, Sánchez-Sáez (1922) proposed the organisation of a “literary investigation” in order to find out what South American writers knew about “mental Brazil”.

For Lobato, the edition of his work in Argentina was also strategic, since that country represented the great book distributor throughout all Hispanic America. Dom Quixote das crianças was edited in Spanish by the publishing house Claridad from Buenos Aires (Lobato, 1936/1938); since 1944, another publishing house from Buenos Aires, Americalee, published with subsequent re-prints, the whole work for children by the writer, in 23 volumes. The prologue to Urupés: Cuentos brasileños, edited by El Ateneo in 1947, asserted:

In parallel to books for adults, Monteiro Lobato was, intermittently, producing books for children (…) all of them already translated and published in Argentina (…). With those books Monteiro Lobato created not only Brazilian children’s literature, but also Latin American (…). (Lobato, 1918/1947, pp. 7-9).

Attracted by the editorial and affective bonds that he had been building since the times of Revista do Brasil with editors and writers from the neighbouring nation, Lobato moved to Buenos Aires in June 1946, where he lived until May 1947. Apart from having an intense social life, as a result of his success among Argentine people and the outstanding bohemians from Buenos Aires, he revised translations of his books for Americalee, translated books into Portuguese, wrote new texts and founded, together with others, the publishing house Acteon.

In the opposite direction, Hispanic-American writers came closer to the Brazilian literary world. In 1930, Chilean poet Gabriela Mistral started the diplomatic career that took her as a consul of Chile to different European countries and, later, to the United States and Mexico, after being in Brazil during the first half of 1940. She lived in Niterói and then in Petrópolis, lived together with Manuel Bandeira and Cécilia Meireles and collaborated with regular publications such as modernist Festa from Rio de Janeiro. At the end of 1945, Gabriela Mistral left Rio and travelled to Stockholm to receive the Nobel Prize.

For the writers of this period, Latin America appeared as a scenario for the creation of intellectual and artistic networks which, when crossing local borders, enriched their repertoires and languages.

At certain historical moments, that perception was particularly alive. In 1960, the success of the Cuban Revolution helped to tighten the bonds between intellectuals, writers, artists and musicians, encouraged by the idea of Latin American unity. Once again, the search for popular roots – indigenous, African, “folk” in the language of some people – and for what was inherent to a temporality of this spatial and historical universe, became common background for many creations, some of them based on transnational societies or exchanges.

An emblem of this moment is the novel Cien años de soledad [One hundred years of solitude] by Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez (1967), published by the Argentine publishing house Sudamericana. As Maria Ligia Prado and I wrote, the work turns...

...the imaginary town of Macondo into a metaphor of the transformations which
Colombia went through – and to a certain extent Latin America – during the times of the formation of the National State and the gradual modernisation of the country. The reader gets lost in the confusing family tree of names that are repeated – José Arcadio, Aureliano, Ursula –, experiencing a time of slow transformations, sometimes cyclical, in which the modern novelties and the continuities of a remote universe are articulated. (Prado y Pellegrino, 2014).

Cien años de soledad was part of the Latin American literary boom in 1960, which had “magical realism” as a landmark. Articulated in political networks in which transformation projects of the unequal and dependent socio-economic structures were promoted, writers from different Latin American countries cultivated the genre. Many of them lived together in Paris, a city which has not lost the position of cultural centre of attraction for intellectuals from the other side of the ocean. It is not a coincidence that the figure and work of Jean Paul Sartre were vital for the Latin American literary field of the time. And, after the military coups in Brazil, Chile, Argentina and other places, the City of Lights also brought political refugees from different origins closer.

Also in music, the idea of a Latin America united by the struggle for emancipation, after a long history of colonial and imperialist yoke, produced movements of extraordinary quality that went beyond national borders. “The New Song,” born at the beginning of the ’60s, in Argentina and Uruguay, was an expression of that. It was based on the renewal proposal of rhythms considered traditional drawing on modern musical references and lyrics that sang to the life of humble and working people. “Canción para mi América” by Uruguayan Daniel Viglietti (1968, song 1) or the album by Mercedes Sosa (1966) Yo no canto por cantar, symbolise the new collection of songs.

In 1967, the First Encounter of the Protest Song took place in Cuba. Its impact translated into the work of different composers, who adopted the themes of revolution, anti-imperialism and Latin American union in the heart of their works. Music was becoming an instrument of political awareness and social intervention, to look for the formation of the “new man,” idealised by Che Guevara. That translated, at the same time, into the promotion of the Cuban Nueva Trova, a movement that allowed exchanges with Brazilian composers and interpreters such as Chico Buarque and Milton Nascimento.

Finally, I would like to highlight the editorial initiatives that contributed to define academic, literary and historical repertoires representative of Latin America. I am referring, in the first place, to the American Library, created in 1940 by Editor Arnaldo Orfila Reynal, together with the Mexican publishing house Fondo de Cultura Económica. The collection had a long life and was a pioneer of other initiatives that prospered in that field over the following years, such as Biblioteca Ayacucho, published in Caracas, Venezuela, since 1974, directed by Uruguayan Angel Rama, and the collection Archivos, created by Fondo de Cultura Económica, in partnership with Unesco and Latin American university publishing houses at the end of the ’80s. All of them were crossed by the premise that Latin America could and had to be considered as a whole.

I will close this reflection with a critical consideration. How fertile is to us, at present, the concept of Latin America, crossed by colonial and post-colonial sufferings on the one hand, and by resistance and self-assertion on the other? In 2000, during Lula's presidency, Brazil’s loyalty towards that reference was in the centre of the government’s foreign policy.
In the media, in diplomacy, in university curricula and in the areas of academic knowledge, the category also keeps its functionality by distinguishing a world region.

In the field of historiography, above all, I think that the critical appraisal proposed by Mauricio Tenorio Trillo (1999, pp. 239-266) about the eternal questions that carry weight over Latin America as an object par excellence of cultural history, trapped in the dilemma of whether to be or not to be modern or to be modern but not enough. In other words, a field of history quite interwoven with utopia. Yet truly strict and well-built research is capable of going beyond this association.

And, speaking for myself –not necessarily for Tenorio Trillo–, capable of making use of that conceptual key already legitimised over a century and a half of symbolic, political and institutional references, to attain a vast world of social experiences of extraordinary richness, which deserve to be told and known.

References

Is there a Latin American literature?
An unanswered question

A century and a half after Hegel (1830/2004), in Lectures on the philosophy of world history, made his prophecy about America, César Fernández Moreno (1979), an Argentine poet, essayist and diplomat wondered about Latin America and confirmed: the continent, which was pure nature for the German philosopher, already had a story to tell. In the mid-70s of the 20th century, what was a part of North America, the United States, became the most powerful nation in the world and, South America, Mexico and Central America, on their part, had started to be called Latin America and were exploding demographically and culturally.

The expression Latin America was, from its origin, completely inaccurate, in the first place due to the silly idea of having resorted to the name Latin to differentiate it from the Anglo Saxon one, referring to the languages of its discovery that here came across those of the natives. Now, a language such as French had also anchored in the northern hemisphere of the continent, in Canada and in the south of the United States and, at the same time, English settled in four Latin American countries which today are part of the British Commonwealth: Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana...

Besides all that, the influx of the massive African contingent, which arrived due to the trafficking of slaves between the 16th and 19th centuries, added to that linguistic and racial myriad. The result of that terrible period of enslavement was the incorporation of the
African culture, its musical rhythms, its cooking, its religions and its colour, to a great part of this America that calls itself Latin.

Speaking about Latin America is speaking about an image, a forged mirage throughout more than five centuries and, making use of the expression coined by Mexican Edmundo O’Gorman (1992), it is speaking about an invention.

“I tend to think that America, the American continent at large, was a verbal invention,” also says Chilean Jorge Edwards (2014), author of a novel recently translated into Portuguese: A origem do mundo.

Since 1942, Europe started to develop what could be understood as the new design of the world, which had been conceived until then as a unique orbis terrarum, a big island surrounded by a mare magnum. Upon the arrival of civilisation in America, what was in fact a whole varied and heterogeneous territory due to its geography, its languages and its multiple millenary cultures started to be understood as an orbis novo, a new entity to be annexed to what was already known. The Spanish and Portuguese conquerors’ attitude is consistent with that of European Renaissance intellectuals who interpreted that the issue was to make a tabula rasa before this huge block of lands that was conceived as new and uniformly meaningless.

Two things are particularly interesting in this, somewhat insolent since it is brief, summary: firstly, the idea of unity with which the American continent was conceived from that moment; and secondly, the lack of an own identity which was attributed to it and which, since Columbus’ arrival, they attempted to construct.

What is impressive is that we are still referring to it in that way, despite its heterogeneity, its plurality and the noticeable differences that cross it from end to end, given the fact that each one understands in different ways what Latin America is and what that might mean.

The first great mistake was that of Columbus, who despite having made four long voyages to the continent, never quit on the idea that he had reached Asia. Bewildered by reading about Marco Polo’s travels, he forged the first mirages faced with the beautiful tropical landscapes that appeared before him, believing that he was near the Earthly Paradise “which has the shape of a woman’s breast,” as he described it in the diary of his third voyage.

In his magnificent book Visão do Paraíso, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1998, pp. 13-15) remembers that also the Anglo Saxons that arrived in the northern shores gradually developed, in many other varied ways, the theme of the visions of paradise. In other words, in the southern hemisphere as well as in the northern hemisphere, travellers believed that they had found a more favourable and pleasant land than that they had left in Europe. The cliché of an idyllic America would continue to spread, in fact, throughout the centuries, until it reached its highest point with Rousseau and his theory of the noble savage.

We know, however, that the advancement of the western civilisation on American soil was violent and relentless, mainly throughout the first decades of the 16th century. Little was left of what had been the Aztec and Inca empires, and thousands of aimarás, araucanos, guaraníes, sioux, and many other indigenous people met their death, victims of slaughter and pests.

What we call today “discourses of the Latin American conquest” is a set of hybrid books that collect biographical aspects, historiography and great doses of romantic imagination, inspired by the most popular genre of the 15th century: chivalric novels. They are texts that also offer us different versions of the events of the conquest and show how, by that time, there were radical divergences between European settlers and religious ones regarding the meaning of the endeavour in America. Bartolomé de las Casas, Spanish Dominican priest, loathed and denounced the way in which Hernán Cortés sent soldiers against contingents of defenceless Aztecs. The same happened in Brazil with the Jesuit José de Anchieta and priest Antonio Vieira, from the Society of Jesus.

If at that time Spanish and Portuguese coexist in the colonies with a myriad of indigenous languages (quechua, náhuatl, aimará, mapuche, tupí, guaraní...), those will be the only linguistic gateways to writing, including
the transcriptions of the stories that up to then had circulated orally through generations of indigenous people.

It is impressive to perceive the power and speed with which biblical elements and western ideologies gradually permeated those narratives, within which if, on the one hand, the existence of rich and complex cultures prior to the European’s arrival was vindicated, on the other, that same arrival was considered as a natural and expected phenomenon, which God would have devised to save the peoples that were here from spiritual darkness. This ideological syncretism resulting from the passage from an oral language to a written one is seen in all the narratives of the time, such as *Popol Vuh* (a cosmogonic book from the Maya culture), or the works written by indigenous people like *Nueva corónica y buen gobierno*, by Guamán Poma de Ayala (1936/1980), born a few years before the arrival of Almagro and the Pizarro brothers in Cusco; and *Comentarios reales de los incas*, by the brilliant mestizo Inca Garcilaso de la Vega (1609/2013), son of a Spanish captain and an Inca princess and also born in Cusco after the invasion.

After the first period, during the colonial centuries and until the end of the 18th century, Latin America considers itself and is considered as an annex of the Iberian Peninsula. This does not mean, in any way, that during these three centuries nothing important regarding America has been written. A vast bibliography about local habits and customs, forms of politics and of social organisation witnesses the syncretism mentioned above and the many ways of adaptation, exchange and conflicts between the indigenous and Iberian cultures.

But for the purpose of this reflection, it is interesting to retake the discussion from the years of the continent’s independence, when the need to consider itself with an identity separate from that of Spain and Portugal arose. It became crucial then to create their own symbols of identity and to invent national histories. According to this premise, throughout the turbulent Hispanic-American 19th century, Spain turned into a great enemy of the continent, a situation which had already been developing since the 18th century with the increasing disagreement and conflicts between the metropolis and the colonies.

From then onwards, the possibilities and temptations to diffuse tensions and conflicts in globalising solutions became endless and always insufficient. As we have already seen, the ethnic criterion is not viable, and a conception purely linguistic or then religious which defines satisfactorily and in a sensible way what Latin America is does not seem feasible either.

The Venezuelan liberator Simón Bolívar thought in Panamerican terms, in the context of the revolutions for the colonies’ independence. José de San Martín, Bernardo O’Higgins, Carlos Bustamante, Toussaint Louverture, the great liberators of the early 19th century, were with him on the same side. As Antonio Candido (1979) remembers in “Literatura e subdesenvolvimento,” during those years, the Brazilian poet Gonçalves Dias wrote in a state of euphoria his paradigmatic verses about the American landscape, with bluer skies and more luxuriant flowers, but they could have been killed “by any of their contemporaries between Mexico and Tierra del Fuego.”
Paradoxically, it is necessary to register that almost all those Hispanic-American independence leaders died in circumstances with little glory, killed, poor or expatriated, transformed into conservative and disenchanted individuals. The optimism during the first decades of liberalism was losing strength and gradually revealed economies impoverished by wars of independence and old-fashioned, ineffective and unfair political and social systems. Bolívar himself asserted at the end of his life that making the revolution in America was like ploughing in the sea...

José Martí, the last liberator and a romantic poet, who died pierced by a Spanish bullet in the midst of the revolution for the emancipation of Cuba, foresaw that the liberation was necessary to avoid the advancement of the United States, which would only mean to change hands. He died before confirming his worst omens. In 1898, Spain withdrew, yielding to the pressure from the United States, whose intervention on the island would extend through the Enmienda Platt until 1959. On the other hand, it is worth recalling here the position of a Brazilian of that time, José Veríssimo, who considered the United States' entry into the conflict between Cuba and Spain as a highly positive event. Opposed to the imperialist fears of Uruguayan Rodó and of Martí himself, he attributed the ill-disposed attitude of the "Castilian speaking nations" towards North America to an old dispute of races in which the chieftainships and Hispanic exalted spirits should be calmed with the Saxons' rationality (Veríssimo, 1986a).

This view of the facts, from Latin America of Portuguese origin, coincides with that which another Brazilian contemporary, the Visconde de Taunay, presents more than once regarding these nations, Spanish warm-blooded daughters, and shows the discrepancies that were evidenced more than once between the different peoples and cultures of this entangled scenario. The acutest and most particularised focus about its components, in their different contexts, evidences the superficiality of any unitary vision that is not just geographical.

On the other hand, Veríssimo himself is the one who exalts with admiration the words that Argentine Manuel Ugarte uttered in 1912 during a meeting at Columbia University, in New York, against what seemed to be an evident imperialist drive of the United States in relation to Latin America (Veríssimo, 1986b). More than 10 years had passed since the Cuban episode and, certainly, Veríssimo's endorsement to the "giant of the north" had changed, as it is proved by many of his articles from those years before the First Great War.

Since the enactment of the Monroe Doctrine, in 1870, all liberal Latin America has gradually aligned against "North American imperialism. I would say that at that moment, thanks to that potential common enemy, the countries of this America felt united by that strong bond that also tied them in a unanimous desire for independent progress.

As António Cândido used to say, it is possible to apply to all Latin America the concept developed for Brazil by Brazilian thinker and diplomat Mário Vieira de Mello, for whom, until 1930, the notion of "new country" prevailed, a country which still had a future to shape, but which from that date, suffered the replacement of that notion by that of "underdeveloped country," which highlighted its poverty, its atrophy, what was missing and not what abounded (Candido, 1979).

In fact, since the interwar period, in 1930, in the face of the advent of modernity, the idea of underdevelopment combined the continent's material, political and social conditions
with a greater spectrum, a global one, that divided the world between developed peoples (richer, fairer and happier) and less developed peoples and, therefore, towed by the evolutionary process.

This is the idea that Mexican poet and thinker Octavio Paz (1998a, p. 62) supports in Fundación y disidencia: “I believe that what we lacked, above all, was the equivalent to the Enlightenment and to critical philosophy. We did not have an 18th century: not even with the best will can we compare Feijóo or Jovellanos to Hume, Locke, Diderot, Rousseau, Kant. There lies the great rupture: there where the modern age begins, our separation also begins...” For Paz, as for many other intellectuals of the second half of the 20th century, our condition is the absence of some crucial stages of historical evolution, and with that we would be condemned to dance in a masquerade, a dance of imposters and simulations of what we never had. Faced with modernity, coming from the centre, our peripheral condition would be of asynchronism. Paz says (1979) in O ogro filantrópico: “Masked realities. Lack of authenticity and falsehood appear, endemic evils of Latin American countries. At the beginning of the 20th century, we had already settled in a full pseudo-modernity: railways and large estates, democratic constitutions and chieftains in the best Hispanic-Arabic tradition; positivist philosophers and pre-Columbian caciques; symbolic poetry and illiteracy. “Certainly, the theories of dependence and a progressive conception of history lie behind these views.

Another position regarding modernity, at the other end of the scale, is that of a baroque America, defended by first-rate writers, like Cuban Alejo Carpentier (during his early phase [Carpentier, 1949/2010]) and José Lezama Lima (1988), according to whom the architectural, pictorial and literary movement born in the 17th century was, since then, a Latin American resistance weapon used by the indigenous cultures against Spain and an own way of assimilating what came from Europe, in an original intertwining with what already existed here. Ranging from Inca Kondori and Brazilian Aleijadinho to Mexican Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, in the 17th century, coming to Alejo Carpentier and Lezama Lima, in the 20th century. Modern Latin America would be baroque par excellence. Poets and writers self-proclaimed neo-baroque would subscribe to that image later.

The Argentine intellectual mentioned at the beginning, Fernández Moreno, organised in 1972, sponsored by Unesco, the book Amé rica Latina en su literatura (in simultaneous Spanish and Portuguese editions), which had huge impact at the time and for which he summoned essayists and literary critics from 12 Latin American nationalities, including Brazil (Fernández Moreno, 1979). The book is compulsory reading for those interested in the matter. Due to the multiplicity of approaches and points of view, it can be seen there that the theme about Latin America is far from being defined and acquires new facets every day.

Literature is useful to understand this difficulty very well. If we think about the first authors of texts about America, during those turbulent first centuries of the colony, none of them dared to even think about the experience altogether, in continental terms. Three of the most important authors, whose work nurtured the fantasy world of many of the great writers of modernity, wrote about their direct experiences: Spanish captain Bernal Díaz del Castillo (1632/2012) produced his magnificent Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España about the memories of his campaigns with Hernán Cortés, during the conquest and dominance of the Aztec empire; in his exquisite Comentarios reales, published in Spain, the already mentioned mestizo Inca Garcilaso de la Vega (1609/2013) made the first thorough description of a pre-Hispanic culture, drawing from his childhood experience in Cusco; and later, in the 17th century Mexican poet Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, an unprecedented literary phenomenon of the Baroque, whose protection extends up to Octavio Paz (1998b), who attempted to understand her in his book Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz: As armadilhas da fé. There is almost nothing that brings these three authors closer, except for the language (though its level and treatment differs greatly among them) and the subtlety of their per-
ceptions of the world settled down in time and the circumstances in which each of them had to live.

Between 1960 and 1980 approximately, Latin American literature was thought again as a whole within the same main line with the idealisation of a Latin American literary boom. Half a dozen writers fit in it such as Gabriel García Márquez, Julio Cortázar, José Donoso, Mario Vargas Llosa and Carlos Fuentes, authors who -each one with their own style and making use of contemporary and global narrative techniques- searched for a comprehensive definition for the Latin American identity. Yet that same boom left aside great expressions which did not fit at the time into the proposed definition of this total and unifying view, in search for a Latin American identity. Since the ‘80s, fortunately, literature came to be seen in a fragmented way, without a line that crossed it or that intended to translate the continent into a mainstream, like Magical Realism, Baroque or Macondism. João Guimarães Rosa, Jorge Luis Borges, Juan Carlos Onetti, Juan José Saer and Clarice Lispector appear then as genuine possibilities for the creation of new meanings, without necessarily adhering to styles outlined beforehand.

In order to provide an insight about everything I have been discussing, it can be interesting to think about the corpus of authors with whom a Hispanic-American Literature Professor at the University of São Paulo is working during this first semester in 2015. It consists of seven 20th-century writers, that is, all belong to the same period, Hispanic-American and contemporary, though not all of them have been included in the famous boom: Alejo Carpentier, the great Cuban romantic who is characterised by the relationships he establishes with historiography, in a Baroque language, full of erudition and archaisms, in which detailed descriptions of architectural spaces are frequent and in which his broad musical culture (he wrote the anthological *La música en Cuba* [Carpentier, 1946/1972]) reveals itself all the time. Francisco Coloane, son of a whaler from the south of Chile, whose narrative takes place in the archipelagos of the region, among the strong seamen. His plots remind of the power of the stories of a Jack London, in which lonely individuals face the outdoors, in tempestuous landscapes that echo their devastated own personal universes. María Luisa Bombal, who, though being a Chilean, wrote most of her ephemeral work in Argentina. It is a prose with a great poetic power, with which she explores the techniques of interior monologue to immerse herself into the subjectivity of her female characters, making use of the records of Surrealism which dissolve the borders of wakefulness and dreaming. Julio Cortázar, who left Argentina in a voluntary exile in France, where he wrote almost all his works. A master of the short story, self-confessed disciple of Edgar Allan Poe, he explored the fantasy genre and ways to escape from the familiar and urban everyday life—imbued with his French experience—drawing from the unusual. He wrote some essential essays about short narrative forms. Mexican Juan Rulfo, who published only one book of short stories and only one novel, whose undisputed power lies in the wiry and certain way in which he gives life to Mexico’s interior rural world, in a dry and deprived language, extracted from orality and combined with a broken narrative, with flashbacks, flashforwards and space leaps. Julio Ramón Ribeyro, whose discretion always acted in the opposite direction of a broader projection of his work. It also characterises a look on beings and things from a minor point of view, dwelling on what is apparently secondary. Amidst the advancement of capitalist progress over Peruvian cities, he is interested in those excluded from the process; not only from a social point of view, but also from a point of view of mismatching, incompatibility with the new rhythm of modernity. And finally, the range of the semester’s writers ends with Roberto Bolaño, the Chilean reader of Borges and Poe, who clearly opted for the representation of the intellectual in fiction. Deprived almost completely of the descriptive element, his prose centres itself on the labyrinthine dislocation of readers whose movements are pursued by narrative, at an almost detective rhythm.

This completely random selection of seven Hispanic-American narrators who make
up the syllabuses of two Hispanic-American literature subjects, enables us, in my opinion, to assess in a more concrete way the insoluble paradox to which the question of the notion Latin America refers to, in an even broader way. These authors and their works' topics, points of view, approaches, effects and projections are far from a common path which, beyond the fact that they all use the Spanish language to create their works, the label Hispanic-American is of little or no use, except to think them in an initially superficial approach which integrates them into a geographical whole of belonging.

Bolaño himself has precisely put in check the possibility of agglutination of a language within a culture, making his characters circulate through different Spanish languages (Chilean, Mexican, Spanish or Argentine), thus showing that the uniqueness and particularity of a writer, rooted in certain contexts and situations, go beyond what is national and beyond any a priori regional determination. These labels can be useful for an economic or political consideration, but they are not useful when understanding an author and their production. That task has more to do with the literary traditions and the ethical and aesthetic assumptions in which each author chooses to fit into in order to develop their reading of the world and write.

References
Left-wings and right-wings in a new democratic age
At the dawn of the 21st century, Latin America displays a novel political scene. Although there have been several presidents who were forced out and even some coups, like the one which marked Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian exercise of power in Peru, democracy has become widespread in almost every country in the region and governments commonly result from free elections.

However, there are democratic regimes in place which are of different quality and type: in fact, there are pluralist and competitive democracies as opposed to others which are not, depending basically on the vitality of the party system, the government’s behaviour and the existence of an organised and effective opposition.

In this context, an unprecedented historical event which has attracted great attention in the public debate and in the academy takes place: the establishment by means of elections of left-wing or centre-left governments in a large number of countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Uruguay, beside Paraguay during Lugo’s term in office, as well as Ollanta Humala’s case in Peru.

In the historical cycle of new democra-

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cies another important event is found as well. Together with that range of left-wing governments, there have been and there are nowadays right-wing or centre-right governments resulting also from free elections in Latin America. Unlike what used to happen in former times, and except for the case of Fujimori in Peru (Carrión, 2006), these presidencies are also found in democratic regimes, though, even on this side, the quality of democracies is also varied. In this field, traditional expressions are found but also “new” or “modern” right-wings emerge (and even former updated right-wings) which, as it is the case among contemporary left-wings, accept elections as the only game in town, adopt democratic behaviour with more or less conviction and, if acting in scenarios of effective competition, eventually tend to moderate their ideological positions and political actions.

Without including the ‘90s –during the heyday of neoliberalism and pro-market reforms, when several right-wing or centre-right governments stood out–, the current cases and the ones which took place in recent periods are not scarce. The list includes Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, with more than one government alternations, which improve democratic civilisation. However, even though there is relevant research (Luna & Rovira, 2014; Middlebrook, 2000), we are far from the boom of approaches generated by left-wing governments and, unlike what happens in European districts, right-wings mainly in their last manifestations– have not received the attention which the phenomenon deserves.

The saga of populism

In the range of left-wing governments numerous manifestations are found, which in many countries are repeated for several terms. Paraphrasing Samuel Huntington (1991/1994), it could be said that we are experiencing a “third wave” upswing of Latin American left-wings: if we count from the events in 1960 and 1970, from the Cuban Revolution to the tragedy of the Popular Unity in Chile, with a second round, which shifts towards Central America during the '80s, and in that context the Nicaraguan Revolution stands out. The current phase gives rise to phenomena different from those which could have existed over those two periods and the preceding era; to begin with, because they are government experiences and because these governments have been formed by means of elections, and not through revolutions.

Governments adhering to such movement show a great diversity. At one end of the spectrum the new populist figures from Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador stand out, who are striking, have original characteristics and differ one from the other and from their predecessors. Yet they belong to the core of populism, which is a recurring political phenomenon in the history of Latin America.1

The saga which ranges from old populism to modern populism, since the beginnings of the 20th century until the present, includes some emblematic cases and several aborted manifestations, at different historical phases and with different ideological signs: going through developmental times and through neoliberal populism so as to reach the current examples of left-wings.

It is not possible to identify populism with a uniform pattern of public policies or a given economic approach, like conventional wisdom usually does and exactly like the devotees of the “macro-economy of populism” (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991) propose. Classical populisms develop during the “national development” stage, through peripheral keynesianism, the extension of the State and the domestic market, “protected” capitalism and

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1. Among the recreations of populism and the brand-new social democratic undertakings are all the other experiences of local left-wing: the Kirchners’ Argentina, marked by another twist in Peronism national and popular strand; Ortega’s return in Nicaragua, which involves changes and continuities in the mark of Sandinist revolutionary nationalism; or the singular determination of FMLN [its acronym in Spanish] [Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front], initiated by Mauricio Funes in El Salvador. It is not easy to frame these manifestations in a simple proposal of “two lefts”, though they may come close to populist examples or may have similarities with social democratic figures. We should eventually examine each case, based on decisive variables such as the existence of a plural and competitive democracy, the party system and the characteristics of the governing political actors.
social integration, based on networks of mass clientelism and with corporate articulations. This batch of popular nationalism— which obsessed the great Gino Germani (1962)— left several experiences incomplete and three emblematic examples. Vargas and *trabalhismo* in Brazil. Perón’s first government (1946-1955), which founds a lasting and changing movement, with a large centrality in Argentine politics, which has been able to incorporate expressions of very different orientations, but similar in their political nature, like Menem’s (1989-1999) and the Kirchners’ ones (2003-2015). The Mexican regime, which is the only one that achieved a firm institutionalisation and was in force for many consecutive decades, from the Mexican Revolution until the alternation of 2000.

The “neopopulist” versions of the ’90s move away from their ancestors’ legacy and, in fact, turn against their constructions since they perform a right-wing populism determined to dismantle the “active” State, rush privatisations and introduce market reforms, becoming sometimes leaders of the roughest therapies of neoliberalism. In this new chapter of populism—with that neoliberal link which generates “unexpected affinities” (Weyland, 1996)— Collor de Mello’s short adventure in Brazil would fit, but the most exact case is represented by Fujimori’s long establishment. In a debatable and debated opinion, some people include Carlos Menem’s administration here.

Conversely, exponents who mark the beginning of the 21st century and make up one of the strands of the new left-wing, of “re-founding” rhetorics, propose themselves as an alternative to neoliberalism and mark a significant turning point—with steps of social inclusion—though without leaving capitalism behind or escaping the market—far from it—and without necessarily falling into the misconduct usually attributed to populism. In fact, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador adhere to relatively strict macroeconomic disciplines and only in Venezuela Chavism incurs in serious disruption.

Strictly speaking, populism is a specifically political phenomenon, which must be defined as such and which, in the Latin American horizon, has been associated with different historical moments, different development models and different economic orientations.

Populisms prosper in the context of regimes lacking plurality, without balance of powers or institutional equilibrium, with weak or decomposing party systems. They are political activation strategies, which appeal to elite sectors and class fractions, middle or low layers, urban and rural, harmed and eventually excluded, which find themselves in a state of uncertainty and “availability” as a consequence of the system’s defects: precisely due to the political vacuum and the State’s shortsightedness, the loss of prestige of the institutions and the actors in force, the parties’ weakness or directly their collapse.

They are adversative strategies, hegemonic ambitions, with a strong rupture bias and revolutionary marks, uprising against the preceding establishment and riding on belligerent formulations of the binomial friend/enemy, which insists on cornering opponents, through a radical line of the ingredients that every political action has (Laclau, 2005). In that sensitive context, antagonistic positions usually privilege social identities and some construction of “people”, as a focus for summoning, in representational formats which prevail over political citizenship and which appeal to a hypothesis of social, political and economic inclusion.

Populism works, by definition, in a plebiscitary mode, around successful personalistic leaderships and with the participation of an “anti-elite”. The relation leader/masses is constitutive of populism; it implies a determining vertical hook—from top to bottom—which lays the foundations for a peculiar bond of representation and is an attention grabber; therefore, it practises a kind of “democracy of audience” more than a democracy of citizens, parties and institutions. However, that does not exclude organisation formulas, whose characteristics provide one of the dimensions which allow the classification of the different populist manifestations. In fact, throughout history, the most persistent populisms, with more strength and stability, are the ones which nurture the organisational nets and achieve a
certain degree of institutionalisation, making use of government’s resources, military personnel and the State’s civilian bodies.

The populist summon is substantially popular and nationalistic. It unfolds based on significant problems, which can affect mainly social sectors or class groups, which are constituted as subjects –against each other– drawing from a focused interpelation and a relevant political offer. Yet the catalogue of vindications and positions which drives populism should have, at the same time, an important dose of “popularity”, in other words, a considerable breadth or “transversality”, together with a nationalistic attack in the domestic sector and overseas. Historically, this composition does not have a univocal sign and case by case; it can compromise different political assets, specially those which seek out to overcome the international disadvantages of the respective countries, the times of national weakening, the economic and social vicissitudes as well as other situations of uncertainty and public insecurity.²

Thanks to the characteristics of the framework in which they appear, to their course of action and to the absence or weakness of the opposition, populist governments tend to reproduce scenarios of political polarisation, with asymmetries, power concentration and unbalance among public bodies, through a predominance of the Executive power and with top-down marks, deficit in the control processes and in the representing institutions, which show serious lacks in terms of “checks and balances.” This generates configurations which may display certain strength, but are often affected by instability and are, in any case, of low democratic quality, or even authoritarian. Due to this combination of factors, the distance to political liberalism stands out, as well as the contrasts of a virtual “populist democracy” against a republican democracy and pluralist regimes.

In the above discussed terms, populism seems to have schematically three possible paths: to consolidate as such, to move towards a pluralist derivation or to live in an endemic instability, even categorical. Indeed, if there are not any changes that promote the equality

² Fujimori provides a good example in this sense. He based his power on the successful battle against two very different national disasters, which affected Peruvian people with serious consequences for middle classes and popular sectors: inflation and Shining Path.
of powers, party pluralism and institutional improvements, the persistence of populisms and the stabilisation of this kind of regimes depend on their accomplishments in the construction of a new hegemony and on the consistency of their organisation assembly, always supported by a leadership structure and a conducive system of partnerships. So far, only the Mexican Revolution gave rise to a long-lasting populist democracy – the only Latin American stable regime of popular nationalism – thanks to its revolutionary origin and to other peculiarities of its political gestation, in particular, the alliance which it ardously seals among the fractions of the revolutionary family and a robust institutionalisation, with a mass framing, which is based on the constructions of Lázaro Cárdenas. In the other cases, the runnings of populism – in interrupted itineraries or with a longer duration, with more or less lasting effects – tend to fall back into political vices similar to those which allowed their initial launch.

Venezuela is an illustrative example since it registers the most typical and controversial populist experience of the current cycle. A radical, resounding and long-lasting populism which settles in 1999, stemming from the implosion of the “party-ocracy” arising from the Punto Fijo Pact (1958). There was a hard cycle during the leadership of Hugo Chávez, who supported by the triad warlord-army-people and thanks to the revenues of the “petrol-State”, became the leader of the “Bolivarian revolution” and of 21st-century Socialism. Conversely, his segundón [T.N. term used derogatorily referring to the second person], Nicolás Maduro, is the visible face of a pathetic version, affected by serious weaknesses and crisis aspects.

The Venezuelan government could be regarded as a “hybrid” or “semi-democratic” system since although it has had repeated electoral triumphs, it insists on plenipotentiary exercises of “hyper-presidentialism”: with restricted freedoms and a great concentration of powers – supported by Chavism circles, the State apparatus and military lodges –, with institutional equality or conducive political opposition, with a persistent lack of parties and weaknesses in the civil society. However – increasingly – the Venezuelan regime seems to be moving from a defective democracy to the “authoritarian leftism” Gino Germani (1962) referred to, with a type of government which, while remaining subject to the effective plebiscite of the ballot box, may be categorised as “electoral” authoritarianism.

**Criollo social democracy:**

**a historical debut**

The current period of Latin American left-wing records at the same time an unprecedented phenomenon: the debut of social democratic governments in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay: the presidencies of Lula da Silva (2003–2011), Dilma Rousseff (2011–2019), Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006), Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010 and 2014–2018), Tabaré Vázquez (2005–2010 and 2015–2020) and José Mujica (2010–2015). They represent unprecedented formulas, which show typical features of their “peripheral” condition and of the current historical stage, but they can be compared with the classical European references and with the “late” experiences in southern Europe, especially those emerging in the ’70s and ’80s in Spain, Portugal and Greece. Just as in the case of Latin American contemporary manifestations, the social democratic governments of those three countries occur during a “double” transition: after the respective democratic transitions and in the course of liberal transition, outside the virtuous circles of the Keynesian era and during a new globalisation thrust. There are, thus, several generations of social democratic governments, during different historical stages and in different regions, in the context of different development modes of capitalism (Lanzaro, 2014).

**A political concept**

Like in other regions, in Latin America the term is used very broadly and there are other

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3. This leads to a broader debate about the difficulties and options of social democracy in globalised contexts and since the liberal era, after the “golden years” of keynesianism, with questions that are posed in Europe and also in Latin America.
figures –parties and governments– which are called social democrat. However, it is the first time that actual social democratic governments materialise, according to a strict political concept that applies both to the European examples and the new Latin American experiences.

According to our definition (Lanzaro, 2008, 2011), social democratic governments are those formed by institutionalised left-wing parties, closely linked to the trade union movement and of socialist affiliation (though not necessarily with such name), which have gone through processes of political adaptation and replaced their revolutionary or radical ideologies by a moderate but effective reformism which complies with the rules of representative democracy and the restrictions of capitalist economy. And this, as a result of the political orientations and the electoral strategies that those parties adopt, working in democracies with systems of plural parties and effective competition. That leads, at the same time, to distinguishing features in the quality of democracy and the kind of presidential government, the consistency of the opposition and the effectiveness of the institutional checks and balances.

What identifies social democratic governments is that they are experiences led by a left-wing that may be considered “institutional” in two senses: firstly, due to the degree of institutionalisation, the age and the political accumulation of the left-wing parties that form the government: in Brazil, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT); in Chile, Partido Socialista (PS) in tandem with Partido por la Democracia (PPD); in Uruguay, Frente Amplio (FA). Secondly, due to the crucial, decisive fact that such parties are integrated with the representative democracy and electoral competition, in the context of systems of plural and competitive, relatively institutionalised parties. This draws a basic distinction in Latin America’s map, where left-wing governments without parties are found and in systems of weak or collapsed parties.

The institutionalisation of the party system is high in Chile and Uruguay. In the case of Brazil, it is more rudimentary but with relatively stable political alignments. With more or less institutionalisation, the left-wing in the three countries works in systems of effective competition, with a moderate “margin of victory” faced with a sustained and organised opposition. Elections, political representation and parliamentary composition result in a balance of powers and thus favour institutional balance. These circumstances –specifically, the existence of a competitive opposition, organised in parties– positively influence the quality of democracy as well as the quality of government processes, public policies and the constructions of institutionalism that frame them.

Political resources and social democratic potential

The governments of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have key common features, but at the same time there are tangible differences among them, which impact on the policies they apply and, thus, on their social democratic potential. These differences respond to structural conditions, the historical context and the system of restrictions in which they act. Yet they depend more precisely on the political strategies and the power resources of each government.

All of that leads to the following dimensions: a) institutional legacies, structure of the State and inherited patterns of public policies; b) the coefficient of power of the government and the government’s party, in relation to the party system and –in its case–
to the governing coalition; c) the strength of presidential leadership; d) the relationship of the ruling party with the government and the president, with a varying degree of political influence or as a party at the service of the government; e) the features of the trade union movement and its links with the government and the ruling party; f) the bilateral or tripartite relationship with business people and their trade union entities; g) in short, the relationship between the government and the ruling party with the organised or unorganised social subjects outside the trade unions circuits (population on poverty lines, the unemployed, informal workers).

**Different governments, diverse reformisms**

The “coefficient of power” (Merkel, 1995) can be measured in terms of parliamentary support considering two vectors: a) the position of the ruling left-wing party in the left-wing as a whole and, in its case, within the governing coalitions; b) the position of the ruling left-wing party and, in its case, the governing coalition in the party system as a whole. Furthermore, there are other relevant components such as ideological distances in the party system and in the context of coalitions or within the president’s party, the institutional and party powers that support the head of government and the leadership structure.

In this sense, significant differences are noticed. The FA is virtually a monopoly in Uruguayan left-wing and has become the “predominant” party because it obtained parliamentary majority in three consecutive elections. Thanks to the majority in both houses, the firm command of Tabaré Vázquez and the cabinet integration with all the FA’s heads, the first government of Uruguayan left-wing had a high coefficient of power without the need to form coalitions or make commitments with other parties. The social democratic debut could be considerably productive, with a series of significant changes, which, however, remain within gradual and moderate reformism, which the left-wing adopted step by step in order to achieve the electoral victory.

In Brazil and Chile, instead, during Lula da Silva’s, Dilma Rousseff’s, Ricardo Lagos’ and Michelle Bachelet’s terms, neither the PT nor the pair PS-PPD have obtained own majorities, and formed coalition governments sharing powers with partners from other lineages. Brazilian coalitions have been relatively broad and heterogeneous and included some centre-right parties. But the PT has had centrist PMDB as its main partner and its ideological distance with the opposition blocs led by the PSDB is not so big. In such terms, the government maintained a centre-left orientation and, even though the composition of the “legislative cartel” in Parliament was habitually arduous, it could carry out a considerable reform agenda.

In Chile the PS has been a part of **Concertación para la Democracia** [T.N. an agreement to strengthen democracy] in a jointed and stable alliance with Christian Democracy (DC for its acronym in Spanish), which was decisive for the democratic transition and was in the government for 20 consecutive years (1990-2000). The **Concertación** has also been a broad coalition, quite homogeneous –from the centre to centre-left–, in which the DC initially had certain predominance and the PS gained a political weight which went beyond their electoral support. The **Concertación** could be conceived as a “social democrat force” and generated a considerable cross-party “transversality”; but in its heart there are different positions and the ideological distance between the PS and the DC has always been important. Even greater has been the distance between the PS and the right bloc.

During Lagos’ and Bachelet’s terms, as in both presidencies of the **Concertación** which preceded them, they had to weave tough commitments within the governing coalition. Besides, in order to avoid any relapse in polarisation, and even during the periods in which it had the majority, the government nurtured a policy of consensus with the right-wing, giving rise to a kind of “democracy of agreements” and adjusting to a moderate incremental pragmatics, with important, but gradual, innovations. Bachelet’s second presidency –which is making its first tests– is based on a broader and more heterogeneous coalition...
–“New Majority”– which includes the Communist Party and integrates some of the leaders who led the strong student protests over the past years.

With these political formats, the first Latin American social democratic experiences are taking place in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. The governments are different and the resulting products differ. There are rhythms in between that tend to delineate a normative regime of public policies (a policy regime), in other words, similar policies implemented by parties of different ideological affiliation, in terms of continuity and convergence with the neoliberal scripts. There are also innovative trends and realisations in between, which face the challenge of forging a “post-liberal” path to eventually create a new development paradigm, not designed beforehand but, as it is common in the recesses of history, is forged on the go.

It is about unique undertakings, comparable to other species of the genus, which in all cases, however, lead to a commitment regime between the parameters of capitalist development and moderate reformism. A typically social democratic commitment –between capitalism and democracy– which, by definition, takes place in plural and competitive political systems.

References
Brazil and our America: a continent and two islands?1

In his preface to the reprint of the classical work by Manoel Bonfim (1905/1993), A América Latina, males de origem, Darcy Ribeiro would write:

During my years of exile in Montevideo, I spent most of my time in Uruguayan public libraries. There I read, then, almost everything that was written about Latin America to prepare myself to write Estudos de antropologia da civilização (Ribeiro, 1964-1976). It was there, reading and rethinking our experiences, that I dropped my Brazilian provincianism to realise that we are part of a greater whole: Latin America". (Ribeiro, 1993, p. 10).

Darcy Ribeiro’s understanding of his Latin American condition, which was possible thanks to his forced stay in Uruguay, draws the attention towards Brazil’s ambiguous position regarding the inner side of Latin America: being part of the continent, the country remained far from it. Such eloquent words of the anthropologist fit like a glove in the purposes of this text, which aims at looking closely at such ambivalence and, drawing from it, at Latin America as a cultural category and construct, cut, throughout time, by different imaginary lines: Hispanic and Portuguese America; Latin and Anglo Saxon America; white (Argentina, Chile), indigenous (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador) and mestiza (Brazil, Cuba) America.

If the successive maps outlined by American reflection since the 19th century point out different borders, one that works as a frequently established limit is the one which separates America to the south of Rio Grande (catholic and latin) from the northern part (protestant and saxon). Such separation, in the Americanist essay from the end of the 19th century to the first decades of the 20th is associated to different meanings, while insisting on the

1. This text arose from the invitation by Regina Reiss and had its origin in a course offered at IHEAL – Paris 3, during the first term of 2010. Thus, it benefited a lot from the debates with the students; I fondly remember Xavier, Santiago, Diana, Elsa, Guillaume, Marie, Océane, Pierre, Charlie, Hélène and Joanna.

opposition between the republics from the south and the Caliban from the north –Shakespeare's character (Shakespeare, 1611/2008) works as an allegory to represent the dominant enemy during most of the 20th century.

Imaginary geographies, essays of an Americanist kind, localisation of Brazil in the American map: these are the topics (and problems) that we are interested in approaching, without the intention of exhausting them in this essay, but in an attempt to present them briefly, revealing the way in which they call for a reflection on “Latin America, we and we the others”, a thread that runs through this Dossier.

1

Going back to Darcy Ribeiro’s words, it is worth remembering that his experience of exile, like that of many other people, contributed to strengthen Brazil’s relations with neighbouring countries such as Uruguay, but also with Chile and Cuba, where some of the opponents of the dictatorship established by the military coup of 1964 headed for.

In any case, the historical event and its tragic consequences changed neither the place of Brazil inside Latin America, nor the position of the continent in Brazilians’ conscience. And if it is true that the relations of the country with Hispanic America had been changing since 1990, according to an intended policy of economic, political and cultural exchanges, Ribeiro’s “confession” seems to give it a sense that crosses the limits of a historic and individual experience.

Brazil’s continental dimensions, associated to its language different from the Spanish spoken in the rest of Latin American countries, led European travellers, when coming to Latin America for the first time, to get many times the impression that they were facing separate worlds, connected by some bridges... Two islands?

Not only foreigners, but also Latin American intellectuals and writers, when projecting a more general reflection on the continent and attempting to apprehend it as a transnational unity, had difficulty accounting for “Brazilian differences”, so this country appears in a very discreet way in the americanist reflection of the first decades of the 20th century. From the Brazilian perspective, the historical-sociological essay, with few exceptions, refused to expose a systematic reflection on Latin America, and decided to research into Brazil itself in its formation process as well as in relation to European matrices.

A different colonial experience (though equally brutal from the point of view of vio-
lence against native populations), in which the colony becomes the capital of the Empire in 1808; a *sui generis* process of independence, carried out by a Portuguese prince, and an unparalleled monarchic experience in the southern part of the continent: these are at least three strong factors that influenced in Brazil’s isolation from the rest of Latin American countries, and that led it, on the one hand, to a certain withdrawal in itself and, on the other hand, to an opening towards Europe.

The distrust of the neighbouring countries regarding the Brazilian monarchic choice was not minor since, at last, the republican model was seen as the most appropriate for the independent, free and modern nations which were forming in America since the 19th century. Unlike the current visions, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1811-1888), an Argentine politician and writer, considered that the monarchy was the only political form capable of controlling the “barbarism” he associated with Brazil; barbarism which resulted from exuberant nature (at the same time fascinating and dangerous) and, above all, from the strong presence of Africans and mestizos.

Brazil’s systematic policy of alliance with the U.S., as well as the frequent tensions that involved Brazil’s policies of expansion of the borders since the end of the 19th century, were additional elements that contributed to isolate the country from the rest of Latin America.

Historical, cultural and political isolations did not prevent, however, that some authors made an effort to make the “two islands” get closer, crossing bridges and borders. We can remember poet Ruben Darío (1867-1905), who was, between 1906 and 1922, in the “Brazil of fire”, just like he described it in his well-known poem dedicated to Machado de Assis (Dario, 1967). Also the book by Argentine writer and diplomat Martín García Mérou (1862-1905), *El Brasil intelectual: Impresiones y notas literarias* (García Mérou, 1900/2013), which, while pointing out the real distances existing among the different countries of America, repeated Bolivar’s independence and unifying aspirations in relation to the fragmentation risks of the continent.

Mérou –it is important to say it– liked Brazil’s political stability and the consolidation of Brazilian institutions in opposition to the turbulence prevailing in Hispanic American republics, which is shared by historian and diplomat Oliveira Lima (1867-1928), one of the Brazilian authors who devoted himself to the relations between Portuguese America and Spanish America.

Manoel Bonfim (1868-1932) is another national author who would deal with the American issue, and he stood out even more for removing the stress from the reflection on race issues, which pervaded the Latin American intellectual horizon until mid-20th century, in order to project a sociological analysis supported by the exam of colonial domination, built on the basis of an evident continental conscience (Bonfim, 1905/1993). It is true that *Revista americana* (1909-1919), directed by diplomat Araújo Jorge, constituted an instrument for approach among subcontinental countries; and so is the fact that it is possible to find certain American concern in the work...
of Brazilian authors who were active between 1880 and 1920, as Antonio Cândido (1993) points out. In any case, the Portuguese bloc of Latin America seems to have refused to project essays of an American tone, a view that refers back to 1930, when interpreters tend to focus on the analysis of Brazilian peculiarities, explained according to the different nature of our colonisation.

The “adventure” of the colonisation carried out by a Portuguese colonist who opposed to calculations and planning gave rise to a civilisation prominently rural, patriarchal and mestiza among us, as Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1936) points out in Raízes do Brasil. The plastic and adaptable nature of the Portuguese, a hybrid between Africa and Europe, is what allows the understanding of the formation of a mestizo country, in spite of slave violence and oppression, as Gilberto Freyre (1933) will say in Casa-grande e senzala. Historical roots and cultural fictions that worked in the construction of gaps between the two great linguistic blocs of the South American continent.

2

Latin America is not a natural reality but a cultural category and construction that produces realities, guides policies and encourages fantasies. The history of the creation of the concept refers to the international policies of the Second French Empire (1852-1870) led by Napoleon III. Used for the first time in 1856 by Chilean Francisco Bilbao (1823-1865) and Colombian José María Caicedo (1830-1889), in a context in which France was building its monarchical project and the intervention in Mexico (1862), the term will be taken over by opposing currents in the ideological spectrum. On the one hand, Bonapartist groups that would reinforce the Pan-Latin discourse against North American expansionism and the republican model spread in Latin America. On the other hand, fractions of the French and European left-wing, united around abbot Félicité de Lamennais (1872-1854), which resumed the argument of latinity and associated it to the republican project, in order to project the union of a Latin bloc (which includes American and European nations) against an Anglo-Saxon bloc (in which the U.S. is included).

Yet the antagonistic derivations of the concept get closer in what they say about the Latin/Saxon opposition, noticeable in Lamennais’ thinking as well as in a Bonapartist like Chevalier; and they also get closer due to the way in which they share certain vision of civilisation, linked to the erudite “spirit” and culture, which does not consider historical and cultural realities of Latin American countries (Romero, 1998).

Built at the right time and used, from the beginning, in many senses, the notion of Latin America acquires new and varied connotations throughout time. Despite its different meanings, it divides continental geography in two parts, presented as opposite: Latin America which becomes established as “another America”, different from North America. Forged in Europe, the term migrates to the Americas and is translated according to other demands and concerns. In the American continent it tends to become “our America”, more or less distant from the colonial empires and the ideological and intellectual commitments of its creators.

Two examples, chosen according to the inaugural nature they possess, can help to sketch the outlines that the idea of Latin America will take on in Latin American debates at the beginning of the 20th century, which had so many repercussions on subsequent formulations. Nuestra América (Martí, 1891/2005), by Cuban writer, translator and journalist José Martí (1853-1899), announces the expression which will become a symbol of certain Latin American essay, and associates it to the mestiza and independent America of the European

7. For a discussion on the construction of the concept of Latin American city (and of Latin America), see Gorelik (2005).
8. If we consider Latin American population in 1825, Romero points out, we find a majority of black people and mestizos, together with natives and a white minority; how to talk about Latin people from the ethnic point of view then?, the author wonders. On the notion of Latin America, see also Martinière (1982).
and North American models. Ariel (Rodó, 1900/1947), by Uruguayan journalist and writer José Enrique Rodó (1871-1917), suggests another vision—which restores the bonds between the southern part of the continent and the Iberian civilising models—and becomes the matrix for subsequent “arielisms”, such as those by Pedro Henríquez Ureña, Alfonso Reyes and José Vasconcelos.

The expression “our America”, which inspires the title of the article by José Martí (1891) published in Illustrated Review of New York on January 10th 1891, points out a clear assumption of political position, purely anti-colonialist and anti-interventionist; a critical attitude of denial that comes with the projection of a common destiny for the south of the continent. The first person plural indicates the place of enunciation of the discourse author: it is the South American man the one who speaks and reflects on his condition as a colonised person and on the economic, political and intellectual subordination of the southern part of America. The article is written and published in the U.S., where the restless activist for the independence of Cuba is after many exiles. The political commitment that marks the writer’s career impacts directly on his production. His articles, chronicles and poems are written in light of the time, under the impact of the political events he comments and in relation to which he forcefully takes sides. Thus, the figures of “warrior hero” and “literate hero” play a key role in Martí’s work, and they relate to the topic of “guns and letters” which a large part of his production deals with. The spiritual, national and social war does not appear only in occasional articles but it is present at the heart of his poetic work, opening up space for an epic imagination (Díaz Quiñones, 2006).

Our America takes the form of a letter written remotely to the “brothers” of “Mother America”,10 whom it cries out to “wake up” before the danger that dwells next to them (“a giant of seven leagues?”, “a tiger?”). With an oral and emotional tone, the article wants to persuade the reader: they must wake up and help in the transformation of America, an urgent task faced with the imminent struggle.

The purpose of the text is clear (to summon Americans to adopt the motive of the independence of South America), as well as the paths for the fulfilment of the task: it is necessary to study the continent’s “real factors” in order to find solutions, “liberating it from tyrannies”. The article appeals to the construction of a new view on the American world, liberated from prêt-à-porter imported devices and formulas. Thus, a central topic of Latin American essay in general and our modernism in particular is posed: the problem of acritical imitation of models and independence of the spirit.

Our America is, then, a synonym of the return to the “natural” and “true” matrices that


10. Martí delivered a speech to the delegates of the International American Conference, in December 1889, which was precisely entitled Mother America (Martí, 1965).
date back to the period prior to the conquest. To the “natural America” Martí also links the mestiza America: under a diversity of colours and bodies, the “American soul” is always the same, he points out. Between the Cuban experience and life in the U.S., which make him a “man between two worlds”, as Díaz Quiñones (2006) puts it, Martí makes the political and intellectual independence of his native country, as well as that of all Latin America, his main subject and war weapon.

In the far south of the continent, on the other hand, and living in a country whose social indicators, the functioning of democratic institutions and the process of modernisation lead it to be considered “America’s Switzerland”, Rodó reflects on American freedom and independence from another point of view. A catholic, holder of a cultivated formation in a bourgeois family and delineating a journey between his habitual journalistic activity and parliamentary obligations (he was elected deputy three times by the Colorado Party), the Uruguayan writer projects his American utopia according to a different social and intellectual experience.

Ariel (Rodó, 1900/1947) resumes, from the title, the occidental educated tradition that shelters it. The text tone is oral, like that of Martí’s, but in this case it is about Prospero’s farewell class, which takes place in a great hall decorated with a bronze sculpture of Ariel, which inspires the teacher’s “sermon” addressed to the youngsters, his students, but also to the “youth of America”, to whom he dedicates the essay. His way of speaking mixes a friendly and family tone with a persuasive and somewhat messianic one, mainly highlighted in the final pages: he wants to show youngsters the road to follow. Prospero’s speech provides the text’s central material, which has an opening and a closing conceived in a clearly literary register. The speech possesses an unquestionable universalist vocation (only at the end it makes reference to “our America”, which gives its name to Martí’s article), and predicates a combination of a classical ideal and a Christian one, valued as matrices of a civilising model, of which America would be a member.

Spiritual progress, moral and aesthetic development and selfless meditation are some of the key words of the text, which outlines an America capable of reaching freedom based on the expansion of art, science, ideas and religious values. And the path to reach such an ideal is education, a tool that enables access to classical tradition (Greek and Roman) and to refine spirits, directing them towards universal values.

If in Martí education and knowledge combine in order to approach the reality of the world, the return to true traditions (“our own Greece is preferable to the Greece that is not ours”, in the words of the author [Martí, 1891/2005]) and political commitment, in Rodó this links to “selfless spiritual idealism” and to the figure of Ariel. The famous character of Shakespeare’s (1611/2008), The tempest, appears as the greatest expression of American ideals: “Ariel is superior reason and sentiment. Ariel is this sublime instinct of perfectibility...” (Rodó, 1900/1947, p. 121).

Then, making of Ariel the synthetic image of his American utopia, Rodó criticises the material utility, selfishness, “disordered passions” and “tight utilitarianism” which characterise the “civilisation of the north”, associated to Caliban (Rodó, 1900/1947, pp. 70-71). North American “democratic mediocrity” is

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11. The article is full of metaphors taken from nature –the Andes, trees, the earth, roots– and of references to animals and “natural” inhabitants –natives and mestizos–. Nature provides a rich vocabulary for Martí to speak about creating fecundity and the potentialities of the south of the continent, with which he outlines the image of a “natural America.”

12. Rodó’s stated inspirations, mentioned more than once, are the speech that North American philosopher and poet Ralph Waldo Emerson (1837) delivers at Phi Beta Kappa Society (The American scholar) and the “lay sermon” by Renan, given in 1896 at the Student Association of Paris. Also the well-known speeches by Andrés Bello (1843) at the University of Chile and by Lucio Vicente López, in Argentina, in 1890, are responsible for the creation of an oratory style.

13. Though the text also implies the admiration for conquests of the Empire of the North, directly declared at some moments, for example: “though I do not love them (the United States), I admire them. I admire them, firstly, due to their great capacity of loving, and I bend in front of the ‘school of will and work’ [...] that they instituted” (Rodó, 1900/1947, p. 96). It is even worth mentioning that, by using Shakespeare’s characters, Rodó follows the steps of Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío who, in his essay about Edgar Allan Poe published in Los raros (Darío, 1896/1998), refers to the Caliban that has its kingdom to the north of Manhattan island.
also criticised, though he does not reject democracy as a model. The challenge would be to balance the excess of egalitarianism with full development of the spirit; to expand the access to education and culture while forming an aristocracy of the spirit. “Rationally conceived, democracy will always include an indispensable element of aristocracy that consists of establishing the superiority of the finest...” (Rodó, 1900/1947, p. 84).

It does not seem difficult to perceive how the opposition civilisation/barbarism, forged by Sarmiento, is reissued, though the terms of Rodó's formulations add new meanings: the barbarian and materialistic civilisation of the North (Caliban and Anglo Saxon America), the “giant of the north” against which Martí also rebels when trying to project “another America”, is opposed to the high ideals of the spirit (Ariel and Latin America).

The American difference and the utopia it entails present different profiles in both authors, which outlines two lineages into the inner part of American essays: one that highlights the mestizo character of America and emphasises its radical difference in relation to Europe and the U.S.; another that inscribes the future of America in the trail of Iberian Western tradition. The first one recovers the America considered “barbarian” in the eyes of the coloniser –the “natural” America, before the conquest–, while the second one recovers the “America of civilisation”, represented by Ariel.

If Caliban is associated to the U.S. in Rodó –barbarism linked to the empire of the North and not to the natives of the South–, the savage and malformed creature of Shakespeare's entanglement feeds the construction of a mythical character who gradually acquires positive connotations throughout the 20th century. Let us remember, among others, the piece by Aimé Césaire (1969/1997), Une tempête, an adaptation of Shakespeare's drama for black theatre; the poem by Edward Brathwaite (1969) dedicated to Caliban (in the book Islands), or even the essay by Cuban Roberto Fernández Retamar (1971/2004) entitled “Caliban”, of 1971, in which the character is taken as a symbol of “our America”, as an opposition to arielist reflection.14

It is true that Caliban becomes a post-colonial hero after 1960, not only in Latin America but also in the U. S.. Yet the political and intellectual journey made by the character should not let us forget other much earlier readings, that elevate the “cannibal” to the position of main figure in the reflection generated in the south of the continent.15 I refer to Manifiesto antropófago by Oswald de Andrade (1928) which, by inverting the relations between centre and periphery, making the act of devouring the engine for cultural production, generates a theory of culture with wide scope; a theory that crosses Brazilian borders and the persistent concern for the “national identity”.

Including the poet of our modernism and other national authors within an American reflection, with the help of a comparative perspective, can be a way to reintegrate Brazil into the continent, making us perceive that “we part of a greater whole”, as Darcy Ribeiro (1993) wanted. As long as the comparison is not satisfied by confirming similarities but that, on the contrary, takes difference as the springboard to reflection.

14. On the character’s appropriations, re-readings and recreations, see Zabus (2002).
15. Let us remember that Caliban, in its origin, designates the savage and the cannibal, a man who inhabited the American territory before the arrival of Europeans. The well-known essay “Of cannibals” by Montaigne (1580/2003), as we know, was one of Shakespeare's sources, translated into English by his friend Giovanni Floro in 1603.
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Argentina’s and Brazil’s art: placing the low over the high

During the last 20 years, a lot has been said about the emergence of a “Latin American art.” Despite this, there is a total absence of comparative critical analyses of the region’s contemporary art. Due to this, it is almost impossible to carry out an analysis of the characteristics of such art without the corresponding visual analysis of some artists’ works which will allow us to shed some light on an area about which a lot is said but very little is known.

At first sight, there is a common denominator between Brazilian and Argentine contemporary art, and that is their obsession with the thematisation of the inversion of the low over the high, understood as the manipulation of “low” materials (everyday or discarded objects) for the production of “high” objects (works of art). This kind of alchemical concern of transforming the low into the high, as an allegory of the virtues of the south (in relation to the north), has its roots in Buenos Aires in the late 1960s in the Di Tella Institute and collective projects such as Tucumán Arde. In São Paulo, Hélio Oiticica’s socially inclusive art exhibitions in the Museum of Modern Art represent a similar type of concern about the expansion of the universe of “art spectators.”

From the analysis of the next three Brazilian artists and their Argentine colleagues we can see that such concern about inserting elements from popular culture into elite culture has lasted until the present. To illustrate what I have said above, I will closely discuss the work of three Brazilian “contemporary” artists: Barrão (1959), Tiago Carneiro da Cunha (1973) and Alexandre da Cunha (1969), establishing a dialogue with their Argentine counterpart: Liliana Porter (1941) and León Ferrari (1920), Max Gómez Canle (1972), Omar Schiliro (1962) and Carlos Herrera (1976).

Barrão, born in Rio, is self-taught and started his artistic career as part of Seis Manos Group [Six Hands] (1983-1991) with the artists Ricardo Brisbaum and Alexandre Dacosta, with whom he made performances and art in the streets. As we can see, in the origin itself of performance art this positioning of the artist as an outsider is evident, that is, as a
product of their own life experience and not of the traditional system of artistic-academic training which has easel painting and sculpture as its favourite means. During the '90s, Barrão devoted himself to cinema and took part in the collective Chelpa Ferro, which he co-founded in 1995 with Luiz Zerbini and Sergio Mekler.

The sculptural objects made by Barrão are collages assembled with everyday use objects, in general belonging to the *kitsch* category and almost always made of pottery or porcelain. There is a certain lyrical but also Dada search, in the use of low level ornamental objects to make organic assemblages that call our attention due to their rejection to classicism in the sense that they always seem to be inverted or meaningless. In Barrão, the inversion of the high over the low happens not only allegorically but also materially and formally. His objects are kind of whirlpools that remind of certain vegetal formations. In his *Ninfas derramadas* (2009), for example, the classical figures (or neo-classical in this case) seem to be the roots of the blue ornaments placed over them. The inversion of classicism in this case is literal since the rhetorically artistic elements (the nymphs) are placed in an inverted way below the ornamental and functional fetishes, like the jugs and teapots.

The way in which Barrão uses objects from *kitsch* art makes a first difference between the types of Brazilian and Argentine artistic production if we take as examples canonical artists such as the Argentine León Ferrari or Liliana Porter. In fact, whereas Barrão remains within the type of *kitsch* aestheticization which will 10 years later characterize the production of Ricardo Rojas Centre Group in Argentina, Ferrari and Porter embrace a type of art in which the political allegories and the references to pop art abound. This leads us to the second difference which, as I understand, is even more important and has to do with the greater dedication of the Brazilians to the finish of the works. While in Argentina there is a preference for the conceptual dematerialization of the artistic work and for the ready-made, in Brazil there is a greater concern about the finish of the artistic object as such.

In the case of the Brazilians, the works never stop being considered "works of art" but in the case of the Argentines, they seem to manipulate the artistic institution so that they do not have to finish such works. While Liliana Porter and León Ferrari confine themselves to arrange the parts like in a Christmas crib, Barrão challenges gravity and materials in order to create self-sufficient aesthetical objects that do not need the art gallery or the art system to exist as such.

Tiago Carneiro da Cunha could be compared to the Argentine Max Gómez Canle since they both work with post-apocalyptic images (or antediluvian) and use the already mentioned inversion of the low over the high regarding materials, functionalities and themes. Their objects work as visual ironies. Carneiro da Cunha lives in New York. After studying painting with Sérgio Sister and Paulo Pasta in Brazil, he was accepted in the Parsons School.

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of Design of New York in 1994 and then he moved to London, where he obtained an MA at Goldsmiths College in Fine Arts.

His work is more typical of the Anglo-Saxon educational system than of the Brazilian one since during his career a renouncement to the task of the artist as a drawer and painter can be seen to embrace a more conceptual concern, in which the works seem to be intervened to the point of boasting about his lack of finish. In that sense, the comparison with Max Gómez Canle is appropriate since the Argentine inserts elements of the futuristic aesthetics of the video games of his generation (Tetris, for instance) into a pseudo-flamenco 15th century landscape (Joachim Patinir, 1480 - 1524). However, though in Gómez Canle there is a juxtaposition of styles and themes, in Carneiro da Cunha such conceptual strategy goes from the mere juxtaposition to a more elaborate irony. In him, the pieces -in an inversion game of the low over the high- use the elements of pottery and kitsch ornaments (glazed) to indicate the opposite to what they are supposed to refer to. It is as though Tiago Carneiro da Cunha's objects disintegrated in the spectator's viewing process. While Max Gómez Canle works the clichés only to confirm them, in Da Cunha those clichés seem to disintegrate. Thus in Toxic waste beggar (2009) we have a figure in the position of a beggar with a dodecahedral finish, made of polyester resin, generally used for car commercials, for instance, in which such connotation is contradicted by the adopted posture. The same happens in Large mud man (2010) or in Monkey buddha (2009), in which a kind of pottery monster wants to frighten us but seems to disintegrate like an ice cream. Even though conceptually the work of the Brazilian is better accomplished than that of Max Gómez Canle, in the case of the Argentine there is a greater attention to the final product as an artistic object or work of art. Despite being deeply ornamental, his works call for attention as "serious" art. In Da Cunha, instead, sculptures function in that middle ground between the ornament and the work of art. In both cases, the work of art is dismantled in the joke which in the case of the Argentine happens only at one level (theme/style) and in the case of the Brazilian at two levels (theme/style, materiality/function).

Alexandre da Cunha's work (1969) is symptomatic of the modes of circulation not only of the artistic production but also of its creators. I am referring to "migrant" artists. Also based in London, he studied at Royal College of Art between 1998 and 1999 and then obtained an MA at Chelsea College. His work shares with Barroa's that thematisation of the inversion of the low over the high, understood in terms of the use of "everyday" or "disposable" objects for the creation of objects considered as "high art." His work is easily comparable to that of the Argentine Omar Schiliro, a member of the above mentioned Rojas Group.
from Buenos Aires, which emerged during the '90s. The second part of Da Cunha's production, however, can be compared to that of the winner of ArteBa 2013 Petrobras Award, Carlos Herrera from the city of Rosario, where the ready-made is placed into space in a “lyrical” way. Despite this, the differences between one and the other are big.

If in the case of the Argentine Schiliro (and also in that of the Brazilian Barrão) there was an ironic wink to the ideals of beauty as “prettiness”, in Alexandre da Cunha this is not a concern anymore. His work only acquires meaning in the mind of a spectator knowledgeable about the international minimalist art of Sol Lewitt, Donald Judd, Barnett Newman or Carl André. In that sense, this kind of art establishes an informed dialogue between trained interlocutors. Even though this artist seems to say that his main concern is to explore the place of Brazilian art in the world, in fact in his work there is a deep concern about the relationship between the artistic educational system of the First World (Royal College of Art and Chelsea College, just to mention relevant examples) and the opportunities of an “immigrant” artist in the international art system. Thus, in Alexandre da Cunha there is a certain emphasis on the low, representative of the poverty of our continent, understood as “lack of opportunities,” in relation to the high, the “high culture,” which is indicated as such through the indexicality of his gallery in São Paulo and his mode of circulation in the international art fairs. With his work, Da Cunha takes sides and seems to mean that contemporary art is only relevant if it is connected to the aesthetics canonised in New York and London. This, in itself, is neither true nor false but rather irrelevant for the discussion of art, in general. The inversion of the low over the high, in this case, expresses the position of Brazilian art in the world through its minimisation as “peripheral” production.

We can also see a concern about the finish of the works, which always seem to point towards the minimalism of polished surfaces. This sort of obsession for cleanliness (to the point of literally including cleansers) confirms that vocation for denying the “lack of it” which characterises Latin American daily life and, as such, constitutes a reference to its syncretism and hybridity. It is as though Alexandre da Cunha were more concerned about “differentiating himself from the hillock” than about confirming his “Brazilian condition.” It is this emphasis on conceptual cleanliness what differentiates the production of Brazilians trained in London from that of their Argentine colleagues, who seem to embrace, in a militant way, dirt, marginality and hybridity as main themes. These are the cases of Adrián Villar Rojas, Diego Bianchi and, more generally, the production derived from Belleza y Felicidad group [Beauty and Happiness], which had emerged before 2010. This rejection to the “aesthetics of poverty” on the part of some Brazilian artists can be understood as the consequence of the governmental decision to grant scholarships to their artists to study at elite arts academies, eminently conceptuallist, mainly in London. The Argentine artists, instead, did not have access to this kind of education so they ended up making poverty the theme of their work and untidiness they suffer themselves. The context of the country is much more evident in the Argentine’s work than in that of the Brazilian’s, who seem to propose a more international dialogue.

Tonico Lemos Auad (1968) confirms the previously mentioned since, in 1998, he was also granted a scholarship by the Brazilian government to study at Goldsmiths College in London. Lemos Auad is part of the group of artists that arose from the English educational system and gained presence in the emerging local art scene. With Duchampian influences, his work makes use of the ready-made and perishable materials as well in order to change the experience between the spectator, the work and the exhibition context in a moment of “poetic humour.” While such allusions and influences allow the educated circle in the profitable industry of the English artistic education to discuss these works in an “erudite” way, the appeal to humour makes it possible for a less erudite group of collectors to digest this type of conceptual exercise. We see how in this context the reference to Brazil is only reduced to the use of materials like bananas,
for instance. The fact that, in some of his works, Tonico Lemos Auad makes figures with the putrefaction of certain organic objects could be understood as an allegory of the “low” from the periphery over the “high” from the centre. However, this kind of allegory never ends up being properly elaborate.

The kind of concern existing due to the inversion of the low over the high, which we saw in Barrão, Tiago and Alexandre da Cunha, is also present here. However, Tonico adds the dimension of the perishable. His art is positioned as art due to the simple fact that everything in it tends to disappear at some point. For instance, he puts a group of bananas at the initial stages of decomposition and such spots form faces that some days later will disappear. Because of this, the work must be inscribed in a middle ground between performance and the photographic register of such performance. This kind of work characterised the production of the Argentine Víctor Grippo during the late ‘60s, and possibly Lemos Auad had been inspired by the retrospective exhibition of the Argentine which took place in London at the Camden Arts Centre. Thus, we have Clairvoyant (2008), made up by a dozen germinating sweet potatoes hanging from strings; Sleep walkers (2009), which is a pineapple made of embroidered hair, and Seven seas (2007), a series of poster cardboards on a shelf and facing the sun. Even though this kind of art promises to deal with the topos of the history of art of the vanitas, such approach remains there: a mere promise. It is rather the discussion of the means (painting and sculpture) from the ready-made and “the organic” what this artist seems to be truly interested in.

The immediate antecedents of this kind of approach to art as a “humorous” trigger of that inversion of the low over the high can be found in the work of Marcos Chaves. Chaves was born in 1961 in Santa Teresa and studied in Rio de Janeiro, where he lives. The source of value of his art lies in humour as a catalyst for that conceptual allegory of the “periphery” and South American “poverty.” There are neither formal concerns nor references to art as such but rather an appropriation of different visual registers (the advertising one, the touristic kitsch one, the contemporary art of art fairs) with the purpose of, more or less explicit, desacralization of the institution of art.

In an installation presented in 2002 in the 25th São Paulo Art Biennial called Morir de risa [Laughing to death], Chaves puts his face in repeated gigantographies around the room in which he appears “roaring with laughter”, and, by means of a series of headsets available in the room, he allows the spectators to listen to such laughter. Thus, he transforms the space of “sacralising” consecration of art objects into a space without objects in which what is sacralised is the desacralisation itself. This idea is present in Eu só vendo a vista (1998), where the artist plays with the touristic image (commercial and kitsch) of Ipanema, with the Sugar Loaf at the background, which he transforms into a work of art through its re-dimensionalisation and its “conceptual” intervention. He does this including in the image a sign that says “eu só vendo a vista,” which has two interpretations since, on the one hand, it can be read as “I just sell this view” and, on the other hand, “I just sell cash.” This, said in the context of the Brazilian art market, has several implications since during the last 10 years the government has been trying to regulate the

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art market which is used, in part, for money laundering. Another interpretation may have to do with the corruption in the allocation of permits for the construction of buildings in the Rio de Janeiro coast.

In his series *Agueros* (1996-2008), Chaves photographs objects used by the locals from Rio de Janeiro to signal holes to prevent the neighbours from suffering accidents. This again is an allegory for the corruption and inefficiency of the city authorities, who need the public works to be as precarious as possible in order to redo them and thus have more opportunities for business. According to Chaves, “humour can be a concise way to struggle against established power.” This kind of art uses the language of advertising since there is no formal concern. The only difference between advertising and this kind of images is that the aim of advertising is to sell and the aim of these images is to provoke or to “call for reflection.”

The case of the conceptual artist Jac Leirner is one those which appeared earlier and more successfully. Having studied and worked in São Paulo all her life, she was able to draw attention to this kind of art after her participation in the 20th São Paulo Art Biennial. Afterwards, she participated in Venice Art Biennial (1990 and 1997) representing Brazil and in Documenta/Kassel (1992). Her work has influences of minimalism, pop and constructivism, and is oriented towards assembling usual images of those movements with low materials such as shopping bags and cigarette packets. In her work *Pulmón* (1987) she piles up hundreds of open cigarette packets and burns their edges to create a sculpture of the constructivist type. In *Todos los de cien* (1998) she makes squares and figures with notes of 100 reales [Brazilian currency]. In *Nombres* (1999)7 she covered the walls of a museum with the part of shopping bags that show the image of the brand. The counterpart of this installation was *Vacío* (2000), where she did the same but removing the brands. However, the work which I consider more interesting is *Cuatro amarillos* (2010), where she gradually assembles on cotton paper different yellows, reds and blues in combinations which look like “blood” colour in its different ways of putrefaction.

If we want to compare Leiner’s pioneering work with that of the previous exponents of the inversion of the low over the high (which is found in Argentina in galleries such as Belleza y Felicidad and Appetite, for instance), we can see that in the case of Leirner there is certain aestheticizing concern to try to integrate “rubbish” into a stylised construction that looks like art in an actually artistic context. In Buenos Aires, this conflation of “humour” and advertising language collapses as a strategy and goes back to the dematerialised conceptualism of artists such as Oscar Bony (1941) or Marta Minujín (1943). From there it has permeated into the works of Hernán Marina (1969) or Fabio Kacero (1961), just to give two examples.

**Tropical decorativism**
Throughout this journey into Brazilian and Argentine contemporary art, I have decided to leave aside the cases of tropical decorativists such as Beatriz Milhazes, Adriana Varejão and Caetano de Almeida, in whom, almost uniformly, canonical elements from the Brazilian artistic past are articulated (tiles, Aleijadinho, concrete art, Burle Marx, among many others)

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in a festive and ironically ornamentalistic way. Even though this last kind of art seems to respond to the need to identify itself with an idea of a “modernised jungle” of a certain part of Brazilian art, that identity construction complies with rather superficial criteria. I have chosen these two generations of artists since they establish a double dialogue. On the one hand, they have a dialogue with “participacionismo” of Lygia Clark and Helio Oiticica and, on the other hand, they have a dialogue with the canonical art of the First World which they would like to resemble, at least, formally.

However, the question that is worth asking is whether these artists choose a “tropical” version of the First World art by their own choice or to please the collectors’ and sponsoring institutions’ expectations of international penetration. The question I am posing here is whether, at least from the point of view of contemporary art, the cultural identity is being forged in response to what is considered to be the First World’s expectations. I say this because when inverting the low over the high and adapting it formally and aesthetically to the requirements of London and New York, art is being emptied of its “cultural vitality” to resign itself to be a festive, cheerful and troubleless pose.

This makes us wonder whether this way of presenting the South American reality as “acceptable” has to do with the inward and outward need of South American societies to be perceived as “under control.” Who does this kind of art represent? Or, rather, whose social group’s values are being expressed? The art to which I have made reference in this article seems to tell us more about those who consume and want it than about those who produce it. Through the stylised trivialisation of that inversion of the low over the high, a suspension of the social context occurs in order to transform art into a shell where problems are posed but never discussed. The art of Mercosur thus seems to speak more about the uncertainties of elite who looks for international acceptance in a global world than about our societies.

References
Invisible Cities
Between memories and dreams: an invisible Porto Alegre

I will speak about the only possible Porto Alegre: my invisible Porto Alegre! Which, in fact, is many. Just like Calvino (1972), from the magic realism which blossoms from our unconscious, we invent our cities.

I feel a deep joy wandering around, together with Calibán's reader, the streets, the neighbourhoods, the places and the corners of an urban space which is born from memories and dreams... In these places I have also dreamt and created myself.

Porto Alegre from its origins

Founded in 1772 upon the arrival of 60 couples coming from the Azores, it begins to be shaped from a meeting of cultures: the Portuguese and the Spanish, German and Italian immigrants, native remnants from the Missions and African slaves make up the synthesis of the gaúcho people. Almost two centuries younger than Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre is the result of a mosaic of histories of these lineages, which makes gaúchos multifaceted in a unique way, something that they breathe and is revealed in their expressions.

In a place marked by consecutive wars and bloody revolutions, a city was established and also the character of a people who stands out due to its proud and enthusiastic spirit.

Porto Alegre of gaúchos, the eternal farrapo

It is impossible to speak about Porto Alegre without mentioning the Revolução Farroupilha, a historical event that reveals essential features of gaúchos.

Separatist sentiments with regard to the central government, expressed in this revolution, sealed an insoluble ambivalence regarding the brasilidade. The permanently blurred borders with Uruguay and Argentina, as well as the countless cultural similarities

1. “He who loves invents the things he loves...Perhaps you arrived when I was dreaming you.../(...) You do not know how good it is for us /To have dreamt ... and to have lived the dream!” [Free translation].
2. Gentilic used to refer to the inhabitants of Rio Grande do Sul, an area located in the south of Brazil [translator's note].
3. “Rags”, “ragged”; in this context, a member of the war of the Farroupilhas.
4. War of the Farrapos.
5. Feeling of being Brazilian.
that fraternise us so closely, make us feel more *rioplatense* [from the River Plate area] than Brazilian at times. The rural aesthetics joins us. The landscape of the *Pampa*, the figure of the man who rides a horse in those oceanic plains, the music, the *chimarrão,* the winter… This ambivalence also assumes that, during a football match between Brazil and Argentina, the national feeling revives and the borders are drawn again insurmountable like the Great Wall of China. The *gaúcho* identity crisis is updated by the passion with which the date of the *Revolução Farroupilha* is commemorated, a revolution that ironically failed. There is something resilient in the revolutionary spirit that encourages countless horse riders to parade elegantly along the streets of Porto Alegre and all over the southern area on that date. Would they be commemorating the conquest of an identity? Could the revolutions have closed the psychic borders of this people? When waving their *eu não sou,* *gaúchos* create their own psychic existence. We are neither *castelhano* nor Brazilian, we are *gaúchos*!

This warrior, a founding myth, essence of the *gaúcho* profile (very well portrayed in the statue *O laçador,* at the city entrance), dwells inside the *portoalegrense* [Porto Alegre local]. Even if they are refined and globalised, something passionate, opposing, dual and extreme reveals their personality. The ancient antinomies from the struggles between *castelhano* and *lusitano,* *chimango* and *maragato,* *farroupilha* and *caramuru,* federals and republicans, are still present in football, in the everlasting duel between *gremista* and *colorado.* *Gaúchos* do not lack political confrontations either, an intense and politicised people,

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6. In the River Plate: "*mate*" [traditional South American infused drink]
7. "I am not".
8. The way in which Brazilian people call those who speak Spanish. In particular, people from Rio Grande do Sul refer to Uruguay’s and Argentina’s inhabitants like this.
9. The lasso cowboy.
10. Members of opposing groups in the history of Rio Grande do Sul over the 19th and 20th centuries. The *chimangos*, characterised by their white handkerchiefs, defended the instituted government. The *maragatos*, characterised by their red handkerchiefs, opposed it. [Translator’s note].
11. Members of the War of the *Farrapos*, on the one hand, and their antagonists, the soldiers of the Brazilian Empire.
12. Supporters of the football teams Gremio and Internacional (popularly known as Inter), both from Porto Alegre.
a generator of leaderships with a leading role in movements and national revolutions.

**Urban Porto Alegre**

*Olho o mapa da cidade*

*Como quem examinasse a anatomia de um corpo…*

*Sinto uma dor infinita*

*Das ruas de Porto Alegre*

*Onde jamais passarei…*\(^{13}\)

(Quintana, 1976).

Porto Alegre is not a city that unveils itself or that charms visitors at first sight. It is like a woman whose beauty is not revealed immediately. It is not seductive; it is full of curves that impose themselves. It is rather like a woman that reveals herself suddenly and unexpectedly, with a dim beam of light on her hair, displayed in the glow of her look, which embraces and gives balance… Like her, Porto Alegre, with the same subtlety, is not discovered easily.

It reminds of “Tamara, the city of symbols, where the eyes do not see things but figures of things that mean other things…” (Calvino, 1972). Porto Alegre has several symbols and many enigmas. One should surrender to its complexity, wandering around it, breathing it, mapping it with sweetness in the multiple facets that compose its soul…

I would begin this ride at the Historic Centre. Porto Alegre was born at the banks of the “river” Guaíba, belatedly revealed as a lake, but never added as such. We have, as Altair Martins (2013) says “a lake that is called Guaíba River!”

In the centre there is a *Rua da Praia* [Beach Street] which before the subsequent landfills that the Guaíba suffered, it was a beach. Today the river is distant and hidden behind a wall. The historical trauma of the 1941 flooding explains everything. With more than 70,000 evacuees, the city helplessly suffered the transformation of its centre into a dull Venice, of illnesses and ruin.

Like at the intrapsychic level, the wall represents the defensive effort against the trauma violence. From the urban point of view, it is an ostentatious intruder in the landscape, which takes the river to ostracism. The Guai- ba, upon suffering the talionic retaliation of the *portoalegrense*, ceased to take part in the city life and became a landfill of urban rubbish. Traumatic marks and ideological controversies still prevent the rescue of its dialogue with the city.

The harbour pier was vital at other times. Life arrived there, through all the food supply. Beside the pier the Public Market was born, in 1869, a majestic venue from which products were distributed. The market still keeps its prominence in the city life, offering the freshest fish and the most delicious fruit. Everything is found there, from rare refined cookery spices to handicrafts, cafés and some of the oldest restaurants. In every metropolis, it is in the public market that the soul of the city dwells, making past and present have a dialogue. In my invisible Porto Alegre too!

In the centre there are still some venues that cherish the resistance to the marks of history against the force of globalisation, enumerator of cities in the line of shopping centres, avenues and viaducts that overvalue the presence of the car at the expense of the person, the true meaning of urbanity. Aldo Rossi (1966) remembers that “the city is the location of the collective memory of the peoples” and the old has to find its place in the present without being replaced by it.

There, icons of a time of valuing the sculptural beauty in architecture stand out. Some buildings, *Praça XV* chalet, *Carvalho* chemist’s, *Palácio do Piratini*, *Rocco* café, the ancient *Banco da Provincia*, the Art Museum of Rio Grande do Sul and *Dos Correios* venue, show some traces of the eclectic, *art nouveau* and neoclassical styles. Also spread downtown modernist ones are found, exhibiting the rigour of their clean shapes. At night, covered

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\(^{13}\) “I look at the city map/As if I were examining the anatomy of a body…I feel an intense pain/Of the streets of Porto Alegre/Along which I will never pass…” [Free translation].
by a light of warm tones that reminds of 19th century lanterns, Porto Alegre’s great urban canyon imposes itself: the viaduct of Borges de Medeiros Avenue. I take that way whenever I can, with the emotion of feeling swallowed by that huge cosmic throat that shouts that there was a past there, that important things happened there...

Near the pier, Praça da Alfândega, venue of annual book fairs, with its jacaranda trees blossoming during springtime covering the entire place with lilac light.

In the Historical Centre, the cathedral, Praça da Matriz, opposite the majestic grounds of São Pedro Theatre, from 1858, still the venue of the best artistic productions.

After leaving behind the downtown area and following the shore of the Guaíba towards the south, with the river view and the sailboats that cross its waters, the huge green area of Marinha do Brasil Park and the old Usina do Gasômetro, which was transformed into a cultural centre. The former producer of energy today produces art, also essential to life. The invisible Porto Alegre is full of trees. Centenary trees witness the passing of time and the change of shapes, faster and faster steps, the talk of people after work, the laughter of children after school and the hustle of youngsters. All the streets have trees. In one of them, Marquês do Pombal, the confluence of vegetation forms a tunnel, which became natural heritage of the city. Trees that attract birds whose singing is more audible at the weekend when cars and people rest and the city is silent. Flocks of birds form their orchestras and cicadas make a choir on hot Sundays. Ah, my childhood memory evokes the sound of the cicada during siesta time!...

Also on Sundays the pervasive smell of barbecues and the luxurious images of succulent meats that emanate when walking around the city... I could also talk about winter, with its colours and its minuano, our mythic wind form the south. I would also talk about the pleasure feeling its blade cuts on my face...

Under its siege we feel like Ana Terra, from O tempo e o vento (Verissimo, 1949/2004), facing the frost and thinking: “The wind is always blowing when something important happens to me...” I would talk about how the wind is movement, an event, about how it makes us feel alive!

**Porto Alegre of psychoanalysis and dreams ...**

It is possible that the description of Porto Alegre and the soul of its inhabitants has already suggested the reader the endearing vocation of its people to establish a deep bond with psychoanalysis. Our ancestrality, linked to migration, to its melancholy and the dialogue between different origins, gradually shaped a reflective and inquiring character that seems to find in the Freudian invention a good guide to inquire.

It is true that current demands permeate us, with their unique subjective productions, linked to speed, to the fast obsolescence of things and relationships, as well as the somatisations and the act performances. However, I think that such imperatives amalgamate in an essential cultural background that still marks certain differences between human groups. Even under the cover of globalisation, gaúchos have myths, features and stories that make them different from a mineiro, a paulista or a porteño, not only in their healthy aspects but also in their morbid ones.

The way in which psychoanalysis is developed in Porto Alegre is quite representative of the descriptions of its links with Brazil and the River Plate. We nurture from the drive and depth of the Uruguayan and Argentine schools, important centres of psychoanalysis where many professionals from Porto Alegre were trained but we also keep a fruitful dialogue with the Brazilian societies such as those from Brasilia, São Paulo and Rio, born from other matrixes that helped us to breathe the plurality. There is a strong psychoanalytic movement, with two I.P.A. societies in Porto

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15. Inhabitant of São Paulo.  
Alegre, besides Sociedade de Pelotas, 250 kilometres to the south, and many non-affiliated groups and schools, thinking and disseminating that discipline.

I would define being a psychoanalyst in my hometown as a comfortable experience despite the impossible condition of the act of psychoanalysing. The comfort comes from the chance of sharing certain remote existence codes, which offer a natural accuracy, almost automatic, for listening. One can be a good psychoanalyst in any latitude; however, being one in an adopted culture, something which I have intensely experienced for many years, requires an additional effort to capture and translate the subtle polysemy of words, gestures and even silences...

My initial experiences were not here, but to discover myself as a psychoanalyst in the city that dreamt about me and hosted my dreams and my games during the dawn of life, was something that put my pieces together and gave meaning to them...

**Porto Alegre from childhood**

The city experience leaves invisible marks on us, immersed in a sea of sensoriality, during those periods of blurred borders between dream and reality, inside and outside...

The first memory outside home protection, feeling the impact of urban aesthetics on the skin, with its hustle, smells and the heat of people, had the shape of a tram ride ... Yes! At that time there were trams and one of them went past my house. The tram was made of solid wood and the fun was to lift and pull down those seats, making a loud noise. That memory comes in white colour, like the dress I used to wear, or perhaps like faded scenes, faded by the passing of time... But what has not lost its colour was the memory of almost utter happiness of being there, feeling pretty in my white dress and in the most emblematic company of all: my father’s, the one who took me to know the world! And the city was a vast world, full of question marks...
Porto Alegre of many cities

Between memories and dreams: an invisible Porto Alegre

An interesting aspect about cities is that, like space translations of civilisation, they inherit humanity’s dilemma: human beings cannot live without civilisation, but cannot be happy in it either. The urban space, as an enlarged replica of our humanity, is created by us and, in a dialectic movement, also creates us. Inevitable setting to express the discomfort inherent to the human condition (Freud, 1930). Architect Aldo Rossi (1966) says that “architecture began with the first sketches of cities, thus being inseparable from the construction of civilisation and a permanent, universal and necessary fact.”

Human beings built cities in a collective movement in search for protection against the abandonment of loneliness and nature’s inclemency. But would the motivation to transcend not be even stronger? On the other hand, urban theatres also exhibit the fear of this migration to the other, implied in the transcending act.

Valdrada, Calvino’s city (1972), expresses this narcissistic defense, so emblematic in our times. It is a city divided in two, in which one is the reflection of the other and things are not so valuable for what they are but “for their clear and cold images on the mirror. They live one for the other, looking at each other’s eyes constantly, but without loving each other.” This is the constant movement of human beings that cities put on stage: an approach followed by mirroring and distance.

In the heroic and erotic act of constructing urban space, with its architecture, aesthetics, intellectual and scientific production, the individual shows their appetite for the other. The inevitable of the narcissism of the little differences, of violence, of exclusions, of fear, also imposes itself... This movement of opposites, so inherent to human condition, is breathed in any city; beauty next to the rubbish, order and chaos, joy and pain, colours and shades, brightness and opacity, meetings and loneliness. “The same city that joins us is the one that separates us...” (Francisco, Friedel & Miñarro, 2011).

There are many Porto Alegre dwelling in my invisible city imaginary ... these perceptions of the city during childhood gradually create a kind of oceanic feeling that bonds us emotionally to an urban space, lifting it to the category of place with which we share the intimacy of joint construction: forming our psyche and our ego at the same time. In the love for the city and in the feeling of belonging, an extension of the love for our own ego always persists. Our invisible cities are creations of our dreams, which also dream and create us...

References


Classic & Modern
Ignacio Matte-Blanco: questions and challenges

I had the opportunity to listen to Matte-Blanco in a far-off 1989, at the IPA Congress in Rome where, past his eighties, he presented a panel on his ideas. With a slightly broken voice, simultaneously calm and enthusiastic, he remarked that he had rewritten his speech twenty-seven times! On his way out, Reggy Serebrany asked me:

“Jorge, did that remind you of someone?”

I answered: “Of Borges” and she smilingly agreed: “so did I”. We were witnesses, I could say today, to a Borges who until his final days continued to examine, fascinatedly, the intricacies of that ultimate Aleph, the human psyche, as the astronomer in Jan Vermeer’s painting, “The astronomer”, who strived to observe the confines of the Universe.

It has been rightly stated, in my opinion, that Matte-Blanco is the most original psychoanalytic thinker from Latin America: British psychoanalyst Eric Rayner said Matte introduced him to ideas he would never have thought of in a thousand years. Parthenope Bion, on the other hand, stated in 1995, at the San Francisco IPA Congress, that her father in his last months told her that studying Matte-Blanco was the best way to approach his own work. Perhaps because of the complexity of Matte’s contributions—putting forth an arid study at the service of psychoanalysis, the symbolic logic that emerged with Peano, Russell and Frege at the start of the 20th century—he is not a widely known thinker. To grasp his thinking it is necessary in the first place to dispel the misunderstandings that surround the term “logic.”

Well over a century ago an eminent forerunner of the symbolic logics, Charles Peirce, compiled over two hundred different definitions of logic, demonstrating clearly that logic is not univocal and rigid as it is usually regarded. Peirce distinguished unambiguously logica docens, that intends to be completely formalized and to operate on its own based on the rules of deduction, presumes to be fully directly applicable to facts and events, and logica utens, a conceptual instrument that can be revised at any time and is apt for heuristic purposes, this is, exploratory ones. We tend to make use of logic in our aspiration of pure formality, as in Structuralism and in Lacan’s sustained efforts to attain mathemes. This is not Matte’s intent: although he unfolds his thinking through symbolic logic, giving his writing a neat logistic bent, he does not vacillate in modifying and correcting his logical attempts in face of the difficulties presented by clinical material, which retains epis-

* Argentine Psychoanalytic Association.
temic primacy. Matte aims for a heuristic use of symbolic logic, that is, its use as an exploratory instrument as he roundly admits in his final book: “logic is in itself passive in the sense that it can take no initiative; it is an instrument” (1988, p. 94). It should also be clarified that Matte does not bring a new theory to psychoanalysis but a new instrument to investigate clinical findings and develop theories.

Let us situate the author and his development. Born in 1908 in Santiago de Chile, he studied medicine and went to London for his psychiatric and psychoanalytic training at the Maudsley Hospital and the British Psychoanalytical Society, where he was analyzed by Walter Schmiedeberg, supervised by Anna Freud and James Strachey, and had a seminar with Melanie Klein. He later recognized did not grasp at that time the value of this experience: its impact was a turbulence that took him decades to deal with. Having started the study of symbolic logic in the 30’s on his own, during the II World War he went to New York and contacted the noted mathematician Courant, who influenced his posterior thinking. Returning to Chile he founded the Chilean Psychoanalytic Society and from 1948 on he was for two decades professor of psychiatry at the University of Chile, where among others, he had Klaus Fink and Otto Kernberg as assistants. In 1966 he moved to Italy for good, where he was professor of psychiatry at the Rome Catholic University. His two books, *The unconscious as infinite sets* (1975) and *Thinking, feeling and being* (1988), were published in London in English thus hampering the exposure of his ideas within the Latin American psychoanalytic milieu.

His ideas were only made public in Buenos Aires in 1956, at the first Latin American Psychoanalytic Congress. His paper “Expression of the characteristics of the system Ucs in symbolic logic, or the logic of the system Ucs” was published in the records of that Congress and later translated into English for the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* in 1958.

Initiating with the idea that a good parcel of the richness of our clinical material escapes us since we lack suitable ideational frames to grasp them, his paper elucidated in terms of symbolic logic the core of the Freudian distinction between secondary and primary processes, established by Freud in 1900 in *The interpretation of dreams* and later in 1915 in *The unconscious*. He stated that the characteristics of the system Ucs, that is, the absence of contradiction between the different impulses, and accordingly the absence of negation, the displacement, condensation, the a-temporality and the substitution of external reality by psychic reality, differed clearly from the characteristics of the secondary processes that center upon bivalent logics, the principle of contradiction, which he calls asymmetric logics: the
Aristotelian logic, the scientific or symbolic logics. The bivalent logics, he holds, allows the conceptualization of succession, of time, of space, the distinction between the whole and its parts, and also, the distinction between self and object.

Making use of the "logic of the attribute", described by von Domarus after his contact with schizophrenic thought, in which the part is equivalent to the whole, Matte-Blanco avowed that the characteristics of the unconscious system presented by Freud derived from the joint operation of two principles: 1) the principle of generalization, according to which unconscious logic does not take into account individuals as such, only as members of classes, of sub-classes, of classes, and so on, treating the different members of such classes as if they were symmetrical; 2) the principle of symmetry, according to which the Unconscious can treat the reverse of any relation as identical to it, that is, it can treat any relation as if it were symmetrical. In asymmetrical or bivalent logics if "John is Peter's father", then "Peter is John's son", the relation is not reversible; at the level of the symmetrical logics that characterizes the system Unconscious it is viable to treat the relation as reversible, Peter may become John's father, as John may become Peter's father. Matte names these modes of symmetrical logic as the indivisible mode, since there is no possibility, at this level of relations, of succession and therefore of space or time.

The psychical processes studied by Freud between 1900 and 1915, implicates for Matte-Blanco the joint operation of a double logic, that he calls bi-logic. The unconscious system is dominated by primary process thinking that operates according to symmetrical logic, while consciousness has access in good measure, to secondary process thinking, operating in line with asymmetrical logic. In the initial indication of psychoanalysis, the classical neuroses, in which secondary process thinking is more firmly established, the use of the couch and the exercise of free association by the patient, and the use of free-floating attention by the analyst, intended to turn manifest the primary processes, through the analyst's intuition and through the tentative response to the patient in the form of interpretations.

Putting it in terms that may be excessively generic, the concept presented in his first book, “The unconscious as infinite sets” (1975) deals mainly with the conceptualizations of the unconscious developed by Freud until the metapsychology of 1915, that is, the so called first topic. While in the initial stages of psychoanalysis the concept of the unconscious was built on the idea of repression and the unconscious was mainly a repressed unconscious, after the metapsychology of 1915 Freud gave increasingly more importance to an unrepressed unconscious whose access to consciousness was blocked by its inner qualities: in so far as the unconscious functions according to the indivisible mode, conscious thought is unable to grasp it since it can only grasp the divisible, that is, what consists of triads: something, something other, and the relation between them. We are immersed in the indivisible without realizing it, says Matte, and he distinguishes five levels in this mode, from the predominance of the bivalent logics to levels where the indivisible rules. He conceives the indivisible, the enumeration of which would be interminable, as tending to assume the qualities of the infinite, which bears directly, as we shall see, on the qualities of the emotions.

Both modes, indivisible and divisible, are mutually anaclitic in the sense that each would be unintelligible without the other. It is important to consider that in presenting the indivisible mode (symmetrical logics) and the divisible mode (bivalent or asymmetrical logics) Matte is proposing boundary-concepts, ideal types not manifest in “pure” forms, as in many psychoanalytical concepts. This occurs in Winnicott's concept of ‘true self’ for example and, more extensively, with the
concepts of truth and reality. Thus, he affirms, in practice what brings us closer to a perception of the indivisible mode is the symmetrical frenzy, which becomes present in a chaotic manner, in states of confusion.

Matte’s final book, *Thinking, feeling and being* (1988) reformulates his thought around Frege’s concept of propositional functions that define the classes, maintained by the dynamics of the unconscious with the exclusion of the individuals; he also attempts to make an exhaustive analysis of the Kleinian concept of projective identification, which will be discussed briefly. The idea of an unpressed unconscious as the basis of the psyche becomes a conceptual axis that leads him to relocate affects and emotions.

As a starting point Matte takes up Freud’s assertion in relation to affects and emotions present in *The unconscious*, a highly ambiguous assertion, since he states: “It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it, i.e., that it should become known to consciousness. Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned” (1914, p. 177), and he adds subsequently: “but in psychoanalytic practice we are accustomed to speak of unconscious love, hate, anger, etc., and find it impossible to avoid even the strange conjunction of ‘unconscious consciousness of guilt’, or the paradoxical ‘unconscious anxiety’” (p. 177). Faced with this Freudian dichotomy between what is indicated by the theory and the needs of the practice, Matte opts for prioritizing the demands of the practice, concluding that “there is no means of establishing a clear and neat psychological distinction between the emotional and the unconscious” (1988, p. 84): thereby the study of emotions becomes central in his contribution. Matte reminds us that Einstein spoke of emotions as a guide for our thought, and that for Freud the communication between the patient’s and the analyst’s unconscious guides the definition of many aspects of the patient’s unconscious.

Matte’s bi-logic revises and renews the basic Freudian distinction between the thing-presentations (*Dingvorstellungen*) that occupy the unconscious, and the concept that Freud counterpoises to it all along his work, the word-presentations (*Wortvorstellungen*) that enable access to consciousness. He insists once and again that meaning resides primarily in the unconscious thing-presentations, an issue that nowadays in the urge of giving priority to language, many analysts forget or put aside.

The centrality of emotion as the pillar of the human psyche and thinking, as stated in “emotion is the mother of thinking” (1975, p. 303), leads me to examine some aspects of Matte’s conceptions on affect. I take up his example of a young man in love that attributes to his beloved all the attractions of a Woman: intelligence, goodness, tenderness, and so on, which involves a symmetry that attributes to a given individual all the qualities of the class, qualities experienced in the maximum degree as being infinite. But, if the symmetry does not sweep him completely, he will be able at the same time to realize that his loved one has limitations and defects, which implies an asymmetrical logic (1988, p. 62). But the experience of being infinite provokes fascination and fear and the emotion will be similar to experiences of catastrophe (1988, p. 140). He further underlines that emotions tend to be hazy, and that efforts to describe them verbally are unavoidably imprecise.

If the basic Freudian pair, unconscious thing-presentation/conscious word-presentation, already implies a double logic of psychic processes, this becomes even more explicit in the Freudian notion of identification by infection or imitation, that puts aside the individual qualities of the participants and is based exclusively on a matter of analogy (1921, p. 107). This Freudian idea was later amplified by Helene
Deutsch (1942) as mimetic identification in her classic paper on the ‘as if’ personalities. The idea of a bi-logic can be situated, in a Freudian frame, as the operation of the beginnings of the processes of symbolization and its later development; its assertion can help us understand these processes and elaborate new conceptual bridges. I shall now explore this dimension that in my view plays a major role in the beginnings of symbolization, exemplified by an everyday life observation of a 21 months-old infant.

The setting was the arrival of two grandchildren that lived abroad and whom I had not seen for the last eight months. At the airport the eldest child, aged four, saw me from afar and came to me running, shouting “Abu, Abu” (for Abuelo, grandfather): we embraced profusely, I threw him up in the air, we embraced once and again. In the meantime I realized that sitting in his stroller led by his mother the younger boy whom I will call Tim, had arrived and looked at me, perplexed. It was obvious that on the one hand he saw me as a stranger, and on the other hand he felt that the affectionate expansions his much admired older brother had sought and enjoyed also belonged to him. Perceiving the extremes of his affective dilemma, that is, that he would feel excluded and ignored if I did not respond adequately, and that he could easily feel an affective disclosure of mine as an intrusion, I embraced and kissed him tenderly with some care, and he responded embracing me tenderly though with some reticence. Later in the day, already at home, he brought and placed briefly in my hands, his most precious possessions: his two woven blankets, his two pacifiers, and his water bottle– as evidence that he had “adopted” me affectionately, this is, that his link to me had managed to traverse the initial paradox.

The reader will probably agree that perplexity is a sophisticated psychic state, inasmuch as it involves tolerance for contact with paradoxical feelings. We can see that thinking derives from affective-instinctual impulses that lead to an emotional thinking, since the earliest stages in life. I shall emphasize that the narrated scene, though intensely significant, did not include verbal expressions on his or my side, corresponding, therefore, to the level of the Freudian thing-presentation. The signification comes from the enactment level, that is, the level of emotional pragmatism that precedes semantics, as Freud sustained in his statement: “in the beginning was the Act”. It was in that pragmatic level that I had to tend to my attitude when I was faced with the two aspects of the affective dilemma: each one of them could lead Tim to a traumatic “emotional frenzy” and consequently affect his link to me.

In order to expand the comprehension of this account, I will begin with Matte’s assertion that “thinking can deal only with that which is divisible, formed of triads: something, something else, and the relation between them” (1988, p. 142). For the observation we are dealing with, it is necessary to expand this to a phenomenal level as: someone, someone else, a third party and their relation, respectively denoting, Tim, his older brother, and a third party represented by me. Within the scope of the ongoing affective thought, which is my interest, the description becomes more complex since the affective dilemma that lead Tim into perplexity involves two counterpoised dynamics.

In my understanding, the description of the constitution of Tim’s perplexity would be termed as follows: on the one hand “someone (Tim), someone else (Abu), and the relation of ‘strangeness’”; on the other hand “someone (Tim), someone else (the older brother) and the relation of loving familiarity (of the older brother) with that someone (Abu) who, up to then, was felt as a ‘stranger’”. What I mean to say is that the experienced context of the enacted emotional dilemma that led him
into danger (and also led me) was given by Tim's mimetic identification with his older brother; that may be explained in terms of a psychic level in which for Tim, his older brother and himself are one and the same, and this symmetry leads to the idea of identicalness in his psychic reality. To sustain that in Tim's psychic reality his adored older brother, is at the same time himself, puts into play a psychic identicalness similar to that attributed by Freud to the baby and the breast: in the beginning the baby is the breast, and only later he possesses it as something different from himself. “The breast is a part of me, I am the breast”. And later: “I only have it”; to have it means, “I am not the breast” (Freud, 1941, p. 299).

Would Matte-Blanco agree to this conceptual development, in which mimetic identification takes place in dynamics where the concept of projective identification, in Kleinian terms, would rule? I think so, since although it is evident that he admires Klein's developments, he questions the unusual amplification that this concept has taken, in detriment of considering an unconscious psychic level where the homogeneous mode rules, where self and object are not discriminated. The notion of identicalness that I bring forward is present in Matte-Blanco, although he mentions it briefly.

As I understand it, the notion of mimetic identicalness carries the homogeneous mode is a decisive concept that reaches far beyond simple imitation into the early stages, perhaps in the beginning, the origins of emotional thought that as shown in our example, is in itself contextual, in the sense of including as its motive, often centrally, the experiences of others, in this case those of his older brother toward his Abu. These evolutions carry, as we had the chance to observe, a strong emotional impression, and if all goes well they will allow the resolution of the inevitable paradoxes that are presented to us, as it was successfully solved for Tim in our encounter: this success is evidenced by his “gift”, that demonstrates another dimension of the practical situation, the assumption of the emotional reciprocity, in conformity with a genuine otherness. This dynamic of identification is a step in the process of working-through in the direction of discrimination, leading to the ultimate step which is genuine introjective identification, where object and self are discriminated.

It goes without saying that traumatic conditions as well as deprivations may obstruct the working through dimension, leading to the stereotypical of the mimetic dynamics, as in the “as if” personalities, in mimetic infantile autism (Busch de Ahumada and Ahumada 2005) and more extensively in the autistically inclined present day patients, who seem to be increasingly replacing the socio-cultural classic neuroses as the dominant psychopathology. (Ahumada 2014).

After thirty years of reading Matte-Blanco’s work-- what could I say about its impact on my psychoanalytic work? This is a relevant question since the ability to contribute to clinical work and to the genesis of new concepts would in the last analysis, indicate the pertinence of his ideas; but this question is not easy to answer. I believe that his ideas contribute to make the analyst's attitude and interventions more flexible. I have discussed an example of this, with a small twist, in 1991: for the patient, the analyst is/is not the archaic object that shapes the pragmatic paradox, and as Strachey magisterially noted, the patient's fragile ego exposes him to be overwhelmed in one way or another by the emotions in play, leading him to experience the analyst more and more as his archaic object. This obstructs the possibility of genuine introjections in the analytic experience since, he clarifies, introjections can only be useful when they are specific, gradual, and linked to reality. Reality, as I mentioned, that is a boundary-concept never completely attained,
that requires the emergence of a new kind of logic for its differentiation. As Mark Twain cunningly expressed: reality is more mysterious than fiction. Thinking, Matte emphasizes, can only reach the divisible: given that reality does not depend on our efforts to grasp it, neither the patient nor we can be fully assured of our interpretative conjectures. Thus the analyst must place himself in a position that allows a flexible grasp of these two different levels, that belong to different kinds of logic: to be aware of the omnipresence of these two levels will help him maintain the serenity that the analytic neutrality requires.

Matte-Blanco’s work opens up a myriad of questions, and it is up to us to respond to the challenge. As I have mentioned, references in Spanish to his work are scant. The English reader is better off: without the intention of being exhaustive, besides Matte-Blanco’s books, some of his papers are available in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis in the late 80s, including his responses to papers by Klaus Fink and Ross Skelton, should be mentioned. A volume published by the Journal of Melanie Klein and Object Relations in 1997 under the editorship of Alejandro Reyes, should also be mentioned. The introductions to his work by Rayner and Tuckett (1988) and Rayner (1995) should allow the reader an easier access than Matte-Blanco’s admittedly difficult books.

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1. This final paragraph has been modified in order to include some relevant references in English.
Moscow, 1971. We were part of a delegation of psychoanalysts (on our way to I.P.A. Congress in Vienna) and Latin American psychiatrists. Organised by colleagues that had studied in the Soviet Union, this delegation’s evident objective was to exchange experiences and learn about Russian psychiatry, and a latent one to catechise in the Communist Party the leaders of the Argentine Federation of Psychiatry (F.A.P. for its acronym in Spanish) who were there. Emilio, who was president of the Federation’s Buenos Aires regional office— who had already been president of A.P.A.—, Mimi Langer who was (or was going to be) F.A.P. president at national level, Tato Pavlovsky, Armando Bauleo, Fernando Ulloa, the García Reinoso and, later on, one by one, all the delegation members started to arrive fascinated by the contact with two Afro-Hispanics whom we had met at the Rossiva Hotel, where we were staying. As Marcelo Viñar offered them mates [traditional South American infused drink], we were talking and differences started to arise between our new friends from Spanish Equatorial Guinea (a country recently—and temporarily—converting to communism): one of them was a monogamist and the other one a polygamist.

Emilio was fascinated with the discussion (as we all were!). He, who already at that time had the idea to “reformulate monogamy” and that later during one of his marriages declared himself to be a supporter of “free love”, confirmed by experiencing it himself, once more, the importance of sociocultural determinations. The questions made by Emilio to our friends while they were accusing each other of treating women as objects (to the polygamist) or assuming the coloniser’s habits (to the monogamist) were about jealousy, about conflicts in that family size, about hidden hunger, etcetera. Emilio, as he said many times, was a psychoanalyst 24 hours a day. When, in that same trip, the social-catechist colleagues took us to

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* Buenos Aires Psychoanalytic Association.
admire the beauty of a socialist kindergarten, in his dubious manner, with false admiration, he said “How careful they are with toys!” An ironic way of denouncing the repression of aggressiveness at the most intimate levels of a totalitarian state. It is likely that thanks to the experience during that trip Emilio “had only been able to be a communist for 3 hours”, as he once asserted.

Jorge Luis Borges used to say in his hesitant manner that the Spaniards talked as if they did not have any doubts, that their speech was made of certainties. Emilio's communicational style was Borges-like, anti-Iberian.

Arnaldo Rascovsky was Emilio's first analyst. The decision to travel to London came about after the fight between them during that first saddened analysis. At that time, no candidate that interrupted their analysis could be analysed by another didactic professional. Thus, Emilio set off to London, was analysed by Paula Heimann and worked with Bion, Klein and other British analysts.

Upon his return to Argentina, he left again. This time to Austen Riggs. An experience that he summarised in a wonderful book: *Biografía de una comunidad terapéutica* (Rodrigué, 1965). Deleuze talks about escaping as a way to reinvent the horizon. Emilio constantly needed to reinvent his horizon.

During that “escape” he joined Plataforma group, which had been organised by a lot of young people from A.P.A. following the rebellious guidelines expressed at the 1969 I.P.A. Congress in Rome.

Emilio lived intensely all his “heteronyms”: the “good kid” who looked at the world out of the window in a car with chauffeur, the psychoanalyst, the unbiased scientist, the best seller writer (*Heroina* [Rodrigué, 1969]), the corporation man (A.P.A. president and I.P.A. vice-president), the man that breaks up with the corporation, the psychoanalytic revolution, habit revolution and, finally, social revolution joiner. He wanted to widen-revolutionise psychoanalysis from his experience in Austen Riggs, submerge himself in the revolution that was taking place in California in the 60’s and 70’s and, lastly, join hopes for political and social changes that were being experienced in Latin America during the same years. All that alternated, happened and coexisted within an Emilio that was in constant pursuit of new geographic, theoretical and literary horizons where he could dream.

Emilio dared to take risks by being different.

Perhaps out of his total production, his first work read by me, his *Biografía de una comunidad terapéutica* (Rodrigué, 1965), and his last work, *Sigmund Freud. El siglo del psicoanálisis* (Rodrigué, 1996) were the ones that I enjoyed the most. A remark in the French newspaper *Libération* (Maggiorí, 2000) about the French translation of this last work acknowledges that, out of the other great biographies of Freud, Jones’s one (1970) was written by somebody that was not a writer, and Gay’s one (1988/2010) by someone that was not a psychoanalyst. I believe that this work, written by a great psychoanalyst and writer, was his greatest legacy.

References
Desiring duty by Rodrigué

“Forgetting is as important as remembering to understand how knowledge is acquired”, asserts Emilio Rodrigué (1965a) in his essay “Relación entre descubrimiento e identificación proyectiva”. It was through that essay and the book in which it is included that I first came into contact with Emilio Rodrigué. I was introduced to his writings by my mother, Regina Schnaiderman, and I know that Isaías Melsohn admired him.¹ Passion for Susanne Langer was the link between them.

Sensing the world from its other side and, in this way, opening multiple possibilities for us to deal with the mystery that constitutes us. Experimenting, being bold. There was an integrity in Rodrigué that was based on his deep knowledge of Freud, of the Kleinian followers, of Susanne Langer. In his search, he came across Reich and, at the end of his life, he plunged himself into the study of Lacan.

Rodrigué always had a strong theoretical background. He was trained in the times when Melanie Klein predominated and, in fact, she referred her granddaughter to him as his patient, volunteering herself to supervise that treatment. From that very first moment he showed interest in working with groups.

It was while writing his text for the volume Nuevas direcciones en psicoanálisis, “Análisis de un esquizofrénico de tres años con mutismo” (Rodrigué, 1965b) that he comes across the philosopher Susanne Langer while he was reading Marion Milner (1965)’s essay about “El papel de la ilusión en la formación de símbolos”.

He goes to the United States trying to meet Susanne Langer. Once there and working with Erickson and Rappaport, Emilio goes every Thursday to Langer’s place, in the middle of an isolated forest, and spends the day with her. The immersion in Langer’s work transforms his relation with psychoanalysis.

Upon his return, he gets separated from his first wife and starts living with Noune, with whom he writes El contexto del proceso analítico (Rodrigué & T. de Rodrigué, 1965). Noune died prematurely and Emilio married a few more times.

In 1969, as president of A.P.A., he was elected vice-president of I.P.A. I.P.A. was

¹ That admiration, which was reciprocal, was beautifully documented in Percurso magazine, under the Debates section, where the meeting between Isaías and Emilio is transcribed, which took place during the “Aesthetic event in the psychoanalytic clinic”, sponsored by the Department of Psychoanalysis of Sedes Sapientiae (Melsohn & Rodrigué, 1996).
holding its 26th Congress. A group of young psychoanalysts called Plataforma Internacional organised then a counter-congress that had a great impact in Argentina and gave birth to Plataforma Group, founded by 11 psychoanalysts. Throughout 1970 the entire group insists on carrying out a theoretical review of psychoanalysis and its practice. The political and social context must be part of what makes us psychoanalysts. A great part of that group had to go into exile afterwards and a lot of its members went to Brazil. Many of us are the Plataforma Group's offspring.

Emilio Rodrigué arrives in Salvador for the first time invited to take part in an event about candomblé. His gateway to Brazil was religiosity. He was still married to Martha Berlin. Together they went to Ysalén, an alternative practice marquee. Rodrigué was curious and interested in what was happening in the world. He lived radical experiences and always returned to psychoanalysis.

I still remember when I went to meet Emilio on Itapoá beach. Holding his whisky glass, we walked extensively on the sand and talked a lot. He loved skiing in his youth. While I interviewed him (Chnaiderman, 1995), he asserted: "Skiing and the sea are alike. It is the mountain but gaining many other aspects…They are other mountains…sand and waves".

That is how his beautiful biography of Freud (Rodrigué, 1995) was born, in which all the sexuality and virility was revived. Only someone with such an open-mindedness for the new was able to produce that work. Five years were devoted to that project, for which Salvador was crucial. It was also crucial his relationship with Graça, a beautiful woman linked to mãe Estela.2

Emilio tells us that we have to, throughout life, know where what he referred to as “desiring duty” takes us. In his pursuit of life and freedom, Emilio taught us all about that. Thank you, dear Emilio.

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2. Priestess of Afro-Brazilian religions: umbanda, candomblé and quimbanda.
Unquestionably Emilio’s career is an incentive to think and question the different training models in the field of psychoanalysis. That career intertwines with the history of 20th century psychoanalysis, when he played, among others, a key role.

During many years, mainly in the ’60s, Emilio was a leading figure who stood out within the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association (A.P.A.) so much that he became its president in 1966. Later he was also elected president of the Argentine Federation of Psychiatry (F.A.P. for its acronym in Spanish), which was an unprecedented action until then: the fact that an internationally known psychoanalyst started to manage that institution, which had already been a bastion of conservative psychiatry and was beginning to take on questioning stances, thus drawing groups of psychoanalysts who identified themselves politically with cutting-edge ideas.

Emilio himself, reflecting on that period as an activist, tells us: “There I learnt another kind of political game, one that is closer to reality, in this case referring to mental health and repressive violence. It was there that I knew fear, which would accompany me like a shadow during the following decade.”

It was during E.R.’s management that the Teaching and Research Centre (C.D.I. for its acronym in Spanish) was created, which opened new ways and paths of training for those who wished to become psychoanalysts. It represented an opening and a gain in freedom since it made it possible that personal analysis, inherent and necessary for a psychoanalyst’s training, could be done by choosing their analyst freely.

In 1971, Rodrigué resigns from the A.P.A. taking the decision together with the group Plataforma and seriously questions the institution, specially its training model.

During the ’70s Emilio turned 50 years old and had to face a series of political and personal circumstances which led him to leave the country and travel to Brazil. Of his existence with several insertions in that country, what I will highlight is his experience as a writer of Freud’s biography, something which he himself emphasises in the prologue: “After writing the history I am not the same person.”

One of the peculiarities that many authors highlight in this biography of Freud is the fact that it was written by a psychoanalyst. Someone who sees the human side of the other, their frailties, and who also capitalises on their creative richness. Someone who sees himself in the other and makes use of the other’s history in order to understand and relativise his own history.
However, obviously it is not a work that does not acknowledge the importance of its predecessors. Emilio emphasises precisely the historical role of the biography of Freud written by Ernest Jones (1953-1957/1970), published for the first time when he himself was living in London. Besides, he adds that that event would have been the trigger for what was called “the return to Freud”, which was during the ’60s Lacan’s main motto.

At the symposium A Century of Psychoanalysis, which took place in Salvador on October 12th 1995, where his book was launched, Élisabeth Roudinesco (1995) gave the opening conference and posed important questions.

Here in Latin America, the French psychoanalyst highlighted, we witness an expansion of Freudianism and a revival of the passion for psychoanalysis. Something that contrasts with the situation in Europe and, especially, in France, where the disease of that first Freudian century is depression. That depression noticeable everywhere affects psychoanalysis and its institutions.

It was because of Jones that he started to develop the history of the variations and interpretations about Freud’s life, later going through its several reviewers.

As Roudinesco (1995) asserts “he wrote less of a new life of Freud than the history of the history of the different ways of telling Freud’s life.”

Being he himself one of those historians, the book would not be complete if the author did not deal with himself. That happens in an indirect and subtle way but many of its readers understood it correctly. And it is again Roudinesco (1995) who explains it: “That book was for him a kind of disguised autobiography because we know that every historical research supposes an autobiography. Because when telling the history of others, the historian tells about himself through the other, through what he tells about the others.”

Finally, reading again the several books and countless pieces of writing that Rodrigué has left us, it is clear that he wrote, from different angles and in varied ways, a sequence of multiple autobiographies. A set in which the reader finds and recognises the dense and rich path that was his life.

References
An archer with many arrows

Born on January 8th 1923, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and deceased on February 21st 2008, in Bahia, Brazil, Emilio Rodrigué has left a great legacy with his work. How he lived his life, the movements in which he participated and the ones he led as well as his pieces of writing are also part of his legacy.

Endowed with a unique critical capacity and intelligence, he sustained agreements and divergences with his teachers from the beginning and he successfully moved within the institutional pathways, officially established. He finished his training in London and became president of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association (A.P.A.) and vice-president of the powerful International Psychoanalytical Association (I.P.A.). The Argentine Federation of Psychiatry (F.A.P. for its acronym in Spanish) also experienced the effects of his “chair”.

At the beginning of the ’70s he led Plataforma with Marie Langer and others. Criticism and proposals of this movement provoked divisions and gave rise to the emergence of new territories for training, outside the I.P.A. That brought about important consequences for psychoanalysis not only in Argentina and Brazil, but also in many other Latin American and European countries since during that time the Argentine dictatorship turned extremely violent with its opponents, thus provoking a great exodus within the Argentine psychoanalytic environment, which spread the proposals of this movement. Rodrigué decided to live in Salvador and received the training of the great analysts that started the Lacanian movement in Bahia.

He published several articles and 17 books. Some of them with well-known co-authors such as León Grinberg, Marie Langer, Geneviève T. de Rodrigué, Martha Berlin, Norma Ferro and Syra Tain Lopes. In general, his works were published in Spanish and Portuguese, but many of them were also published or are written just in French or English. They bear the mark of a unique path in the vanguard of the history of psychoanalysis. About his life Urania Tourinho Peres (2004) wrote Emilio Rodrigué, caçador de labirintos, an essential reference for those who want to know him and his work.

After he finished his training in London, still during his institutionalised period, he questioned the long-lasting English colonisation of Argentine psychoanalysis. He also highlighted its creativity and originality delving into practices and concepts developed by Argentine analysts. He himself wrote some classics of this vanguard: Psicoterapia del grupo (Grinberg, Langer & Rodrigué, 1955a), El grupo terapéutico (Grinberg, Langer & Rodrigué, 1955b), El contexto del proceso analítico (Rodrigué & T. de Rodrigué, 1965), Biografía de una comunidad terapéutica (Rodrigué, 1965) - a tale about part of his experience in the United States during the period when he was Susanne Langer’s disciple - and O paciente das 50.000 horas (Rodrigué, 1977).

He also wrote short stories in Plenipotencia (Rodrigué, 1966), Heroína

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An archer with many arrows – a best seller in Argentina which inspired the film (De la Torre, 1972) – and El anti-yo: nueva propuesta amorosa (Berlin & Rodríguez, 1977), A lição de Ondina (Rodríguez, 1983), Ondina Supertramp (Rodríguez, 1987), Gigante pela própria natureza (Rodríguez, 1991) and El libro de las separaciones (Rodríguez, 2000), which are autobiographic reflections.

Um sonho de final de análise (Lopes & Rodríguez, 1986), with interesting articulations about transference, the end of analysis and supervision, and O último laboratório (Ferro & Rodríguez, 1985), which are tales about different core ideas of his clinical work.

Two issues mobilised the author for a long time during his experience: the devitalisation of psychoanalysis and whether there would be an end of the analyst or not, through whom all transference could pass, coming to an end.

All these works account for a bold, passionate and thrilling reflection. All in all, maybe his greatest boldness was to write a new biography of Freud (Rodríguez, 1995). As if this were not enough, he begins the prologue to this book with a nagó1 tale. His life experience and his thinking skills allowed him to hold a panoramic view of psychoanalysis, which began in Brazil, but went through Argentina, England, the United States, France, Austria and other places, researching into relevant literature produced in these corners of the world. Sigmund Freud. O século da psicanálise (Rodríguez, 1995), was published in Brazil by the publishing houses Escuta in 1995, in Buenos Aires by Sudamericana in 1996 and by Payot & Rivales in 2000, with a new edition in 2007. With a playful and fun spirit, Rodríguez has left us a demystified and loved Freud.

La respuesta de Heráclito (Rodríguez, 2006), published in Buenos Aires, and Penélope (Rodríguez, 2007), in Paris were his last works.

References

1. N.T.: Name given to black slaves, sold in the former Slave Coast, who spoke yoruba.
Emilio Rodrigué made valuable clinical and training interventions in different places where he was invited. He created bonds around him, he gathered psychoanalysts from all trends, he established bridges between the different Latin American cultures. “From there comes his place as a Socratic master of psychoanalysis, unique at this turn of the 20th century,” Plon and Roudinesco said (1998, p. 9).

His presence among us, in 1996, talking with Isaías Melsohn at a round table about the aesthetical event in the psychoanalytic clinic (Melsohn & Rodrigué, 1996, pp. 139-152), organised by the Department of Psychoanalysis of the Sedes Sapientiae Institute of São Paulo was memorable. Everyone knew them and there were great expectations. I was delighted to coordinate the table and began by introducing them.

I highlighted the relevant role of Rodrigué, who, together with his colleagues of Plataforma and Documento, produced a historic change in the Argentine psychoanalytic movement that transcended the borders. They were a benchmark in our training project.

Isaías Melsohn had been one of the analysts belonging to the SBPSP that, with Regina Schnaiderman and her group, created in the Sedes the first course in which psychoanalysis was taught outside the official sphere and they were part of a resistance movement against the process of power centralisation and ideological, methodological and clinical confinement established in the institution during the ’60s. Strong pressure was exerted so that they gave up that initiative. Melsohn denounced, in an assembly, the unconstitutionality of these manoeuvres of the institutional power.

The political struggle to end the dictatorship and return to democracy in the country began to take shape in the psychoanalytic field and defined struggle spaces such as the Sedes, where new and transforming initiatives could blossom and grow. As a result of that pressure, some people left the course and the team weakened. It is under these circumstances that several Argentine psychoanalysts arrive in São Paulo, bearing a psychoanalytic and political background that made us allies and “natural” partners in this project. In that meeting, 20 years later, the initial history of the project was present again, alive, sitting quietly next to me, in order to talk about its paths.

Symbolisation difficulties had led these two Latin Americans to study Philosophy with Susanne Langer in the United States. Thanks to this bond, they could, also, thread memories.

Invited to start, Rodrigué, a man full of surprises, tells that some days before he had had a dream that prompted him to re-formulate his intervention. Someone, it could be me, told him: “Emilio, you don’t know anything about Jurassic Park (Kennedy, 1993).” These unusual words produced an impact and were also funny.

Through a tale of great beauty, he referred to his research on Freud, and he postulated that if dreams had been the via regia of access to the unconscious, it was cocaine that electrified the rails.

He considered, then, the experience of unreality and time suspension expe-
rienced by Freud in front of the Acropolis (letter to Romain Rolland of 1936) that makes him exclaim: “Then that Loch Ness Monster, in which we never believed, does exist!” (Freud, 1932-1936/1986).

The states of consciousness induced by cocaine as well as this other strange enjoyment represent for Rodrigué moments when a transgressive dimension comes into play; a dimension which develops a creative transformation. “I believe, and I repeat it, that we must find that impossible creature, that minotaur, which for me implies a kind of relation with the unconscious where my id gives its best. I also say unicorn because it is a willingness of spirit in which it becomes possible to develop the art of being a psychoanalyst. Psychoanalysis, thus, turns into a discipline which allows a serial reflection to become initiatory, since we give a symbolic register to the unknown. There is a martial path in being an analyst (Melsohn & Rodrigué, 1996, p. 142).

Melsohn’s intervention showed the richness given to the understanding of the analytic situation and the affective movements that cross it, by the categories of expressive and denotative symbolic form –created on the basis of the works of E. Cassirer y S. Langer.

I think that in Emilio’s discourse strategy and in the dialogue style that he promotes -even from the tale of the dream where he is deprived of any knowledge about fantastic objects about which he wants to reflect- one can make out another reason, and not the least important, to consider him as a Socratic master. Just there, live, for all of us the exchange between Emilio and Isaias becomes a unique experience, an individual and collective one at the same time, full of intelligence and friendliness, an aesthetical and formative event. This also takes us to Regina Schnaiderman (1988), an interlocutor and friend of Isaias’s, when, 20 years before, she wrote: “Teaching psychoanalysis is a psychoanalytic act and a project of unalienation (...) What is taught, in fact, is the methodological model that subordinates all knowledge to an inquiry, a questioning” (p. 13).

Already near the end of the round table, he is asked with reference to his dream if it does not suggest the idea that we could all fossilise in time. His answer is affectionate and humorous, commenting about the richness of the reunion after 30 years: “Then we are two wonderful fossils!” However, he would complete this answer, some time afterwards, asserting in connection to the clinic: “Psychoanalytic practice is not so old. It is still pretty and graceful. It did not need any plastic surgery (...) and the current group of psychoanalysts is less arrogant and more sensitive to human suffering” (Rodrigué, 2005, p. 122).

The question about the past, the present and the future is inherent to the psychoanalytic movement of all times. However, it is worth keeping in mind the consistent criticism and the creativity that it was given by some monsters who dared to get out of the water and open new paths on these Latin American lands.

References
A psychoanalyst has to be subversive

What can I write about Emilio Rodrigué after everything I have already written? I will make an effort to avoid repetition, to avoid a text with a biographical touch and I will seek a testimony about the one who was my analyst, became a great friend and, above all, was my fellow in critical speculations and opinions about psychoanalysis. Thus, I begin with the analyst whom I met as a therapist in crisis with psychoanalysis and searching for something new. Certainly, his motto for wisdom was to always look for something new or to do the same in a different way. Maybe it was that unique way of being wise that allowed him not to be intimidated when faced with writing a biography of Freud (Rodrigué, 1996), after the great number already written, without access to the primary sources and even without mastering the German language to eventually do some research. He trusted his creative capacity and plunged into the task convinced that, writing a biography of biographies, he would innovate. In this way, he would show a Freud revisited by his strong sense of humour and he did not care about plagiarism but he minimised it. His book was a success, especially in France, and it became an excellent introduction to psychoanalysis.

Having been president of the A.P.A. and vice-president of the I.P.A., he left psychoanalysis on hold, outraged with the fights for power within the societies, and he set off to discover the “techniques for the development of human potential.” It was like this that I met him, or rather, that he arrived in Bahia. His arrival was marked by candomblé since he had been invited to take part in a party in the Terreiro Axé Opô Afonjá. He came with Martha Berlin, an expert psychodramatist, and he accepted to meet our group, who craved for a psychoanalytic training. Together with Martha, he was starting a period devoted to therapeutic laboratories.

A six-month employment contract and the other six months travelling, looking for experiences in London, Amsterdam, Spain, the United States (Esalen), in touch with professionals from several countries. In this way he began his love relationship with our city and a strong bond with a group who did not flinch when faced with innovations. The laboratories were unforgettable experiences and I used to visit them; some of them as a patient and some others as a co-therapist. They invariably started on Friday night and finished on Sunday evening, conveying, as he

* Founder of Colégio de Psicanálise of Bahia. Member of École Lacanienne de Psychanalyse (Paris).
1. A place where ceremonies of candomblé take place, one of the most important in Salvador de Bahia.
said, “an ‘oceanic’ climate of strangeness... somewhat messianic.” Those were transforming experiences and Emilio got excited together with the group's excitement. The work dynamics started from psychodramatic techniques or even others – and here I am referring to the influences of gestaltic therapy, bioenergetics, the teachings of Lowen, Boadella and many others. However, it is necessary to make clear that Rodrigué's interventions were always the result of an acute psychoanalytic interpretation, that is to say that the psychoanalyst continued his tour outside the rigidity of the psychoanalytic frame.

He talked little about the psychoanalytic theory and even said that he did not consider himself a holder of "psychoanalytic culture.” He preferred “the creation to the memory,” to have freedom so that ideas and thoughts could emerge far from oppression. That was also the way in which he walked through life in the family, social and love bonds. He pursued freedom of pleasure and, for that reason he liked to reaffirm his transgressive side. He did not deny the fact that oftentimes that stance led him to some cruelty. He was surprised because he aroused passions until the end of his life. Once he asked me: "How is it possible to have aroused passion in a beautiful woman at the age of 80?" Emilio always conveyed a promise that it could be possible to go the extra mile, a great conquest. He had an acute curiosity for everything and everyone. A stunning vanity for considering himself a wise man in life trying to avoid even old age and saying that, at 81 years old, he was living his happiest stage in life. He planned to live beyond 100 years and, when the body announced its tyranny, he was puzzled and asked himself: "Is what I am feeling something serious?" Death came fast and he did not suffer much. But it left great nostalgia of him.

A good psychoanalyst has to be subversive; that is what he asserted and practised and did not refrain from the contact with patients outside the office even being aware of the particularity of the psychoanalytic abstinence. In that sense, he has left great friendships.

I thank the analyst I had; I miss my dear friend and I cannot avoid confessing that our freedom and psychoanalytic rebelliousness was appropriate.

Reference
Logbook

Adriane Vidal Costa

This book analyses the careers of the writers who were part of the Latin American literary boom. Rather than on their novels, the book focuses on the networks of sociability and political commitment which they were involved in, especially during periods of exile and self-exile in Europe. The cultural and political circles were strategic to celebrate works like *One hundred years of solitude*, translated into several languages, with millions of copies sold, and an author, García Márquez, who was Nobel Prize Laureate in Literature in 1982. In the same way, they were also decisive to define those critical of the Cuban socialist regime, such as Vargas Llosa, and close ranks among the most loyal to the Revolution, such as Cortázar and García Márquez. In 2010 –other times– Vargas Llosa was also awarded his Nobel Prize. (Gabriela Pellegrino)

São Paulo: Alameda, 2013

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Latino-americanos à procura de um lugar neste século

Néstor García Canclini

An Argentine sociologist, whose long career in the field of reflection on Latin America was awarded the Book Award of the Latin American Studies Association (for his book *Hybrid Cultures*) in 2002, has worked for some years as Professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. The topic already explicit in the title deals with statistical and historically relevant data which need to be adjusted, as García Canclini explains in the preface. However, the thesis, and mainly, the fundamental questions are still valid. García Canclini wonders about the (im)pertinence or not for someone to be considered a Latin American citizen today and states the paradoxes of thinking the group of countries called Latin America as a unity. Brazil particularly stands out in this intellectual’s reflection. (Laura Janina Hosiasson)


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Freud and the writers

Edmundo Gómez Mango and J.-B. Pontalis

Two analysts who are passionate about literature and psychoanalysis, by re-reading Freud, show him as a “contemporary” and surprise us with a different approach to literature and psychoanalysis, in which that relationship shows different types of Freud, in his personal bond with letters, which returns from them in the original and in the translations, his ideas in its “nascent state”. The creator’s intimacy emerges, and his reading connects us with several libraries. The opposition between the poetic and fantasies side (the *Dichter*) and the researching and thinking one (the *Forschter*) is explored in the works. The choice of writers seeks to understand the driving motivations, with the turn regarding positive scientific nature that psychoanalysis makes. The polarity and richness of this dialogue is revealed in the authors’ writing itself, with different perspectives and styles. (Marta Labraga de Mirza)

Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión, 2014
The therapeutic process, the Self, and female psychology: collected psychoanalytic papers
Helene Deutsch

In this collection of writings, we can find the classical work by Helene Deutsch “Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia” (1942), which, while it resumes the Freudian concept of identification by infection or mimesis, deserves (though its author connects it with, and differentiates it from, schizophrenia) to be seen as a pioneer work since it introduces us, before Kanner, to the subject of autism and, especially, to “autistoid” patients—a term introduced by Bernd Nissen. This collection also includes the classical work by Helene Deutsch “Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia” (1942), which, while it resumes the Freudian concept of identification by infection or mimesis, deserves (though its author connects it with, and differentiates it from, schizophrenia) to be seen as a pioneer work since it introduces us, before Kanner, to the subject of autism and, especially, to “autistoid” patients—a term introduced by Bernd Nissen. This collection also includes the classical work by Helene Deutsch “Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relationship to schizophrenia” (1942), which, while it resumes the Freudian concept of identification by infection or mimesis, deserves (though its author connects it with, and differentiates it from, schizophrenia) to be seen as a pioneer work since it introduces us, before Kanner, to the subject of autism and, especially, to “autistoid” patients—a term introduced by Bernd Nissen.

Sigmund Freud. O século da psicanálise. 1895-1995
Emilio Rodrigué

Rodrigué offers us a very personal and delightful view of the life and work of the father of psychoanalysis. They were six years devoted to his work, to the vast existing literature about his life and also to the contributions of post-Freudian authors who have questioned his theories and concepts. It is a work which has a tasty and very funny style which shows us the author’s great freedom as well as his talent to tell us his most intimate intuitions. In this supersonic flight, we cannot fail to appreciate Rodrigué’s creativity to name the chapters: “Jump of the tiger”, “The magic drug”, “A Jew in King Charcot’s court”, “The odysseys of drives”. And others... (Anna Maria Alcântara do Amaral)

São Paulo: Escuta, 1995

Living, thinking, looking
Siri Hustvedt

Hustvedt offers a harmonious reading. Three central subjects divide the book in parts although throughout all of it there are arguments that reverberate from the different frameworks: in “Living” the autobiographical notes are at the fore; in “Thinking” there are essays about her research, mainly into psychoanalysis, literature and neurosciences; in “Looking” she deals with essays about the arts and about looking into them and through them. Without evading responsibility, she speaks in the first person and gives the reader the chance to agree or disagree. The tour throughout the book is always amazing as regards the constant presence of psychoanalysis, which, while remaining “American”, gives rise to other developments. It shows that psychoanalysis is unsuspectedly rich and its presence has to do with human nature. It would be far from dying, or we would die with it. (Natalia Barrionuevo)

Buenos Aires: Anagrama, 2013
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